THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE COPY

A Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Approach

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Editors

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Philipp W. Stockhammer and Corinna Forberg

Introduction

What is a copy? What would be a correct response? One might agree at once, that the answer is much too complex to be given in a few sentences. With this volume, we would like to suggest a basis for a better understanding of both the potential of the copy and the act of copying, by revealing the network of interaction between humans, notions, perceptions, objects, and practices that underlie them from an interdisciplinary and transcultural perspective. The individual contributions in this book emerged from an interdisciplinary workshop by the same name that took place in Heidelberg, Germany, on February 14 and 15, 2014. The workshop aimed to bring together as broad a range of academic disciplines and individual positions as possible. Stimulated by the rich and fruitful discussions that have emerged from this venue, we decided to share our ideas and results with the broader audience by translating them into this volume. In its introduction, we first discuss possible understandings of the copy and copying, and then argue for the necessity of both an interdisciplinary and a transcultural approach. Subsequently, we summarise the different contributions of the volume by embedding the "copy" within a network of associated concepts and liberating it from temporal or disciplinary boundaries. Finally, we attempt to merge the different lines of thought in order to lay the basis for a more integrated understanding of the "copy" and "copying".

Conceptualizing the "copy" and "copying"

There has never been a consensus of what constitutes a "copy". What we perceive as a "copy" is very much bound to our individual experience and, therefore, depends on individual perceptions of the world.[1] The ascribing of "copy" to something has always been dynamic and contextual. Therefore, definitions of terms such as "copy," "imitation," "original," and "authenticity," to name several, have been continuously redefined and re-established in societal discourses since antiquity, and even earlier. Neither in the public nor the academic discourse has there ever been an agreement on how to define the "copy"—even though this subject and the related practice of copying have been the topic of several recent volumes in a broad

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1   Schütz and Luckmann 1979; Habermas 1981.

range of disciplines.[2] There is no particular understanding associated with any geographical (e.g. "Western" or "European") or assumed cultural boundaries, or within any temporal or disciplinary frame. The replacement of "copy" with related terms like "imitation," "mimesis," "reproduction," or "series" depends on the linguistic choice of the individual user. So far, no attempts to systematically differentiate these terms have been successful. As a consequence, studies have focused on the development of the understanding of a specific term through time, or its contemporary use in different contexts across the globe. Several disciplines, be it art history,[3] classical archaeology,[4] anthropology,[5] aesthetic theory,[6] philosophy,[7] sociology,[8] or even politics have produced important contributions with regard to the definition and differentiation of the copy.[9] Klaus Junker and Adrian Stähli have even defined the discourse on the "copy" and the "original" as a key constituent of classical archaeology.[10] The same is true for philosophy, where debates on "mimesis" are almost as old as the discipline itself, and still have not been solved.[11] Susanne Knaller's study of the understanding of "authenticity" in (Early) Modern European thinking is a good example of this kind of current research. She aims to understand and define the term by exhibiting temporal dynamics.[12] Modernity seems to have led to a rather negative idea of the copy in many parts of the world, especially in Europe and the Americas. As for art history, the pejorative meaning of the copy still dominates the discourse, despite numerous excellent studies over the last thirty years that have convincingly argued in favor of the copy's creative and transformative potential.[13] Moreover, translation studies have had an important conceptual impact on the entanglement between the copy and translation.[14] Hillel Schwartz reveals the narrow definition of the copy in Europe and North America as being rooted in a cult of the copy that gets its life from a striving for uniqueness and ends with a moral appeal to Western societies: "Whatever we come up with, authenticity can no longer be

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2 E.g. Schwartz 1996; Fehrmann et al. 2004; Bartsch et al. 2010; Boon 2010; Wong 2013.
3 E.g. Haverkamp-Begemann 1988; Preciado 1989; Naredi-Rainer 2001; Bartsch et al. 2010; Müller et al. 2011; Cupperi 2014.
4 E.g. Barbanera 2005; Junker and Stähli 2008a; Settis and Anguissola 2015.
5 E.g. Taussig 1993; Schwarz 2000; Kalshoven 2010; Küchler 2010.
6 E.g. Sörbom 1966; Bhabha 1994; Bachmann-Medick 1997; Knaller 2006.
7 E.g. Plato, Republic; Plutarch, Vita Thesei; Benjamin (1933) 1966; (1936) 2002.
8 E.g. Tarde 1903; Gebauer and Wulf 1992.
9 E.g. Mitchell 2011.
10 Junker and Stähli 2008b, 1.
11 Plato, Republic.
12 Knaller 2006.
13 E.g. Preciado 1989; Wong 2013; Cupperi 2014; cf. Haverkamp-Begemann 1988, 13: "[E]ach copy constitutes a dialogue between the interpreter and the interpreted; this dialogue fosters new solutions to problems shared by the two artists and creates new ideas."
14 Cf. Bachmann-Medick 1997 defines (literary) translations as a creative process of interpretation and contextualization (cf. also Forberg 2015, 10–12; Hutter 1980; Bartsch et al. 2010).

rooted in singularity, in what the Greeks called the *idion* [...] [The impostors] may call us away from the despair of uniqueness toward more companionate lives."[15] In an ethnohistoric case study, Michael Taussig elaborates on the dialectics between the practice of copying and the construction of alterity in the framework of managing otherness.[16] Without a doubt, the discourse on the copy has had a strong impact on the social, cultural, political, and economic aspects of our lives, surpassing mere academic debate. The diversity of the concept seems to prevent generally-accepted definition—with the exception of UNESCO's aim to achieve common definitions within the heritage discourse on a global scale. However, it is worth noting that the members of these international organisations represent different modern nation states and, as such, are steeped in national discourses that are almost impossible to overcome.

Many of the relevant studies on this subject are characterised by an approach that aims to transgress disciplines, times, and regions. Nevertheless, most of them are written from a single discipline's perspective. We, the editors, are completely aware that our selection of disciplines for the workshop and the subsequent publication as well as our knowledge of disciplinary approaches to the "copy" is very much determined by our own disciplinary backgrounds (namely, archaeology and art history). We are neither able to oversee all disciplinary discourses nor to do justice to all those authors who have contributed to the topic until now. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the different perspectives exemplified in the contributions to this volume are able to reinforce ongoing disciplinary discourses by stimulating the transgression of disciplinary and cultural boundaries to obtain an open, dynamic, and transcultural perspective.

It is not the aim of this volume to present, contrast, or even assess different understandings of the "copy" in temporal or spatial perspectives. This book is not written as a reader on the "copy." Instead, it should inspire and incite ongoing discussions by presenting new perspectives on the topic. The contributors of this volume were free to define their own understanding of the term and all related practices and were not asked to adhere to terms used by the editors. As a consequence, this volume presents a variety of interpretations, rather than a common understanding of the relevant terms. We, the editors, are aware that we use the term "copy" to mean phenomena that might be termed "reproduction" or "imitation" by others. By using "copy," we create a topic from an etic perspective (i.e. the analytical perspective of the scientist). In our view, this usage does not run the risk of oversimplifying or homogenising very different, complex phenomena and practices, as long as the individual understanding of the term is explicitly presented. It is the task of the different contributors to shed light on emic perceptions (i.e. that of the past or present actors) of what we chose to discuss under the framework of the "copy." Even if critical

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15 Schwartz 1996, 17.
16 Taussig 1993.

voices against the use of the term have been raised and alternative terms proposed, we are convinced that studying practices of the secondary or derivative requires the use of the term "copy."[17] Moreover, as will be shown below, an integrated interdisciplinary and transcultural approach is necessary both to do justice to the "copy" and to understand its potential.

Defining something as a "copy" always requires something else to be defined as the "original." The definition of both phenomena is always relational. Both aspects are linked to each other within a network and it is only the introduction of notions of authenticity and originality that can lead to different assessments of value. From an analytical point of view, the definition of the copy always requires the designation as something secondary or derivative, even if the primary, i.e. the so-called original, is more or less fictitious and only established at the same instant at which something is perceived as a copy. For example, anyone visiting a museum can experience this dependency of original and copy, whenever (s)he is told that what (s)he perceives to be a unique "original" is just the "copy" of a lost "original." In this very moment, the copy and the original are constituted simultaneously in interdependence. The designation of the copy, as well as its analysis, therefore always requires a diachronic and contextual perspective. It is the permanent change of human perception, in all its dimensions, that gives the copy and its related practice, i.e. copying, such an interesting inherent dynamic.[18] The situational dependence of the dynamics of the copy also points to the necessity to embed every analysis of notions of the "copy" in a particular (historical, geographical, etc.) context. Without that context, concepts and dynamics of the "copy" cannot be understood. To sum up, we use "copy" to denominate a phenomenon that is—in all or at least some of its features—related to something else (i.e. the original). It was created later than the original and assumes (through an intentional act by the one who copies) one or several features of the original. It can exist without the spectator being aware of its secondary position, but only the realisation of the relatedness and temporal difference enables the understanding of something as a copy.

This is equally true of copying as a social practice, i.e. as the practical realisation of something that might be deemed a "copy."[19] In our own understanding, "copying" means intentionally (re-)producing an object, practice, sound, movement, or idea that is perceived by oneself and/or others as having a secondary position to another object, practice, etc. that is—at the same time—understood as the "original." Basically everything can be copied: mimetic behaviour is a fundamental trait of human learning. From childhood through education to professional practice: all are informed by the practice of copying. Copying means perceiving and defining something as original and, at the same time, translating it and

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17 Cf. Fehrmann et al. 2004.
18 Merleau-Ponty 1966; Olsen 2006; Stockhammer 2015.
19 Cf. Ortland 2015.

mastering its traits, in order to make it one's own and thereby opening up the potential to transform the copy into a new original The perception of original and copy and the practice of copying are indistinguishably entangled, as practice always means perceiving[20] and vice versa[21]. Copying is, therefore, an intimate act based on the intense engagement with another person, object, or practice. Copying has the potential to shape both the copy and the original; concept and practice condition each other.

The "copy" and "copying" from a transcultural and interdisciplinary perspective

The dynamics of the "copy" and "copying" constitute their crucial role in transcultural studies. We understand the concept of "transculturality" in a twofold way: the concept can be used to refer to both a concrete object of investigation as well as an analytical method.[22]

First, a transcultural approach is a research agenda that aims to overcome disciplinary, national, or "Western" discourses and to do justice to manifold understandings of the world. The term relates explicitly and critically to a notion that defines culture as being ethnically bound and contained within a territorial frame, i.e. the traditional, container-like understanding of culture.[23] Basing our work on the concept of transculturality enables us to emancipate it from such traditional notions of culture. Instead, we argue that cultures are invariably constituted by interaction, entanglement, and reconfiguration.

By using transculturality as an analytical approach, we attempt to shed light on past and present understandings of "copy" and "copying" in different contexts, as well as from a broad range of disciplinary perspectives. So far, related discourses have been almost entirely bound to cultural, scientific, or political distinctions and are both rooted in and constrained by national scholarly discourses. A transcultural approach is by definition interdisciplinary. When organising the workshop on which this volume is based, we aimed to foster our conceptual awareness by bringing together scholars from very different disciplines who could only communicate with each other on a conceptual level, as they all have worked with very different sources and materials. It became clear during the workshop that the very different disciplinary traditions and achievements did not present an obstacle to our goal, but rather forced the contributors to break down their complex discipline-specific discourses into their constituent concepts for the benefit of the interdisciplinary audience.

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20 Gatewood 1985; Knoblauch and Heath 2006; Richardson 2009.
21 Frers 2009, 188; Hofmann 2015; Stockhammer 2015, 35.
22 Eibach, Opitz-Belakhal, and Juneja 2012; Juneja and Falser 2013.
23 Eibach, Opitz-Belakhal, and Juneja 2012; Juneja and Falser 2013; Flüchter and Schöttli 2015.

From an analytical perspective, we are also aware that speaking of cultural encounters involves the risk of reintroducing that which we aim to overcome, i.e. the definition of cultural entities and borders. It is an epistemological consequence that every analytical approach to the study of transculturality requires the distinction and definition of cultures first, if only to be dissolved and transgressed in the analytical approach that follows.[24] The same holds true for the notion of the copy. How should we speak about the "secondary" without having first defined the "primary?" Every study of the dynamic processes triggered by practices of the secondary means acknowledging—or, more precisely, defining—the primary. Therefore, even if we aim to overcome the mere binary differentiation between the "original" and the "copy" we have to reintroduce this distinction at the beginning of our analysis, even if it is only for the subsequent demonstration of the fact that both classifications and the practice of copying in particular constitute each other and are permanently (re-)negotiated within social practice. We are therefore conscious that we tend to initiate our thoughts with notions that need to be overcome in the discussion that follows.

Second, a transcultural approach aims to analyse the transformative potential of intercultural encounters and the processes of transculturation and entanglement (which again comprise manifold individual actors' practices of appropriation, copying, translating, and rejection) related to it. Therefore, the focus is on shifting designations and social practices and not on the definition of seemingly stable symbols, functions, or structures.

The dynamics of perception, and the resultant attribution and change of meanings to objects and practices, are the basis for the transformative power of the copy and copying. Ultimately, it is not the copy that has an agency and exerts power to change us. It is our shifting perception and re-evaluation of the copy and, therefore, the copy's virtual changeability that has the power to transform.[25] In other words, it is not the copy itself that changes, but our perception of it. The copy, therefore, has "effectancy" rather than "agency."[26]

Moreover, a copy's transformative potential for re-interpretation and re-evaluation has an inherent dynamic and it can increase in the course of its itinerary, e.g. when an object is transported over large distances. As an itinerant copy, it can provide a link with distant actors, due to its supposed sameness with the original. It can also be understood as an original when its viewers are ignorant of the original or other copies, or if it is the product of conscious re-interpretation—in which case it can become even more valuable in its new context than the presumed original was in the old context.[27] Thus the copy has the potential to be a very influential actor in the transcultural field.[28]

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24 Stockhammer 2012; Stockhammer 2013.
25 Cf. Stockhammer 2015.
26 Stockhammer 2015.
27 E.g. Juneja 2008, 193.
28 Forberg 2014.

In contrast to "copy," "copying" has a direct transformative power as a practice that shapes our own lifeworld and, at the same time, helps us to link ourselves to other actors in the field. Copying enables the expression of similarity and difference at the same time since, during the act of copying, the actor decides what to meticulously imitate in his/her own work and what to translate and transform according to his/her own lifeworld. Copying therefore involves deciding between three different choices that are possible in a situation of contact: acceptance (trying to get as close to the original/other as possible), appropriation (transforming the original/other according to one's own lifeworld), and rejection (re-emphasizing otherness and difference). When copying an object, for example, one has to permanently decide between the three choices in the process of perceiving the object in order to be able to copy it. Therefore, copying involves both deciding on and performing practices with the other that subsequently open up the space for very different methods and results. It enables copying to become part of a strategy to react to, to question, to challenge, to manage, and even to overcome what is perceived as the original.

The diversity of human perception can best be understood with the help of a transcultural approach which welcomes, but does not enforce, the inclusion of Asian, African, or other non-European perspectives. A transcultural approach must not be confused with a postcolonial approach, which explicitly aims to involve scholars and perspectives from non-European, postcolonial contexts. As mentioned before, transcultural studies focuses on the transformative potential of intercultural encounters realised in practices of copying, appropriation, and hybridisation—and those practices can take place with differing intensity at all times and in almost all locales.

To sum up, the "copy" and "copying" as its related practice are components of the transformative dynamics of intercultural encounters. Perception and practice are intrinsically linked when defining one thing as an original or a copy or while copying the other. The question "what is a copy?" is permanently re-negotiated between one's lifeworld and one's momentary perception of the copy, as well as during the practice of copying. The kinds of transformations connected with—and triggered by—the understanding of something as a "copy" and the process of copying are manifold. These transformations can happen very locally, on an individual level, but can also affect a large group of actors (e.g. a particular society) on a regional or even global level. They may concern human perceptions of the world (e.g. ideas, cosmologies, or knowledge) as well as the shape, functions, and meanings of objects and/or practices.

The individual contributions in this volume exemplify a transcultural approach, but with differing intensities and emphases. Such an understanding guided the discussions during the workshop, but is more implicit in some of the contributions than others. Nevertheless, it has shaped our discussions, the selection process, and the presentation of these studies to such an extent that we chose to use the term "transcultural" along with "interdisciplinary" in order to characterise the approach and aims of this volume.

The copy in a network of notions

The contributions to this book span a wide evaluation period, from the Bronze Age to modern times. Rather than sequencing the contributions temporally, we have grouped the articles by concept into six different parts. From the large number of possible conceptual groupings, we have selected "anthropology," "reality," "original," "materiality, "power," and "competition." There is no doubt that the attributes of these conceptual divisions are sometimes very closely related, and that one contribution can refer to more than one of the aforementioned terms. However, each part identifies a line of thought that runs through its articles. In the last part of this introduction, we bring these lines together, to provide a starting point for further cross-referencing by the reader.

Part I: The copy and anthropology (Ribeiro, Ladwig)

What's in a copy? Gustavo Lins Ribeiro poses this question in his introductory article while examining the topic "copy" through the eyes of an anthropologist. This contribution is less about the characteristics of a copy than its inherent potential. Within the categories of academia, cultural life, and economics Ribeiro examines the Western concept of the copy, which can be traced back to Plato's philosophy. The author highlights the copy's necessity to all three categories and determines the origin of its negative and diminutive evaluation in the West, which cannot be found, for instance, in China or other regions of the world. Moreover, he portrays how the terms "original" and "authenticity" are both instrumental to political and economic purposes and challenged by new technologies.

Also from an anthropologist's perspective, Patrice Ladwig describes how the centuries-old concept of "copy" or "mimesis/imitation" affected later anthropological research. Ladwig begins by reflecting on the primitivism of non-literate societies, which has been directly connected to mimetic practices by early anthropologists like James Frazer. These practices were considered underdeveloped and were classified as belonging to an early evolutionary stage of human society. This evaluation is based on a fundamental, negative assessment of copying that has its origins in Plato's reflections on mimesis. Due to religious scepticism and philosophical criticism during the Enlightenment, the distance between object and subject became wider and found expression in a reduced and pejorative understanding of imitation. The understanding of imitation is not, as Kant put it, epistemologically universal, but culturally specific. Walter Benjamin therefore bemoans the loss of the possibility of mimetic practices in modern times, which he considers to be responsible for the disenchantment of the world.

Part II: The copy and reality (Knaller, Schröter)

From the Early Modern Age to the nineteenth century, the idea that art was the imitation of nature prevailed. According to Susanne Knaller, a crucial question in aesthetics until now has been to what extent reality reveals itself in art objects, on the one hand, and in empirical objects/objects of nature, on the other. In order to answer this question, the concept of the copy and the original is helpful. However, this concept is stretched to its limits when it is confronted with avant-garde art—especially from the post-1950 era—which consciously mixes aesthetic categories. Knaller therefore introduces the term "authenticity" to the discourse—a term closely related to the concepts of original and copy, as well as art and reality, but offering a more comprehensive and more flexible approach to a definition of the relationship between art and reality.

The seemingly endless reproducibility of things which, without an obvious original, occasionally leads to the opinion that the difference between original and copy is obsolete. There seems to be only a world of copied copies (c.f. Ribeiro, Knaller and Mersmann). If this were true, our political, economic, and social worlds would collapse, as Jens Schröter argues in his article. The danger of anarchy inevitably evokes the necessity of something unreproducible—banknotes and ID cards are prominent examples. Extending Schröter's idea, this means that we need the uncopiable original in order to maintain social order.

Part III: The copy and the original
(Graulund, Sanchez-Stockhammer, Schwan)

From a point of view of literary studies, Rune Graulund does not discuss the concepts of the original and/or copy as being a matter of debate. For him, there is little doubt that one can exist without the other. His criticism is directed at the perception of an original—more precisely an original text—as an independently existing entity. Graulund does not see the copy as a work referring to an isolable entity (original), but rather as the many conditions of a creative process that does not have any natural, authentic origin. In this way, the copy is not only perceived as a creative process, but as an original as well. According to Graulund, the original in literature is not an entity, but a variety of concepts, such that several versions of a text can possess status comparable to the original.

From a linguistic point of view, Christina Sanchez-Stockhammer disagrees with Graulund. Linguistics shows that the original and the copy follow a chronological process that schedules the original's existence before the copy. According to Sanchez-Stockhammer, it is not clear how much similarity to the original something has to display to be called a copy. To conceptualise this, the author uses Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic, dichotomous language model, which states that language is composed

of *langue* (the meaning of a word and its grammatical characteristics) and *parole* (language use in specific utterances). In both oral and textual language, an exact copy, labelled an "absolutely faithful copy" by the author, would not be possible; only what she calls a "functionally faithful copy"—even in the case of academic quotations—is achievable.

Alexander Schwan's proposition is located between those of Graulund and Sanchez-Stockhammer. In order to explain the complicated structure of the original and the copy in the field of the performing arts, especially dance, he postulates a paradox caused by the combination of choreographic performances and the body's anatomy. On the one hand, the alleged original—the performance of a choreographic idea—turns out to be an ephemeral phenomenon vanishing in the very moment of its production and therefore preventing the copying process. On the other hand, the possibilities of human movement are clearly limited due to the body's anatomy. Similar to linguistics (e.g. Sanchez-Stockhammer), where individual words or phrases can only rarely be traced to their origin, it is impossible to detect a master pattern in a seemingly perpetual repetition of moves. By implication, this means that a dance cannot exist without the copy, and dancing without copying. The paradox of dancing arises from the double-premise that copying, strictly speaking, is not possible due to the original's ephemeral character, but motion is solely based on the process of copying.

Part IV: The copy and materiality
(Stockhammer, Schreiter, Ortland)

While the previous contributions concentrated first and foremost on immaterial and abstract phenomena such as ideas, language, and motion, the essays by Stockhammer, Schreiter, and Ortland focus on the relationship between copy and materiality. An object's materiality and substance hold a special position in the copying process because they shape human practices through the dynamics of their perception.

Philipp Stockhammer's article focuses on the Bronze Age in Central Europe. He shows how innovations in bronze casting enabled a completely new form of copying. The characteristics of bronze, especially its ease of casting, along with the use of casting moulds, allowed for the serial production of quasi-identical objects, particularly weapons and tools, for the first time in human history. It seems that this new technology had initially been considered a threat. Copying as a transformative practice enabled the appropriation as well as the management of the new technology at the same time. Moreover, the new technology of reproduction fundamentally changed the human perception of objects.

Charlotte Schreiter's contribution reflects the more recent past and focuses on the various copies of ancient statuary from the late eighteenth century. She shows that plaster casts of different materials were highly

appreciated among contemporary customers. These sculptures were not exact copies, as art historians later determined, but creative imitations which were upgraded by material and technological innovations as well as sophisticated contextualisations. However, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were preceded by continuous examinations of ancient times, in which this "foreign" culture—contrary to non-European cultures—was widely reinterpreted and instrumentalised again and again.

Another form of copying ancient artworks is at the centre of Eberhard Ortland's article. He analyses the copies of famous European and East Asian paintings on porcelain panels in Kyoto. From a philosophical point of view, he questions the hegemony of European art and illustrates what is perceived as famous and original and therefore worth copying. Moreover, the medium's transfer from canvas or fresco onto ceramics guarantees a special durability—possibly longer than that of the original. According to Ortland, the copy's material, surroundings, and *mise-en-scène* are key to accessing a copy's transformative power.

Part V: The copy and power (Mersmann, Brumann, Falser)

The phenomena of endless reproducibility in the digital world and of the disappearance of the original, which Ribeiro, Knaller, and Schröter focus on, are also Birgit Mersmann's topics of study. Global networking, thanks to the Internet and the possibilities posed by digital technology, has led to the notion of a global copying culture. Mersmann discusses the patterns underlying these phenomena with the help of two case studies: an individual sculpture and an institution that were both placed on UNESCO's World Heritage lists. These cases generate a complex network of global and local power, political interests and strategies—from local tourism industries to international committees such as UNESCO.

Christoph Brumann investigates UNESCO's concept of authenticity and its political interwovenness from an anthropological point of view. He outlines the development of the term "World Heritage" and the understanding of "original" and "authenticity" that is related to it from a European, restricted definition to a very broad term that adequately addresses the concerns and perspectives of all countries involved. Nevertheless, Brumann points out the fact that this development was more likely to have been based on rather inconsistent decisions and the negotiation of political interests than on a consistent conceptual progression.

According to Micheal Falser's historical remarks, this concept of World Heritage is based on the colonial practice of transferring sculptures and, especially, monumental buildings such as Angkor Wat, into the museum context of European colonialists with the help of plaster casts. This copying practice does not only indicate a change of the meaning of a non-European object, but also the evaluation standard of a building in its cultural context. Like Mersmann, Falser emphasises that the notions of

the copy and copying have to be discussed in the light of global and local strategies.

Part VI: The copy and competition (Prien, Weber, Forberg)

Archaeological-protohistoric and art historical analyses reveal the importance of copying within the scope of social competition. Roland Prien's example of the so-called Carolingian Renaissance, or *Renovatio*, shows to what extent the contemporary idea of "orginal" and "copy" even hinders our understanding of historical phenomena. He concludes that the long-dominating idea that Charlemagne took the Roman Empire and Rome as examples of the creation of his own empire and the construction of his capital, Aachen, has no factual basis.

Julia Weber's analysis focuses on Meissen porcelain. With the ability to produce porcelain, Augustus the Strong's main motivation was to acquire treasured "white gold" at a reduced rate. This is primarily why new technology was employed to copy vases and other vessels from China and Japan. These copies—being deprived of their mark by a French dealer—were transformed into forgeries. By the discovery of their production site in Saxony they were later re-identified by contemporary connoisseurs as originals of European fabrication. At Augustus's court, therefore, the idea of competing with the Emperor of China arose.

Corinna Forberg's contribution stays at the court of Augustus the Strong and concentrates on copies of Indian models which were employed as a means of absolutist self-representation in Dresden. The Saxon court jeweller Johann Melchior Dinglinger presented his famous *Thron des Großmoguls* (Throne of the Great Moghul) to Augustus the Strong and creatively transformed Indian models into semiotic vehicles that delivered political messages to European rulers. The singularity and inimitability of absolute power was in the centre of these representations.

Entangling the strings

Copying stands at the beginning of human life. Speaking, singing, and dancing, all require the perpetual repetition of what has been spoken or performed before (Sanchez-Stockhammer, Schwan). It is only the copy of a particular pattern of words or movements that can be defined as something original, not because of its particular components, but because someone defines the particular combination of the components (be it a certain literary phrase or sequence of body movements) as something extraordinary, something original. But what happens when the realisation of such an idea—understood as something original—is perpetuated? Over and over, a certain theatre play or ballet can create an aura of uniqueness and authenticity, although it has been performed many times before (Schwan).

The same movement, sentence, or body pose can be understood as a copy and an original at the same time, depending on the individual knowledge and expectations of the listener or spectator (Sanchez-Stockhammer, Forberg). The copy becomes original and the original's right to exist as such is cast into doubt. Our globalised digital age forces us to radically re-think and re-conceptualise the original and the copy on an even larger scale. As several of the contributions in this volume show, the possibilities of digital reproduction have severe consequences (Ribeiro, Mersmann). Current copying techniques allow for the creation of copies of such quality that they are indistinguishable from the original and can even evoke the same aura as the original (Knaller). Even live digital copies of drama and music performances are now possible and are accessible to more people than ever before. The original seems to get lost or become obsolete, as it is nothing more than a dataset that is later printed out in countless copies. While the original cannot exist without the copy (Graulund), it almost seems that the copy can exist without the original. The disappearance of the original has been possible for a long time—since the beginning of refined casting technologies in the Early Bronze Age at the latest (Stockhammer)—but has become increasingly pervasive and challenging due to the digital revolution. It has become clear that the original is always defined by actors who have the power to force their normative world views onto other actors. Obtaining the power to define the original has often been a power strategy in human history (Prien, Forberg). The copy has always had the power to challenge individual world views as well as political systems and existing power structures. As a result, copying was long understood as the backward practice of primitive people (Ladwig). Maintaining power positions requires the management of copying (Schröter) and the transformation of powerful copies into originals by reinterpretation or recontextualization (Weber, Schreiter). The original can be defined, classified, and thereby tamed. The copy is more difficult to tame: the copy is wild. In every society, past and present, the transformative power of the copy leads to ever new reinterpretations of the world and the destabilisation of normative ideas of the world. Freedom to copy thus runs the risk of provoking anarchy (Schröter). Today, more than ever before, copying is becoming easier and easier due to the relevance and dominance of virtual data without any materialisation. In order to obtain norms and order, those in power—in politics as well as in the fields of law, economics, art, and science—try to define the authentic and original like a canon of what is still "worthy" to be kept, seen, and preserved in a globalised world that is both changing and challenging (Brumann, Ortland). The power to turn a copy into an original means the ability to create additional value in a very monetary sense of the word (Weber). The current topic of defining and debating UNESCO World Heritage, for example, gives a vivid impression of these efforts (Brumann). At the same time, it unveils the utmost colonial character of the practice of attributing authenticity (Falser) and the political power play whereby the most powerful actors finally define what is authentic and

what is not—irrespective of the advice of all (so-called) specialists. Coming to terms with our world also means accepting different notions of the copy and the original, in the past as in the present. We must not take our individual, scholarly, and analytical understanding of the relevant terms as the basis from which to explain what we determine as practices of copying in the past or in the present around the globe. However, we also do not argue for the acceptance of every possible understanding of these terms as a basis for further reflection. Taking a transcultural approach seriously does not mean embracing relativism, but reflectivity and openness toward different approaches to examining the world without devaluating one's own or the other's view. It means taking the other seriously, and seeing it as a crucial factor for defining oneself.

