Introduction

Ambivalent Enmity: Making the Case for a Transcultural Turn in Enmity Studies

Johannes Becke, Nikolas Jaspert, and Joachim Kurtz[*]

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine puzzled even the most seasoned Russia experts. Throughout the post-Soviet space, one could not have imagined two nations more closely entangled in terms of history and culture, ranging from the shared legacy of the Kievan Rus’ and the Eastern Orthodox Church all the way to Nazi German occupation, the liberation by the Red Army, and the chaos of post-Soviet collapse. Core authors of Russian literature like Nikolai Gogol were equally comfortable in Russian and Ukrainian; Ukrainians like Leonid Brezhnev could rise to the highest ranks of the Soviet Union; Ukrainian dishes such as borscht became popular all across Eastern Europe and its various diasporas; and for multilingual Ukrainian Jews like Ze’ev Jabotinsky (born in Odessa), the multi-ethnic and multilingual reality of Eastern Europe served as an inspiration for Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel/Palestine.[1] So what went wrong? How could a pattern of seemingly inextricable historical entanglement be disrupted or even reversed so severely within a few years?

The essays in this theme issue make the case that even pattern-shattering events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which have been called “historical turning points,” or Zeitenwenden, must be understood as integral parts of dynamic processes of transculturation. We argue for an epistemological reorientation, a transcultural turn in enmity studies. In view of the increase in conflict and polarization in both international and domestic politics, we believe that the phenomenon of enmity deserves to be studied from a fresh perspective, a perspective that fully recognizes enmity’s transcultural, processual, and deeply ambivalent features. The outlines of such an approach can be summarized in five working hypotheses:

1. Enmity is a driver of transculturation, not an obstacle;

2. Enmity describes a process, not an outcome;

3. Enmity is an expression of ambivalence, not of conclusiveness;

4. The study of enmity requires a transdisciplinary approach;

5. The study of enmity needs historical depth.

To illustrate the value of a transcultural approach to enmity studies, this theme issue offers five case studies focusing on different regions and time periods. Two of the essays were co-written by scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds. The five studies integrate concepts and methodological insights from the humanities and social sciences, and highlight the persistent links between enmity, understood as enduring forms of potentially violent antagonism, and ambivalence, defined as contradictory patterns of emotions, values, and cultural habits. Before introducing the individual contributions, this short introduction will provide definitions of our understanding of enmity and ambivalence and flesh out our working hypotheses in conversation with the existing scholarly literature.

Defining enmity and ambivalence

Let us start by clarifying our understanding of “enmity” and “ambivalence,” as well as their protracted relationship. In contrast to the existing literature that defines enmity as mutual hatred and a will to harm other actors,[2] our approach emphasizes the processual, relational, and profoundly ambivalent nature of both enmity and the various modes of what has been called “enemization.”[3] In this effort, we build on previous contributions of several disciplines. Peace and conflict studies, for example, has developed both a strong focus on the terminology of “peace” (positive vs. negative) and a productive research agenda that studies the driving causes of conflict (greed vs. grievance) as well as a strong empirical focus on the shifting contours of political violence over time.[4] Sociologists have studied violent conflict and war-mongering as a tool of social mobilization, as a historical source of state-making, and as a negotiating space between civilian and military actors, complemented by an emphasis on non-violent conflict as a driving force of social integration.[5] International law has explored the juridification of military conflict and the “norm spirals” in the domain of human rights law, not least by focusing on international humanitarian law as an attempt to engage in the systematic de-enemization of both civilians and military personnel.[6] Finally, anthropologists have investigated the variety and cultural embeddedness of human violence, often interrogating the field’s own entanglement in the history of colonial expansion.[7]