What is a copy, then? It seems as if this question cannot easily be answered by taming the copy and presenting a clear-cut taxonomy with global applicability that functions across all scientific disciplines, or by re-defining copies as originals in order to increase their particular value. This is also not the aim of this volume. Instead of presenting a comprehensive discussion of the history and present state of our understanding of the copy in different disciplines, we wish to inspire an ongoing discourse by bringing together disciplines and discourses that have not been connected so far, and by promoting the transcultural approach as a new way of thinking and analysing a relevant phenomenon like the copy. We do not question or devalue (political) efforts to define originality or authenticity, as we acknowledge these concepts as necessary for creating stability in a changing world. We wish to shed light on the potential of the copy and copying, re-evaluating and defining the copy and the original, and the dynamic processes which result from these practices in a world where absolute distinctions between the two are narrowing.

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The Copy
and Anthropology

Gustavo Lins Ribeiro

What's in a Copy?

Abstract What is in a copy? I will answer this question by considering the importance of the copy in three related areas: academia, cultural life, and the economy. In academia, the ease with which copies can be made is challenging pedagogical practices and the trust of its members, with plagiarism being the most immediate problem. The notion of authorship is also undergoing changes provoked by a proliferation of authors and by possibilities opened recently by cyberspace. In cultural life, imitation and mimesis have long been fundamental engines of socialization. Our enhanced capacity of copying problematizes, with new intensity, the relationships between homogeneity and heterogeneity, between the genuine and the spurious. In the economic world, the digital era is threatening some of the fundamental tenets of capitalism, especially of its variant, the "knowledge society," which concerns the control of intellectual property rights. The gap between normativity and social practices is widening. The many dilemmas and tensions identified in this text are therefore understood as symptoms of two major characteristics of the current times: hyperfetishism and hyperanimism.

> *"Copying makes us what we are. Our bodies take shape from the transcrip-*
> *tion of protein templates, our languages from the mimicry of privileged*
> *sounds, our crafts from the repetition of prototypes. Cultures cohere in*
> *the faithful transmission of rituals and rules of conduct. To copy cell for cell,*
> *word for word, image for image, is to make the known world our own."*[1]

In academic life, it is rather common to begin looking an issue that one supposes to be familiar with only to find out—after successive approxima-tions—that the issue at hand is enormous and intriguingly complex and needs to be further explored.[2] This is, once more, the case. I first thought of writing about copies as an opportunity to present my latest findings concerning the breadth of issues that the term "piracy" poses for our con-temporary economic reality. Indeed, I entered this fascinating world in the late 1990's by asking a simple question while looking at the Made in China goods sold by hawks in downtown Brasilia, in a crowded street market called the Paraguayan Fair: how did these things get here?

I then started a line of research that has lasted for more than ten years and ended up coining the phrases "economic globalization from below" and "non-hegemonic world system" in the process. I will certainly present my ideas about these topics here, but I will also explore new ground and new issues that posing the question "what's in a copy?" made me think of.

A few initial considerations are in order. The English word copy comes from the Latin word "copia,"[3] the meaning of which (that is "abundance, plenty, multitude") already insinuates a vast semantic universe. The world has always been full of copies, the Industrial Revolution only accelerated the multiplication of objects and images while the Digital Era made copy-ing easier, more exact, and ubiquitous. Copies always imply several points of tension: between essence and appearance, the particular and the uni-versal, the unique and the many, the original and the replica, the authentic and the fake/spurious, sameness and difference, production and repro-duction, homogeneity and heterogeneity, and creativity and commerce.

What's in a copy, then? At this point, I could well answer this question with a simple "everything." Indeed, according to Canadian philosopher Marcus Boon, in his thought-provoking book *In Praise of Copying,* copying "rather than being an aberration or a mistake or a crime, is a fundamen-tal condition or requirement for anything, human or not."[4] Succumbing to the temptation of answering "everything" would certainly grant me the world record of the shortest article ever, but the answer's astonishing generalization would amount to nothing more than a refusal to face the complexity underneath the subject. Therefore, I will answer this question

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1   Schwartz 1998, 211.
2   Keynote speech of the congress of German speaking anthropologists, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, September 14, 2011. I thank my colleagues in Aus-tria, especially Andre Gingrich, for the honor.
3   Boon 2010, 41.
4   Boon 2010, 3.

by considering three sets of related issues in which the copy is equally important: academia, cultural life, and in the economic world. It goes without saying that these are not separate universes.

Copying and academia

It is impossible to think of a university existing without copies, since it is a place designed for the production, reproduction, storage, exhibition, and reverence of knowledge. We find copies everywhere: in the libraries or in the copy shops, in the uploaded PDF files of scanned texts, or in the term papers downloaded from virtual firms that may even write customized monographs for their clients. Copying is also at the center of the classrooms, at the heart of pedagogy and learning, not only because professors repeat other authors' works while teaching but because students are supposed to show how they have understood them by copying and reproducing their thoughts. Furthermore, isn't the academic ethos itself heavily based on the admiration and mimicry of certain role models, at times displayed and incorporated in theories, and at other times in behavioral styles and political leanings?

At the university, the contradictions between copying and originality abound. At the same time that copyrights are praised by many as a modern right, they are constantly disrespected in the name of education. While students need to know and copy other people's work, they are also supposed to add something new. At the same time that they admire and often emulate their masters or their mentors, they are supposed to make original contributions to knowledge. Originality here means aggregated differences between the student's work and that which he/she cites. Perhaps, in the pragmatics of the academic world, we (most often unconsciously) accept the fact that there is no such thing as 100 per cent originality and that there will never be a perfect copy, that copying always means adding something different, a fact that is especially clear in art history.[5] In the end, creation and innovation mean an addition to previously known things or processes resulting from copying exercises and from the imperfections of memory and reproduction. But since academics also need to be authors, our tendency, as in any other realm, is to abhor copies and praise originality, something made clear by the use of expressions such as "my own theory is" and "in my view."

In academic life, nowhere is the scorn for copying greater than when the issue is plagiarism, a problem that has consistently grown since "cut and paste" became a popular jargon. Cut and paste problematizes the pedagogical role of copying. One thing is a handwritten copy of a published text, the other is its digital copy. A handwritten copy demands a time of reflection, of getting acquainted with the author's ideas, of thinking

5   Boon 2010.

about how to appropriate and criticize interpretations. The digital copy is an almost instantaneous action in which the content being copied may remain completely unknown. I am not so interested in the ethical problems triggered by plagiarism and forgery which, most of the time, are related to moral and professional deceptions and to frustrated economic interests. In fact, deception never yields a good feeling. What interests me is the idea that the current spread of plagiarism is embedded in major changes in the technology used in teaching, publishing, reproducing, and using information within academia. These changes impact traditional work routines in the academic milieu in ways that are still difficult to understand, but will certainly generate radically different scenarios and practices in the future. According to Hillel Schwartz,

> Lexicographers responsible for defining plagiarism have been accused of plagiarizing definitions. A University of Oregon booklet plagiarized its section on plagiarism. Given this compulsion to repeat that which bears on repeating, plagiarism in our culture of the copy appears inevitable. [...] Our culture of the copy tends to make plagiarism a necessity, and the more we look for replays to be superior to originals, the more we will embrace plagiarism as elemental.[6]

The scorn for plagiarism is intimately related to the Western idea of authorship, a notion that is central to the modern academy. Marilyn Strathern considers "the eighteenth century idea that persons are the natural owners of both themselves and their labour" a "notion of singular ownership/authorship [that] also sets up the conceptual possibility of one author supplanting or displacing the other."[7] In a productivist era, in which competition is taken to its limits, Strathern's statement is self-explanatory.

At the same time that authorship reinforces authenticity and originality as major academic values, it depreciates copying. Considering copying a problem is far from a universal position. The importance of copying as a way of learning has long been acknowledged in Buddhism, and in China, where "the multiplication of nearly identical images is understood not as the degradation of an original but the invocation of an impermanent, provisional form with the goal of training the mind to recognize its own true nature."[8] Interestingly enough, authorship developed in the eighteenth century alongside the regulation of copyrights in Europe, an offshoot of an established and growing book industry.

But in the digital era, with the advent of the World Wide Web, the notion of authorship may well undergo dramatic changes—if not disappear entirely. As Michel Foucault anticipated, a concept that came into being at

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6   Schwartz 1998, 313.
7   Strathern 1986, 21–22.
8   Boon 2010, 63.

a given moment in history may well disappear in the future. The notion of "author," as Foucault put it, is intimately related to a "privileged moment of *individualization* in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy and the sciences."[9] On the internet, there are experiments that use the immense collective creativity found in global fragmented spaces that may now be articulated online. The global cooperation that now exists within this virtual public space,[10] which is practiced by political collectives such as the free software movement, provides an interesting example of global creativity enacted by a great number or persons that are not interested in individual authorship and copyright, but in the collective perfecting of a common good that is free for all.

Such collective online creation may concretely challenge the notion that the relationship between creativity and commerce is always mediated by individual authorship and copyrights. This does not amount to saying that we are on the verge of discovering an alternative to capitalist appropriation of creative work, as some activists of the open source and free software movements would like to believe.[11] It is not impossible to suppose that a corporation, such as Google, is likely to profit from an environment free of copyrights, a sort of global fragmented creative mind, where global hackers would provide, for free, the work and information needed to improve the company's products. If such a scenario develops fully in the current juncture of computer electronic capitalism's hegemony, we should add Googleism as a new label to classify capitalist production, after Taylorism and Toyotism.

Authorship may also radically change in the face of other types of online cooperation. Here, the main example is Wikipedia. Although Wikipedia is no panacea (in the end, there is always an editor who controls what is published), it allows us to speculate about the possibility of a radical wiki-anthropology, for instance. Such on-line text construction would excel over the format of traditional journals with their referee system—which, at the core of the world system of anthropological production, more often than not replicates the styles and agendas of the Anglo-American academic milieu.[12] The possibility of writing with myriad other known or anonymous cyber-colleagues may also point to the emergence of post-authorial academic texts. Are we ready to make global wiki experiments in academic writing and theoretical production? Are we ready to go beyond the notion of authorship in academia, one of the bases of inequality reproduction in a world full of individualism and individual power seekers? I don't know. Perhaps my generation is not. Perhaps younger scholars, natives of digital culture who are completely immersed in cyberspace, are.

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9   Foucault 1984, 101.
10 Ribeiro 2003.
11 Evangelista 2010.
12 Kuwayama 2004.

Copying and culture

There are several possible explorations of the relations between copying and culture. I will tackle with but a few here. How one acquires or learns a culture and a language, that is, how a person becomes human or a member of a culture and a society, has been a much-debated subject in philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. Learning is presumed central to *Homo sapiens* evolution. Indeed, if every hunter and gatherer had to invent arrows and bowls again and again, the human capacity for adaptation and evolution would have been seriously affected. Mimesis, socialization, enculturation, diffusion, and borrowing are recurrent concepts in this universe. Discussions often resonate with questions of structure and agency in ways that resemble the attribution of positive characteristics to authenticity, originality, and authorship and of negative characteristics to copying and imitation.

A relatively recent revisionist perspective on enculturation by Cindy Dell Clark provides an interesting illustration of a position that emphasizes children's agency. Dell Clark considers enculturation "not so much a straightforward mature-on-immature imposition of practices" but "a many-laned and multi-directional matrix in which children and elders interact."[13] Following Jean Briggs,[14] Dell Clark asserts that "enculturation entails a complex, shifting assortment of ingredients to be actively selected and interpreted by the child." Dell Clark takes a critical stance of "cultural reduplication" and concludes that a "revisionist notion of enculturation implies a dynamism and fluidity to cultural learning, rather than a cloning like social reproduction process."[15] Once more, what seems to be at stake are the tensions among creativity and inventiveness versus repetition, copying, and imitation.

The notion of imitation has enjoyed a greater visibility in the past in the social sciences. Perhaps we are at the forefront of a return of its influence caused by a growing interest in the work of French sociologist Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904), who published his book *Les Lois de l'Imitation* in 1890 (the English version, *The Laws of Imitation*, was published 1903). Matei Candea, the editor of a recent volume entitled *The Social After Gabriel Tarde*, speaks of a Tardean revival.[16] Tarde's mimetic paradigm is also an exercise on the value of difference; in his view, repetition provokes difference. His thinking has informed disparate but influential works, including Everett Rogers' *Diffusion of Innovations*, which was first published in 1962 and later became a classic on the subject.[17] Rogers' theoretical approach is radically different from those of authors such as Gilles Delleuze and Bruno Latour, who were also influenced by Tarde. It is not my intention to summarize Tarde's rather complex production nor

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13 Dell Clark 2005, 182.
14 Briggs 1992 and 1998.
15 Dell Clark 2005, 183.
16 Candea 2010, 2.
17 Rogers 2003.

the equally elaborate current appropriations of his work. Rather, I am more interested in looking at the renaissance of his influence as another indication of the increased awareness of the importance of copying and the challenges it brings.

If imitation entails complex theories and arguments, mimesis, simulation, and mimicry do not lag far behind. Suffice it to mention the lasting influence of the Platonic interpretation of the relationship between outward appearance and essence in Western philosophy, the echoes of which, in anthropology, could be heard in hot debates about identity, authenticity, and essentialism in the 1990's.[18] Or we could also mention Jean Baudrillard's well-known contribution on the role of simulacra and simulations in the constitution and reproduction of current social life.[19] The digital age, in which copies do not have originals, may perforce witness the death of the original, clearly subverting the Platonic gaze. In this environment, we are inevitably drawn to a discussion on virtuality and the status of reality. Virtuality creates confusion about the phenomenological status of the real world at the same that it magnifies our life experience. This principle is certainly behind the choice of the name "Second Life" for the popular virtual "place" in cyberspace.

I myself wrote that, in order to understand current public space, we need to make a distinction between the virtual public space and the real public space that, together, make up public-space-in-general.[20] The increased political use of the internet since the Rio 1992 Earth Conference, and of cell phones since at least the anti-globalization 1999 Seattle battle, as well as the work of groups such as Avaaz, to mention three out of myriad examples, clearly illustrate the intertwinement between the real and the virtual public space, something that intensifies what I have referred to as "political activism at a distance."[21] The intertwinement of virtuality and reality may derive from the division of the sign into signifier and signified, and is thus necessarily embedded in all symbolic systems that depend on the linguistic sign.

Avatars insinuate the possibility of virtual cloning—something not as disturbing as the possibility of the genetic cloning of human bodies, a subject that immediately spurs waves of technophobic reactions. At present, human cloning is a limit imposed on bioengineering's copying capacity. Nature and culture, a preferred anthropological topic, now needs to be considered through other lenses as the capacity to manipulate the natural world is extended to more fundamental dimensions such as the very code of organic life. In an age of technoculture, it is not by chance that anthropologists have become involved with science and technology studies to

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18 Boon 2010.
19 Baudrillard (1981) 1994.
20 Ribeiro 2003.
21 Ribeiro 1998.

understand "emergent forms of life," an allusion I make to the title of a 2003 book by Michael Fischer, a leading scholar in this field.[22]

Owing to their interest in diffusion and dissemination, and in the exchange between local and supralocal settings enmeshed in flows of people, knowledge, and things, anthropologists know that the relationships between sameness and difference, between homogeneity and heterogeneity are central to human life and to our understanding of the complex symbolic umbrella we all live under. In the past, some influential anthropological visions of culture were strongly informed by a nostalgic ethos as well as by the search for an organic, harmonious, totality within which genuine links between location, history, and individuality might thrive. A classic reference here is Edward Sapir's well-known 1924 piece "Culture, Genuine and Spurious."[23] From this perspective, "internal" factors are highly valued to the detriment of "external" ones, and to the detriment of what Sapir described as a "spiritual hybrid of contradictory patches, of water-tight compartments of consciousness that avoid participation in a harmonious synthesis."[24] This position has long been accompanied by another, which stresses that cultural life is an amalgamation of several borrowings. Think, for instance, of Ralph Linton's equally classic piece, the 1936 article "One Hundred Percent American," in which he stresses how Americans use and copy objects and behaviors of many different origins.[25] Almost a century later, we surely are far from Sapir's position not only because hybridity and fragmentation are no longer seen in a negative way,[26] but also because— for many of us—it is clear, as Eric Wolf put it, that "in a majority of cases the entities studied by anthropologists owe their development to processes that originate outside them and reach well beyond them, [...] they owe their crystallization to these processes, take part in them, and affect them in turn."[27]

However, resonances of the genuine/spurious tension still seem to interfere in current political ideologies and in the pragmatics of identity politics, especially when interethnic politics is at stake. "Strategic essentialism," a concept in postcolonial theory coined by Gayatri Spivak, refers to the strategic political use of a supposedly unified social identity. In a different mode, postcolonial approaches also make clear the political role of imitation and of "spurious" culture in settings where subalternity is a hallmark of the relations between different ethnic segments. Here, a good example is Homi Bhabha's well known essay "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," on the role of mimicry in colonialism.[28] For him, mimicry is at once resemblance and menace, since the discourses that

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22 Fischer 2003.
23 Sapir (1924) 1949.
24 Sapir (1924) 1949, 315.
25 Linton 1936.
26 See, for instance, García Canclini 1990 and Ribeiro 1992.
27 Wolf 2001, 312.
28 Bhabha 1994.

reproduce imperial dominance carry a weakness that destroys domination from within. The subversive force of imitation imposes itself because nothing is pure replication and new critical interpretations and practices may always arise. The realization that borrowing symbols and discourses from the dominant colonizer always involves re-readings and the agency of native populations has its own tradition in anthropology, as the classic 1958 essay by Eric Wolf, "The Virgin of Guadalupe: A Mexican National Symbol," testifies.[29]

But what exactly is at stake in the several facets and implications of the relationship between culture and copying that I have been exploring? Why are imitation and copying criticized when they are so necessary? Always living in a hall of mirrors, in a multiplicity of social relations and representations, we fear losing our uniqueness, losing control of who we think we *really* are and being dissolved in an amorphous and imagined mass of other beings like us. We fear becoming avatars in a world without flesh and bone. Even worse, the fear of losing one's authentic being and capacity of being a human subject is also a fear of becoming a puppet or a drone, of falling under someone else's spell, or falling prey to their desires and power.

Somewhat less dramatically, I will explore another angle to conclude this section. Can you imagine the amount of time it would take just to move around and complete our everyday activities if each object were unique? Copying, repetition, and imitation serve previsibility, something fundamental to the reproduction of what Anthony Giddens calls "practical consciousness," or our ability to reproduce patterned daily life.[30] Without this ability, and given the enormous amount of energy we would have to expend to constantly monitor extraordinariness and randomness, the human subject and social life as we know them would not exist. In view of this reasoning, I can also conclude that uniqueness and authenticity are highly valued because they represent a rupture in the chain of repetitions, thereby bringing extra-ordinariness and novelty to light. It is failure in repetition, in a series of events or objects, it is the unexpected—in a word, serendipity—that constitutes a privileged mode of creation and innovation. In the end, copying and creativity depend on each other because without copying—and the flaws it implies—there could be no extraordinariness.

Copying and economy

There would be no economy without copying. Labor processes and technologies rely on repetition, replication, and predictability. Production relies on re-production. Consumption relies not only on innovation but on the capability of predicting an object's usefulness. The multiplication of copied objects for consumption according to previously existing templates (let's call

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29 Wolf 1958.
30 Giddens 1984.

this mass production) is not new. Coins and bottles, for instance, have been mass produced in the West since ancient times.[31] However, the Gutenberg Revolution and, later, the Industrial Revolution, dramatically increased the mass production of objects. More importantly, the Industrial Revolution, with its accelerated production of copies, imposed the hegemony of commodification as a regime of social (re)production that impacted not only the economy but all aspects of human life, in a process well captured by Karl Marx's seminal work, *The Capital* (and especially by his notion of commodity fetishism). Hereafter, social actors would be mesmerized by commodities and the market in ways that hindered them from understanding the social forces and processes responsible for the re-production of their own lives.

If capitalist commodity production in the nineteenth century was already so powerful as to commodify the lives of the inhabitants of industrial nations, imagine the extent to which this pattern has developed today— when even the unconscious has been colonized by capitalism. The digital era, with its tremendous copying capacity, dawned when Fredric Jameson published his prescient 1984 essay on the cultural logic of late capitalism (and from which I derived my last assertion about the unconscious).[32] The proliferation of copies of creative works granted by digital technologies also makes Walter Benjamin's classic 1936 essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" appear somewhat dated.[33] It couldn't be any other way. Benjamin's writing reflects the analogue logic of reproduction of his day. Currently, we are under the hegemony of electronic and computer capitalism. Mechanical reproduction no longer sets the pace of social life. But Benjamin is a great thinker. He anticipated, for instance, that the notion of authenticity does not make sense for reproductions as well as that "technical reproduction can put the copy of the original into situations that would be out of reach for the original itself."[34] Also, from his work, we can imply that there are no Benjaminian originals in the world of commodities. Originals suppose an aura that withers in systems of mass production.

More than eighty years later, notwithstanding Benjamin's work of genius, it is possible to see some of its limits. This limitation, as a matter of fact, does not disallow the brilliance of the essay. Quite the contrary, such limits can only be seen because their potential existence was already in the text. For instance, his comments about the power of photography to accelerate "the process of pictorial reproduction"[35] could not suppose the digital convergence that made photography and videography from a mobile phone possible. Now, taking pictures or making videos is so easy and accomplished so *en masse* that it is impossible to calculate how many pictures and videos are made and shared in a year. With the popularization of cell phones, soon every person will carry a camera. Concurrently, the

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31 Boon 2010.
32 Jameson 1984.
33 Benjamin (1936) 1975.
34 Benjamin (1936) 1975, 13.
35 Benjamin (1936) 1975, 12.

internet has become a fantastic treasure hoard of images. Consider, for instance, what Facebook and YouTube mean as repositories of testimonies. The scope of the YouTube archive is so immense that it makes me toy with the idea that, now, researchers in the social sciences and in psychology have the Jungian "collective unconscious"—a notion I was never truly comfortable with—available for inquiry on their computers. In the same vein, Benjamin saw that, with the "increasing extension of the press," "an increasing number of readers became writers," and what "began with the daily press opening to its readers space for 'letters to the editor'" resulted in such a state that "the distinction between author and public is about to lose its basic character. [...] At any moment the reader is ready to turn into a writer. [...] the reader gains access to authorship."[36]

What would Benjamin write if he could see today's proliferation of authors on blogs, websites, Facebook, and Twitter? A world where everyone is potentially (or de facto) an author is a world so saturated of authors that the very notion of authorship seems senseless. But it is not only writers that proliferate on the internet: there are also crowds of photographers, filmmakers, and musicians that publicize their work online. YouTube is actually functioning as a screener for the discovery of new talents by the entertainment industry. The number of views a video gets is a free-of-charge global poll. YouTube is a virtual mega impresario and employment agency for artists of all kinds on a global level.

But, at the same time, the internet also represents the greatest present challenge to copyright. If, on the one hand, the economy depends on copying, then economic agents also need to control copying, since retaining rights to certain commodities means having a monopolistic niche in the market. Such control is increasingly more complicated to exert—especially over transactions involving digital culture.

Notions of originals and authenticity have long been formulated to help control economic competition. Indeed, coins have been falsified since ancient times and the history of the term piracy, meaning the antithesis of civilization, is associated with the rise of Athens.[37] However, according to Adrian Johns in his book on piracy, "although appropriators of ideas may always have existed, societies have not always recognized a specific concept of intellectual property. [...that concept] owed its origins to the cultural transformations set in train by Johann Gutenberg's invention of the printing press."[38]

Although patents were already being granted in Italy and England by the fifteenth century, and "patents controlling the 'rights in copies' of books can be dated to 1563 in England,"[39] people started to refer to "intellectual purloining as piracy [...] sometime in the mid-seventeenth century,"[40] and

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36 Benjamin (1936) 1975, 24.
37 Johns 2009, 33–34.
38 Johns 2009, 8.
39 Boon 2010, 48.
40 Johns 2009, 23.

the first copyright law only emerged in 1709. However, intellectual property as a regulatory mode of economic activity developed only in the nineteenth century. Currently, as Brazilian anthropologists Ondina Fachel Leal and Rebecca Henneman Vergara de Souza show, intellectual property is intrinsically linked to the 1994 legally-instituted global regime on "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" (or "TRIPS") administered by the World Trade Organization, an agency of global governance.[41] This international agreement legitimates a "power structure that gives support to an emerging knowledge and information economy."[42] Globalization and the digital age thus brought copyrights and trademarks to the center of economic conflict. This is why many analysts view piracy as the greatest threat to national and global economies, or believe that the regulatory framework needs to change.[43] Lawrence Lessig's *Free Culture*, for instance, is a well-known book on new scenarios that the internet has generated regarding copyrights and the free exchange of ideas.[44] For him, current laws are used by corporations to "lock down culture and control creativity."

At the same time, the production of unauthorized copies is a highly stigmatized activity.[45] Nevertheless, it is a major economic force everywhere and not only in the so-called "developing nations."[46] Here we enter the realm of the appropriation of flows of global wealth by the grass roots, by people who participate in what I call "economic globalization from below" and "the non-hegemonic world system."[47] What is behind the unauthorized copies of a Louis Vuitton purse or of DVDs sold in street markets almost everywhere?

"Trader-tourists" and street vendors of global gadgets, for instance, are but the tip of the iceberg of economic globalization from below which, in turn, is part of the non-hegemonic world system. I call their activities non-hegemonic because they defy the economic establishment everywhere. Their occupations are considered illegal, as "smuggling." In consequence, these trading networks and markets are seen as illegitimate and are confronted with repression in the name of legality. The commodities traded are usually classified as piracy. Sometimes, they are simulacra of "superlogos," i.e. highly desired global brands controlled by major transnational corporations in order to retain monopolistic niches in the global market.[48] The difference between the prices of original superlogo items and fake ones is the source of a profit margin that makes working in the non-hegemonic world system worthwhile. Economic globalization from

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41 Leal and Souza 2010.
42 Leal and Souza 2010, 15.
43 See for instance Johns 2009.
44 Lessig 2004.
45 See for instance Naím 2005.
46 Johns 2009, 14.
47 Ribeiro 2007 and 2011; see also Mathews, Ribeiro, and Vega 2012.
48 Chang 2004.

below provides access to flows of global wealth that otherwise would not reach the more vulnerable ranks of any society.

Economic globalization from below is made up of 1) nodes, i.e., of markets where global gadgets and copies of superlogos are sold, 2) flows among such nodes, typically connected by way of migratory networks and diasporas such as the Chinese and Lebanese ones, and 3) of production centers. Larger nodes of the system feed smaller ones in a trickle-down fashion. The totality of the activities within these markets, routes, and production centers of globalization from below comprises what I call the "non-hegemonic world system."[49] One may find nodes of this non-hegemonic world system as large as the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, or in the city of Dubai—both markets that move billions of dollars annually—or in areas of major cities such as China Town in New York and in small street markets scattered on the sidewalks and squares of major metropolises of the world.[50] These are (i)llicit activities, i.e., they are considered illegal by the state and the economic establishment, but they are socially accepted and viewed as legitimate by their practitioners, who do not consider themselves criminals.[51] The main production centers that feed these global networks are located in Asia, in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and especially China. The province of Guangdong, China, is the center of the non-hegemonic world system.

What's in a copy?