Building on this literature, our understanding of enmity and ambivalence cuts across disciplinary boundaries and starts from the premise that enmity must be unequivocally understood as a transcultural, processual, and profoundly ambivalent phenomenon.[8] This understanding differs significantly from existing approaches in political philosophy that conceive of enmity either as desirable (political realism) or fundamental (political essentialism) to political life. In the broader debates about the nature, origins, and effects of enmity,[9] political realism tends to describe the construction of enemies as a fundamental feature of social life.[10] From this perspective, antagonistic relationships should not be understood as problematic, but as an acceptable or even desirable source of dynamism, innovation, and political legitimacy.[11] If autocratic political rulers rely on enemy images to justify social mobilization, we should not be surprised that even democratic states have a strong tendency to engage in othering and systematic demonization.[12] In contrast, from a perspective of political essentialism, enmity represents the very essence of all things political. According to this line of thought, the “political” is defined in opposition to an enemy and by nothing else.[13] For Carl Schmitt and his disciples in Europe, North America, and elsewhere, enmity represents the key catalyst for political life. From this perspective, any ambivalent reading of the political enemy would indicate a troublesome blurring of the crucial friend/enemy distinction, indicating a worrisome decline of political order and a likely shift towards civil unrest.[14] By reducing political life to the friend/enemy distinction, political essentialism warns against utopian fantasies of a world without conflict, advocating instead that both domestic and international politics should be organized according to anti-pluralistic, centralized, and authoritarian patterns.[15]

We disagree with both positions. Rather than comprehending enmity as a necessary evil or as the essence of all things political, our approach follows authors like Murray Edelman who emphasize the contingency and plasticity of enmity.[16] If enemization consists of co-constitutive social processes, the relational logic of enmity can produce profoundly ambivalent patterns of rejection and attraction, of mutual learning and silencing, and of long-lasting transcultural entanglements, both violent and peaceful. For instance, while societies may rely on enmity as an ordering function that informs human world views,[17] representations of enmity in official documents and propaganda, media, and political pamphlets are often ambivalent and subject to historical change.[18] Similarly, immediate contact with declared enemies can lead to ambivalent patterns of cultural learning. As researchers of postcolonial conditions have demonstrated, social and historical actors acquire knowledge about their antagonists as a form of self-demarcation, frequently in a curious combination of explicit rejection and grudging fascination.[19] Their engagement can provoke processes of mimicry, learning from, or even identification with the enemy.[20]

Historical research has similarly shown that transfer processes in Europe and beyond were often driven by the need or desire to learn from antagonistic political systems.[21] It is therefore necessary to analyze the ambivalences that emerge from such processes within and between both dominant and non-dominant societies and societal groups. For example, the notion of hereditary enmity (Erbfeindschaft) between nation states as developed and nurtured over centuries in Germany and France was accompanied by subtle dynamics of emulation that went hand-in-hand with strategic deployments of a vociferous language of demarcation.[22] Similar observations can be made in the postcolonial world, including the post-Soviet space. The move toward de-Sovietization can be regarded as a fourth wave of decolonization that contributed to the dissolution of one of the last empires of the twentieth century, ended the bipolar world order, and helped to overcome, if only temporarily, the division of Europe that had existed since 1945.[23] When examined on a global scale, however, this narrative of decolonization can reveal deep ambivalences, as recent Ukrainian historiography has emphasized.[24] Outside of Europe, such ambivalences are no less striking. One example can be found in recent Chinese attempts to justify the repression of Hong Kong’s democracy movement as a morally and politically justified act of “decolonization” countering the “West’s” unabated drive for hegemony.[25]

To throw our conception of enmity into sharper relief, a further clarification is required. Our studies do not confound the antagonistic nature of enmity with agonistic modes of contestation. While agonistic forms of interaction (controversy, competition, contestation) take place within regulated and rule-bound arenas of governance, antagonistic forms of interaction (ranging from non-violent enmity to physical annihilation) tend to question both the “rules of the game” and, ultimately, the adversary’s right to exist. Consequently, our understanding of enmity must be distinguished both from the totalizing understanding of Schmitt and from rule-bound forms of interaction between social actors under an omnipresent shadow of authority. But enmity studies thus understood also differs from research on agonistic contestation, a broad field which cuts across the humanities and the social sciences, from museum studies and curating, through history and law to, most prominently, political science.[26] “Agonistic democracy” and “agonistic pluralism,” two important areas of political theory, enlist the concept to advocate for an alternative, pluralistic, and productive form of democratic protest, while other domains of research explore its ability to explain deliberative processes.[27] Especially noteworthy from a transcultural point of view, the notion of “agonism” has also been deployed to study oppositional reactions to globalization.[28] Although undoubtedly productive, these explorations of agonism are clearly distinct from studies of enmity. In contrast to the antagonisms at the center of our attention, agonisms denote struggles between adversaries rather than enemies and are rarely premised on radical alterity and the desire of its annihilation. Their oppositional thrust does not necessarily call for open and often violent conflict but may, on the contrary, encourage restraint and cooperation.[29]

Enmity is a driver of transculturation, not an obstacle

Having defined our understanding of both enmity and ambivalence, we may now turn to what exactly we mean by a transcultural approach to enmity studies. Our first working hypothesis, namely our understanding of enmity as a paradoxical driver of transculturation, is based on the insight that even the most violent processes of hostile encounter are embedded in, and results of, transcultural dynamics such as transfers, flows, exchanges, rejections, emulations, translations, adaptations, and other modes of interaction. In this context, knowledge about the enemy’s history, language, and society can be deployed for campaigns of demonization and securitization,[30] but intimate knowledge of the other side can also have a normalizing effect, resulting in everyday contact and even collaboration.[31] The logic of ambivalent enmity is to ask: To defeat the enemy, should one not try to learn from them?

By understanding enmity as a driver of transculturation (and not as an obstacle to exchange and interaction), we build on both the relational social ontology of transcultural studies[32] and the pre-existing scholarly literature on antagonistic entanglements.[33] We do not deny the existence of cultures or boundaries between human groups and communities, but rather focus on the dynamics of interaction and exchange that produce and perpetuate them.[34] Relations between cultures and other collectives, both friendly and hostile, are understood as mutually constitutive co-productions, even under conditions of harsh asymmetries of power.[35] Thus, by understanding enmity as a particularly close form of interaction, we can expect to uncover particularly profound patterns of transculturation.

This focus on enmity-driven transculturation supports recent attempts in global history to refute the criticism, also raised against transcultural studies, that practitioners tend to “dwell on integration and concord, rather than disintegration and discord.”[36] While it is fair to say that conflict, warfare, and enmity have not been central to the interests and concerns of global historians,[37] numerous scholars and initiatives have provided detailed and in-depth studies of resistance to integration, moments of crisis, or the breakdown of connections.[38] Following the example of these studies and Daniel Bell’s call to see hostility, aggression, and antagonism as “the most direct form of connection imaginable,”[39] our understanding of enmity as a transcultural phenomenon shifts our attention to the multilayered bonds that have sustained relations between even mortal enemies across languages, cultures, continents, and ages.

Enmity describes a process, not an outcome

Our second working hypothesis emphasizes the processual nature of enmity, with a special focus on the paradoxical patterns of emotions and agency that provoke and sustain hostility over time. In the context of emotions, we build on insights from clinical psychology and advances in the global history of emotions. The spectrum of “ugly feelings”[40] and “unsocial passions” [41] that we consider ranges from relatively mild varieties of irritation, aggravation, and resentment to intense forms of loathing, contempt, hatred, and disgust.

Including perspectives adapted from clinical psychology, as exemplified by Tanja Penter and Svenja Taubner’s contribution to this theme issue, helps to inscribe affectivity in enmity studies. According to clinical psychologists, violent acts may in fact regulate emotional states, resulting in a feeling of relief for the offender who may often describe aggression as a kind of dissociative, dream-like experience, marked by an impaired sense of self-agency. The mechanism of such modes of aggression can be explained psychoanalytically as a form of projective identification that forces somebody else—the victim and society in general—to feel the emotional states the offender cannot contain.[42] In conversation with such approaches, the contradictory effects of enmity can also be explored from the angles of history and area studies, research fields that have recently begun to accord emotions a greater role.[43] In their view, emotions can motivate and deter actions, form and destroy communities, and allow and disrupt communication. At the same time, emotions have their own histories: the modes in which they are experienced and expressed change as much as the objects to which they are attached and the values ascribed to them.[44] Similar to the basic concepts of social and political discourse,[45] emotions will not and cannot remain stable and uncontested. This also applies to emotions of enmity, which range from estrangement and resentment to contempt and outright hatred.[46] Enmity studies therefore need to place a stronger and empirically grounded emphasis on the affects that cause, reflect, and shape the ambivalences of enmity and stress its procedural character.