Campaigns against piracy are expressions of a crisis of the notion of property and of related normative frameworks that are central to the reproduction of capitalism.[52] This is why copying is taken so seriously by the economic and political establishment. Unauthorized copies of commodities are subversive forces. They denounce the arbitrariness of the extraordinary profits that trademark and copyright allow; they make the promise of consumption to everyone more feasible through unregulated means and defy the monopoly and privilege that the largest corporations in the world hope to maintain. In the end, copying is also a political issue as the expressions "copyright" and "copyleft" make clear. Indeed, the struggle to free copies and innovation processes from the hold of powerful corporations is basically a political struggle.[53]

Ultimately, the main issue at stake is whether we want to live in a world completely colonized by flexible capitalism, with its tremendous copying capacity and voracious desire to control intellectual property. It seems we are almost there. I see two possible outcomes, both of which are, in

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49 Ribeiro 2007.
50 Ribeiro 2006a, 2006b.
51 Abraham and Van Schendel 2005.
52 Boon 2010; Johns 2009.
53 Evangelista 2010.

one way or another, related to the efficacy of commodification. The first could be called "hyperfetishism," meaning the hyper efficacy of fetishism in a world completely colonized by copies without originals, and by their central role in accumulation within the cutting-edge sectors of electronic and computer capitalism. In such a realm, no one would really care about alienation. The current almost complete disappearance of this term is an indication of what I just said. The other outcome is what I would call "hyperanimism," or a return to the metaphysics of animism among the moderns.[54] One expression of hyperanimism is the prestige currently enjoyed by some theories that attribute agency to things. Perhaps it is a reaction to a world where copies have no originals but algorithms, a reaction to the possibility of a shallow world, finally and completely disenchanted, in which human clones may exist.

There are other dilemmas brought on by the enhanced capacity of copying. I argued that the very notion of author as originator,[55] as someone who gives existence to something, is being challenged by the rise of collective and anonymous global forms of creation. I also argued that the notion of authenticity is being challenged by the disappearance of the original and of genuineness. It is hard to anticipate what a world without authors and authenticity would be like. Would it be a world with a more collective sense of membership?

Finally, copies compel us to think about the dialectics between difference and similarity as necessary features for perceiving and acting in the world. On the one hand, if everything were the same, it would be impossible to distinguish any particular part of the real world from another—it would be something akin to experiencing a void space where recognition through contrast would be nonexistent. On the other hand, if all things were different from each other, it would be impossible to predict form, function, and process—it would be something akin to experiencing an overwhelming chaotic space where all our energies would be spent on understanding the uniqueness of everything and where recognition through resemblance would be nonexistent. In short, I consider copying a total social fact, to borrow Marcel Mauss's terms.[56] It is an activity that has economic, sociological, psychological, cultural, artistic, scientific, legal, academic, and political implications. Indeed, mimesis is a fundamental quality of human life in every regard. If it is true that copying has always been central to social, cultural, and economic life—and is becoming increasingly more so—it is hard

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54 I am aware of Fabian's (1983) critique about the use of "animism." My use of the term does not imply a negation of the coevalness, nor is it meant to be an invective. For me, what is at stake here is not the notion of time nor its political and ethnographic usage. Rather, what is at stake are the different understandings of humankind's capabilities of changing natural and social realities by means of human labor.

55 Schwartz 1998, 248.

56 Mauss 1973.

not to conclude that we are on the verge of a great change in the way we perceive and react to the role of copying in the reproduction of our lives.

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Patrice Ladwig

Mimetic Theories, Representation, and "Savages:" Critiques of the Enlightenment and Modernity Through the Lens of Primitive Mimesis

Abstract   This essay explores the "primitive" sources of mimetic theory. With a focus on concepts of imitation and representation, it discusses how ethnographic and imaginary depictions of allegedly primitive and tribal societies influenced the theorizing of mimesis in different historical periods. The first part argues that, during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, understandings of mimesis and representation evolved that put an emphasis on their mechanical, and potentially deceptive, features. Discourses on the fetishist and imitative practices of indigenous societies were based on these assumptions, and in the course of colonial expansion, substantiated claims of civilizational superiority. With reference to late nineteenth and early twentieth-century anthropology, the following part of the essay explores James Frazer's theory of imitative magic and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's concept of mystical participation. Whereas differences regarding notions of imitation and representation here still mark the evolution from primitive to modern society, later developments turn these ideas on their heads: critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment, especially in the works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno of the Frankfurt School of critical theory before WWII, postulate that mimesis and animist representations have been repressed. Like other accounts of primitivism, these theories suppose that they are still present in primitive societies, but that their vanishing in modernity have lead to alienation. The final part argues that claims of civilizational superiority on the one hand, and anxiety over increasing alienation on the other, have now been critically reviewed in the theorizing of mimesis and representation, but that current discussions on authenticity and originality are still marked by traces of primitivism.

Keywords   Mimesis, primitivism, representation, anthropology

Introduction

> *Side by side with the view of the world as pervaded by spiritual forces,*
> *primitive man has another conception in which we may detect a germ*
> *of the modern notion of natural law [...] The germ of which I speak is*
> *involved in that sympathetic magic, as it may be called, which plays*
> *a large part in most systems of superstition. One of the principles of*
> *sympathetic magic is that any effect may be produced by imitating*
> *it. To take a few instances: If it is wished to kill a person an image of*
> *him is made and then destroyed; and it is believed that through a cer-*
> *tain physical sympathy between the person and his image, the man*
> *feels the injuries done to the image as if they were done to his own*
> *body, and that when it is destroyed he must simultaneously perish.*[1]

When James Frazer—considered one of the founding fathers of anthropol-
ogy—published *The Golden Bough* in 1890, the book became a large suc-
cess and was widely read beyond purely academic circles. Intellectuals like
T. S. Elliot and Sigmund Freud were inspired by the work, which surveyed
a huge mass of historical and ethnographic accounts from all around the
world.[2] The aim of Frazer's undertaking was to compare customs and
beliefs on a global scale, and to investigate their common logics. Primarily
referring to ancient societies and ethnographic reports from "primitive"
and "savage" societies,[3] he presented the modern reader with an array of
seemingly bizarre customs, rites, and beliefs. His account of various forms
of magic also included many references to imitation that became part of
his famous definition of sympathetic magic. By referring to rain-making
ceremonies, voodoo dolls, the making of effigies, and so forth, he pointed
to their common features and postulated that mimesis and imitation were
essential for their understanding.

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1   Frazer 1894, 9.
2   I thank Corinna Forberg and Philipp Stockhammer for their invitation to Heidel-
     berg, but especially for their patience. Christoph Brumann's final reading of the
     text and his funny comments helped me to correct many mistakes and unclear
     formulations. Many of the ideas developed in this essay are based on discus-
     sions with colleagues from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
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     Lisbon (ICS-UL), Portugal. The joint project 'Colonialism and Mimetic Processes
     in Historical and Anthropological Perspectives' was funded by the German Aca-
     demic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Portuguese Acções Integradas Luso-
     Alemãs (FUP/CRUP) (project reference A-07/2011). Finally, thanks to the German
     Agentur für Arbeit for unemployment benefits that enabled me to meander
     around and get lost in the writings of Lévy-Bruhl, Benjamin, Kant, Adorno, and
     others.
3   Throughout this essay, I will use the terms "primitive" and "savage" without
     quotation marks. From anthropology's beginnings as an academic subject,
     as well as in public discourse, this designated small-scale, mostly non-literate
     tribal societies that are today variously labeled as "indigenous peoples," "ethnic
     minorities," etc. As will become clear in the course of this essay, many of the
     accounts of these societies, especially in the time frame under discussion here,
     were products of the Western ethnographic imagination, which at times has
     little to do with the societies in question.

At the end of the nineteenth century, these societies were, on the one hand, deemed primitive for their practices of imitative magic and their belief in fetishes or effigies. Early anthropology, comparative religion, and scholars such as Edward Tylor and James Frazer postulated that these cultures represented mankind in its early stages, similar to European prehistoric cultures.[4] In this view, the savages had a limited capacity for logical thinking and were undeveloped types of the civilized mind. Magical thinking and its imitative rites were considered to be the lowest evolutionary stage of mankind. On the other hand, images of the noble savage had been part of the public imagination for a long time, and the numerous accounts show that the trope was essential for constituting modernity in opposition to a primitive "other."[5] Some of these accounts argued that this other was still capable of mimetic and animistic thinking, allegedly lost among civilized societies. Consequently, indigenous populations and their mimetic cultures were also used as a contrast to modern life, marked by alienation, social fragmentation, and the disappearance of mimesis.

Despite the diversity of these encounters and their distorted representations in the context of colonialism, missionary work, travel accounts, and early anthropological research, the information and imaginaries attached to the primitive also fed into Western theories of mimetic behavior. Confrontations with different systems of thinking in which mimetic processes could be observed spurred wider discussions on what imitation might mean in human culture beyond the "West." Mathew Potolsky proposes that, through this encounter, remarkable differences to the Western Enlightenment and its ideas of mimesis and representation became apparent. The mimetic behavior attributed to indigenous people was considered foreign to the scientific world-view of the Enlightenment, as in these systems of thinking "magical copies have real properties and genuine powers on their own. They belong to a network of reciprocal sympathies and material embodiments, not a hierarchical ladder of rational forms and material embodiments."[6] Like Birgit Mersmann's essay in this volume, which explores the relations of particular cultures to the concepts of copy and original in the field of art and heritage, I understand imitation and mimesis as processes that are subject to remarkable shifts under the conditions of modernity that also re-negotiate these concepts and the relationships between cultures.

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4 For the process of "othering" based on ideas of time and progress, see Fabian (1983).
5 Although the simple opposition of the "West" and the "other" is a simplification of sorts, I think it makes sense in the context I will discuss here. See Eric Wolf (1982) for a seminal account of the relationship of European expansion and primitives, and Huhndorf (2001) for the idea of the Indian "noble savage" in American culture. Numerous studies have also analyzed the impact of these images on European intellectuals and artistic culture. See Torgovnick (1991).
6 Potolsky 2006, 139.

Although mimetic theory has been a prominent topic in recent and current anthropological studies[7], this essay sets out to explore the "primitive sources" of mimetic theory and their link to early anthropological accounts of indigenous societies. Focusing on a period stretching from the Enlightenment to the critical theory of the early Frankfurt School, this essay will take a somewhat selective perspective. However, by following the thread of the two interrelated questions of mimesis and representation, I hope to show that the reflection on, and appropriation of, descriptions of primitive mimesis and representation were essential for both the constitution and later critique of the Enlightenment project. I argue that we deal here with what Christoph Wulf has called (with reference to Wittgenstein) the "family resemblance" of theories of mimesis, describing the changing understandings of mimesis in different contexts and historical eras.[8] This implies that the reception, interpretation, and subsequent theorizing of descriptions of mimetic behavior among primitives are strongly embedded into modernity's ambivalent self-reflections. On the one hand, it is a discourse of superiority and progress and, on the other hand, a melancholic self-critique circling around ideas of loss and alienation.

In order to explore the reception of primitive mimesis, the first part of this essay will discuss some basic definitions of mimesis, especially its Platonic and Enlightenment genealogies. Here, I will show that the evolvement of the hierarchical relationship of original and copy and the negative connotations of imitation and representation are based on important epistemic shifts linked, for example, to the Reformation and the Enlightenment. I largely remain in the domain of conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), but will then, in the following part, embed these views into social developments of the time, which I will approach from two angles: first, I shall start with the understanding of primitive "fetishes" in the eighteenth century, and I will then move on to early anthropological theories of magic and their reference to imitative behavior. James Frazer's notion of sympathetic magic and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's notion of mystical participation will be discussed with reference to several ethnographic examples. The final part will explore to what extent certain forms of primitivism become crucial for critiques of the Enlightenment and modernity. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's account of mimesis in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and Walter Benjamin's work on the "mimetic faculty" will here serve as examples that use a specific reading of the ethnography

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7   See Lempert (2014), for an excellent overview for imitation and its various uses in social anthropological theory, and Roque (2015) for a very useful overview of studies employing mimesis in a colonial context. See also the now seminal works of Michael Taussig (1992; 1987) on colonialism, mimesis, and resistance. Recent approaches have also emphasized constructions of identity via mimetic processes (Harrison 2006).

8   Information taken from the website of Christoph Wulf. Last modified July 24, 2012. Accessed February 20, 2017. http://www.christophwulf.de.

of primitive mimesis, in order to reevaluate and radically question the Enlightenment and modernity.

Mimesis, representation, and the shift toward ambivalent meaning

Mimesis has a long genealogy in theorizing art and society; several excellent studies that give an overview of the diverse histories of the concept have been published.[9] For centuries, the concept was dominant in discussions relating to art, theatre, painting, and literature.[10] The Oxford English Dictionary defines mimesis as "imitative representation of the real world in art and literature," and as "the deliberate imitation of the behavior of one group of people by another as a factor in social change." Behind these seemingly straightforward definitions lingers a history that covers an intellectual terrain reaching from classical Greek philosophy, in Plato's and Aristotle's works, to issues of copyright and originality in the contemporary digital age. But with every inclusive concept that has such a long and diverse history, its application and use have also changed considerably and are therefore subject to a certain fuzziness. According to Christoph Wulf,[11] the term mimesis has its roots in Sicily (the place of origin of the *mimos*) and only later entered Greek thought. He proposes that originally, it probably referred to burlesque and clownish performances of scenes taken from the everyday life of peasants that were performed for the entertainment of the wealthy.

If Alfred North Whitehead's exaggerated dictum that "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to *Plato*" contains at least some truth,[12] then a critical reflection on the concept of mimesis and its various transformations has to take Plato's essentially ambivalent understanding into account. Plato's view of mimesis is manifold and not as reductionist as I might depict it here. It operates on several levels, and at times with contradictory implications.[13] Generally speaking, in Plato's *Republic* we are told that positive mimesis has educational and socializing functions.[14] However, uncontrolled and chaotic mimesis (unnecessary craft-making, imitating nature

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9   Potolsky 2006; Gebauer and Wulf 1992.
10 For literature, see Erich Auerbach's (1953) classic account.
11 Wulf 2015, 15.
12 Whitehead 1979, 39.
13 See also Gebauer and Wulf (1992, 25–30) on the plurality of meanings of mimesis in Plato. They state that "in addition to imitation, representation, and expression, there is also emulation, transformation, the creation of similarity, the production of appearances, and illusion" (Gebauer and Wulf 1992, 25).
14 See Plato's *Republic* (Plato 1992), especially Books II and III on the basic and vague definition of imitation. The ban of certain forms of poetry from the polis is treated in Book III. In Book X, this ban is extended to all poetry.

sounds, etc.) is seen critically.[15] Homer's images of gods and demi-gods are seen as blasphemous, and chosen as an imitation of bad examples that have to be controlled by the guardians of the *polis*.[16] Here, the link between mimesis and ideas about representation becomes relevant: like in Plato's allegory of the cave, art is seen as an imitation of an imitation in the sense that art copies the world of phenomena, which in itself is already an imitation of the "real."[17] Art and its imitative representations of "original reality" are therefore subject to a double removal, and the illusion produced by art is seen as potentially deceptive and therefore inferior.[18] Hence, mimesis is understood as an act that potentially corrupts and deceives the real, and therefore has to be controlled.[19]

I think that some of Plato's "negative" features of mimesis have had a crucial influence on Enlightenment discourses, and were and still are present in modern disguise. Mathew Potolsky has detected traces of this understanding of mimesis in a variety of modern theories, and rightly points out that mimesis is, in some of these approaches, still a slave to its (at times distorted) Platonic genealogy. The implicit assumption is that mimetic behavior produces inferior copies of something else more original, and that it results in misrepresentations. In Marx's view, for example, Potolsky argues that "the accounts of social mimesis […] remain within the Platonic tradition of treating mimesis as a source of deception and a false representation of reality."[20]

How were these Platonic features of mimesis transmitted, and in which social and philosophical context did this transmission take place? While the Aristotelian-inspired view of mimesis remained crucial until the Middle Ages,[21] traces of Plato's account of mimesis and its negative connotations resurfaced later in a variety of approaches. Especially with the coming of the Renaissance, we witness a turn to Plato and a reevaluation of mimetic behavior. The translation of mimesis into the Latin *imitatio* puts the focus on the mechanical and "fake" character of mimesis,[22] and Renaissance writers discover imitation as a central concept but not as original and creative behavior. Imitation becomes a topic of parodies of outdated, mechanical behavior such as in Cervantes's *Don Quixote*. This and other works explore "the failure of imitation" in an age where old social orders—like knighthood in Cervantes's case—became destabilized and gave way

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15 Plato 1992, Book II, 395c–397e; also Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 25–30.
16 Plato 1992, Book II, 377e–392c; see also Wulf 1997, 1017.
17 For the allegory of the cave, see Plato 1992, Book VII.
18 Plato 1992, Book X, 596e–602c.
19 On the corrupting features of mimesis see Plato 1992, Book X, 602c–608b.
20 Potolsky 2006, 138.
21 We find Aristotle's work on "poesies" a more positive account of mimesis. Aristotle understood mimesis as a natural behavior and considered representations as essential for processes of learning and socialization in general, as for example in the cathartic functions of theater; it is conceptualized as a natural human inclination or instinct.
22 Wulf 1997, 1020.

to new ideas and values.[23] Michel Foucault interprets Don Quixote's mad behavior in epistemic terms. In the context of the great epistemological shift of the late sixteenth century, when the interplay of resemblance and sign was redefined, "language breaks off its old kinship with things and enters into that lonely sovereignty."[24] Don Quixote still acts according to the old order of things and epistemes,[25] and therefore appears as a madman. Stephen Halliwell argues that the translation to imitation (and, one might add, its embeddedness into the ruptures of social orders and new epistemes) changed the concept to such a degree that, for several centuries, its negative connotations became emphasized: "No greater obstacle now stands in the way of a sophisticated understanding of all the varieties of mimeticism, both ancient and modern, than the negative associations that tend to colour the still regrettably standard translation of mimesis as 'imitation,' or its equivalent in any modern language."[26]

In an over-generalizing manner, one could state that, especially with the coming of Enlightenment, many of the negative features of imitation again come to the fore. The Enlightenment and modernity put emphasis on an independent, rational subject,[27] which has itself freed from superstition and the bonds of tradition. According to Immanuel Kant, who in 1784 famously defined Enlightenment as "the escape of men from their self-imposed immaturity, especially set in matters of religion,"[28] one of the main reasons for the regrettable condition of mankind is the habit of imitating the traditions of previous generations.[29]

During the Enlightenment, however, it is not the transformation of the understanding of mimesis that signals a change; the shift primarily becomes visible in new ideas about representation and perception. A self-conscious subject that surveys the outer world arises, and sets new standards for how the world as an objectified entity is perceived. Concomitantly, representation evolves as a separation of essence and external

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23 Potolsky 2006, 60.
24 Foucault 1994, 49.
25 Foucault defines episteme as a priori knowledge, a matrix on which knowledge and discourses becomes possible is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of the possibility of all knowledge (Foucault 1994, 168).
26 Halliwell 2002, 13.
27 Modernity here acts as a term defining a period that, depending on one's perspective, starts with the French Revolution and the Enlightenment. In this essay, it also comes to take on meanings that delineate modernity from primitiveness and act as a specific narrative to legitimize Western domination. Similar to the idea of civilization, the term has now become pluralized in order to weaken its Eurocentric associations. See Eisenstadt (2003) for the idea of multiple modernities.
28 Kant 2013, 8. In this understanding, a large part of humanity was still marked by their "minority of age" (*Minderjährigkeit*) and "legal or civil immaturity."
29 Kant's account of innovation and genius in Western history here serves as a good example: imitation is seen as the antidote to innovation, as true innovation progresses through the genius who, in an authentic manner, advances through his own reason without imitating others. See Potolsky 2006, 67.

form, of truth and its various appearances. In Kant's philosophy,[30] the things in themselves (*Dinge an sich*) are now unknowable:

> In reinterpreting the cognitive subject, Kant extends the modern causal loop between things and ideas at the cost of introducing a distinction between what appears and what is. In calling attention to the difference between objects of experience and knowledge on the one hand, and things in themselves on the other, Kant formulates a new and very powerful version of the old Platonic dualism between objects of experience and knowledge, between the world in which we live and the world we invoke to explain the world. This results in a new conception of the subject, the object, and the relation between them.[31]

In this view, objects are basically of interest because they "materialize and express otherwise immaterial or abstract entities, organizing subjects' perpetual experiences and clarifying their cognitions. The very materiality of objects, their availability to the senses, is of interest primarily as the condition for the knowability of otherwise abstract or otherwise invisible structures."[32] This binary dimension of representation implies the division of truth and appearance.[33] Therefore, imitation is also bound up here with the question of representation, and again viewed as potentially corrupting, as it is in Plato. The anthropologist Johannes Fabian widens this focus on objects and includes a number of other points:

> Taken as a philosophical issue, the idea of representation implies the prior assumption of a difference between reality and its "doubles." Things are paired with images, concepts, or symbols, acts with rules and norms, events with structures. Traditionally, the problem with representations has been their "accuracy," the degree of fit between reality and its reproductions in the mind.[34]

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30 Philosophers and experts of Kantian and Platonic thought would probably dismiss my superficial reading here. Whether Kant returned to certain aspects of Plato's ideas (e.g. *noumenon*) has been discussed with much controversy. For a position that conforms to my understanding, see Rockmore (2011). For an opposing perspective that reads Kant in terms of his *Erkenntnistheorie* as essentially anti-Platonian, see Walter Patt (1997, 38–39).
31 Rockmore 2011, 45.
32 Keane 2006, 198.
33 Michel Foucault has traced this development and its shifts in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in terms of the relationship between signifier and signified: "This new arrangement brought about the appearance of a new problem, unknown until then: in the sixteenth century one asked oneself how it was possible to know that the sign did in fact designate what it signified; from the seventeenth century, one began to ask how a sign could be linked to what it signified. A question to which the Classical period was to reply by the analysis of representation, and to which modern thought was to reply by the analysis of meaning and signification." Foucault 1994, 43.
34 Fabian 1990, 753–754.

I think, however, that the Kantian stance described above can rather be seen as one of the endpoints of century-long problematizations that had very concrete, historical implications. Whereas my reading of the changes that mimesis and representation underwent from the perspective of Enlightenment epistemology has been rather limited and selective due its focus on philosophical questions, those previous changes were not present in discourses among philosophy experts alone. The question to what extent, if at all, images could actually represent gods, holy objects, etc. is of an earlier date. Historically speaking, the numerous theological discussions that circle around the problem of imitation and representation were part of major shifts in the understanding of religion in Europe.[35] An important point of crystallization of these questions can be located, for example, in the transformations that came with the Reformation. In some interpretations of Protestantism, the outer world, and especially its religious iconicity as in Catholicism, becomes devalued and belief is increasingly defined as an inner condition located in the subject.[36] Some Protestant movements (led by Calvin or Zwingli, for example) developed strong forms of iconoclasm. In the years following the initial Reformation (especially between 1520 and 1570), iconoclastic riots took place all over Europe.[37] Likewise, discourses for or against consubstantiation and transubstantiation in the context of the Eucharist focused the problem of representation to a specific debate and were important points of controversy in the development of Christian theologies. Are bread and wine really the body of Christ, or are they just representative and symbolic of it? Is the rite of participating in the Eucharist a mimetic act in which, through an exchange, the believer can participate?[38] As Corinna Forberg's discussion in this volume with reference to courtly representations of kings in Europe and emperors in Asia shows, art was another field in which these discussions became central.

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35 Carlo Ginzburg (1991) gives a very interesting overview of the changing connotations of representation to which I will return later. On the practical level of ritual, see Ralph Giesey's (1960) excellent discussion on changes in the understanding of effigies as representing the king in the royal funeral ceremonies in France. This also relates to the discussion of the notion of the "king's two bodies" in Ernst Kantorowicz's (1997) work on representation in medieval political theology. See also Corinna Forberg's contribution in this volume on the portrait of Louis XIV and her discussion of Kantorowicz and concepts of representation.

36 See, for example, the discussions on belief and their applicability in anthropology in Needham (1972) and, more recently, in Linquist and Coleman (2008).

37 See Besançon's (2009) study on the intellectual history of iconoclasm.

38 Proponents of consubstantiation—often arguing in the context of the Reformation—advocate that, during the sacrament, the substance of the body and blood of Christ are present alongside the bread and wine, which remain present through their taste, smell, etc. Transubstantiation postulates that, through consecration by the priest, one set of substances (bread and wine) is substituted (or exchanged) for the body and blood of Christ. Positions on this concept vary among churches. See Wandel (2005) for a historical study of this controversy since the Reformation.

Although these processes were never overarching, complete, or followed a simple teleology, one could state in general terms that, at the end of these complex developments, we arrive at a rather new epistemology: after centuries of religious quarrels and wars, new ways of conceptualizing the relationship between external world and the subject evolved with the Enlightenment. The subject has to be overcome in order to free itself from the bonds of tradition and belief, and the gap between subject and object widens. Objects can still "symbolize" meanings and "stand for something."[39] However, the notion of an active presence of a living entity in, for example, an effigy gradually disappears. Concomitantly, mimesis undergoes a similar shift, namely from a term that at the beginning denoted an act of creatively forging links between subject and object, to a more reductionist, even pejorative understanding of imitation. Although this development was by no means universal, it laid the groundwork for cultural encounters with primitives that were still clinging to mimetic practices and said to believe in the living qualities of certain objects.

Images of the primitive: Mimetic thinking and its savage sources

Many of the discussed intellectual and religious developments were paralleled by an increasing European domination in various parts of the world. With a very selective focus on the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century, I want to explore in this part how depictions of indigenous, allegedly primitive societies were worked into a variety of European ideas surrounding mimesis and representation. First, I shall discuss how a discourse on fetishism as a form of illogical imitation and representation evolved in the context of the Enlightenment and European expansion. Secondly, I will discuss how early anthropology as a discipline interpreted these mimetic practices in the context of James Frazer's theory of magic and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's idea of a primitive mentality.[40] Here, both by delivering ethnographic data and actively theorizing mimesis and imitation, anthropology became one of the mediators between the European Enlightenment and a primitive other.

The work of mimesis as an intercultural process itself is marked by encountering cultural "others" (in texts or in "reality"); information about them is partially appropriated and set into a new context. The other's imitative practices become part of the European way of theorizing mimesis and

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39 See Ladwig (2012) for different understandings of symbols and representations in modernity.
40 I will here take a rather generalizing perspective on anthropology as a subject. What the subject had in common in its early phase was its focus on allegedly primitive societies in non-Western societies. This focus has been largely lost in contemporary anthropology and the subject has developed a multiplicity of agendas that involves work on modernity and urbanity, kinship, genetics, etc.

representation. Ideas of nineteenth and early twentieth-century anthropology entered into a range of academic disciplines and the arts. E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, Frazer's *Golden Bough*, and Lévy-Bruhl's *How Natives Think* were widely discussed, and influenced literature, the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences.[41] The theorizing of mimesis on the basis of accounts of cultural "others" is exposed to power relations which are already visible in the production of ethnographic information itself and its reception among European thinkers and artists. The overwhelming part of the data was drawn from travel descriptions and missionary reports, and not from ethnographic fieldwork. Fritz Kramer has coined the term "imaginary ethnography" in relation to nineteenth-century accounts. He sees in them "moments of a naive metaphysics, that in some respects continue the fantasies of heaven and hell of European Christianity."[42] However, after the rise of the natural sciences and the Enlightenment he also locates in these ethnographic narratives a longing for a counterpart to the "radical rational culture of Europe."[43]

One of the best examples of establishing a distinction between enlightenment civilization and its primitive antipodes is the discourse that was constructed around "fetishes." Taken to be emblematic of the pre-logical thinking of, for example, "Africans," fetishism was, in the popular evolutionary schemes, located at the lowest level of development, with polytheism and monotheism being later stages of development. Fetishes were taken to be "false" copies of something they could not be. Objects such as stones, Voodoo dolls amulets, and so forth were, in indigenous conceptions, seen as active and living "copies" of persons. They were produced through acts of imitation, in which mimesis created a lasting link between original and copy. Often replicating not external forms but their "spiritual essence," enlightenment thinking understood them as false representations that were grounded in the illogical thinking of the natives. William Pietz has traced the genealogy of the idea of the fetish to the sixteenth and seventeenth century, in the context of Portuguese and Dutch expeditions to West Africa. He defines the fetish as "the problematic of the social value of material objects as revealed in situations formed by the encounter of radically heterogeneous social systems,"[44] but also works out a history-of-ideas approach to fetishism, and speaks of the "fetish theory of enlightenment" that evolved at the end of the eighteenth century. Interestingly, the belief in fetishes was not only attributed to primitives, but also delivered fodder for the protestant critiques of idolatry in Catholicism that I already briefly alluded to in the previous part:

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41 For the status and impact of early British social anthropology, especially Tylor and Frazer, see George W. Stocking's (1992, 40–41) excellent reflection on the history of anthropology.
42 Kramer 1981, 111.
43 Kramer 1981, 111.
44 Pietz 1985, 7.