Patterns of agency in the context of enemization are no less ambivalent. By retracing the specific processes of enemization, we can distinguish how even the most cynical framing of enemies for political purposes “conflict entrepreneurs” tends to involve a hidden fascination, high levels of intense engagement, and prima facie contradictory processes of cultural learning and oppositional brokerage.[47] Typically, these ambivalent patterns of agency stand out most clearly in frontline social actors that are involved in face-to-face encounters with the enemy and its representation, or in modes of generation and circulation of knowledge about the enemy: academia, the media, the military, intelligence services, or the arts.[48] Often these frontline social actors rely on mimicry, camouflage, and strategic emulation (or indeed “learning from the enemy”). To give just two examples: In the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Zionist militias systematically adopted the dress-code and nomadic customs of Palestinian Arab Bedouins throughout the 1920s as a form of self-indigenization and self-orientalization.[49] After the emergence of the State of Israel, Middle Eastern Jews were frequently deployed in Arab countries in the framework of intelligence missions and to this day the Israeli security forces operate “Arabized” undercover units.[50] Similar and comparable forms of emulation can be observed throughout history in other locations. For example, medieval Roman Catholic orders, such as the Dominicans, adopted core elements of the religious movements they were created to combat, whilst their “enemies,” the Cathars, picked up traits of the new brethren that persecuted them.[51]

Enmity is an expression of ambivalence, not of conclusiveness

Our third working hypothesis substantiates our understanding of enmity as a profoundly ambivalent phenomenon, as a process marked by contradictory patterns of emotions, values, and cultural habits. In this context, the term ambivalence must be distinguished from ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty about the meaning of something.[52] To date, the paradoxical logic of ambivalence, which we propose to relate to enmity studies, has been probed most productively by scholars in psychology, sociology, and postcolonial studies, but it is also beginning to find resonance in historical research and area studies.

In psychology, the ambivalence of enmity becomes tangible in the coexisting efforts to approach and avoid an enemy who, as the hated other, is feared or rejected yet remains at the center of attention. Such efforts are required for a subject to create identity, organize belief systems, and contain helplessness and unbearable affects.[53] This notion of ambivalence can be linked back to psychoanalytical studies on subject constitution,[54] where the term originally described a pathological tendency towards a defective regulation of emotions, namely the development of two “contradictory emotions, co-existing unconnectedly.”[55] The inability to hold ambivalence within one’s mind and the need to externalize parts of the mind into others (as dissociated parties of the self) is frequently considered to lie at the center of psychopathology, for instance, as a cause of the inability to cope with adverse experiences such as physical abuse.[56] In contrast, the capability to successfully deal with ambivalence is understood as a core element of human identity formation as an “homo ambivalens.”[57]

In sociology, ambivalence is treated as inconsistency of social roles, modes of behavior, and normative frameworks.[58] Ambivalent forms of behavior are understood here as effects of modernization[59] that result in behavioral patterns resisting the planning designs of modern statehood[60] and the demands of economic rationality.[61] For Zygmunt Bauman, the problematic of ambivalence is frequently crystallized in the person of the stranger[62] and, especially in Europe, in the figure of the Jew.[63] Even more pertinent to our perspective, authors in postcolonial studies have questioned the stability of asymmetric power relations generated by unequal patterns of cultural diffusion. According to this perspective, ambivalence refers to a dynamic element of instability that introduces paradoxical effects into processes of hierarchical ascription and self-attribution, either as a consequence of internalized racism[64] or as an outcome of hybridization and “creolization.”[65] More recently, theoretical insights into the nature of ambivalence have begun to inspire historical studies, and not only of European developments. To cite just a few examples, scholars have drawn on these approaches to explore the ambivalent status of social groups and their evolving identities,[66] the definition and proliferation of norms and values,[67] or the paradoxes of memory in social and political conflicts.[68]

Building on these diverse inspirations makes it possible to critically and systematically examine the dynamic linkages between ambivalence and enmity. This can only be achieved by developing a transcultural and historically informed approach to enmity studies. Such an approach builds on and develops findings from postcolonial studies and social studies of identity. Postcolonial scholarship remains an important point of reference for our research because it has revealed the paradoxical logic of intimate contact, mutual attraction, and simultaneous rejection that characterizes asymmetric power relations such as the colonizer/colonized dialectic.[69] From this perspective, enmity and ambivalence do not contradict one another (as both Schmitt and Bauman would claim) but need to be recognized as closely interrelated concepts and phenomena. While acknowledging this necessity, our studies strive to guard against replicating unwarranted simplifications that mar many postcolonial works.[70] Instead of perpetuating static or reductive binaries, we aim to trace the contradictory transcultural dynamics underlying even the most violent processes of hostile interaction.