> The discourse of the fetish has always been a critical discourse about the false objective values of a culture from which the speaker is personally distanced. Such was the negative force of revaluation when Portuguese Catholics named African religious and social objects "feiticos," and such was the force when commodity-minded Dutch, French, and English Protestants identified African religious objects and Catholic sacramental objects equally as fetishes, thereby preparing the way for the general fetish theory of the enlightenment.[45]

The reports of travelers, merchants, slave traders, and missionaries also found their ways into the philosophical writings of the enlightenment, and accounts of fetishism became one of the preferred markers of distinction between civilization and primitiveness. Immanuel Kant gives an excellent example: first, he discusses the alleged lack of development among "the negroes of Africa" due to their racial inferiority. One implicit assumption here is, I think, that the reproduction of traditions through imitation produces a kind of stasis. Secondly, he postulates that the difference regarding mental capacities produces a kind of cognitive distortion in which "things" are taken for living entities (fetishes) worthy of veneration. In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* from 1764, Kant elaborates:

> The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality [...] So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in colour. The religion of fetishes so widespread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry that sinks as deeply into the trifling as appears to be possible to human nature. A bird's feather, a cow's horn, a conch shell, or any other common object, as soon as it becomes consecrated by a few words, is an object of veneration and of invocation in swearing oaths. The blacks are very vain but in the Negro's way, and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other with thrashings.[46]

In a similar way, G.W.F. Hegel proposed in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, given between 1821 and 1831, that Africans are not capable of imagining anything greater than man, and therefore concluded that

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45 Pietz 1985, 14.
46 Kant 1960, 110–111.

fetish worship was the only religion they were able to develop.[47] Closely linked to the idea of the fetish, magic became another favorite topic of analysis, and also marks the beginning of the anthropological theorizing of religion under the influence of evolutionism and colonialism.[48] James Frazer surveyed a mass of ethnographic reports and mythologies from all around the world, and a great number of descriptions related to beliefs and rituals in which a created image (effigies, puppets, etc.) is thought to catch the essence of an object it represents, so that what is done to the image is thought to be done to the object. Through mimetic enactment, the object "represents" what is perceived as absent (from the perspective of the Enlightenment thinker); it gives the object a sort of life and reality, invoked through mimesis. Frazer subsumes them in his major work *The Golden Bough* under the notion of "sympathetic magic." He proposes that, in these magical practices, imitation and similarity play a key role.[49] He elaborates:

> If we analyze the principles of thought on which magic is based, they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and, second, that things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed. The former principle may be called the Law of Similarity, the latter the Law of Contact or Contagion. From the first of these principles, namely the Law of Similarity, the magician infers that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it: from the second he infers that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not.[50]

Frazer's work was one of the first efforts to systematize a large body of ethnographic and historical accounts, and also included an exegesis of Greek mythology. However, its perspective on magic was still close to accounts of fetishism. From the standpoint of the Enlightenment, Frazer concluded that "magic is a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive art."[51] He saw magic as the most basic level in the evolution of mankind. Religion was already a sign of a higher complexity of thinking, superseded by the scientific view of the world. As a "dispassionate observer" who studied these customs

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47 On Hegel's images of Africa in these lectures, see Susan Buck-Moriss (2009). On Hegel's extensive treatment of fetishes, see Teshale Tibebu's study on Hegel and his role in the making of Eurocentric world history (2011, 192–193).

48 The history of social anthropology as an academic and applied subject is closely linked to the colonial project (Asad 1973; Said 1978). See also Fabian (1983, 11–12) on notions of time and evolution in early anthropology.

49 Frazer 1894, 52.

50 Frazer 1894, 48.

51 Frazer 1894, 39.

and myths, he still concluded that one "can hardly regard it otherwise than as a standing menace to civilization."[52] Sigmund Freud later used some of Frazer's ideas and descriptions, and incorporated them into his *Totem and Taboo* (1913) with the telling subtitle *Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics,* comparing the level of consciousness among primitives with that of children*.*

Whereas parts of the British school of social anthropology still adhered to an evolutionary paradigm, the French philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1859-1939) had a somewhat different agenda. Trained as a philosopher, but also active in French sociology and anthropology, he is mainly known for his works on the "primitive mentality" and concepts such as "mystical participation." His major publications such as *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (1910) and *La mentalité primitive* (1922) seem to suggest a strong evolutionary bias, which later anthropologists described as "a horrific example for the miscomprehension of a scientific discourse."[53] As an armchair anthropologist, he assembled (similar to Frazer) a huge mass of ethnographic reports and tried to explore the mental functions at the base of a wide range of phenomena such as totemism, magic and magically-loaded objects, shamanism, belief in ghosts and effigies, and the return of the dead. He understood his work not as an effort to classify primitives into an evolutionary scheme like Frazer, but as an attempt to compare modern ways of thinking about the world with primitive ones. The latter also included references to Chinese, ancient Greek, and Hindu traditions. Postulating a great gap between primitive and scientific thinking, he especially referred to phenomena of non-distinction and suggested that primitive man lives in a non-dual, animistic universe in which matter and mind are not divided—a standpoint which has been heavily criticized due to its generality and exoticizing effects.[54] These "pre-logical" systems of thinking, as he labeled them, constitute the "collective representations of the primitive" that "differ profoundly from our ideas or concepts; nor are they the equivalent of them."[55] Unlike in societies where scientific thinking has become the dominant way of seeing the world, these collective representations are based on animistic principles, and do not distinguish between dream and reality, subject and object, and mind and matter. Although missionaries, travelers, and anthropologists had crafted reports on these beliefs from all around the world, Lévy-Bruhl's starting point is that the facts described mostly remain alien to *our* form of thinking:

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52 Frazer 1894, 53.
53 Muenzel 2001, 250–251. Lévy-Bruhl proclaimed at other occasions: "Let us abandon the attempt to refer their mental activity to an inferior variety of our own" (1985, 76). See also the account of Edward Evans Pritchard (1971) for a more balanced view of Lévy-Bruhl's works.
54 For an overview of critiques of Lévy-Bruhl and re-interpretations, see Mousalimas (1990, 40–41).
55 Lévy-Bruhl 1923, 7.

> In the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both themselves and something other than themselves. In a fashion no less incomprehensible, they give forth and they receive mystic powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make themselves felt outside, without ceasing to remain where they are.[56]

As in Frazer's account, things can become "doubled" via imitation, and mimetic behavior and representation play an important role in Lévy-Bruhl's theorizing.[57] I will here discuss two sets of examples analyzed by Lévy-Bruhl: The first relates to his extensive treatment of ritual and religious dance performances that imitate ancestors and the departed. The second group of examples discusses the use of objects such as amulets that imitate the qualities of other objects or persons. Both discussions also relate to the concept of "representation" and ideas about fetishes.

In his chapters "Ceremonies and Dances" and "The Worship of Ancestors and the Dead,"[58] Lévy-Bruhl focuses on a notion of mimesis that today would be labeled "performative."[59] As an example, he takes an annual festival performed by the Kiwai (of Papua New Guinea), in which the masked males dress up as animals. Lévy-Bruhl cites the ethnography by Gunnar Landtman, who states that, among the Kiwai, "nearly all the outdoor dances can be called mimetic, inasmuch as they imitate actions from real life" and they display "great ingenuity, for the dancers do not just copy the various movements in a mechanical way."[60] In opposition to Frazer and other accounts of mimesis, imitation is not seen as mechanical here but as a kind of aesthetic expression. Lévy-Bruhl then explores another example of a dance ritual in more detail, taken from Theodor Koch-Grunberg's study of the Baniwa in Northwest Brazil:

> The idea of magic influence is at the basis of all these mimetic representations. They are destined to bring to the village and its inhabitants, their plantations, and to all the surrounding nature, blessing and fertility. From the circumstance that the dancer in his movements and gestures imitates, as faithfully as it is in his power to do, the being whom he endeavors to represent, he identifies himself with him. The magic power dwelling in the mask is transferred to the dancer, makes him a masterful "demon," capable of subduing "demons" or making them favorable to him.[61]

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56 Lévy-Bruhl 1984, 76–77.
57 In his posthumously-published notebooks, Lévy-Bruhl also makes more explicit references to Greek philosophic notions such as mimesis (Lévy-Bruhl 1975).
58 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 113–114 and 134–135, respectively.
59 Gebauer and Wulf (1995, 316) have linked performativity to mimesis and focus on body-related motions, rhythms, gestures, and sounds.
60 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 122.
61 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 127.

The performance of the rite demands an effort to copy the movements of other beings, and the mask worn during the rite gives the dancer a new identity via mimetic transfer. Moving on to his analysis of this and similar rites, Lévy-Bruhl states that "by imitating what their mythical ancestors have done in certain circumstances, and reproducing their gestures and their acts, these natives are in communion with them and actually participating in their substance."[62] He elaborates further:

> Is it possible to penetrate yet further into the significance of these ceremonies and these magico-propitiatory dances? For there seems to be no doubt that in nearly all such dances the wearers of these masks represent "ghosts," that is, save in exceptional cases, the dead or the ancestral spirits. Now the word "represent" must be understood here in its literal etymological sense—that in which the primitives would take it if they used it: to re-present, to cause to reappear that which has disappeared. As long as the actors and dancers wear these masks, and from the mere fact that they cover their faces, they are not only the representatives of the dead and the ancestors whom these masks portray: for the time being, they actually become these dead and these ancestors. To primitives, as we know, bi-presence is not an inconceivable, or even unnatural idea.[63]

Here, imitating the moves of ancestors is not just a mere representation or performance but a kind of immersion into a role that does not allow for any distance between past and present, self and other, the living and the dead. Mimesis here mediates between these (at least to our perception) separate domains. In the quote above, Lévy-Bruhl alludes to the fact that representation has, etymologically speaking, an interesting double meaning, which Carlo Ginzburg and Raymond Williams refer to as well: on the one hand, it describes in an older translation "the efficacious presence of something," and on the other hand its "standing for something that is actually not present."[64] Lévy-Bruhl deems the first meaning as more suited to his case. Then, *pace* the concept of representation that evolved during the enlightenment and the reformation,[65] imitative acts as ritual performances have an efficacious character according to Lévy-Bruhl, and are not mechanical acts that produce inferior copies of originals.

Coming back to the discussion of the fetish as a living object, we can note that a similar conclusion is drawn by Lévy-Bruhl in relation to magically charged objects and the principle of what he (somewhat misleadingly) labels mystical participation. Imitation here is not necessarily a copy

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62 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 115.
63 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 123–124.
64 Ginzburg 1991, 1219–1220; see also William 1983, 267.
65 Carlo Ginzburg (1991, 1226–1227) has argued that the evolvement of the second meaning (absence) can, in general, be attributed to the Jewish-Christian vision of icons even before the Reformation.

of another object's exterior form, but the act of copying aims at the force inherent to that object. Giving the example of the production of amulets among the Eskimos of Greenland,[66] in which certain qualities of animals are copied into an object, he notes,

> The amulet does more than merely represent the animal or human being which it imitates or by which it is made. The amulet is alive, because it has been made during the recitation of a charm or spell, when the dominating qualities of the animal or the part of the body have been invoked; the power of these qualities is at any rate potentially present in the animal. It evidently makes no great difference whether it is the thing (animal) itself or an imitation which is used as an amulet; it has the same power.[67]

Lévy-Bruhl gives numerous other examples which are comparable to the relationship between an "original" human being and its effigy-copy. He understands them as expressions of the *mentalité primitive* in which "the reality of the similitude is of the same kind as the original—that is, essentially mystic."[68] Christopher Bracken refines the explanation given by Lévy-Bruhl and states: "The likeness does not stand in for what it imitates, it participates in what it imitates. The thing contains its likeness, and the likeness, the thing for both contain a force communicated along the pathway of mimesis."[69] Significant here is that Lévy-Bruhl did not consider imitative representations as mere "symbols" that "stand for something"—an approach that was dominant in anthropology for several decades.[70]

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66 Lévy-Bruhl here cites the ethnography of William Thalbitzer, who spent two years in an isolated Inuit settlement around 1900. Like in the previous case, Lévy-Bruhl in my opinion actually draws on ethnographies that expose a much higher level of refinement than those of Frazer some decades earlier. This might be based in the fact that he—as an armchair anthropologist—seems to have had a different agenda than Frazer and puts more emphasis on detail. Frazer was, however, a better storyteller. The second explanation might be that, in the course of two decades, the amount of reliable ethnographic material had increased tremendously.

67 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 339–340.

68 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 52.

69 Bracken 2002, 335.

70 I have outlined in another paper (Ladwig 2012, 429–430) that the anthropologists of different generations have usually followed one of the following methods for understanding these representations: Either there is a purpose connected to these transformations (functionalism), they show how the brain works (cognitivism), they have to be interpreted (interpretivism); or these transformations are of a metaphorical nature (symbolism). Recent approaches see this as a way of domesticating "otherness" into our frameworks of analysis, and advance a reading of representation that is actually very close to that of Lévy-Bruhl. See Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell (2007) for a call to rethink the position of objects and representation.

Despite the evolutionary tendencies of his theory, and the over-stretched, generalizing distinction between the modern mind and primitiveness,[71] Lévy-Bruhl can be credited for pointing out that Western ideas about "rationality," and certain divides that were emerging in the context of the Enlightenment and Reformation, are far from general. Lévy-Bruhl understands his own modern and scientific culture and its understandings of imitation and representation as being culturally specific, and not, like Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers, as epistemological universals. This theme was picked up by one of his pupils and actually has regained importance in recent discussion in anthropology.[72] Although Lévy-Bruhl does not theorize mimesis explicitly, his concept of participation shows that he understood these practices of imitation and representation as a challenge to, and extension of, Western mimetic theory. In opposition to Enlightenment discourses on fetishism and to Frazer's pejorative account of imitative magic as a "false science as well as an abortive art," Lévy-Bruhl implicitly recognized that the negative connotations of mimesis and representation were only of limited value when trying to understand systems of thinking positioned outside the context of modernity.

Primitive mimesis: The Frankfurt School's critique of the Enlightenment

It is rather easy to detect in Lévy-Bruhls' notions of the primitive mentality and mystical participation, with their non-dualistic features, a form of extreme primitivism. Do such theories, in the end, tell us more about "our" desires than explain the logics of other cultures? It is rather obvious that the contrast between the rationality of modernity, and that of true representation and mimetic thinking, can easily become a sort of lament about what has been lost through the enlightenment and modernity. As I will outline in this part, the enlightenment and its move to an objectified world surveyed by an interior subject, have indeed been critiqued by several theorists from the perspective of mimetic theory. Some Neo-Marxist propagators of the Frankfurt School have suggested that we witness a

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71 Lévy-Bruhl, however, saw the primitive mentality also at work in our own culture. The British social anthropologist Evans-Pritchard writes: "For him, Christianity and Judaism were also superstitions, indicative of pre-logical and mystical mentality ('primitive mentality'), and on his definitions necessarily so. But, I think in order not to cause offence, he made no allusion to them" Evans-Pritchard (1965, 90).
72 Maurice Leenhardt (1979) continued some of these themes in his anthropological accounts of Melanesia, in which the socio-cosmic principles animating the body are described as an essential part of the concept of the person. This principle makes it possible to transform the body and actually become another being, as is, for example, often encountered in shamanism.

decrease of mimetic practices in modern, industrial society, and that that one consequence of this process is increasing alienation.[73]

It is this kind of reverse perspective that Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer suggest in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Written during World War II and originally published in 1947, the work can be seen as an effort of critical theory trying to come to terms with high modernity's inherent barbaric and exploitative dimensions, exemplified by Nazi Germany and the Holocaust one the one hand, and by mass production and the cultural industry on the other. Adorno and Horkheimer undertake a polemical reading of the Enlightenment and argue that we witness a decline of mimesis in modernity. In a world in which the self becomes more and more an inner property of the individual, and in which the outer world and nature are reduced to the analytical reason of modernity, mimesis, animistic, and magical beliefs become repressed. In their account, "the disenchantment of the world means the extirpation of animism,"[74] and "for civilization, purely natural existence, both animal and vegetative, was the absolute danger. Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior were successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left behind."[75] They argue that the Enlightenment and the spread of scientific worldviews "flatten" the world, thereby disenchanting it:

> The whole ambiguous profusion of mythical demons was intellectualized to become the pure form of ontological entities. Even the patriarchal gods of Olympus were finally assimilated by the philosophical logos as the Platonic Forms. But the Enlightenment discerned the old powers in the Platonic and Aristotelian heritage of metaphysics and suppressed the universal categories' claims to truth as superstition. In the authority of universal concepts the Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effigies human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals. From now on matter was finally to be controlled without the illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties. For Enlightenment, anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion.[76]

However, in their view, modernity does not progress towards greater freedom, but to a pure immanence-based rationality, paving the way for domination and totalitarian rule. Magic is linked to deeper truth, but it is not a universal and dominant truth.[77] Mimesis becomes controlled and bureau-

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73 For the wider context of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, see the seminal work of Rolf Wiggershaus (2010) and Jay Bernstein (1994).
74 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 2.
75 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 24.
76 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 3.
77 Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, 7) state that "magic is bloody untruth, but in it domination is not yet disclaimed by transforming itself into a pure truth

cratic, cutting off the subject from objects under the pretext of rationality.[78] In order to contrast this disenchanted world of "fake Enlightenment" with that of magic and animism among primitives, Adorno and Horkheimer do not discuss ethnographic examples but make several references to the anthropological research of, for example, Robert H. Lowie, Marcel Mauss, Emile Durkheim, and Edvard Westermarck. As I outlined before with reference to theoreticians of mimesis, the question of representation also takes a central position in these arguments. With reference to language, they state:

> The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by the single relationship between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between rational significance and its accidental bearer. On the magical plane, dream and image were not mere signs for the thing in question, but were bound up with it by similarity or names. The relation is one not of intention but of relatedness. Like science, magic pursues aims, but seeks to achieve them by mimesis—not by progressively distancing itself from the object.[79]

When mimesis is understood as a process of appropriation and as an exchange, as it is here, it has the capacity to bridge the gap between world and consciousness, between subject and object. The loss of mimesis therefore implies a larger distance between these dualities. Consequently, a hierarchy of rationalities, in which cultures that still believe in mimesis supposedly occupy a lower position in the civilizational scale, is introduced:

> The superseding of the old diffuse notions of the magical heritage by conceptual unity expresses a condition of life defined by the freeborn citizen and articulated by command [...] long with mimetic magic it tabooed the knowledge which really apprehends the object. Its hatred is directed at the image of the vanquished primeval world and its imaginary happiness. The dark, chthonic gods of the original inhabitants are banished to the hell into which the earth is transformed.[80]

Although mimesis and imitation are conceptualized as positive features, Adorno's and Horkheimer's image of pre-modern societies still follows a similar trope as that of other evolutionists. Their concept of natural or animistic mimesis is embedded into a "schematic version of the history of modern consciousness" in which "human understanding progresses

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underlying the world which it enslaves."
78 See Potolsky (2006, 144) on the notion of mimesis in this work. For further explorations of Adorno's and Horkheimer's notion of mimesis, see Michael Cahn (1984).
79 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 7.
80 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 10.

in three stages, from magical to mythic/epic to modern/scientific."[81] By depicting modernity, similar to Max Weber, as an iron cage (*stahlhartes Gehäuse*) in which formal-procedural rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) and efficacy progress,[82] it seems that Adorno and Horkheimer were in need of a counter-image. They found this in allegedly pre-modern, non-capitalist societies that had not yet undergone Enlightenment and rationalization. One the one hand, this view might be seen as having rather romantic undertones that postulate a non-alienated form of existence, in which mimesis can give access to authentic experience. Ernesto Verdeja thinks that "Adorno's idea of mimesis [...] relies on a problematic, unmediated conception of authenticity."[83] On the other hand, recent discussions in philosophy and anthropology have raised similar topics with reference to ontology. Bruno Latour's idea of purification and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's emphasis on ontologies are not that far away from Adorno's reasoning.[84]

The understanding of mimesis in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* partially also resonates with the thoughts of another member of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin. Benjamin has a less coherent account of mimesis and actually changes his definition according to the context of its application. This tendency reflects his methods of working and thinking, which are marked by fragments, collage, and the simultaneity of past and present.[85] In his 1933 essay "On the Mimetic Faculty" (a revised version of the "Doctrine of the Similar"), Benjamin defines language in terms of mimesis, but already sees language as evolving from another stage of development, that of non-sensuous similarity: "Language may be seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and the most complete archive of non-sensuous similarity: a medium into which the earlier powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed without residue, to the point where they have liquidated those of magic."[86] Benjamin postulates that, in pre-historic times and among "druids, brahmins and shamans,"[87] words and names did not refer to things (as in Saussurian linguistics), but magically participated through sound in things, a capacity that is inevitably lost. But for

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81 Miller 2011, 24.
82 Weber 1992, 123.
83 See Verdeja 2009, 494.
84 Bruno Latour's work takes a central role in these discussions about the value of ontology for understanding not only science and technology, but also primitive societies. Latour (1993, 11) suggests that modernity enforces a distinction of various ontological spheres "Purification creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of non-humans on the other." The anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro adds, in a tone that is close to that of Adorno's analysis of the disappearance of mimesis, "Modernity started with it: with the massive conversion of ontological into epistemological questions—that is, questions of representation [...] After objects or things were pacified, retreating to an exterior, silent and uniform world of 'nature' subjects began to proliferate and to chatter endlessly" (Viveiros de Castro 2012, 152).
85 On Benjamin's notion of mimesis and its contextualization in his working methods and development of ideas, see Taussig 1993, 19–32.
86 Benjamin (1933) 1999, 722.
87 Benjamin 1996, 274.

Benjamin, this is a process that has been at work for ages, not only since the encroachment of modernity. Generally speaking, through any expression in a language, an original state of total immersion into nature becomes fragmented. It is not the unity of word and thing, of subject and object that is at the center of his interest in language, but the process of becoming the subject in the course of acquiring a language. What we are left with today is the gift of seeing resemblances, only a "rudiment of a powerful compulsion in former times to behave and become like something else."[88] In Benjamin's other works we find examples where the mimetic and magic capacities of the primitives are equated with that of children. In *Berlin Childhood Around 1900,* the child mixes dream, fantasy, and reality, and the differentiation of self and external world is not yet accomplished.[89] He also refers to primitive forms of play, ritual, and dance.[90] Children and primitives still have a sense for magical correspondence. Benjamin sees—like Adorno—a decline of mimesis: "The perceptual world of modern human beings seems to contain far fewer of those magical correspondences than did that of the ancients or even that of primitive peoples. The question is simply: Are we dealing with a dying out of the mimetic faculty, or rather perhaps with a transformation that has taken place within it?"[91]

How can we contextualize Benjamin's use of the primitive in his philosophy of language and his account of mimesis? In 1915, Benjamin had already attended the lectures of Walter Lehmann on ancient Peruvian art in Munich. Lehmann presented clay heads that resembled decapitated heads. He interpreted them as trophies from headhunting; it was not an exact likeness that was crucial, but the strength of the victim that one could absorb while holding the head imitation.[92] So it was not only representation, but the belief in efficacy that Lehmann emphasized. Another speculative hint might be that some of Benjamin's best friends (like Siegfried Kracauer) employed ethnographic methods,[93] and his work at times has ethnographic features, too. Benjamin's interest in anthropological accounts and his primitivism surfaced again, according to Gershom Sholem, in the summer of 1918, when he immersed himself in history and anthropological accounts that later formed the groundwork for his essay on the mimetic faculty. Nicola Gess has argued that Benjamin's ideas on language are little, if at all, influenced by Lévy-Bruhl's notion of primitive or mystic participation.[94] In contrast, Christopher Bracken explicitly links Benjamin's philosophy of language to Lévy-Bruhl without, however, delivering

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88 Benjamin (1933) 1999, 720.
89 See Gess (2007) on Benjamin's primitivism and the context of its time.
90 Benjamin 1990.
91 Benjamin (1933) 1999, 721.
92 Brodersen 1996, 81.
93 Perhaps Benjamin was also inspired by his good friend Sigfried Kracauer, who studied white-collar workers in 1920s Berlin with ethnographic methods learnt under his studies with Georg Simmel. Benjamin used ethnographic approaches in several of his writings, but they were rarely made explicit, as in Kracauer's work.
94 Gess 2009, 308.

direct proof. Benjamin was well aware of the works of Lévy-Bruhl, and a review of the sociology of language discusses the concept of mystic participation at length.[95] One finds in Benjamin's idea that the process of *naming* things once contained the magical capacity of language, a strong parallel to Lévy-Bruhl's extensive treatment of this question. Paolo Gabrielli mentions that one of Benjamin's central ideas, namely "non-sensuous similarity" had already been used by Lévy-Bruhl in 1927.[96]

Although primitivism was widespread in intellectual circles in Benjamin's times,[97] I think that his version is rather complex. In 1917, Benjamin wrote *On the Program of the Coming Philosophy*, in which he attacks Kant's theory of knowledge. Referring to Kant's subject-object distinction, he picks up a thread that was already discussed in a previous part of this essay and lists "examples" that contradict Kant's thesis:

> We know that primitive peoples, at the stage of so-called pre-animism, identify themselves with animals and plants, and take their name from them; we know that madmen at times identify themselves in part with objects of their perception, which are thus no longer "objects" standing before them; we know of sick persons who attribute the sensations of their bodies to beings other than themselves; and of visionaries who at least claim to be able to feel the perception of others as their own.[98]

Although his analogies between primitive people, madmen, and visionaries might be disturbing, Benjamin wants to develop a form of "magical critique" from these cases. Countering Kant, Benjamin sees in ritual, madness, drug-induced states of mind, and in surrealist art possibilities for a return of mimetic capacities.[99] He "conjures up the specter of the primitive neither to condemn it, nor to advise those whose job is to civilize it, but to imitate it. He develops the term magical critique for his thinking."[100] In opposition to Adorno and Horkheimer, he does not only lament the disappearance of mimesis in modernity, but also sees opportunities for its return. His work therefore "celebrates and mourns [...] the liquidation of tradition"[101] at the same time.

This stance is also deducible from his account of mimesis that is implicitly contained in one of his more famous essays, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,* originally published in 1936. He proposes that modern technologies such as film and photography change the way we

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95 Benjamin 1991.
96 Gabrielli 2004, 323.
97 On Walter Benjamin's use of certain images of the primitive, see the excellent analysis of Gess (2013).
98 Benjamin 1989, 2.
99 See Cheng (2009) on Benjamin's relation to surrealism.
100 Bracken 2002, 344.
101 McCole 1993, 8.

perceive the world: While a painting as an original has, according to Benjamin, an "aura" (substituting the "magic" of his language philosophy), modern techniques of reproduction (the capacity to produce infinite copies) and mass consumption are not able to incorporate this aura. However, Benjamin here exposes not a simple melancholia for older times and other cultures, but also sees opportunities opening up through this concept. The cinema itself, with its fast-moving images and overstimulation, can, first, create a shock that frees the subject from its routines. Secondly, Benjamin proposes that, through these technologies, the masses develop a greater desire to get closer to the image, and to annihilate the uniqueness of the object by mimetically appropriating it.[102] I agree with Taussig, who proposes that it is not only melancholia and loss that surround Benjamin's notion of mimesis, but "instead, modernity provides the cause, context, means, and needs for the resurgence—not the continuity—of the mimetic faculty."[103] This differentiates Benjamin's idea of mimesis from Adorno's account, which simply sees its decline in modernity.