Any attempt to grasp the ambivalent or even paradoxical effects of enmity must also engage research on social identity. Recent examples of the close linkages between enemization and identity construction include the rise of identitarian and nativist movements in many European and non-European countries that are openly hostile to multiculturalism, minorities, immigrants, “foreign” religions, and alternative ways of life.[71] Conspiracy theories and identitarian narratives often focus on singling out enemies within or beyond one’s own imagined community.[72] Our studies therefore draw on four established approaches to studying social identity. These include, firstly, the sociological and historical schools of symbolic interaction that have stressed the constitutive function of interaction in fashioning the individual self and the forging of groups.[73] Secondly, we draw on psychological literature that regards personal identity as a fundamental organizing principle allowing us to distinguish between self and others. Identity formation in this perspective is a lifelong process of psychological work and performance. Strenuous effort is required to create a sense of continuity in one’s self,[74] a process that can easily fail, both for individuals and groups. Thirdly, we take into account the work of historians and social scientists who have revealed ethnic, national, religious, and gender identities as communicatively mediated constructs.[75] Finally, we consider the work of scholars who have examined identities as social constructs dividing individuals and groups and setting one against the other,[76] and shown that walls are erected and prisons built in the name of identity as part of a divisive “politics of enmity.”[77]

Our working hypothesis that enmity must be analyzed as an inevitably ambivalent relationship synthesizes these inspirations. Extending the insights sketched above, our studies aim to counter simplistic accounts of enmity and the structures along which it is constructed and understood. Certainly, there is plenty to suggest that enmity implies a reduction of complexity. Many theorists have argued that categories such as “nation” or “race” are monolithic cultural constructs that conceal intrinsic variance.[78] In an increasingly interconnected world, this line of argument claims, enemization emerges as a response to multiplying identities, promising to provide orientation and secure a collective sense of belonging. As a result, images of enemies bear similar features of homogenization or simplification. Populism has been shown to bring together manifold claims under a common umbrella, establishing a chain of equivalence and construing an “empty signifier.”[79] One of the most powerful of these signifiers is the identification of clear-cut, tangible, and invariably oversimplified enemies. Without denying the merits of such accounts, our case studies demonstrate that relations of enmity generate highly complex linkages, driven not by reduction, but by ambivalence.

The study of enmity requires a transdisciplinary approach

Our fourth hypothesis demonstrates that our understanding of enmity as a transcultural, processual, and ambivalent phenomenon relies on a transdisciplinary approach. Both the humanities and the social sciences are needed to dissect the different stages of enemization, which can be divided analytically into (a) knowledge production, (b) representation, and (c) encounter. The three stages are often linked in a feedback loop: Experiences of hostility drive the generation of knowledge about real or perceived enemies; the knowledge gathered is mediated and weaponized in representations of antagonistic relationships; and these representations of enmity in turn shape the attitudes, behavior, and perceptions of individual and institutional actors in future encounters. In practice, expressions of enmity are not typically so neatly divided into temporal and causal steps, but rather intermingle simultaneously. Ambivalences create tensions at every stage of these interconnected processes; without them, conflict entrepreneurs would not need to work so persistently to multiply grievances, bolster suspicions, suppress uncertainties, streamline narratives, and construct reductive and sufficiently unambiguous images. A comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of antagonism therefore needs to consider all three dimensions and determine their specific significance on a case-by-case basis. But how could a transdisciplinary approach to all three stages of enemization be put into practice?

(a) Knowledge production: The phenomenon of knowledge production about enemies (both real and imagined) calls for the close cooperation between specialists in intellectual history, historians of intelligence apparatuses, and social scientists specializing in particular conflict regions. The call to “know your enemy” will be raised in any community that faces entrenched competition over economic, cultural, or symbolic resources.[80] Typically, this knowledge is produced by a set of institutions, discourses, and social practices that range from informal networks sharing perceived threats to various forms of pseudo-science and formal institutions of “enemy studies.” While enmity generally plays a key role for the establishment and maintenance of social and political cohesion,[81] knowledge about the enemy that is produced, shared, and contested in situations of social conflict stands out for its ambivalence.[82] Knowing the enemy can be the cause of both anxiety (about their capabilities) and exuberance (on knowing their weaknesses).

The systematic production of knowledge about alleged enemies is by no means an exclusively modern phenomenon but can be traced back to medieval and ancient times.[83] A case in point is the translation of fundamental texts of Islamic lore into Latin by Christian scholars of the twelfth century—in order to “fight with words not with weapons,” as the monk Peter the Venerable famously put it.[84] The entanglement between conflict and knowledge production is particularly well documented in the context of the Cold War.[85] Transnational comparisons have established similarities and differences in studying enemy mentalities throughout the major armed conflicts of the past century.[86] Scholars of totalitarian regimes have revealed that such mentality studies, for example of Jews and Roma in Nazi Germany, border on pseudoscience produced for the specific needs of broader audiences.[87] The nexus between knowledge production and ambivalence has also been documented for colonial settings. Cases in point include studies of anthropology as a colonial science[88] and research on anti-colonial forms of knowledge production about the “intimate enemy.”[89]

(b) Representation: Deciphering representations of enmity can involve a broad diversity of research fields, ranging from the histories of art and literature to media studies. The ascription of enmity depends on the presence, real or imagined, of a threat that incites fear and loathing of the opponent and, almost as often, fosters unity and a sense of purpose among peers. There are few communities that do not relate what they are or aspire to become to enemies that reflect what they are not or struggle to leave behind. While representations of enmity are not the most important element in assertions of collective identity, they add a critical edge to discursive self-constructions and their stabilizations.[90] They invite prolonged and intimate engagement and may result in enduring but inevitably ambivalent entanglements that shape the histories and identities of all involved parties[91] and may become an indispensable part of their sense of self.

Relations of enmity are nurtured and sustained by cultural practices of representation that are instrumental in defining, portraying, or enacting relationships as either undesirable, volatile, hostile, or dangerous. As many studies have shown, depictions of enemies and their relations to “us” in literature, arts, media, and popular culture are crucial to creating and disseminating typified images and rousing powerful emotions.[92] Ritualized performances of enmity, either decrying the opponent’s depravity or celebrating a community’s purity, similarly serve to enhance cohesion and fortify resilience in times of threat or uncertainty.[93] They normalize a language of alterity that is essential to marking and othering enemies within or without.[94] Visual and media representations provide further clues to identifying difference; historical narratives legitimize claims of the inevitability or transhistorical nature of cultural rivalries and political conflicts; and institutionalized attempts at shaping collective memory,[95] such as lieux de mémoire or museums dedicated to traumatic events, condition emotional responses and instill lasting resentment.[96]

Efforts to stage enmity are no less marked by ambivalences than knowledge production about enemies or experiences gained in actual encounters with them. Historical reenactments no longer aim for authenticity but focus rather on creating “affective communities” that share a fortified sense of belonging through common enemies.[97] Even parochial expressions of enmity are of necessity exercises in transculturation that provoke ambivalent psychological and social responses.[98] Displays of enmity depend on competing interpretations of shared symbolic resources, be they textual, artistic, or theatrical. They are riddled with ambivalences emerging from unacknowledged cultural continuities and shared traumatic experiences, and often betray doubts that undercut efforts to ostracize opponents unambiguously. Insecurities extend to the forms of expression that are mobilized to portray enemies and legitimize hostile actions, as the considerable body of literature that probes constructions of alterity[99] and the making of enemies has demonstrated.[100]

(c) Encounter: Actual encounters between enemies can be fruitfully explored through the collaboration between specialists in international relations, historians and organizational sociologists or linguists. Inciting or sustaining enmity does not require face-to-face interaction, but actual encounters add poignancy to what is known and expected of real and imagined enemies. It is therefore necessary to scrutinize the spaces, circumstances, and effects of such meetings. Analyses of direct contacts between declared opponents confirm that enmity must be understood as an immediate social relationship—a “soziale Nahbeziehung.”[101] Studying the immediate contexts in which such relationships evolve, the dynamics of the social interrelations they enable, and the psychological impact they have upon individuals and groups affords detailed insights into the ambivalences of hostile encounters. The different modes of antagonistic interaction uncovered in studies of enmity-in-action can be positioned analytically along a wide scale of “applied” or “practiced” forms of enmity. This scale extends from different forms of physical violence (war, torture, physical abuse, killing, etc.) and aggressive appropriation (captivity, enslavement, etc.), through structural violence (psychological warfare, legal segregation, societal marginalization, linguistic stigmatization, etc.) and intellectual controversies (public polemics and disputes), to diplomacy and the often painful but inevitable negotiations between declared enemies.[102]