Conclusion

I began this essay with an overview of the genealogies and transformations of concepts of mimesis and representation. By postulating a close link between mimesis and representation, I argued that, with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the negative connotations of mimesis (first pronounced in Plato's philosophy) became dominant. These also laid the groundwork for understanding the reception of descriptions of mimetic practices of primitive societies. Theories of fetishism and Frazer's notion of primitive imitative magic were interpreted as proof of the illogical thinking of the natives, of their lack of rationality. This understanding also provided substance for the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century, and, moreover, a legitimation for colonial expansion through civilizational superiority. The alleged barbarism of the primitives was conceptualized as "'the reversal of what we may call the project of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, namely the establishment of a universal system of such rules and standards of moral behaviour, embodied in the institutions of states dedicated to the national progress of humanity."[104]

With Lévy-Bruhl's theories, I outlined an approach that exoticizes the mimetic and representational thinking of primitives, and draws a dividing line between modernity and primitiveness, but nevertheless seriously tries to understand the difference between systems of thinking. With an emphasis on the capacity of objects and rituals to make "something present anew" through mystical participation, Lévy-Bruhl actually employs a

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102 Benjamin (1936) 2002, 105.
103 Taussig 1993, 20.
104 Hobsbawm 1994, 46.

notion of representation that has been attested to have parallels with Western concepts before the Enlightenment. Due to the apparent but exaggerated contrast between mimesis and representation in primitive and scientific thinking, Lévy-Bruhl's ideas also appealed to theorists that formulated critiques of modernity. With Adorno and Horkhheimer, and finally Walter Benjamin, primitive mimesis is transformed into a counter-image of the Enlightenment and modernity. The objectification of nature, the increased bureaucratization of society, and the repression and disappearance of mimesis in modernity was made visible by pointing to societies in which mimesis was still alive. Whereas Adorno and Horkheimer mainly accused modernity and Enlightenment thinking of oppressing mimesis, I argue that Benjamin has a somewhat less pessimistic perspective. In both approaches, however, "Mimesis sounds a muted and half-forgotten, but still optimistic tone in that it signals a force both primitive and irrational, prior to and resistant to the encroachment of full-on modernity."[105]

The encounters between Western theories of mimetic behavior and more or less fictional ethnographies of primitives can in this sense be understood as an appropriation of a cultural "other," as a process of mimesis itself. Depending on a multiplicity of factors such as reception, power constellations, and so forth, I argue that these appropriations create discourses that move between two poles: one the one side, a strengthening of European superiority and hegemony, and on the other side a critique of modernity and rationality.

It is rather obvious that, in the case of critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment, we deal with a form of primitivism expressed as a lack of real mimesis and representation. Primitivism was a popular trope of the nineteenth and twentieth century, and has been well documented in art history and literature. This is even more valid for Orientalism.[106] It is interesting to note that, between 1900 and World War I, primitivism was frequently used without reference to tribal societies, but could contain a plethora of figures that stood outside or at the periphery of society such as madmen, children, or the uneducated peasants. Here, "the myth of the artist expressed kinship with marginal groups in his own society."[107] In this light, the associations made between primitive mimesis and the mimetic capacities of children and madmen, in, for example, Walter Benjamin's thinking comes as no surprise. Here, in a somewhat romantic approach to art and artists, the outside of society can be occupied as a position that allows for a de-centering of perspectives.

The question, however, why certain accounts of primitive mimesis held such an attraction for Adorno, Benjamin, and others probably has many answers. There was need for a counter-image, but to be more specific, one

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105 Miller 2011, 23.
106 See Flam and Deutch (2003) for a history of primitivism in twentieth-century art. The classical reference to Orientalism is Said (1978).
107 Grijp 2012, 134.

could argue that this image had to embody a certain kind of authenticity. Charles Lindholm suggests that the "pervasive desire for authenticity is a consequence of a modern loss of faith and meaning," a proposition that resonates very well with critical stances on the Enlightenment and modernity.[108] Another anthropologist, Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, states that there is often a "presupposition that authenticity lies at an inaccessible level below the surface of social life, deep within oneself or among societies 'uncontaminated' by modernity."[109] Moreover, he argues that "authenticity encodes the expectation of truthful representation."[110] With a return to an older notion of mimetic representation in Lévy-Bruhl, Adorno, and Benjamin, a return to something more "real" and original was imagined. However, according to Gustave Ribeiro, this longing for authenticity is in the current age again exposed to shifts. Living an in age where the original is increasingly disappearing, he imagines two outcomes of this process:

> The first could be called "hyperfetishism," meaning the hyper efficacy of fetishism in a world completely colonized by copies without originals, and by their central role in accumulation within the cutting-edge sectors of electronic and computer capitalism. In such a realm, no one would really care about alienation. The current almost complete disappearance of this term is an indication of what I just said. The other outcome is what I would call "hyperanimism," or a return to the metaphysics of animism among the moderns. One expression of hyperanimism is the prestige currently enjoyed by some theories that attribute agency to things. Perhaps it is a reaction to a world where copies have no originals but algorithms, a reaction to the possibility of a shallow world, finally and completely disenchanted, in which human clones may exist.[111]

So, in the end, the same things are still with us: the fetish, the magical agency of objects, animism, and the disenchanted world haven't left us, despite all our mimetic appropriations of the primitive.

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108 Lindholm 2008, 3.
109 Theodossopoulos 2013, 338.
110 Theodossopoulos 2013, 339.
111 See Ribeiro, in this volume.

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PART II
The Copy and Reality

Susanne Knaller

Always Dealing with Reality but Never Too Close to It: Original and Copy in Modern Aesthetics

Abstract   The following essay deals with the idea that 1) the concept of copy is a most basic one in Western epistemology and still forming the ground of artistic and aesthetic notions up to today. Furthermore, the thesis that 2) the discourse of copy is always a discourse on the quality of reality of artistic and aesthetic works. Therefore, the notion of copy can give insights into the precarious but unavoidable relationship between art and the ideas of reality at its basis. While departing from a very contemporary point of view regarding this relationship and taking into consideration new techniques and theories, it can be demonstrated that the question of copy (and original) can be of help to overcome concepts of binarity as, for example, underlying the dichotomy of materiality-immateriality, material-form, thing-representation etc.—an approach dominating discourses throughout Modern aesthetics.

Art and reality: Preliminary remarks

The question concerning traits (or the quality and levels) of reality of an artistic object in relation to traits (or the quality and levels) of reality of empirical objects ranks among the most challenging questions in aesthetic theories, representing the hinge which connects—and, at the same time, highlights differences among—realism, idealism, phenomenology, constructivism, avant-gardism, and Modernism.[1] Hans Blumenberg suggests that aesthetic materiality can unfold in an aesthetic existence exemplary of one of many worlds, which thus reveals the structures of a "primordial essence of nature with new persuasive power" (Urgrundes der Natur in neuer Überzeugungskraft).[2] However, Alain Robbe-Grillet's realism is an alternative possibility. For Robbe-Grillet, the world is neither exemplary, nor meaningful, nor absurd. It simply "is."[3] The material of a film, hence, remains limited and indefinitely repeatable: "It is a world without a past, a world which is self-sufficient at every moment and which obliterates itself as it proceeds. [...] There can be no reality outside the images we see, the words we hear."[4] Despite their historical proximity, Blumenberg's and Robbe-Grillet's assessments of aesthetic material could not differ more. The dissimilarity of their approaches shows that the position of verbal and pictorial arts can be determined according to how one answers questions pertaining to the quality of reality of the aesthetic as such. After all, the real, nature, and reality have been points of reference for images and texts since before the nineteenth century Realism. An interest in the semiotic relationship between empirical reality and the artistic medium—which also implies an interest in relations of perception and of portrayal—was already ingrained in the classical notion of mimesis, as well as having been pertinent to the invention of central perspective. The interest in this semiotic relationship has provided the basis for aesthetic theories of mimesis since the eighteenth century, as well as for genre- and media-theoretical discussions during the Enlightenment and Romanticism, to name but some points of reference. We are thus concerned with a question of aesthetic theory that has been of relevance until the twenty-first century.

Original and copy are suitable metaphors for scrutinising—analytically and in a historicising manner—these relationships as an interplay of epistemological-ontological and immanently aesthetic issues. In the following, I will restrict myself to outlining this problem.

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1   Cf. Knaller 2015, 11–18.
2   My translation, "'Nachahmung der Natur'. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen," Blumenberg 1981, 54–103, 92, and 93. Blumenberg refers to the example of Paul Klee, who sought to escape the contingency of reality through artistic essence.
3   Robbe-Grillet 1963, 18.
4   "C'est un monde sans passé qui se suffit à lui-même à chaque instant et que s'efface au fur et à mesure. [...] Il ne peut y avoir de réalité en dehors des images que l'on voit, des paroles que l'on entend." Robbe-Grillet 1963, 131.

The notion of the original

In the context of modern aesthetic theory, the term "original" is highly ambivalent.[5] On the one hand, it denotes a unique, evidently authentic object, attributed with so high an actual value of reality that it can also be regulated by a strict legal and economic framework. On the other hand, the original has to be constantly redefined as to its quality of reality: what determines the status of a fine-art photograph, a film, an installation, a performance, a painting from a fifteenth- or sixteenth-century workshop, or a multiple-times restored oil painting as "original?" Despite being frequently dealt with in economic and legal discourse, the idea of original and copy has an extensive impact on the nature and function of all the levels and traits of reality within and outside of an art work. That this is not least due to the fact that the notion of original and copy is dependent on general concepts of reality shows the example of early modern aesthetics and its notion of original. The eighteenth-century concept of modern art as "originality/original" was specified by a metaphysical notion of nature, which for the artists and authors served as an "original" model. Yet, the artistic interpretation and representation of this model, the art works, engender new models of originality which, in turn, encourage *imitatio* by other works of art. This is a key to any understanding of classicism or idealism—that is to say, art for them always implies a copy. To sum up, art in general involves questions of traits of reality on various levels. Two of these will be dealt with in detail:

a) The conceptual level, between art and general models of reality which unfold through different terminologies, conceptualisations, and modes of procedure; this is the field of the epistemological purpose of original and copy and
b) The practical level of artistic and literary artefacts with their periodically changing modes.

In said contexts, traits of reality for one thing play a part insofar as the relevance of a work as an original or a copy—which is informed by artistic programmes and aesthetic theories—strongly depends on the epistemologically marked metaphors of original and copy discussed under point a) above; and for another, traits of reality are of relevance in that they also channel attributions, rejections, or acceptance.

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5   Cf. Knaller 2015, 162–163.

The epistemological purpose of original and copy

The postulate of mimesis (*imitatio naturae*) is certainly the most prominent concept of copying in Modernism. In the eighteenth and also in the nineteenth century, nature's character in terms of originality was still undisputed and art was always (strictly speaking) nothing but a copy. The value of art resided in the influence it wielded on areas of cognition and action predetermined by nature. This postulate to imitate goes beyond specific aesthetic and artistic positions, as Friedrich Schiller shows in his description of "sentimentalischer Dichtung" and "naiver Dichtung"—sentimental as idealistically and naïve as realistically copying poetry—when both—their differences notwithstanding—are held up to copy human nature as such.[6] Original, originality and copy bear a close relation to one another. All modern forms of realism and all media with strong representative and realistic features, such as photography or film, deal with this model of the copying original and artistic originality.

Twentieth century modernism's attribution of an autonomous and constructive quality to art that exceeds a representative, referential, or realistic character obliterates (or at least renders precarious) the qualitative difference between original and copy, between a model and its representation. In that sense, despite their constructive characteristics, the arts' quality of reality can be only gradually differentiated from that of empirical, non-artistic dimensions. In their most radical form, art's quality of reality is identical to those of non-art. This is the aim, for instance, of "pure" modernist art; art that only knows "originals" when it comes to the relationship of art to reality, insofar as artistic originals are meant to engender ever-new, autonomous forms. Also in the context of the avant-gardes and their idea of the de-differentiation between art and reality—or rather between art and life—the opposition of original versus copy does not apply. Both modernism and avant-gardism only know originals. However, this approach has been consistently upended since the 1950s in the wake of new media, cultures, and notions of signs, images, and language. It appears more apt to speak of copies as lacking an original. Art plays with mediality, reproduction, and seriality (of which Pop Art and Photorealism may serve as examples).

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6   As an example: "Dem naiven Dichter hat die Natur die Gunst gezeigt, immer als eine ungeteilte Einheit zu wirken, in jedem Moment ein selbstständiges und vollendetes Ganzes zu sein und die Menschheit, ihrem vollen Gehalt nach, in der Wirklichkeit darzustellen. Dem sentimentalischen hat sie die Macht verliehen oder vielmehr einen lebendigen Trieb eingeprägt, jene Einheit, die durch Abstraktion in ihm aufgehoben worden, aus sich selbst wieder herzustellen, die Menschheit in sich vollständig zu machen, und aus einem beschränkten Zustand zu einem unendlichen überzugehen. Der menschlichen Natur ihren völligen Ausdruck zu geben ist aber die gemeinschaftliche Aufgabe beider, und ohne das würden sie gar nicht Dichter heißen können;" Friedrich Schiller, "Beschluß der Abhandlung über naive und sentimentalische Dichter nebst einigen Bemerkungen einen charakteristischen Unterschied unter den Menschen betreffend," Schiller 2008, 776–791, 776–777.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, new challenges have to be confronted. This can be demonstrated by comparing the ground-breaking *Documenta 5* of 1972 with the no less provoking *Documenta 11* of 2002.[7] While the first dealt with the reality of ever-present mass media and its enormous production of overall images,[8] the latter confronted globalization, postcoloniality, and the post 9/11 era with a strong artistic impact on documentary and realistic forms borrowed from non-artistic contexts. The curator Okwui Enwezor wanted to face the following problem:

> In the past, institutional forms of exhibition practices à la Documenta were employed to devise a narrative context which was meant to either provide the backdrop for a homogenous understanding of art or to come to conclusions concerning the visual arts' distinctive formal features which set them apart from all other practices. This was a vital aspect of understanding the institutional parameters of modern contemporary art. [...] If there is one thing to be stated about Documenta 11's spectacular quality of being different, it is this: The exhibition's critical spaces have no aim to normalise or to make uniform all artistic visions on their way to institutional beatification.[9]

The modes of institutionally, economically, and politically domesticated avant-gardes are meant to be replaced by postcoloniality's model of opposition: "In postcoloniality we are constantly confronted with counter models used by those who are marginalised, that is those who are practically excluded from comprehensive global participation and who utilise counter models to shape new worlds by generating experimental cultures."[10]

On the occasion of *Documenta 11* (2002) and its prevalence of documentary art, Boris Groys discusses the possible twenty-first-century relationships between and validity, respectively, of original and copy: in documentary art, a relationship between original and copy would indeed exist.[11] The copy, however, is endowed with the value of an original in that it need not become a reflexive "work" but instead remains or becomes a thing or object which is dependent of narratives and medial modes. Documentary installations offer an example of this necessity to perceive the relationship between reality and art in terms of materiality and not of ontology. Like in bio-politics,[12] the differentiation between original and

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7   Cf. Knaller 2015, 158.
8   Brock 1972, 2.1–2.19.
9   Enwezor 2002, 43.
10 Enwezor 2002, 45.
11 Groys 2002, 107–113.
12 Michel Foucault, who invented this notion in lectures at the Collège de France in 1978/79, describes—among other things—the control over biological life and sexualty with the help of economical and political measures and manipulations. For Groys, bio-politics is embedded in the present discussions about aritificial live, artificial creation, and the artificial maintainance of life (Foucault 1997, 73–79).

copy—or between reality and construct—no longer characterises the differentiating metaphor of fiction (an ontological quality); rather it indicates a modal dissimilarity: "The documentation inscribes the existence of an object into history, endowing such an existence with a life span and thus, in turn, giving life as such to the object—regardless of whether said object "was originally animate or artificial."[13] A precondition for this concept is a willingness to abandon the idea of a basic opposition between reality and art—which was still the case with *Documenta 5*—or between original and copy while at the same time accepting the differentiation as an everyday tool and to play with it.

The practical level of original and copy

The arts' quality and traits of reality also determine intra-systemic relationships in the sense of relations between original and copy, which are situated within the specific context of production and reception. A notion that is essential for the aesthetic value of original and copy and which therefore helps to elucidate the relationship between a) and b) is authenticity. In the following, I will give a very short historical overview of the changeful history of original and copy in the context of authenticity.

The meaning of the term "original," in its earliest documented occurrences (in the twelfth century), was that of "not derivative" or "that [which] existed at first." At the same time, it also means "archetype," which presupposes the process of copying and denotes the notion of a model.[14] In Latin, the term "authentic" was used synonymously, while an original (*authenticum*) was also an authenticated, certified document as well as an autograph, a manuscript. The term "original," furthermore, refers to the model depicted in a painting—for instance, a real person or an object. As of the end of the seventeenth century, the term was occasionally used in the arts, while it became permanently established in the artistic context as of the end of the eighteenth century.[15] Thus the original is a constructed as well as an autonomous entity. Unsurprisingly, in the course of historical development, the terms "originality" and "original" (as an adjective), derived from the noun "original," have additionally reinforced the elements of novelty, individuality, and ingenuity independent of a model. Here, the French language, where the term has been documented since the end of the seventeenth century, holds a pioneering position.[16] Denis Diderot's *Encyclopédie* states a connection between *original* and *génie*, which makes apparent the semantic field of the term original, spanning

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13 Groys 2002, 109.
14 *Oxford English Dictionary,* s.v. "original"; *Allgemeine deutsche Real-Enzyklopädie für die gebildeten Stände,* s.v. "Original, Originalität, Originell".
15 Antoine Furetière, in his dicctionary of 1690. Cf. Häseler 2002, 640.
16 "Diesen Einfluss des Französischen bestätigen alle gängigen Wörterbücher." Cf. Häseler 2002, 640.

connected terms important for the arts such as "derived from nature," "exemplary," "new," and "creative": "It is used for things one copies. It is said that nature is my original; this drawing, this painting, despite being a copy, is my *original*. *Original* also denotes a drawing, a painting which a painter creates from imagination, from genius. Even when all of its parts are copied after nature."[17]

This combination of creativeness, uniqueness, and exemplariness makes the paradoxical relation of original to mimesis justifiable. This is the case in Immanuel Kant's famous dictum that "*Genius* is the *talent* (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art. Since *talent*, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to Nature, we may express the matter thus: *Genius* is the innate mental disposition *(ingenium) through which* Nature gives the rule to Art."[18]

Despite its quality of copy, art then becomes unique in the sense of being matchless and inimitable. Or, as Umberto Eco puts it, art is its own original.[19] In that sense, the original work of art has to be validated multiple times. Hence the act of authentication is divided among several authorities: the author/artist, the connoisseur, art history, the art market, the media, and scholarship. However, it was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that a stricter opposition between original and copy developed; namely when the postulate of imitation (of both nature and artistic models) was abandoned, the autonomous, creative artist gained complete acceptance—also in the legal and economic field—and new technical means of reproducing artefacts (such as photography) had been invented. As long as the notion of imitation justifies art, original and copy are not mutually exclusive. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries still distinguished between a bad copy and a good copy, between the mere reproduction of a model and an imitation which came close to the ideal. At the same time, the nineteenth century is considered—and often also considered itself to be—an age of copy and reproduction. Despite all criticism levelled against technological innovations and their application in the arts, photography, for example, caused the enthusiastic incorporation of reproduced images into everyday life. In the face of these developments in the media-related context, original and copy needed to be re-discussed.

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17 My translation,"On dit: la nature est mon original; ce dessin, ce tableau, quoique copie, est mon original. Original ce dit encore d'un dessin, d'un tableau qu'un peintre fait d'imagination, de génie, quoique chacune de leurs parties soit copiée d'après nature," Diderot and D'Alembert 1777, 29–30.
18 Kant 2007, 112. "Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt. Da das Talent, als angebornes produktives Vermögen des Künstlers, selbst zur Natur gehört, so könnte man sich auch so ausdrücken: Genie ist die angeborne Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch welche die Natur der Kunst die Regel gibt," Kant 1991, 235.
19 Eco 1988, 13–18.

Therefore, twentieth century aesthetic theories were in need of a category for legitimation, which could be found in authenticity: On the one hand the term denoted a trait of reality which depended on the work's status of original or copy and which was legitimised through various instances of authentication/certification like the law, science, or expert opinion. On the other hand, authenticity expressed a reality and validity peculiar to art. Clement Greenberg, the theoretician of American Modernism, for instance, locates the peculiar authenticity of art in its peculiar historicity: "Nothing could be further from the authentic art of our time than the idea of a rupture of continuity. Art *is*—among other things—continuity, and unthinkable without it. Lacking the past of art, and the need and compulsion to maintain its standards of excellence, Modernist art would lack both substance and justification."[20] This concept can be termed *Kunstauthentizität* (art-informed authenticity).[21] The latter is based on the idea of a creative, autonomous subject and does not face opposition, even in Andy Warhol's artistic coup, which is to employ the copy as a provocation in the face of the differentiation between art and non-art, in that it excludes neither subjective artistic nor conceptual authenticity. The concept of authenticity retains its validity even when craftsmanship and creativity no longer constitute any basis for art.[22] In spite of the delegation of manufacturing work from the artist to professionals and industry (Jeff Koons, for example, has an enormous workshop hall with numerous assistants in New York), the demand for the work and the artist to be unique and original is upheld. A group of Minimalist artists who worked with industrial materials rejected the replication of their works, which were collected for an exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum at the beginning of the 1990s, with the following argument: neither the objects themselves nor the plans were sufficient to create replicas equal in value to the originals because circumstances can unexpectedly change the appearance of a piece during production. Therefore the materiality of the individual work has significance and the necessary authenticity is only attributed by the artist.[23]

This authority of the artist can be supplemented by the contextual authenticity of the convention, the attribution whereby a work is made into a work of art. Arthur C. Danto confronted the dilemma of art criticism in the face of an art that is no longer determined by external characteristics such as technical accomplishment, material, and objects, and internal characteristics such as genre and style, in response to Andy Warhol's

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20 Greenberg 1993, 93.
21 As proposed in Knaller 2007, 8–9, 21–22.
22 Cf. Knaller 2012, 51–75.
23 Tietjen 1998, 31–43. "dass weder die Objekte selbst noch die Pläne ausreichten, um den Originalen gleichwertige Repliken herzustellen, da bei der Produktion der Zufall das Erscheinungsbild unvorhergesehen verändern könne, damit die Materialität des einzelnen Werkes Bedeutung habe und sich die notwendige Authentizität deshalb allein vom Künstler zuschreiben lasse."

exhibition of the *Brillo Box*, in 1964.[24] Given the perceptually indistinguishable difference between art and everyday objects, the philosopher is confronted with a previously neglected philosophical question about art, namely, what is it that constitutes art and how are completely identical objects to be distinguished in terms of art and non-art? This question stands in the same problematic context as questions about falsification and the original: to design a Brillo box means nothing for the art market (although the designer was an artist who accepted the contract due to financial exigency), but to exhibit one may impart lasting renown.

This dissolution of classifications is further radicalised in multi-media performances of situations and actions, as in Daniel Spoerri's eating-actions, for which galleries are turned into restaurants. The work is a series of specific events, an "excerpt from a situation of direct day-to-day living,"[25] that is neither original nor copy, nor is it falsifiable.[26] Art is actionist in all kinds of ways, a search for traces in everyday life, playing out patterns of actions, and performing and documenting everyday situations.[27] The extent to which the art expert too can cling to the longstanding division between original and copy is demonstrated by Francis V. O'Connor:

> It used to be that an "original" work of art was understood to have been created by the artist, its originality proved with documents, signatures, and the informed opinion of experts. [...] More recently, there has been a disturbing tendency to denigrate the authority of both artist and expert, to confuse truth with dogma, and to treat all created objects as "texts" which can be used as pretexts for new texts based on the free associations of their relativistic authors. [...] Taken to extremes, such a point of view denies the objectivity of historical truth, and would deem a fake to be as culturally significant as an authentic object.[28]

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24 Danto 1981. Arthur C. Danto takes the most important innovations in art since Duchamps Ready-Mades, Pop Art, Conceptual Art and Minimal Art as the starting point of his inquiry. He therefore neither presumes a creative genius nor a closed character of the work of art (geschlossenen Werkcharakter) that demands originality. At a time when the copy/reproduction of everyday items and the use of industrially produced material admit of art, for Danto the artistic character of works can no longer lie in the perceptual, but rather only in the conceptual (Danto 1981, 44). Cf. Knaller 2012, 51–75.
25 "Ausschnitt aus einer Situation unmittelbaren Lebensvollzugs"
26 Metzger 1995, 11.
27 Schmidt-Wulffen 1995, 29–36.
28 O'Connor 2004, 4.

The original in the digital age, or, the perfect copy: Paolo Veronese and Adam Lowe's *Le Nozze di Cana* (1562–63 and 2007)

As a contemporary example for a further stage of the original-to-copy relation, I would like to examine the digitally-produced facsimile of Paolo Veronese's large painting, *Le Nozze di Cana*, and the discussion concerned with it.[29]

Veronese's original painting, executed between 1562 and 1563, has been exhibited at the Louvre since 1798, when it was brought to Paris by Napoleon as war loot. It was originally kept in the refectory of Isola San Giorgio Maggiore, a building designed by Palladio, where it was exhibited in such a perfect manner that it soon became famous and was frequently visited. Over the centuries, various attempts to return it to Italy were undertaken.[30] On September 11, 2007—exactly 210 years after the Veronese painting had been removed—a facsimile was installed in San Giorgio Maggiore's refectory, which since Palladio had also undergone extensive reconstruction (fig. 1).

The facsimile created by Adam Lowe is a technically elaborate piece, which takes into account the conditions from which Veronese's painting originated, as well as Palladio's spatial construction, that is the conditions of light and materials. Lowe's piece, executed in the artist's Madrid studio *Faktum Arte*, has not only made it possible to re-stage a historical situation, it also allows for the animation of the painting's particular history, in which we find united a congenial artistic cooperation between architect and painter, combined with political rivalry (Napoleon and Venice) and matters of loss and restitution. Bruno Latour focused on this complex situation in the essay "The Migration of the Aura."[31] With Lowe, Latour elaborates on the modifications determined by digital media and comes to the conclusion that attributing, as well as differentiating between, the status of original and copy ultimately depends on the given technical means and situation. This is because those factors determine an artwork's history, which is always one of reproduction and reworking. To describe this process, Latour uses the term "trajectory," that is, the line/abstraction which permits tracing a sequence of events, changes, etc. in the history of a piece—in short, a biography of the work. It is such a line that the "perfect copy" of Veronese's painting exhibited in Venice supposedly draws. The fact that it is a highly accurate reproduction, which considers both matters of colour and of three-dimensionality, is merely one aspect of its overall success. In Latour's and Lowe's view, there is a version n of artistic and literary artefacts, which is succeeded by respective versions *n1*, *n2*, etc.

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29 Cf. Knaller 2015 184–188.
30 During the twentieth century, André Malraux, Vittorio Branca, and Vittorio Cini were involved; Pasquale Gagliardi and Bruno Latour have recently taken up this endeavor.
31 Latour and Lowe 2010, 2–18. On Latour's position in this, see Neubert 2012, 53.

Figure 1: Paolo Veronese / Adam Lowe: *Le Nozze di Cana,* 1562–63 and 2007.

However, the configurations in which the latter appear, as well as the con-
sequences they have upon the original, depend upon the given technical
situation and conditions, and on how those are dealt with. The conceptual
authenticity of an image is thus a quality that cannot be diminished in
terms of its distinctiveness when art works are being copied, transformed,
or even when they reproduce everyday objects. This is, for instance, the
case when Rubens considers black-and-white drawings or engravings
of paintings legitimate media to enable the beholder to understand the
image, when Diderot in his *Encyclopédie* distinguishes between the copy
of an original as original and the copy of a copy as copy, or when Arthur C.
Danto declares Andy Warhol's *Brillo Box* to be "art," due to its unconditional
conceptuality.

In its turn, digital technology is able to play with, simulate, and produce
all kinds of medial formats For Latour, dividing the arts into repeatable
and unique forms or classes[32] becomes obsolete in light of the dissolution
of analogue image semiotics caused by digital technology. Like a play or

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32 The division into repeatable and unique forms is the base of Nelson Goodman's
    widely cited categorization of art into autographic and allographic systems "Let
    us speak of a work of art as autographic if and only if the distinction between
    original and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most
    exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine," Goodman 1976, 113.

a musical score, an image becomes "stageable" and repeatable, and can, time and again, be newly fashioned in its originality, provided the respective copies are of high quality, capable of changing, and offer ever new approaches to the (immaterial) quality of originality. The aesthetic interrelatedness of materiality and immateriality thus appears as a variable and non-hierarchised form. Lowe's image becomes as much Veronese's image as Veronese's image becomes Lowe's image. Original and copy are mutually dependant in a constructive way via modal formations (narration, technology/technique, installation, interpretation, etc.). Latour's conclusion concerning a good copy is that it extends the original in terms of its originality. A good copy "adds originality to the original version by offering it new dimensions without jeopardizing the penultimate version—without ever touching it, thanks to the delicate process used to record it."[33]

Nevertheless, this very aspect of the trajectory is in need of specification. The notion of originality disregards the question as to where and how aesthetic conceptuality (immateriality) arises—or should arise—and as to how it can and should be receptively experienced. The concept of originality privileged by Latour does not embrace the operating modes of newer and most recent arts. For this a short resume of original and copy in their respective relation to authenticity.

Conclusion: Authenticity, original, and copy

The relationship between the arts and reality, which has been defined as a relationship between original and copy since the age of Humanism and the Renaissance, is determined by epistemological-ontological and intra-systemic relations. In mediaeval art and literature, by contrast, it marks a dilemma in need of constant processing, as it touches upon questions concerning the possibilities and the legitimisation of human production, on the significance of authors versus a divine creator, and of creative form versus hierarchically-structured and analogously related *res* and *individuum*. By harkening back to classical models, the Renaissance employs mimesis—the creative production of a likeness (copy) from a model (original)—as the basis for the development of the modern era's notion of art. Since the nineteenth century, the relational complex of original and copy within the mentioned epistemological-ontological and intra-systemic premises of the modern era has formed the background for the arts while developing the idea of a strictly differentiated relationship between original and copy, a wish that develops alongside the possibility of creating exact reproductions, the emergence of an elaborate art market, and its related legal framework. Since the advent of the avant-garde, and even more so

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On the contrary to this allographic arts like music, dance, theater, or literature allow for or even imply repetition.

33 Latour (2010), 11

since the 1950s, the arts have increasingly abandoned strictly binary structures and—to the confusion of audience and critics alike—there no longer appears to be a preference. Adam Lowe writes on this matter: "In a world of genetic modification notions of originality may not be as obvious as they once seemed. It is becoming clear that originality does not exist in a quasi-religious notion of 'aura' but it lies in more physical things. It lies in the intrinsic qualities of an object. It is not fixed and it can be bestowed and removed."[34] Like "aura," "originality" has become a historical term. "Authenticity" is certainly a term which, more aptly than "original," subsumes the arts' physical and intrinsic traits of reality as mentioned by Lowe.

Contrary to originality, the notion of authenticity is more comprehensive in operational terms. Like originality, authenticity basically displays a paradoxical structure situated between self-validation and validation through others, between autological and hetereological significance.[35] However, other than originality, authenticity encompasses normative, evaluative, interpretative, and descriptive modes of application. Moreover, the term is gradable, extendable by attributes, and makes it possible to describe poetics and approaches beyond traditional notions of art; yet, the term primarily refers to the various constellations of empirical and conceptual conditionality of art and literature. What is respectively at stake are sources of certification such as author, witness, media, law, and economy.[36] Objects are authentic when they are authenticated by a legitimising source or authority. Subjects are authentic when they are authenticated either as their own authors or creators or through objects, media, and works. Authenticity is shaped by a complex of individual perspectives and objectifying authentication.

This ongoing processuality between various categories of certification and validity, of mise-en-scène and notions of truth-determining concepts of authenticity, illustrates that both general and individual moments as well as performative and empirical moments are inherent to the notion of authenticity. Combined, these moments form a complex which, in turn, can fulfil legitimising, interpretative, explanatory, referential, and representative functions. Therein lies the attraction of authenticity in modernity: the authentic is the outcome of a time- and place-specific process of certification that has to be continually reestablished. In their complex facets, copy versus original is but one example of the relevance of authenticity to the modern era, and especially as a term used for defining the relationship between art and reality.

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34 Lowe 2007, 113.
35 Cf. Knaller 2007, 21–22.
36 Cf. Knaller 2006, 17–35.

Figures

Fig. 1:   © Faktum Arte.

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Jens Schröter

Limiting the Power of the Copy

Abstract   The extensive debates in twentieth century media theory are hardly something which lends itself to succinct summary. One striking fact, however, is that "reproducibility" is a recurring theme. The ease with which content can be reproduced is seen as a distinguishing feature of technical media (since the emergence of photography and film, and in particular of new, i.e. digital, media). What is more, such content is designed to be reproducible; it seems as though the very difference between original and copy is becoming obsolete. This observation has been described by various theorists with varying emphasis as a specific feature or objective of media development. Part I of this text will briefly present a few relevant positions. The mere existence, however, of terms such as "piracy" or "pirated copy," and of campaigns against "copyright pirates," shows that reproducibility is not a phenomenon that is welcomed unreservedly. Reproducibility clashes with the economic imperative of scarcity, and therefore with legal regulations. Thus judicial, technical, and didactic procedures work together to prevent unauthorized reproduction, a process that is outlined in Part II. Part III offers a short conclusion.

Keywords   Counterfeiting, commodity, holography, piracy, reproducibility

Theories of reproducibility and simulation

The obvious association evoked by the term "reproducibility" is Walter Benjamin's well-known text *The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproduction*, which was first published in French in 1936.[1] It should be noted that Benjamin, thinking to diagnose a whole epoch, describes an "*age* of technological reproducibility" (which would be a better translation) which, however, initially refers mainly to works of art. He does stress that the work of art has always been manually reproducible, but that the "[t]echnological reproduction of the work of art is something else, something that has been practiced intermittently through history, at widely separated intervals though with growing intensity."[2] Thus it seems that reproducibility has at least intensified in the modern period.

According to Benjamin, the result of this intensification is, *firstly*, "the most profound changes" in the impact of "traditional artworks."[3] Reproduction detaches the artwork from tradition and makes it "come closer to whatever situation the person apprehending it is in;"[4] the exhibition value supplants the cult value. *Secondly*, he underlines this diagnosis by pointing to the emergence of two art forms—photography and cinema—that are already structurally designed to be reproducible: "From a photographic plate, for instance, many prints can be made; the question of the genuine print has no meaning. *However, the instant the criterion of genuineness in art production failed, the entire social function of art underwent an upheaval*."[5]

Benjamin's suggestion has been taken up repeatedly in recent debates on the subject. Rosalind Krauss, for example, writes that "The structural change effected by photography's material base is that it is a medium of direct copies, where there exist multiples *without* an original." She takes this as evidence of a "totally new function of art,"[6] arguing that the art of modernity cannot be understood without this recourse to viewing photography as a "multiple" without an original (and the art of so-called post-modernity even more so). She thus regards the appropriative art forms of the 1980s, which made intense use of the concept of the copy, as particularly important, pointing to the work of artists such as Sherrie Levine, who famously photographed the photos of Walker Evans and presented them as her own work.

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1   This essay came out of a research project that was part of the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 "National Excellence Program—Elaborating and operating an inland student and researcher personal support system." The project was subsidized by the European Union and co-financed by the European Social Fund.
2   Benjamin 2008, 3.
3   Benjamin 2008, 5.
4   Benjamin 2008, 7.
5   Benjamin 2008, 12. Emphasis in original.
6   Krauss 2001, 1002. Emphasis in original.

Benjamin had already noted that the "significance [of reproducibility] points beyond the realm of art."[7] Indeed, even without explicit recourse to Benjamin, comparable diagnoses were made elsewhere. Günther Anders, for example, remarked on television reporting in his 1956 text *Die Welt als Phantom und Matrize* (The World as Phantom and as Matrix), noting that "When the event in its reproduced form is socially more important than the original event, this original must be shaped with a view to being reproduced: in other words, the event becomes merely a master matrix, or a mold for casting its own reproduction."[8] Again, reproduction seems to be the signature of an epoch, replacing the "original," whatever that might be, and/or cancelling out the difference between original and reproduction. Admittedly, Anders was referring to television rather than to photography and film, and his attitude towards this change was marked by much greater cultural pessimism than Benjamin's.

A similar but more affirmative diagnosis is found in the work of Jean Baudrillard, whose work from the mid-1970s onwards formulates—partly with reference to Benjamin—a history of simulacra. He argues that "Western" societies, after a phase of imitation in the Renaissance and a phase of industrial production of identical objects, entered an era of "hyperreal simulation" at some point (he does not specify when) in the twentieth century.[9] By "simulation"—insofar as it is possible to determine this precisely in his sometimes confusing texts—Baudrillard does not mean (or only means in a metaphorical sense) the construction of performative models in computer simulation, which has become increasingly important since 1945 (and particularly in the military, technology, and science).[10] Instead, his main contention, rather like Anders,[11] is that reproduction has already secured a conclusive victory over the real, and that original and copy can therefore no longer be distinguished from one another. He seems to argue that, today, no substantial depth of reference can be assumed to exist behind chains of signifiers pointing exclusively to other signifiers. In such a case, political attitudes, for example, become interchangeable lifestyle accessories. Kramer summarizes as follows: "simulation thus levels out the differences between original and copy, between the real and its reproduction, and in the end eradicates all references to the referent."[12]

Whatever one may think about individual aspects of this strident diagnosis, Baudrillard's texts were extensively discussed in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is probably no coincidence that a series of further publications on related issues followed in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as Hillel Schwartz's *Culture of the Copy* (1996) and *Originalkopie: Praktiken des Sekundären* (Originalcopy: Practices of the Secondary), published in

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7   Benjamin 2008, 7.
8   Anders 1956, 20.
9   Cf. Baudrillard 1993, especially 70–76. On Benjamin, see 55–57.
10 Cf. Schröter 2004a.
11 Cf. Kramer 1998, on Baudrillard and Anders.
12 Kramer 1998, 259.

Cologne at the research center for "Media and Cultural Communication" in 2004, which describes the diverse forms and processes of reproduction.[13] We can see, even beyond the question of originality and its relationship to the copy in art, an increasingly firm diagnosis that we live in an "age of technological reproducibility," (Benjamin) and a "culture of the copy," (Schwartz) or even the "era of simulation" (Baudrillard). This diagnosis does seem plausible. Just a few examples, deliberately taken from a wide range of spheres, highlight the pervasiveness of this phenomenon:

1. *Science*: the sciences relevant for modernity are based on an epistemology of experiment (however problematic this may be), in which the validity of a theory can only be confirmed if an effect is reproducible. Baudrillard wrote: "The very definition of the real is *that of which it is possible to provide an equivalent reproduction*."[14] In this sense, reality depends on reproducibility.
2. *Material production*: The industrial manufacturing of goods surrounds us with an abundance of largely identical copies, e.g. of common household items such as chairs. These items obviously follow a reproducible prototype. Andy Warhol provided a well-known, ironic commentary on this development with his series on Campbell's soup tins and Brillo boxes.

   Here an interesting problem emerges: although the "prototype" for an industrially-produced line of products seems to be "original" in the sense that all specimens comprising the series (e.g. all the produced chairs) resemble it and are constructed according to its "pattern," significant differences exist between the two different relations—of prototype to specimens on the one hand; of original to copies on the other:

   Firstly, the prototype is very seldomly exhibited as such, whereas the original in other art forms (e.g. painting) is the central object of attraction—although prototypes can become originals, such as when the prototype of a famously designed chair is exhibited in a show on a star designer.

   Secondly, no one would see a mass-produced chair as a kind of "degraded" version of the prototype; normally, one doesn't even think about this relation at all. The question if one chair is a "better" or "worse" copy of the prototype than another makes no sense—and this obviously has something to do with the process of production—a point which Baudrillard also makes.[15] Industrial production is, by its very definition, a serial process, characterized by standard technological procedures, whereas in other forms of production (let's say in painting) copies *may* be made from an original, but that is not necessarily the case. The aim of industrial production is to produce a series: the prototype is only the

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13 Cf. Fehrmann et al. 2004.
14 Baudrillard 1993, 73. Emphasis in original.
15 Cf. Baudrillard 1993.

necessary pattern, but the important thing is the series itself, because it contains the commodity to be sold. The aim of an art form like painting (at least in the Western tradition), however, is different: here it's the singular original, touched by the hand of the artist (often glorified as "genius"), that is the important commodity, and to copy this "work" is at best an exercise in emulating and understanding the "genius." At worst, it's simply a crime. But in any case, the copy is normally created not though a standardized technological process, but by hand, such that different people will make different copies of one original. Here, the question of whether there is a "better" or "worse" copy does apply. One perhaps could say that the more standardized routines to produce (nearly) identical specimens are put in place (and this need not only apply to industrial modernity, since such processes were established long time ago[16]), the more the difference between original and copy transforms into a difference between prototype and specimen.

Thirdly, this points to another interesting difference: normally, original and copy have nearly the same materiality. A copy of a statue made of marble may not be marble, but let's say made of bronze, and may not even be to the same scale, but it's still a three-dimensional object. A painting of a statue (or a photo of it) would normally not be called a "copy" of the statue, but a reproduction. A prototype and a specimen can also differ in materiality. Although the prototype of a series of chairs may also be a chair, normally prototypes should give precise information on how to produce the specimen, meaning that prototypes are normally highly complex drawings, scaled down three-dimensional models, or computer models (or an assemblage of all three of these) containing exact quantitative measurements and so on. In sum, a prototype is not an object (like an original), but a kind of "set of instructions" on how to produce an object. While a copy is an object imitating another object (the original), a specimen is a material instantiation of the instructions enclosed in a prototype.[17] In this sense, Baudrillard was correct: industrial production, with its distinction between prototype and specimen, lies halfway between modes of production not centered around a series[18] (and therefore having a strong sense of an "original") and digital modes of production in which even the difference between

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16 With thanks to Philipp W. Stockhammer for his highly interesting talk at the conference "The Transformative Power of the Copy."

17 See Meretz 2010. On the problems of defining "copy," see also the contribution by Philipp W. Stockhammer in this volume.

18 See Baudrillard 1993. An interesting point is that Baudrillard suggests, in his teleological model, that "imitation" (and therefore the "copy") belongs to a phase before industrial production. However, the ongoing importance of the role of the original in the art system (in keeping with Luhmann) until today suggests that different regimes of production now exist side-by-side and cannot be described in a historical sequence alone. On the problem of the history of the copy, see the contribution by Philipp W. Stockhammer in this volume. On the role of original and copy in the art system, see the contribution by Susanne Knaller.

prototype and series seems to make no sense anymore because a "copy" of a finished software product is simply identical to its predecessor (though there are limitations to that, too, as we will see below).

3. *Production of signs*: Reproducible photography covers the world with identical-looking photos. We all use photocopiers to duplicate written documents or pictures, a development Benjamin could not have foreseen, and the emergence of digital media really seems to have brought about the collapse of the difference between original and copy, as already hinted at above. Digital data is, on a basic level, just a sequence of zeros and ones, and if one simply copies this sequence (or if a computer does), the resulting file is *exactly* the same as the original. Unlike analog processes, copying no longer causes a loss in quality that would differentiate the copy from the original. The difference becomes obsolete. Indeed, the argument initially seems more convincing for digital data than for photography (the focus of Benjamin's and subsequently Krauss's theses); most photographic procedures, after all, still distinguish between an original negative and positive prints.

This, then, is the grand narrative recounted by certain representatives of media theory: we are entering an "age of reproducibility" in which everything and everyone will soon be able to be reproduced—and the differences between original and copy will thereby collapse. Thus, for example, Geoffrey Batchen also claims: "We are entering a time when it will no longer be possible to tell any original from its simulations."[19] Cinema and television are full of corresponding phantasms, particularly in the case of science fiction. There are the fantasies of genetic reproduction, which suggest that we will soon be able to create clones of dinosaurs or humans, or phantasms of virtual simulation, in which future computers will be able to reproduce the world in its materiality—just think of the "holodeck" from the *Star Trek* series, or the premise of the film *The Matrix*.[20] The simulations shown there are (almost) as real as reality; the difference between original and copy becomes meaningless.

Stabilizing the reproductive difference

Having followed this idea to its final, phantasmatic climax, a critical commentary on this grand narrative is pertinent, and several points of departure offer themselves here. From a historical point of view we can ask whether culture has not always been based on reproducibility (take language as an example: to learn it means to reproduce the spoken or written signs of language); thus reproducibility does not exclusively correlate with technical or new media. One should also draw attention to the historical

19 Batchen 2000, 10.
20 Cf. Schröter 2004b, 152–276.

contingency of reproducibility as an attribute of certain technical media: photography, for example, is not reproducible "in itself" and non-reproducible photographic processes (daguerreotype, polaroid, etc.) do exist.

The thesis that we live in an age of technological reproducibility can be criticized from another angle, too. One could argue that the expansion of reproducibility—regardless of whether the principle has always existed or not—into an increasingly broad range of subject areas inevitably entails the emergence of strategies to counter it. The description of modernity as an age of ever-increasing reproducibility is not false, but one-sided: it can also be argued that modernity is also an age of technological non-reproducibility. Especially if, as Anders and Baudrillard have done, one takes the ever-increasing reproducibility as evidence that the difference between original and copy is imploding—or has already imploded.

It is obvious that this difference still exists on an everyday level, despite the expansion of analog and digital technical media. The reproduction of money, confidential documents, and identity documents for example is prohibited for all but certain institutions. Otherwise their "authenticity"—and this means nothing less than their operability—would be nullified. These types of documents function on the basis of a distinction between original and copy—a copied banknote is no longer a banknote. Of course there is a history of "unauthorized reproduction,"[21] as it is explicitly called in the relevant guidelines in the European central bank, and the counterfeiting of coins, for example, has long resulted in severe penalties.[22] There are legal regulations against certain forms of reproduction—regulations which find expression in pejorative terms such as "pirated copy" or "piracy."

But the legal penalty always comes *after the fact*. When it comes to the currency system, the damage must be prevented in advance, since large-scale counterfeiting would lead to inflation and could even bring about economic collapse. Because of these dangers, increasing efforts were made in the twentieth century to develop technical—and sometimes legally protected—processes, simply to preclude reproduction.

For example, the spread of photocopiers since the 1960s has resulted in increased ease of reproduction. Parallel to this increase, new types of non-reproducible markings have been devised, and older techniques such as the watermark (as found on bank notes),[23] have been resurrected to prevent counterfeiting. But such technical processes only work if the subjects concerned—i.e. all of us—know how to decipher the mark denoting authenticity. Hence information about techniques of observation which help to detect forgeries has been widely distributed.

The German police advice website, www.polizei-beratung.de, gives information on a holographic "special patch" on the lower right-hand side

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21 EZB/2003/4. Accessed March 31, 2014. http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_0782 0030325de00160019.pdf, last modified March 25, 2003.
22 Cf. Voigtlaender 1976.
23 Cf. Gerstengarbe, Lang, and Schneider 2010.

of the 50 Euro note: "On the right side of the front of the note is a holographic patch. If you move the banknote, depending on the angle of viewing, either the value of the note or the architectural motif will be visible. Concentric circles of rainbow colors wander inwards and outwards through the hologram."[24] One is supposed to learn how to view a banknote, and what to pay attention to in order to distinguish genuine from fake, original from copy. The hologram added to the banknote, which changes its appearance in the light and which cannot be photocopied (with a modern color copier), helps achieve this.[25]

The source of the non-reproducibility of holography lies in its epistemology. The intention here is not to reconstruct the history of holography *in detail*. That would go beyond the scope of this essay.[26] It is enough to state that a central condition of holography is the (re)discovery of wave optics in the nineteenth century.[27] The underlying idea of holography, namely to record the interference pattern between the wavefronts of two coherent light beams, assumes the understanding of interference as a property of light. The recording of the interference between object waves and reference waves permits the exact reconstruction of the object wave. The idea of recording these interferences was formulated in 1948 by Denis Gabor, for the purpose of decreasing limitations to electron microscopes: "It is known that the spherical aberration of electron lenses sets a limit to the resolving power of electron microscopes at about 5 Å. [5×10^{-10} m] ... The new microscopic principle described below offers a way around this difficulty, as it allows one to dispense altogether with electron objectives."[28] This is the central point of Gabor's early considerations—it is possible to avoid lenses, lens systems, and their limitations. This accounts for the unique status of holography in the history of technological imaging methods: it is the only procedure that can depict objects without their having to be projected through a lens.[29] The hologram does not underlie geometrical optics or linear perspective projection and the 1:1 correlation of image and object points.[30] In fact, every object point is correlated with every pixel, which is why each sliver of a broken hologram contains the entire image.[31] Nevertheless, visual media utilizing lenses and therefore being technologically based on the principles of geometrical optics (perspective) are clearly in the overwhelming majority: photography, film, television, video, and

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24 Accessed March 31, 2014. http://www.polizei-beratung.de/medienangebot/details/form/7/189.html. Translated by the author.
25 For a detailed account of the very different optical technologies used to prevent counterfeiting, see Renesse 2005.
26 See Johnston 2006.
27 See Buchwald 1989.
28 Gabor 1948, 777.
29 Photograms do not need a lens either, but offer no image of the object. Instead, they are only records of its shadow.
30 See Carter 1970.
31 Albeit with a resolution that decreases in proportion to the part size.

even many digitized and digitally-generated images belong to this para-digm.[32] The fact that holography arises from a knowledge of wave optics, while all other imaging technologies (relying on the level of the projection of objects on the image sensor) follow geometrical optics (i.e. perspective), has important implications.

Historically, geometrical optics, i.e. the conceptualization of light in the form of straight rays—as in linear perspective—is the older knowledge. It is, as an approach, still a firm component of optics. A contemporary text-book on optics says: "In many situations, the great simplicity arising from the approximation of Geometrical Optics more than compensates for its inaccuracies [in comparison with wave optics]."[33] One of these situations is the calculation of optical systems on the basis of lenses. Wave optics describes phenomena such as diffraction, polarization, and interference of the light, phenomena that cannot be described by geometrical optics—but that's not problematic for the efficiency of geometrical optics. Refraction and reflection as descriptive categories are sufficient because the struc-tures that interact with light (mirrors, lenses, etc.) are large in comparison to the wavelength of light. If the relation between our macro-world and the wave length of light were different, it would be possible to see around cor-ners, as light would flow around them in a wave-like manner (like water). This actually happens to a small degree—the effect is known as diffrac-tion—but such wave-optical phenomena occur in the field of geometric-op-tical technology only as disturbances. Diffraction restricts the resolution of lenses (exactly the problem Gabor tried to solve in his early paper), but such disturbances were historically the starting point for new knowledge and, consequently, new wave-optical technologies like holography.

Wave-optical knowledge encompasses geometric-optical knowledge; the latter is only an approximation of the former. This means that a) the wave-optical imaging technology of holography can include the phenom-ena of geometrical optics but b) this property is not possible in reverse.

In concrete terms, a) means that a holographically recorded lens still works like a lens and a holographically depicted mirror still works as a mir-ror.[34] Today, the construction of such holographic-optical elements is an important branch of research and industry, as space-saving optics can be created for very special purposes.

Just as precisely, b) means that no geometrical-optical technology—such as the photographic optics of a photocopier—can copy holographic images because the information saved in wave-optical images exceeds the potential of the geometrical-optic image.[35] A holographic image contains more information about the object than a photograph of the object, simply

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32 For computer generated imagery, see Schröter 2003.
33 Hecht 2002, 149.
34 For one of the first Soviet experiments on holography in the early 1960s, during which Yuri Denisyuk holographed a mirror, see Johnston 2006, 69.
35 It goes without saying that holograms can, in turn, be reproduced by other holograms.

because holography can record both the amplitude and the phase of light, thanks to the recording of interference patterns. A photocopy of a hologram no longer appears captivatingly three-dimensional and no longer changes when the viewing angle is changed (iridescence). For this reason, imaging technology based on wave optics is well suited when applying safeguards to items such as printed money:[36]

> The first banknote with a hologram patch was the 1988 Austrian 500 Schilling note. In 1994, Kuwait integrated a hologram patch onto three of its banknotes and Bulgaria issued the first banknote in the world with a hologram strip, the LEAD® strip. The first banknote with a hologram window strand was issued in Finland, in 1985, followed by the Latvian 5 latu note, which was issued in 1996. In Germany, the first banknotes were equipped with holograms during the last appreciation of the D-Mark series in 1996. At that time, the 50, 100, and 200 D-Mark notes were enhanced with a hologram patch as an additional security measure. By 2000, 80 different denominations from over 30 countries were in circulation with a hologram. In 2003, 150 denominations were equipped with various optical features, such as in the thread, as a foil strip, or as a patch. Currently, approx. 350 denominations are in circulation with a hologram element.[37]

The whole point of such non-reproducible markings is that they cannot be copied without significantly changing their appearance—but this implies that someone has to look at the markings and register the differences. To support this aim, the website www.polizei-beratung.de provides a Java applet with the name *Euro-Blüten-Trainer* ("fake euro trainer," or sometimes translated as "funny money advisor"—fig. 1). Here, applying comparative visual analysis in a way Heinrich Wölfflin would surely never have imagined, one can learn to recognize the crucial security markings on banknotes. "Train your gaze to 'incorruptible inspector' standard."[38] Similar training software with corresponding short films can be found on the website of the German Federal Bank.

This didactic endeavor also includes film and poster campaigns featuring phrases such as "Copyright pirates are criminals" (fig. 2). These and similar disciplinary paratexts are important since—and this brings us back to the legal side—there are severe penalties (prison sentences of up to ten

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36 Pizzanelli discusses the various attempts and processes created to forge safety holograms and comes to the conclusion that holography is a very effective copy protection method, which is in contrast to occasional claims to the contrary (at least, given the state of the art in 1998 when Pizzanelli wrote his text), see Pizzanelli 1998.
37 Wikipedia, s.v. "Hologramm." Accessed April 11, 2008. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hologramm.
38 Accessed April 11, 2009. http://bluetentrainer.polizei-beratung.de/blueten_euro/trainer_d.html.

Figure 1. *Euro-Blüten-Trainer* ("funny money advisor"), screenshot.

years in Germany) even for unknowingly passing on counterfeit money. These paratexts alert us to our responsibility to learn techniques of observation that will help us recognize legally-protected technical effects—the absence of which signal the criminal offence of unauthorized reproduction of money or documents. For this reason, counterfeiters try to distribute their fake notes in chaotic, hectic situations where there is too little time and/or light for a thorough examination.

In summary, the aim is to prevent unauthorized reproduction with a heterogeneous combination of three components:

1. Legal threats and the institutional conditions which allow them to function, i.e. the legal-institutional complex.
2. Technical effects that cannot be reproduced by the general public (e.g. holograms).
3. Techniques of observation focused on the special effects provided by the processes in 2) that enable one to recognize the differences between authorized and unauthorized reproduction as defined according to 1).

This heterogeneous configuration, designed to stabilize what one might call the reproductive difference between original and copy, appears in a wide variety of areas. I will outline just a few examples:

Figure 2. *Raubkopierer sind Verbrecher* ("Copyright pirates are criminals").

1. Product counterfeiting is a concern in the area of material commodities. At the beginning of 2009, a group of secondary school students from Lübeck, Germany, went on a fatal drinking spree in Kemer, on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, drinking raki laced with methanol. Following this incident, the April 3, 2009 issue of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported on problems with the counterfeiting of raki in Turkey, and more precisely on "2005, the year of the raki crisis," in which one

incident stands out in particular: "First of all, 500,000 holograms, which were supposed to be attached to bottles to guarantee the authenticity of the liquor, were stolen from a raki distillery in Izmir [...]."[39] Two points can be deduced from this.

First, even if Baudrillard may be right in thinking that the industrial mass production of goods has led to an unprecedented spread of identical series of objects, this does not necessarily nullify the distinction between original and copy.[40] Legitimate and illegal specimens should be distinguishable—at least in principle.

Secondly, holograms are mentioned again here, as in the discussion of banknotes above. As was said, holography is one of a number of irreproducible photographic processes, designed to curb reproducibility in conjunction with corresponding legal institutions and observation techniques for assessing validity. The fact that there are small, identical holograms on many banknotes or on "original products" shows that holographs can be reproduced in certain circumstances, but not by the general public. Reproducibility is not something that exists or does not exist; it is present in a graduated and variously distributed state.[41]

2. As already mentioned, one of the most important areas in which reproducibility must be contained and reduced is that of documents pertaining to governmental and economic structures. Money and personal identification documents (of the kind general found in wallets) must only be duplicated or produced by appropriate institutions. Readers will undoubtedly understand the basis for this restriction: you likely have, in your wallet, both identity documents and money or cards with which you can access money. You can easily verify the vital importance of this archive of non-reproducible elements for your economic and political existence, i.e. your existence—to use Marx' terminology—as a *bourgeois* and *citoyen*. If you go to a bank without a credit card or identity card and try to get money, or try to travel to another country without a passport, you will soon run into trouble—especially if you reach a checkpoint. You can claim that you are creditworthy but no one will believe you unless you can present a real credit card or a real passport. You would be considered highly suspicious if you dared to present a photocopy of your passport (or your credit card). You are only "yourself" by virtue of your *original* documents.