The immediate experience of a personal encounter often provokes ambivalent reactions: to suffer physical violence or emotional distress at the hands of others will generally strengthen feelings of enmity or even hatred. However, coming into contact with other individuals or groups can also foster processes of appropriation, imitation, or emulation. For example, it can strengthen the cohesion of warrior classes across enemy lines due to shared military values. Medieval chivalry based on common admiration for soldierly prowess thus became an ideal in seemingly opposing societies; the “Red Baron” and other German “heroes of the skies” were grudginglyadmired by the allies in the First World War, to cite one example.[103] Intensification and normalization are therefore both characteristic effects of enemy contact. Contact reveals the ambivalent relationship between established notions of the enemy and personal or collective experiences, both psychological and physical, that take place in concrete circumstances. Examining enmity-in-action by foregrounding social practices (actions) as well as their impact upon individuals and groups (experiences)[104] thus helps to uncover specific norms of conduct and their translation into the concrete behavior of agents. This in turn allows us to reconstruct the impact of physical contact with a declared enemy on representations of adversity.[105] In order to adequately interpret specific modes of behavior, one needs to consider the educational backgrounds, professional careers, and personal networks of individual actors.[106] Language, too, is a relevant marker of face-to-face interaction. Studies in this area therefore need to investigate modes of a priori stigmatized interaction in their specific settings, that is, their social as well as political or spatial frameworks.[107]

The study of enmity needs historical depth

Our fifth and final hypothesis emphasizes the necessity of historical depth for a deeper understanding of enmity. Any attempt to analyze enmity comprehensively is doomed to fail if limited to current modes of antagonism.[108] Historical studies are necessary to understand the particularities of adversarial relations in specific moments and regions and to inoculate our research against the twin fallacies of methodological presentism and experiential Eurocentrism. Only they can uncover the emergence and construction of enmity around the globe by tracing specific “biographies of hostile ascriptions” of shorter or longer duration—some enduring to this day.[109] To give just one example, in recent years, religion and race have gained renewed currency as instruments of division and accelerants of aggression. But the intensity and efficiency with which both can be deployed by state and non-state actors can only be assessed through transtemporal comparisons with past societies in which religion and race were prominent political and cultural vectors.[110]

Extending the timeline of investigation is also useful to counter the tendency to tie enmity studies exclusively to the existence of the modern state. Including the Middle Ages and the early modern period in our research expands the reach of transcultural enemy studies to polities that were far less coherently organized in administrative and political terms. This had immediate effects on the modes and functions of the adversarial relationships that developed within and between them. When citizenship was far less consistently articulated than today, for instance, certain groups (religious or ethnic minorities, particular professions, etc.) could easily be singled out as supposed enemies, as the case of the Ottoman Empire (among many other examples) shows.[111] Current tendencies to question citizenship are once again sharpening our awareness of such issues.[112] In the Middle Ages and the early modern period, political stakeholders or merchants who conducted maritime violence could be labelled as “pirates,” only to morph back into acknowledged members of society when political and social circumstances changed.[113] Borders and frontiers also showed stark ambivalences, and even the enemization of the non-human—nature in general and certain plants or animals in particular—developed distinct traits due to the scarcity of reliable knowledge.[114]

Case studies of ambivalent enmity

The five case studies in this theme issue highlight exemplary cases of ambivalent enmity in distinct time periods and regions. They examine intentionally diverse forms of enemization and approach their material from different disciplinary angles. They do not and cannot attempt to provide a comprehensive inventory of the ambivalences of enmity; rather they aim to illustrate the richness of the forms, expressions, and effects of hostile relationships and highlight the dynamics of antagonism throughout history.

Our collection begins with an examination of the ambivalences of enmity and amity in Israel/Palestine from the advent of Zionism to today. Juxtaposing intertwined but often contradictory developments on both sides, Derek J. Penslar reviews attempts to define this fateful relationship by a variety of state and non-state actors and traces the ways in which these interventions continue to shape mutual perceptions. Composed as a keynote address for the official opening of our graduate program in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 Hamas massacre, his careful analysis underscores the necessity of continuing scholarly engagement with the dynamics of enmity even in the darkest historical moments.