A clear difference does emerge here, though: in the case of money, you have to be able to recognize a fake 50 euro note, i.e. you have to learn to distinguish it from real 50 euro notes. But you come across a lot of 50 euro notes, which means you have to learn to tell *genuine copies* from *fake copies*. With your ID card, the situation is somewhat

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39 Translation from Strittmatter 2009, 10.
40 Cf. the example of machine construction in Paul 2010.
41 Cf. Schröter 2009.

different. It is only allocated to you, and of course it would make no sense to distribute numerous copies of it. I can scarcely use a copy of someone else's ID card to prove my identity, however good the copy may be. Here the non-reproducibility of the ID card is connected to the prototype of my signature and face. My signature and the photo of my face connect me and my identity document *indexically* (this also applies to biometric data).[42] My face and my signature have to match the face and signature on the document—and vice versa. Thus the prototype has to be reproduced, but it is fixed on a document that is rigorously protected against unauthorized reproduction by security features that cannot readily be reproduced. This shows that it is not a matter of playing reproducibility and non-reproducibility against each other, but of observing their actual configurations, historically, culturally, even situationally. This essay is just a preliminary attempt to chart this difficult terrain. The ID card, which I cannot validly produce myself, assigns my face, and therefore my body, to my name. And this ID card can only be allocated to a specific, i.e. addressable, person by an approved governmental body. In this sense, a person can be defined as a living body + an identity document.[43] Much the same can be said for employee or military ID cards. Access to certain institutions or resources can only be obtained through such processes of identification; this is why "identity theft"[44] is now a key crime in the areas of espionage, industrial espionage, illegal immigration, and emigration.

While every banknote in a series shows the same reference, e.g. a value of 50 Euros, the singular reference is the difference between ID cards, meaning every ID card shows a different person. The issue with ID cards is therefore one of being able to distinguish a *fake* card from a *genuine* one. Strictly speaking, every banknote is also an original, since it has a singular number, but here the question is whether a given banknote is a valid copy of its prototype. In practice, we as users do not really have the opportunity to check whether the serial number on a banknote is correct—e.g. by visiting a bank. Hence we can and generally must disregard this singularity and differentiate, in the case of banknotes,

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42 The indexicality of the signature is also demonstrated by the fact that erasable pencil is not "acceptable for use on official documents," since the trace can be deleted or changed. (See *Wikipedia,* s.v. "Dokumentenechtheit." Accessed March 31, 2014. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dokumentenechtheit.) A particularly strange phenomenon that we cannot go into here is the so-called "facsimile signature stamp," a stamp that imitates a hand-written signature as closely as possible.

43 It is not customary to possess ID cards in every country or culture—though this could be the subject of a comparative cultural study on the production of identity. In the conditions of modern mass societies, however, some sort of mechanism of identification is generally necessary. See a very detailed overview at *Wikipedia,* s.v. "Identity document." Accessed March 31, 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_document.

44 Cf. Hoofnagle 2007.

between *fake* and *genuine* copies.[45] This strange expression may cause discomfort—perhaps it would be better to say "authorized" and "unauthorized"—but, from the point of view of the authorizing bodies, this is the same as the difference between genuine and fake.[46]

3. In the art system, of course, the distinction between original and copy is still maintained.[47] This is particularly evident in the "vintage print" in photography, a practice which would undoubtedly have seemed very peculiar to Walter Benjamin, and would probably also strike Rosalind Krauss as odd. The first print made from the negative by the photographer is valued higher than every subsequent reproduction, and there are always conflicts about the reliability of the documentation of these processes. It is, furthermore, standard practice today for photographers to make just a few prints of their photos—sometimes even destroying the negative after producing the prints—to ensure that only small number of copies are in circulation. Thus even the works of Appropriation Art which Krauss valued so highly have now become expensive originals.

4. In the digital field, especially, reproductive differences are continually being reconstructed. Precisely *because* a loss-free reproduction could theoretically diminish the difference between original and copy,[48] frantic efforts to rebuild this distinction have been redoubled. Increased reproducibility seems liable to break down the object's nature as a commodity and thus the very conditions which make a capitalist economy possible. A digital commodity—whether software, a film, or music—can be reproduced any number of times. This has a huge negative impact on its commercializability if the digital commodity is reproduced by users rather than producers. But this problem is even more fundamental: whether I hand over a piece of software for money or for free, I always keep a copy. No exchange takes place, and thus the object's nature as a commodity seems questionable.[49] Again, strict laws and

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45 Both Jochen Venus and Timo Schemer-Reinhard have raised the question of whether it would be better to speak of banknotes as "specimens" or "examples" (German: *Exemplare*) rather than "copies." This question is quite justified, but it raises the further question of how to distinguish between "example" and "copy"—a difficult question that can only be suggested but not answered here. The first problem is that the distinction between an example and a copy may only be possible in certain languages—what is referred to as an *Exemplar* of a book in German is simply called a "copy" in English.

46 Jochen Venus, in an email to the author, objected: "The distinction between a 'genuine copy' and a 'fake' one seems to me to be contrary to the meaning of the term copy. I don't think you would talk about a fake imitation either." And yet clearly this difference does exist, as one can see from the phenomenon of "certified copies" of documents issued by administrative bodies. Cf. *Wikipedia,* s.v. "Beglaubigung." Accessed March 31, 2014. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beglaubigung.

47 See the contribution of Susanne Knaller in this volume.

48 If one disregards the frequent need to compress data (and thus entail losses). See Salomon 2008.

49 Cf. Grassmuck 2004.

their institutions of enforcement, whether through complicated technical processes—think of digital rights management[50] or copy protection systems for DVDs[51] and audio CDs[52]—as well as techniques of observation of validity are designed to prevent the digital technology's technical potential for mass production from being usable; this is done because this potential is not compatible with the economic principles that are currently in place.

Conclusion

Reproducibility presents a fundamental threat to the existing governmental and economic structures of modern societies; I believe Benjamin saw this correctly, albeit in a different way.[53] Hence the emergence of dramatic terms to describe acts such as "piracy."[54] To combat these threats, a heterogeneous ensemble of special technological processes (such as holography), legal regulations, and observational techniques is constructed, which I call the "heterogeneous ensemble of reproductive difference." It is intended to stabilize the differences between genuine and fake originals, and between genuine and fake copies.

The heterogeneous ensemble of reproductive difference is a mode of—to borrow Foucault's use of the term—"rarefaction,"[55] without which neither the circulation of money or goods, nor of personal identity can be maintained. Such rarefaction seems, depending on the individual practice or subsystem, to be a more or less urgent necessity. It is nonsense to claim that the difference between original and copy is now obsolete. Whole industries earn their money by preventing copies from being produced—and thus stabilizing originals. To sum up, there is indeed a transformative power of the copy—it is so transformative that it threatens the economy and the state. And that is why there are so many mechanisms to contain its power and to tame it.[56]

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50 On DRM, see the wealth of information at the website of Humboldt University's Institut für Informatik. Accessed March 3, 2014. http://waste.informatik.hu-berlin.de/Grassmuck/drm/. On the problem of law relating to digital media, see Boehme-Neßler 2008.
51 Cf. Heilmann 2010.
52 Cf. Wöhner 2005.
53 Benjamin hoped that reproducibility would encourage socialist transformations of society.
54 Cf. Yar 2005.
55 Foucault 1981, 58.
56 In a sense the taming of the copy provides a very good example for what Winston calls the "law of the suppression of radical potential" (1998, 11).

Figures

Fig. 1: Accessed March 31, 2014. http://bluetentrainer.polizei-beratung.de/blueten_euro/ trainer_d.html.

Fig. 2: Accessed February 16. 2017. http://images.mediabiz.de/newspics/032/1450 32_1/b279x396.jpg.

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PART III

The Copy
and the Original

Rune Graulund

The Hegemony of the Copy: The Manuscript, the Book, and the Electronic Text in the Age of Limitless Digital Storage

Abstract   This essay questions when the creative process leading to the original can be said to be complete. When does the series of a pupil's botched attempts at perfection leading to "the" singular and unique object, text, tool, or artwork we recognise as the original expression of the master craftsman stop? Where is the cut-off point between the different versions (copies) of earlier inferior iterations in the gestation process that lead to the original, and final, superior original? This essay chiefly examines the manner in which text has been copied and stored in one particular type of object, namely that of the book, in order to provide some fairly well-known arguments regarding pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. In particular, it examines the differences between manuscript culture and print culture as we see them expressed in the production (and reproduction) of master copies and subsequent copies, of handwritten manuscripts, and mechanically printed books. Finally, it asks what the impact of digital memory and digital copying has had in terms of our current conception of copy and original and, in particular, examines the manner in which an increase in memory storage capacity can be seen to go hand in hand with digitisation's increased role in diluting the differences between original and copy—not only in the excessive copying of the original, but in the creative process itself. For in a world in which objects, information, and text can be copied cheaply in vast quantities, and to a degree of verisimilitude that even the creator of such may no longer know the difference, does it make sense to speak of a distinction between the two any longer? Has the copy turned original, and the original turned copy? How do we discern between the two in a world in which all "copies," the master copy as well as copies of the master copy, are indiscernible?

Keywords   Artefact, aura, authenticity, book, copy, deletion, forgetting, frailty, manuscript, memory, mimesis, original, replica, safekeeping, text

In his seminal study "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Walter Benjamin begins by the admission that "in principle, a work of art has always been reproducible."[1] As long as there have been art and craft, Benjamin explains, there have been attempts at trying to capture the essence of the original, of replicating the outstanding quality of the work of a master craftsman or a genius artist. Indeed, in the very pursuit of the eventual perfection of skill required to create a master artefact worthy to be copied by others, all master craftsmen and genius artists will themselves have had to go through endless repetitive acts of copying in order to attain the experience necessary for the production of the master copy that others would then themselves desire to imitate and replicate.

In this, in the arduous process leading to the supposed perfection and completion of an original master artefact, the superior original from which all subsequent, and subsequently inferior, copies are to compare themselves, we see the root question of the argument which is to follow. I will in general terms be working towards an examination of some fundamental questions pertaining to the relationship between copy and original, as to the creative act leading up to the supposedly complete unique object we term "original." The questions to be asked, and hopefully answered, are therefore as follows: When can the process leading to the original be said to be complete? Where is the cut-off point between different versions (copies) of earlier, inferior iterations in the gestation process leading to the original, and final, superior original?

Obviously, any attempt at answering such questions fully would constitute a Herculean task. Consequently, what I intend to do in the following is to pose some broad questions regarding the tangled and often highly confusing relationship of copy with original, but to do so through an analysis of a selective range of material. In this, I intend to give an overview of at least some (but by no means all) of the general challenges posed by pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. The main thrust of the argument, however, points towards a discussion of the digital techniques of reproduction, the introduction of which have led to a revolution not only in the price and accuracy of copying, but to a questioning of some of the basic questions regarding the relationship between copy and original. Nevertheless, while I am admittedly interested in querying these questions in fairly broad terms, I have picked most of my examples from one particular medium, namely text. Furthermore, I will be looking chiefly at the manner in which text has been copied and stored in one particular type of object, namely that of the book, in order to provide some fairly well-known arguments regarding pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. In particular, I will be looking at the differences between manuscript culture and print culture as we see it expressed in the production, and reproduction, of master copies, and subsequent copies, of handwritten manuscripts and mechanically printed books.

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1   Benjamin (1936) 1999, 212.

In the final section, as we move up to present day, I will however once more move away from the question of text and the object of the book in order to query the questions of digital memory and digital copying in terms broader than those of text and the book. In particular, I want to examine the impact this relatively new technology has had on our current conception of copy and original, as well as the relationship between them. Returning to the initial question posed above regarding the process leading up to the supposed complete and final state of the authentic original, I will be looking at the manner in which an increase in memory storage capacity can be seen to go hand in hand with digitisation's increased role in diluting the differences between original and copy, not only in the excessive copying of the original, but in the creative process itself. For in a world in which objects, information, and text can be copied cheaply, in vast quantities, and to such a degree of verisimilitude that even the creator may no longer know the difference, does it make sense to speak of a distinction between the two any longer? Has the copy turned original, and the original turned copy? How do we discern between the two in a world in which all "copies," master copy as well as copies of the master copy, are indescernible?

Mimesis, copy, text, and book

In literary studies, the conundrum of original and copy are as old as the discipline itself. Indeed, language, the base subject matter from which literature, oral as well as written, originates, is to some extent defined by this troubled relationship between original and copy through concerns regarding the notion of "mimesis." The question of mimesis, of putting a mirror to nature, is of great importance to all forms of art and not just of language and literature. As Plato argued in *The Republic* (ca. 380 BC), all art rests upon the ability to imitate, to act "as a representation of something else."[2] As Matthew Potolsky argues in *Mimesis*, Plato's notion of art as copy "is so fundamental to the way we understand art that it is no exaggeration to claim that art itself, as a distinct human product, is a Platonic invention."[3] Nevertheless, as Potolsky also makes clear, the very idea of "art" as being somehow at a remove from the natural, of art being somehow "artificial" in that it is of a second order to nature, is a problem that becomes compounded several times over once we move from visual artistic representations on to language and literature: "The movement from visual to linguistic imitation is problematic. Language does not imitate in the same ways that images do."[4]

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2 Potolsky 2006, 15.
3 Potolsky 2006, 16.
4 Potolsky 2006, 26.

Even in this seemingly simple distinction between visual representation and textual representation, we begin to encounter a host of problems. First of all, before we even begin to discuss the differences between visual and textual representation, there is the question of exactly what one means by "mimesis." As anthropologist Michael Taussig puts it in *Mimesis and Alterity*, mimesis is a concept that is not easy to pin down and define in that it is a process and "a relationship, not a thing in itself."[5] The title of Taussig's study implies as much, for in his claim that "the faculty to copy, imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and become Other,"[6] we see the constant flux mimesis instigates between sameness (copy) and alterity (originality). "Pulling you this way and that, mimesis plays this trick of dancing between the very same and the very different. An impossible but necessary, indeed an everyday affair, mimesis registers both sameness and difference, of being like, and of being Other."[7] As Gunther Gebauer and Christoph Wulf conclude in *Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society*,[8] to ask the question "what is mimesis?" is therefore asking the wrong question. Such a question, they propose, inevitably "leads to error [in that it] presupposes that mimesis is a largely homogenous concept that undergoes continuous development in a historical space." Rather, they suggest, we should consider mimesis "a highly complex structure in which an entire range of conditions coincide."[9]

Taking up Gebauer and Wulf's admonition, I too will refrain from any attempt to pin down an exact definition of what mimesis may or may not be. What I do intend to do in the following, however, is to take a closer look at the manner in which one specific process of mimetic behaviour, namely that of copying, has been theorised in one specific discipline, namely that of literary studies. In particular, I will be looking at the manner in which the vehicle through which literary meaning was, at least until fairly recently, usually carried. I am referring, of course, to the book.

In a discussion regarding the relationship between original and copy, the book has certain advantages over "language" or "text." Unlike a letter, a word, a sentence, or a paragraph, the book is, or at least it was until fairly recently, a tangible object. While we may arguably also encounter words and sentence written down on a page, which is to say on physical matter, and while we may indeed also discuss the book in abstract terms (the *idea* of the book), at least the first couple of thousand years of the history of the book largely focussed on tangible physical objects consisting of paper, glue, cardboard, leather, ink, and so on. Accordingly, at least for our introductory argument, it is simpler to view the book in terms of a physical entity that can undergo various stages of copying and reproduction.

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5 Taussig 1993, 130.
6 Taussig 1993, xiii.
7 Taussig 1993, 129.
8 Gebauer and Wulf (1992) 1995.
9 Gebauer and Wulf (1992) 1995, 309.

Pre-mechanical reproduction: Manuscript, frailty, and safekeeping

The history of the book is long, complex, and contested. From Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin's *The Coming of the Book* to Marshall McLuhan's *The Gutenberg Galaxy* on to Walter Ong's *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, a range of influential thinkers have attempted to chart the history and influence of the book from its early origins and up until present day.[10] The impact of the book is momentous, book historians agree. Yet they do not always see eye to eye as to what the exact impact of the book may have been. Similarly, there is some confusion as to what exactly we may usefully term a "book" in the first place, a distinction that has not exactly been made easier by the fact that we are now seemingly living in "the late age of print."[11] Accordingly, whereas book historians could formerly at least agree on the fact that the book was a physical object, even this quality is now rapidly fading with the introduction of various forms of e-books, novel digital text formats, and so on.

While there is some uncertainty as to how far we need to go back in history in order to encounter the first book,[12] most book historians tend to agree that the book underwent a major change once print and print technologies were introduced. Obviously, this is a distinction of some importance when we have Benjamin's concept of mechanical reproduction in mind. Indeed, the difference between manuscript culture and print culture is one of Benjamin's first examples of the transformation brought about by mechanical reproduction.

Written and illustrated by hand, manuscripts differ significantly from printed books in that a considerable amount of time and energy must be invested in their production, as well as in their re-production. The original manuscript of a given text, the very first version penned by one or several authors, would have taken a long time to produce, not only in terms of the creative process, but in the actual process of producing the first physical manuscript. Similarly, the subsequent reproductions of those original manuscripts required a great deal of expenditure. As Febvre and Martin point out in *The Coming of the Book*, the claim that "the production of a single book involved a colossal amount of work" may at times have been stressed too strongly,[13] but there can be no doubt that there was a world of difference between the world of manuscripts produced by hand and the world of print. Indeed, if "the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition [and that by] making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique

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10 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998; McLuhan (1962) 1997; Ong (1982) 2000.
11 Striphas (2009) 2011.
12 E.g. whether scrolls, papyrus, clay tablets, runestones, and so on should be included in the history of the book or relegated to an earlier period.
13 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998, 27.

existence,"[14] it should be obvious that the ability of print to reproduce the written word over and over again, and at a massive reduction in energy and cost, puts the printed book at a "colossal" remove from the handwritten manuscript.[15]

Now Benjamin famously bemoaned the arrival of mechanical reproduction due to the fact that it helped undermine the "aura" of a work of art and lead to "a tremendous shattering of tradition."[16] As Benjamin argues, the "authenticity" of the original is therefore eventually eroded, to the point where there is hardly any trace left of the original in the mechanically reproduced copy. Mechanical reproduction technologies like printing may therefore have enacted an erasure of "all that is transmissible from [the original's] beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced," hence diluting the "essence" of the original.[17] We will return to this dilution of aura below, when we engage with the question of digitization. For now, though, the lack of easily reproduced copies eventually enabled by mechanical reproduction poses another question regarding the question of original and copy, and that is the questions posed by frailty and safekeeping. Ironically, the very rarity that Benjamin and others would bemoan the loss of in the age of mechanical reproduction is precisely also the Achilles heel of what Benjamin terms "artifacts."[18] Namely, that they are unique and therefore do not, by definition, exist in any great numbers (indeed that they do not exist in numbers, plural, at all); hence they are highly likely to perish.

The Italian semiotician, philosopher, literary scholar, and novelist Umberto Eco has written widely on original and copy, manuscript and print culture, and language and mimesis. One text in particular stands out in regard to the discussion presented here, though, and that is his novel *Il nome della rosa*. Subsequently translated into English as *The Name of The Rose*, the novel remains Eco's most well-known work, not least due to the fact that the book was later, in 1986, adapted into a highly popular film of the same name.[19] Novel as well as film revolve around a deceptively straightforward murder mystery in a fourteenth century monastery. It soon evolves beyond this fairly simple premise, though, to take on a wide range of philosophical, theological, textual, and cultural conundrums.

While many of Eco's themes in *The Name of The Rose* touch on questions of copy and original, one plot point in particular is of relevance for our discussion of copy, manuscript culture, frailty, and safekeeping. For, as it turns out, the murders committed at the monastery can all in some way or

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14 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
15 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998.
16 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
17 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
18 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 212.
19 Used for citations in this paper is an edition published in 1986 (Eco [1980] 1986). The original Italian version of the novel was published in 1980. The first English edition was published in 1983.

other be traced back to the resurfacing of a copy of a book the world has for centuries presumed lost. The second part of Aristotle's *Poetics* (ca. 335 BCE), *The Book of Comedy*, previously believed to have been lost to humanity, is discovered to still exist, a single copy of the book having somehow been safely kept in the labyrinthine library of the monastery. Indeed, as the two protagonists of the book, Adso and William, eventually discover, the murders in the monastery can all be attributed to the existence of this one copy of a text that had supposedly perished.

The central plot around which the book revolves thus turns out to be a question of copy and original, original idea, and subsequent dissemination of such through the physical copy of a handwritten manuscript. Specifically, the murders in the monastery have all—in some way or another— been orchestrated by the blind head librarian Jorge, a man who will go to any length to prevent what he considers to be a dangerous text falling into the wrong hands. Indeed, so bent is Jorge on barring access to Aristotle's text that he has, at the end of the novel, managed not only to destroy the copy of the book itself, but also the entire library in which it was stored. As a librarian, then, which is to say as a custodian (safe-keeper) of books, Jorge fails miserably, a fact that is mirrored in terms of plot by his own demise as he perishes alongside his library as it all goes up in flames. At the end of *The Name of The Rose*, the one extant copy of Aristotle's *The Book of Comedy*, presumed to have been lost for centuries only to have been temporarily rediscovered, has once again been wiped from the face of the earth.

Through Eco's swashbuckling tale of detective monks, burning libraries, and grisly murder, we are offered a telling parable on the frailty of the copy in the age of non-mechanical reproduction. Before the age of mechanical reproduction, manuscripts existed in one copy only, or at most in a couple handfuls of copies. Accordingly, as was the case with Aristotle's *The Book of Comedy*, many texts have been lost forever because the only copy in existence at one point or other disappeared, or was, as it is the case in *The Name of the Rose*, wilfully destroyed.[20] In addition to being a murder mystery, a meditation on religion, and a philosophical musing on the state of literature, language, and laughter, Eco's novel is therefore also a piece of alternative history, albeit one that ultimately leads to a state of affairs resembling the history we are already familiar with. How different the world would have looked, Eco suggest, and how different Christianity, had the world possessed a copy of Aristotle's controversial *The Book of Comedy*. His two monks-cum-detectives work tirelessly to solve the crime and gain possession of the book in order for the truth to come out so as to challenge the hegemony of church dogma. Yet

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20 The writings of Plato, for instance—documents that would prove so vital to Western civilization—were for a time believed to have been lost, until it was discovered that copies of his writings had in fact survived, safely tucked away in Constantinople. Without such extra copies, Western philosophy would have looked very different today. One could have wished, too, that more copies of Aristotle's works had been made.

in the end, with the library and the book gone up in flames, they end up, towards the close of the novel, without proof. Without actual copies of Aristotle's work, they are helpless to effect change. All they have left is "a library made up of fragments, quotations, unfinished sentences, amputated stumps of books."[21]

We do not, of course, have access to any copy of Aristotle's work on comedy. Indeed, like Eco's protagonists, we possess only fragments. We know of Aristotle's second book from mention of it in other sources, of short passages that have survived more or less intact in other texts, of summaries of what the book was supposed to have been about, and so on and so forth; as for any actual copies, though, original or otherwise, they have long ago been lost. Eco's novel therefore reminds us of the importance of preserving the original as best we can: to copy it as widely and as flawlessly as we possibly can so as to preserve it for future generations. Because the copy, of course, is to some extent intended as a means of safekeeping. A reading of *The Name of the Rose* could therefore be that hegemonies will prefer to destroy dangerous information, or dangerous copies, rather than let it fall into the wrong hands and let their authority be challenged. Another important lesson to be learned here, though, is that copies are an excellent means of safeguarding the original, and also that, prior to the age of mechanical reproduction, copies were frail things simply because they were so difficult to produce in great numbers.

Mechanical reproduction: Print, numbers, and aura

The problem facing Eco's protagonists in *The Name of the Rose* is of course an obsolete problem. No longer do we need to worry about the disappearance of all single copies of a given text, or at least not of the very important ones. It is rare in the age of mechanical reproduction that books disappear altogether. Various repressive political systems have tried, as did Jorge (a representative of Church dogma) in *The Name of the Rose*, to repress particular books. Since the introduction and dissemination of mechanical reproduction of text via the printing press, however, such attempts of silencing dissenting voices have, generally speaking, met with limited success. Accordingly, while we may to some extent have lost the Benjaminian "aura" and the "authenticity" of uniquely handcrafted artefacts like the manuscript, at least we now possess the major works of literature in seemingly indestructible numbers. Barring some sort of earth shattering cataclysmic event, it is highly unlikely that each and every copy of, say, Dante Alighieri's *Divine Comedy* (ca. 1308–1321) or William Shakespeare's *Hamlet* (ca. 1599–1602) would be lost forever. Accordingly, while the shift from manuscript culture to print culture may be said to have eroded tradition and the particularity of craftsmanship, at least it has given us safety in

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21 Eco (1980) 1986, 291.

numbers. Never again will a central document like *The Book of Comedy* be lost forever to flames, floods, or censorship.

The problem I want to address in the following, however, is one of *numbers* as much as of *fidelity*. After all, how many copies does one need? What is the point at which copying the original for safekeeping tips and becomes overwhelming? Is there a finely balanced point between safeguarding the essence of the original so that future generations too may gain access to it, and that of a countless repetition of the original that somehow corrupts and diminishes it? Also, does a copy need to be an exact copy of the original or can it be something in-between? What is the difference between an imperfect imitation of the original, as indeed all acts of craftsmanship must ultimately be, and that of the perfect copy one cannot distinguish from the original? Finally, and this is of course vital for Benjamin's argument, what is the point at which increasing orders of copying, as of the increasingly accurate degrees of fidelity to the original, will impact the value—and the meaning—not only of the copy, but of the original itself? Once again, the object of the book, the original and its copy, may help us consider such questions in further detail.

The quality of the copy in the age of the manuscript was never perfect. As Ong points out in *Orality and Literacy*, "manuscripts, with their glosses or marginal comments (which often got worked into the text in subsequent copies)" were a constant process, a "dialogue" with the original rather than an exact and definite copy of it.[22] With the age of print, however, the relationship between original and copy changed. For while it will arguably always be possible to detect some sort of anomaly in a given print copy of a book, to anyone but the expert, copies of the same edition will in practice seem interchangeable. The print version of the first 1983 English translation of Eco's *The Name of the Rose*, for instance, will seem to be indistinguishable from the first, the fifth, or the fiftieth copy to any standard reader. While, in the time of the manuscript, various techniques and regulations were already in place in order for copies to be "scrupulously checked for textual correctness so that no errors may slip in, distorting the sense," there were nevertheless much greater risk of a "corruption of the text" prior to the invention of mechanical reproduction of text.[23] The further we move into the age of mechanical reproduction, though, and the more the techniques of reproduction perfect the process of producing the perfect copy, we see an increasing concern that the ability to produce ever better, and ever more copies, may in fact itself act as a source of corruption.

The second parable from the world of literature illustrates this conundrum pointedly. Published the year after Eco's *Il nome della rosa* had been translated into English in 1983, American novelist Don DeLillo's *White Noise* addressed similar questions of copy and original, the fake and the

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22 Ong (1982) 2000, 130.
23 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998, 21.

authentic, and appearance and aura.[24] Like Eco's protagonists, DeLillo's Jack Gladney, a college professor in a nondescript college town somewhere in a nondescript part of North America, is concerned about authenticity and originality. Unlike Eco's monks, however, Jack is not on a quest to expose deceit and fallacy. On the contrary, Jack is himself somewhat of a poser. Which is to say a person posing as something he is not, hence a person terrified of being *ex*-posed. As director of Hitler Studies at College-on-the-Hill, Jack is arguably in a position of power that legitimises him as an authentic Hitler scholar. What is more, as the man who in fact invented the discipline of Hitler Studies in the first place, he is also, as the wellspring and original creative source of the discipline itself, the originator of all other Hitler scholars. Compared to other Hitler scholars, Jack can therefore be said to be the real deal, the original, the authentic and unique superior ideal to which all inferior Hitler scholars must compare themselves unfavourably.