The second article takes on the challenge of transdisciplinarity. Historian of Eastern Europe Penter and clinical psychologist Taubner join forces to elucidate the complex psychology of enmity. Their autopsy of the diary of a young Ukrainian woman during the time of the Nazi German occupation captures dynamic affective investments, ranging from hostility to friendship and even romantic longing, and relates their changes to both political realities and adolescent psychological development. The ambivalences visible in the young woman’s painful conflicts of loyalty and identity reflect not only the fog and horrors of war but they also mirror the much more mundane struggles and uncertainties of coming-of-age in volatile times.

Shifting the focus to South Asia, art historian Monica Juneja examines how art objects and architectural remains become enmeshed in the dynamics of enmity. Scrutinizing appropriations and emulations of monumental remains of past empires in South Asia and discussions about their place in post-colonial India through a transcultural lens, her contribution uncovers material evidence of the mutually constitutive relationship between enemization and identity construction. Even moments of iconoclasm and usurpation can thus be revealed as processes that betray dialectic ambivalence: while sites and symbols of the enemy are violently attacked and destroyed, their aesthetic is surprisingly knowledgeably emulated in the very objects designed to take their place.

Probing the link between ambivalent enmity and the politics of anti-modern radicalism, political scientist Johannes Becke and sinologist Joachim Kurtz trace and compare unacknowledged transcultural inspirations in two radical forms of cultural and political revivalism that have recently gained prominence in contemporary Israel and China. Both the Israeli Temple Movement and the muscular political Confucianism of mainland Chinese neo-traditionalists claim to restore and revive a pre-modern social order, often based on apocalyptic visions of a struggle for ethno-cultural survival. Ironically, however, both depend on learning from their enemies to realize their goals and both draw on a globally shared repertoire of radical ideologies and modes of expression. In a pattern of mimetic isomorphism, their organizational templates and rhetorical strategies mimic other radical movements that oppose the “decadence” of modernity and Westernization. The case study thus illustrates how different strategies and discourses of enemization operate as ambivalent drivers of transculturation.

Finally, international relations specialist Sebastian Harnisch asks how, when, and why states have ordered killings of political enemies outside their proper jurisdictions. Applying a comparative approach informed by recent advances in role theory and studies of norm transformation to state-directed assassinations, he proposes to regard politically motivated killings beyond borders as calculated acts of defiance aiming to restore dominant status roles of autocratic governments vis-à-vis critical citizens and the liberal international order. Distinguishing two variants of defiant political murder, exemplified by targeted killings initiated by Russia and North Korea, Harnisch argues that these deliberately spectacular acts of violence achieve their goals as symbolic stagings of enmity directed at domestic as well as global audiences.

Conclusion

What may be learned from our theme issue beyond the analytical results of individual case studies? We argue that only a transcultural, regionally diverse, and historically informed approach can unlock the full potential of enmity studies. Such an approach provides the tools to demonstrate that linkages between enmity and ambivalence are by no means exclusive features of modern, let alone exclusively European, communities and states. Ambivalent constructions of enmity have relied on real or imagined histories and depictions of injustice, conflict, and oppression in many parts of the world and in diverse time periods. By tracing the genealogies of such representations, their staging and perpetuation as well as their effects on actual interactions with perceived enemies, the case studies in this issue show that enmity is driven by a profound tension between the constitutive role of forging collective identities and maintaining internal unity on one hand, and its destructive potential to fuel outward aggression on the other. This approach allows us to transcend lessons learned from postcolonial studies. A transcultural account of the ambivalences of enmity complicates a flattened understanding of power asymmetries. To cite only one example, non-dominant or non-state groups (often labelled as “minorities”) with a long history of state evasion[115] understandably maximize their polytactic potential,[116] that is, their capability of building flexible alliances in contexts of frequent power shifts. Consequently, their histories usually evade simple dichotomies such as colonizers and colonized.[117] Relying on the more fine-grained typology of interaction developed in historical and transcultural studies may help to inspire further research that problematizes static binaries of domination and resistance and highlights the relational, processual, and paradoxical character of enemization and de-enemization. At the same time, it highlights the dynamics of antagonism as an indispensable but as yet understudied dimension of transculturation.