Yet Jack suffers from a major defect as a Hitler scholar: he does not know German. As the novel progresses, Jack desperately tries to remedy this imperfection by taking German lessons, but he never quite manages to get it right. "I had long tried to conceal the fact that I did not know German," Jack remarks to the reader, which has been troublesome enough due to the stipulation (presumably Jack's own) that "no one could major in Hitler studies at the College-on-the-Hill without a minimum of one year of German."[25] Ironically, and somewhat absurdly, the director and inventor of Hitler Studies, the man who requires that his students learn German so as to be properly versed in their subject, is himself ignorant of the language he is supposed to be an expert in. At the beginning of the novel, while living precariously "on the edge of a landscape of vast shame," Jack has still successfully managed to hide this deficiency, and this despite the fact that "I could not speak or read it, could not understand the spoken word or begin to put the simplest sentence on paper."[26] Yet Jack is a haunted man, well aware of the eventual end of his masquerade as he is about to host a Hitler conference: "Three days of lectures, workshops and panels. Hitler scholars from seventeen states and nine foreign countries. Actual Germans would be in attendance."[27] Jack the poser, the man always afraid of being ex-posed, is about to have the rug pulled out from under him by the real deal, actual Germans who can speak actual German, and who threaten to prove the originator of Hitler Studies the fraud he really is.

White Noise is brimming over with juxtapositions of deceptive surfaces and inner truths, copy and original, authenticity and fakery. One scene in particular, however, is of particular importance to the questions posed here. Murray Jay Siskind, a colleague of Jack's, invites Jack to accompany

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24 The 1999 edition was used for the citations in this essay (DeLillo [1984] 1999). The book was originally published in 1984.
25 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 31.
26 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 31.
27 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 33.

him to the tourist attraction "The most photographed barn in America."[28] In one sense, the barn is a standard tourist attraction in that it has achieved the status of being a tourist attraction through the process all other tourist attractions undergo.[29] Yet it is different from older, more traditional types of tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, The Empire State Building, or the pyramids in that it possesses no immediate quality that differentiates it from other examples (copies) of its general type. Indeed, the barn is exactly like all other barns but for the fact that it is "the most photographed." The barn itself, then, the particular object, is not particular at all. It is only through its mediation, through the mechanically reproduced photographs of the barn, that it gains meaning as a tourist destination.

Unremarkable as it may seem, the barn is however the ultimate manifestation of touristic logic, which is at heart all about copy and reproduction. For unlike the Eiffel Tower, The Empire State Building, or the pyramids, all of which have become tourist attractions due the fact that they are architectural and engineering wonders as well as being extremely large, the barn possess no unique qualities whatsoever, but for the fact that other tourists have verified its existence by mediating it via photographs. The barn is neither the largest nor the smallest barn, the most peculiar, or the greenest or reddest or bluest of barns. Its quality as a tourist attraction relies solely on the fact that other tourists have been here to verify its existence via that most Benjaminian of mechanical reproductive techniques, the camera. Consequently, Murray argues, it has become impossible to see the barn itself any longer:

> "No one sees the barn," he said finally.
>
> A long silence followed.
>
> "Once you've seen the signs about the barn, it becomes impossible to see the barn."
>
> He fell silent once more. People with cameras left the elevated site, replaced by others.
>
> "We're not here to capture an image, we're here to maintain one. Every photograph reinforces the aura. Can you feel it, Jack? An accumulation of nameless energies."
>
> There was an extended silence. The man in the booth sold postcards and slides.
>
> "Being here is a kind of spiritual surrender. We see only what the others see. The thousands who were here in the past, those who will come in the future. We've agreed to be part of a collective perception. It literally colors our vision. A religious experience in a way, like all tourism."

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28 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 12. Tellingly, Murray befriends Jack because he wishes to copy Jack's supposed (yet hollow) success by establishing his own original field of study by becoming an expert on Elvis.

29 For more on this, see Dean MacCannell's *The Tourist* ([1976] 1999) or John Urry's *The Tourist Gaze* ([1990] 1998).

> Another silence ensued.
>
> "They are taking pictures of taking pictures," he said.
>
> He did not speak for a while. We listened to the incessant click-ing of shutter release buttons, the rustling crank of levers that advanced the film.
>
> "What was the barn like before it was photographed?" he said. "What did it look like, how was it different from the other barns, how was it similar to other barns?"[30]

Significantly, Murray argues the very opposite of Benjamin here. "Every photograph reinforces the aura," Murray remarks, in effect claiming that, rather than detracting from aura, rather than to "wither" it down,[31] pho-tographing the barn over and over again "reinforces" its aura. Arguably, Murray and Benjamin likely do not mean quite the same thing when they speak of "aura." Yet the paradoxical chicken and egg conundrum posed by Murray (Why was the barn first photographed? When did it change from being simply a barn to being the most photographed barn? What was the barn like before it became known for being the most photographed barn in America?) leads him to some interesting observations regarding copy and original that Benjamin's essay tends to elide. As Murray points out, the problem is that the "authenticity," the "uniqueness," and the "aura" of the original barn no longer exists since the quality of "The most photographed barn in America" identifying it as such relies solely on its relation to all other copies like it, to all other barns, and to the reproductions of such barns through the technology of photography. Not only is the barn a tour-ist destination precisely because it is *not* original, in that it is a standard and utterly typical manifestation (copy) of a certain type of building, a barn that is "in itself," as a type, as unremarkable and typical as buildings go. It is also a tourist destination because this very unremarkable type has been copied over and over and over again in reproductions that look exactly, or at least almost exactly, alike.

It is telling that, unlike Benjamin, Murray sees nothing in this to be worried about. For if Benjamin's 1936 essay points to some of the basic problems facing modernity, and in particular modernism, in the face of an almost perfect reproduction that can be reproduced many times over, DeLillo's 1984 text exemplifies the postmodern conundrum of entering a world in which there is no recourse to the original left, not even as Benja-minian nostalgia. As such, the problem confronting Jack and Murray is, in a sense, the problem facing Benjamin squared. How was it different from the other barns, how was it similar to other barns" is no longer the question, really. The real, and only question, is now that of the copy itself. A copy that has been repeated so many times there is nothing left but the copy itself. The original, if there ever were one, has long since been forgotten.

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30 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 12–13.
31 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.

Digitisation I: Copy and cost, memory and deletion

As we have entered the digital age, the question of craftsmanship as well as of mechanical reproduction seems to have retreated further and further into history. Here, then, we are about to complete the journey that has taken us from the techniques of pre-mechanical reproduction, to mechanical reproduction, and all the way up to post-mechanical techniques. The latter, as we saw it hinted at in DeLillo's *White Noise*, may perhaps be said not to be "reproductive" at all, simply because the very notion of an authentic original disappears somewhere in the process of copies being taken of copies of other copies. Hence, as we shall see in the following, the ability to produce almost perfect copies, and in seemingly infinite numbers, can blur the distinction between original and copy to such an extent that we can no longer tell the two apart.

If the late age of mechanical reproduction as it is parodied in novels like DeLillo's *White Noise* seemed about to effect this transition, we would have to wait for the age of digitisation, I would argue, before we would truly see this come into effect. As I will demonstrate in the following, digital (re)production is radically different from both pre-mechanical and mechanical reproduction in that it has provided us with the capability to document every single stage of the creative process that leads to whatever it is we consider to be the unique (singular, authentic, or auratic) master copy we classify as being "the original." Digital (re)production is also different from all former reproductive techniques, as will become clear, in that it is the first reproductive technique that can produce one hundred per cent exact copies of the original.

As a technique, there can be little question that digital reproduction is, in and of itself, radically different from mechanical and non-mechanical reproductive techniques. The question in this and the following section, however, is whether this revolutionary technology has introduced a new state of affairs in terms of the manner in which original relates to copy and vice versa. Or whether, as may also be the case, that digital (re)production has simply made clear what should perhaps have been obvious all along; namely, that we may in fact never been able to tell the two, copy and original, clearly apart.

Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, whose book *Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age* presents us with some useful observations on this conundrum.[32] As I will attempt to show in the following, the core argument put forth by Mayer-Schönberger regarding copy, memory, and forgetting has significant importance for both abstract and specific claims made in the above regarding both physical and philosophical aspects of the book as copy as well as original.

The prime object of *Delete*, as stated on the book's cover, is to provide an analysis and a survey of the "phenomenon of perfect remembering in

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32 Mayer-Schönberger 2009.

the digital age." What happens, Mayer-Schönberger asks, once "forgetting has become the exception, and remembering the default?"[33] In this , he argues, we are witnessing a revolution in the manner in which we deal with information, such that we are entering an age in which, for the first time in human history, forgetting has required greater expenditure than remembering.

In the past, Mayer-Schönberger claims, memory was special. In oral societies, those who were especially good at remembering were considered to possess exceptional gifts. Later, as script was invented, an invention that "fundamentally changed our human capacity to preserve information and enhance our recollection,"[34] the wonder at superior individual memory subsided somewhat. Nevertheless, the "admiration for superior human memory continued into the Middle Ages and persists in modern times."[35] We are still be awed by individuals who can remember, say, the sequence of an entire deck of cards after just a few minutes, or the first thousand digits of pi. The difference between now and then, however, is that such memory has little practical application. There is no real need, after all, to remember a thousand, one hundred, or even ten digits of pi when the cheapest of calculators can do it for us at the single push of a button.

As the technologies of script developed further, information could be stored in greater and greater amounts, and at increasingly lower costs. In the time that manuscript culture had developed into the sort of assembly lines one sees in, for instance, the medieval monasteries in which the plot of Eco's *The Name of the Rose* unfolds, the cost of storing information dropped markedly. Nevertheless, even as we move past early organised pre-mechanical reproductive processes of the kind seen in medieval monasteries, up to and beyond the introduction of print technologies, and all the way to the invention of a whole new range of media and reproductive techniques in the age of Benjamin, "fundamentally remembering remained expensive."[36] Compared to the painstaking time and costs of producing a manuscript, when it could take a scribe several years to produce a single copy, it may have been one hundred, a thousand, perhaps even ten-thousand times cheaper to produce a paperback book by the time Benjamin published his essay. And yet for all their apparent differences in expenditure, both these objects, both these types of *copies*, share with one another the fact that it cost more to remember than it did to forget. It may have been cheap to produce copies in the early twentieth century, but it was never free. "Until recently, [...] remembering has always been a little bit harder than forgetting."[37]

In this, we are today are faced with an unprecedented revolution in information technology, Mayer-Schönberger claims, so that it is only

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33 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 2.
34 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 34.
35 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 28.
36 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 39.
37 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 49.

recently that "remembering has become the norm, and forgetting the exception."[38] As we see it exemplified via the concerns expressed by Benjamin, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a rapid increase in the ability to provide ever more and ever cheaper copies. The further we move through the twentieth century, as exemplified by the parody provided by DeLillo's characters, this tendency only increased as mechanical reproduction became ever more refined and optimised and new—and even cheaper—technologies became available. Yet even so, as Mayer-Schönberger makes clear, the ability to store information, to produce, store and distribute copies, was fundamentally different than it is today:

> There is no question that the amount of information people captured and committed to various types of external memory drastically increased over the last quarter century, but in the analog age, effective remembering was still complex and time-consuming, and thus costly. Remembering still remained quite a bit harder than forgetting.[39]

In the digital age, this is however no longer the case, a fact that Mayer-Schönberger argues through what he terms "the economics of storage." Tellingly, as was the case with Benjamin and DeLillo, Mayer-Schönberger likewise decides to illustrate this shift with an example chosen from photography:

> The truth is that the economics of storage have made forgetting brutally expensive. Consider digital cameras: When you connect your camera to your computer to upload the images you took into your hard disk, you are usually given a choice. You can either select which images to upload, or have you computer copy automatically all images from you cameras. Reassured perhaps by the soothing idea that one can always go through them later and delete the images one does not like, invariably most people choose the latter option.[40]

There is a significant difference, here, though, between the photography of Benjamin's early twentieth century photography, as well as DeLillo late twentieth century phenomenon of tourists snapping away, reproducing, and reifying "The most photographed barn in America" over and over again.

The difference between the mechanical reproductive techniques discussed by Benjamin and employed by DeLillo's characters on the one hand, and that of Mayer-Schönberger's digital reproductive technique on the other, is that nothing is lost in the former. For while mechanically reproduced photographs would become better and better in the period

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38 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 52.
39 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 48.
40 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 68.

between Benjamin's essay and DeLillo's novel, the digitally reproduced photographs referred to by Mayer-Schönberger are fundamentally different in that they cost us nothing, or almost nothing, and that we have the storage capacity to keep an almost infinite amount of them. A photograph, once a costly commodity that would take time and money to develop, and usually only available in quantities of 24 or 36 per roll of film, now takes up just a couple of megabytes of storage, with standard memory cards able to stock a thousand or more and at negligible cost (and with standard hard drives able to easily store hundreds of thousands of such images). Memory, and therefore also copying, have become cheap. So cheap, in fact, that forgetting has grown costlier than remembering.

Digitisation II: Perfect replicas and total recall

"Four main technological drivers have facilitated this shift: digitization, cheap storage, easy retrieval, and global reach," says Mayer-Schönberger.[41] Of these, the first two have substantial impact on the manner in which we view the relationship between original and copy, especially in regards of quality and quantity. Accordingly, I will deal here only with the first two, digitisation and cheap storage.

First of all, we need to take a closer look at digitisation and the question of quality, similarity, and exactitude. Whether in text, image, or sound, digitisation is different from analogue copying, Mayer-Schönberger claims, because we can now, for the first time ever, make an "exact replica; every bit is the exact copy of the original. Hundreds of generations of copies of copies of the digital original later, the resulting copy is still as perfect as the original. Quality does not diminish, and copying carries no penalty."[42]

Accordingly, unlike the scribes in Umberto Eco's scriptorium, copyists who copied original works in order to safeguard them, adding in their copying—whether intentionally or unintentionally—little variations or imperfections to these copies , digital copies are exact copies of the original. When faced with the original and its copy, it is therefore no longer possible to tell the difference between the two.

Arguably, as mechanical reproduction became ever more refined, and as we saw it exemplified with DeLillo's barn, it would become increasingly difficult to tell original master copy and copy apart. Yet no matter the medium, close scrutiny will always reveal tiny differences between master and copy. Or even for that matter between copy and copy. Two analogue copies that have been mechanically reproduced from the same master, whether that would happen to be a book, a photograph, or a record, are never exactly alike. They may be highly similar, which is to say analogous, to one another, as they are to the master. But all three objects, Copy 1,

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41 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 52.
42 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 56.

Copy 2, and Master Copy are really, when scrutinised in detail, slightly different from one another. There never was an exact copy made, either in the days of pre-mechanical reproduction, or in the age of mechanical reproduction.

With digitisation, however, we have now entered the age of the exact copy. Accordingly, in the digital age it is no longer a case of diminishing returns on the original's aura. Rather, it is a question of there being no diminishment whatsoever, no discernible difference, between original and copy in that they are one and the same. Ultimately, then, "the notion of originals and copies is rapidly becoming an outdated concept. All digital copies are indistinguishable from the original."[43]

Secondly, Mayer-Schönberger makes us reconsider the concept of original and copy in terms of the question of the process leading to the supposedly final, unique, and authentic state of "the original" itself. While the argument I present in the following is not something that Mayer-Schönberger's own argument about memory and data dwell on directly, his analysis of the influx of cheap storage is rather telling concerning the creative process that leads to the production of an "artefact" that we tend to view as the unique and final form of "the" original. For just as we are now getting used to keeping every single photograph we take rather than deleting the ones we do not like, something similar can be said to be the case regarding the creative process leading to the formation of "the original."

Again, however, rather than ushering in a brand new relationship between original and copy, digitisation has perhaps helped us see what has perhaps always been the case, rather than introduced something which is truly novel. Or that is to say, the technologies of digitisation have no doubt, as Mayer-Schönberger convincingly argues, fundamentally changed the manner in which we copy and store information. Yet in terms of the central question of this paper—and indeed of this entire volume, namely of the transformative power of the copy—digitisation has cleared the way for some basic truths about the relationship between original and copy, as well as what these terms mean in isolation. These truths, as I argue in the following concluding section, were as valid in the days of Benjamin and the photograph as they were in the age of the medieval scriptorium. That is to say these are perhaps truths that may have always been valid, but perhaps not always so evident.

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43 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 60.

The original and the copy: First, last, and always transformative

Allow me one final analogy from the world of literature and (print) books before I conclude. I wish here to revisit a famous literary case of the original and the copy, namely that of Franz Kafka and his authorship, surely one of the most important of the twentieth century.

Famous as he was to become, Kafka enjoyed only a modicum of success as a writer in his lifetime. While he managed to get some of his short stories published, none of his longer works, like the novels *Der Prozess* (1925), *Das Schloss* (1926) and *Amerika* (1927), were published while he was still alive. Indeed, but for the obstinacy of his close friend Max Brod, they very well never would have been, seeing as Kafka had informed Brod that all of his unpublished works were to be incinerated. Fortunately, Brod decided to ignore this request, subsequently publishing as much as he could make sense of from Kafka's sprawling notes and notebooks. With this example, we return to the question posed at the beginning of this paper, namely the question of safekeeping and frailty discussed in the section on manuscript culture and of the works of Aristotle (partially recovered) and Plato (initially thought lost but eventually recovered). To the initial question of somehow safeguarding the surviving original copy, we may now add the question of the different iterations (plural) leading to the single authentic copy that we, at some point, somewhat arbitrarily decide is the authentic and therefore unique (singular) copy that constitutes the artefact, or the master copy, from which all subsequent copies are made.

Now when Kafka died, all Brod had to rely on for publication were Kafka's notes, which is to say handwritten copies of his as yet unpublished works. While some of these, especially the shorter works, were more or less ready for publication, many of the longer texts remained in a state of incompletion. Consequently, it would be up to Brod to decide what to leave out and what to leave in as he took it upon himself to arrange for publication such literary classics as *Der Prozess* and *Das Schloss*, texts which have proven of almost incomparable significance to twentieth-century literature. The irony here, though, is of course that these classics, these truly *original* pieces of literature, the likes of which had never been since before or since, only exist in a state of undeniable incompletion. Accordingly, this state of incompletion is the only form in which we, the readers, have ever known them. Indeed, it is the only state in which they ever have existed. Unlike the works of Aristotle or Plato, it is not a case of originals that have been lost, but of *originals that were never complete*. Texts like these therefore cannot be said to be authentically original in the usual sense of the word, because we have no authority, no author, to sanction them as authentic originals. Texts like *Der Prozess* and *Das Schloss* therefore exist only—and always—as copies *and* as originals (plural), simply because we have no way of verifying what the final version of "the" original, singular, was supposed to look like.

This is where we can tie up the questions put forth at the beginning of our argument to the arguments in *Delete* in terms of the question of digital text and digital storage. For what Kafka's surviving texts and his literary and editorial heritage tell us about original and copy, and especially about the process leading to the supposed authentic finality of "the original" (singular), is not dissimilar to the problematizing posed by the breakdown of the barrier between original and copy introduced by digitisation as described by Mayer-Schönberger. Namely that the distinctions between original and copy were never entirely clear; hence we have in fact always needed to see the two as being engaged in am interlinked and always transformative process that is never quite at rest. Consequently, there never was such a thing as "the" original, but only varying versions of a constantly-evolving process.

What a case like Kafka's proves is the concept that the original, too, is a copy: one copy out of many, of the many stages of the creative process. For imagine that every single iteration of Kafka's creative process had been available to us, as indeed it would have been had Kafka used a modern laptop to type up his novels, stored various backups on the cloud, occasionally transferred parts of it to an external hard drive or to Dropbox, logged them on Google's servers as he sent drafts via email for his friends to read, and so on. If every randomly-jotted note, every daily—nay, hourly—correction to his manuscripts was available to us, what would we do? Figuring out the original intent and meaning of a work like *Das Schloss* has already proven difficult enough, even without the interfering white noise of digitisation. Imagine if we had almost infinite amounts of information available on Kafka, almost infinite copies of the various stages of his texts, his thoughts, his everyday concerns and problems. Where to begin? Where to quit?

Due to the proliferation of digital memory now available, and the incessant hoarding of information, it would at least in theory be possible to do just that. In and of itself, this is nothing new. Published texts, in digital or in printed format, have always existed in different draft versions and different copies, before they have been released to the world as the final, original edition. At this basic level, there is little or no difference between pre-mechanical, mechanical, and digital techniques of producing an original. Indeed, the very sense of the revolution in information technology that we are now experiencing may not be that revolutionary when viewed in light of history. The shift from manuscript culture to print culture that Gutenberg ushered in by the fifteenth century, or for that matter the "mid-twelfth century [which] was probably the most important watershed in medieval European book production" and with "some parallels with the information explosion of the twenty-first century,"[44] have likely felt as new, fresh, and potentially intimidating as digitisation does today.[45] Again, when

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44 Hamel 2013, 64.
45 Indeed, as Umberto Eco remarks it in *This is Not the End of the Book:* "This is not a new debate. The invention of printing created the possibility of storing all the cultural information one does not wish to be burdened with "in the fridge"— that is to say in books—whilst knowing that the information could be found

viewed on a very basic level, the creative process itself has not at heart changed, nor has the relationship changed between original and copy—regardless of what sort of reproductive technique we have happen to have available. What *has* changed, however, and indisputably so, is the sheer amount of information, the amount of copies, available—and the speed at which these copies proliferate.

The final lesson taught, then, by this immense proliferation of copies into every nook and cranny of our everyday lives, is that *the original has never been anything but a copy*; a copy from one of the many stages of a creative process that has no natural, authentic conclusion. The original is not the original. The original is a process: a process that, like the copy, is transformative. Whether mechanical or digital reproductions, a handful of crafted copies or endlessly-reproducible digital duplicates, whether copies patiently constructed by hand or speedily stamped out by a machine, the conclusion must inevitably remain the same: Original as well as copy cannot exist in isolation. Original as well as copy are never complete, and never final. Original as well as copy are always in process; indeed they *are* a process.

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whenever it was needed. Aspects of memory can be delegated to books, and to machines, but we still have to know how to use these tools to their maximum effect" (Eco and Carrière [2009] 2012, 73).

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Copy and Write:
The Transformative Power
of Copying in Language

Abstract   This contribution explores what can be considered an original and what can be defined as a copy in language. To this end, it elaborates on the role of the classical Saussurean dichotomy langue/parole and factors such as the size and frequency of prefabricated chunks. Furthermore, it discusses how similar linguistic copies can be to a supposed *original*. After considering briefly whether copying is possible in the oral mode, this paper focuses on the question of what constitutes a copy in written language and, more specifically, quoting in academic writing. It concludes with a discussion of the importance of copying for processes of language change.

Keywords   Original language use, plagiarism, copying in academic quotations, copying in language processing, copying and language change

Introduction

Instances of copying occur in many contexts, as is shown throughout this volume. As a consequence, it is understandable that speakers of any language should also talk and write about the process of copying as such. In the *British National Corpus*, a digital collection of 100 million English words, the word *copy* (as a noun or verb) can be found in contexts such as the following:

- **Objects**: *People were always coming into the shop looking for things to **copy**.* [A6E 864]
- **Movements**: *Cherzeel scored with a close **copy** of England's goal.* [A9H 529][1]
- **Organisms**: *It replicates itself, and each new **copy**, which is independent of the original, goes on to carry out the task for which the virus was designed.* [A5R 720]
- **Painting**: *On my final day at Berkeley, my fourth-form pupils presented me with some flowers and a small mounted **copy** of Claude Lorrain's 'Hagar and the Angel'.* [A0F 632]
- **Film**: *IT IS amazing how few critics seem to have been able to recognise Dennis Potter's* Blackeyes *for what it is, just another Anglo-Australian **copy** of* Neighbours. [AA9 46]
- **Music**: *Consequently, a mechanical royalty arises each time a record company makes a **copy** of an album, cassette or compact disc.* [A6A 2422]

While this list is definitely not exhaustive, what can be noted is that, very frequently, the linguistic expression *copy* is employed to talk or write about copying in the domain of language, e.g. in the following examples from the *British National Corpus*:

- *Every document that goes through them* [photocopiers] *is recorded. Each **copy** is numbered and registered.* [A2X 426]
- *Her partner reads the magazine, too, and sometimes she lends a **copy** to a friend.* [A17 722]
- *Anne sent him a signed **copy** of her first book, Remembering Judi.* (sic) [ALJ 1967]

The corpus hits even suggest that the word *copy* most often refers to instances of language use. Note, however, that the individual, language-related uses of the word *copy* listed above still differ considerably. While the first is a synonym of *photocopy* (instances of which may also be effected of pictures), examples two and three do not refer to photocopies of books and magazines, respectively, but to individual examples from among a

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1   For a discussion of copying with regard to a specific type of movement, namely dance, see Schwan, this volume.

series of printed items. This appears to be by far the most frequent use of the word form *copy* in the *British National Corpus*.

However, one must not forget that these are everyday uses of the word *copy* in language. In dictionaries of linguistic terminology, such as Brown's 2006 *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, the term *copy* is not listed as an entry. Instead, the word *copy* (both as a noun and as a verb) may occasionally appear in linguistic texts in its general usage. It is then used to refer to reproduced texts, and particularly manuscripts that were reproduced by handwriting, e.g. by monks during the Middle Ages.[2] In uses such as *copy-editing*, one finds the additional meaning of a manuscript being prepared for printing.[3] While the ideas represented by the term *copy* are usually expressed in linguistics by the terms *reproduction* or *imitation*, these are no central terms for the discipline, either. By contrast, actual copies of texts do play an important role in linguistics, insofar as they relate to the empirical study of language by means of corpora. Corpora are collections of texts that are usually deemed representative of a particular language or variety and can be searched for patterns. For instance, the *British National Corpus* was designed to represent the English language in general. Since many different aspects of language may be the focus of linguistic research (e.g. vocabulary, grammar, or spelling), corpus texts need to be faithful copies of the original texts. While they may be modified by adding information such as demographic details about authors, sentence numbers, part-of-speech tags etc., such coding is frequently restricted to a meta-level, so that the text as such remains unchanged.

Since *copy* is mainly used in its general meaning in linguistics, it is essential to define what is meant precisely by the term in the context of the present contribution. It makes sense to use the common meaning as the starting point for such a definition. The *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, which uses a limited defining vocabulary, paraphrases the concept as "something that is made to be exactly like another thing," thereby capturing the essence of copying. According to this definition, a copy of an object is therefore expected to be an object,[4] a copy of a process is likewise a process,[5] and a copy of a linguistic entity is also an element of language.

Some concepts can be defined without having recourse to other, related, concepts. For instance, an ADULT can be defined as a person of a certain age without the need to explicitly refer to the concepts CHILD or TEEN-AGER. However, this is not possible for the idea of the copy, since it necessarily presupposes the idea of an original, upon which the copy is based. This aspect introduces a very strong chronological element. Consequently, it will be assumed in the following that it is only possible to produce a copy of an original with prior existence. This view differs from that maintained

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2   Spencer and Howe 2001.
3   *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "copy."
4   Cf. the examples in Stockhammer, this volume.
5   Cf. Schwan, this volume, on copying in dancing.

by Goodman and Latour, and by Lowe, who state that literary works of art do not go back to one original version, thereby implying that all versions of such a text have the same status.[6] In the same vein, the *Oxford English Dictionary* claims that individual examples (i.e. copies) of manuscripts or prints do not refer back to an original and uses the supporting argument that "the original draft is called the **rough** or ***foul*** copy."[7] According to Latour and Lowe, who discuss works of art, the relationship is even reversed, and the concept of originality presupposes the existence of copies: "No copies, no original."[8] Alternatively, one might wish to argue that this condition could be extended from the actual existence of copies to the quality of permitting to be copied—which would, in turn, raise the question of how similar something has to be in order to qualify as a copy rather than as a mere imitation or effigy, e.g. a small-scale model of a mountain which necessarily differs in size from the original. In a directly opposed view, however, one might want to argue that everything that is not a copy is an original. When the original undergoing copying in a secondary process is a copy itself, it would thus become a type of secondary original (e.g. when a student makes a copy of a worksheet he has received from his teacher, which is already a copy of an old original worksheet).

In linguistics, the term *original* is used in relation to texts which are translated into other languages.[9] It is also used to designate the steps that a word undergoes in the borrowing process: thus the English lexeme *chaos* was borrowed from Latin (as a so-called *proximate language*) but it is ultimately of Greek origin (its *original language*).[10]

Another aspect included in the simple definition above is the implication of an agent who deliberately attempts to achieve a likeness. This wording also leaves it open how similar the copy is in the end (e.g. due to the limitations discussed below). This is also true of the definition of *copy* found in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, one of whose meanings is "A transcript or reproduction of an original." To sum up what emerges as common ground in the various definitions of copying, a copy is an entity which is deliberately created with the aim of being exactly like an original.

The original and copy in language

Let us now focus on copying in language and begin by considering an example sentence:

(1) Linguistics is fun!

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6   Goodman 1969, 114; Latour and Lowe 2009, 281. See also the discussion on "original" and "copy" with regard to texts in Graulund, this volume.
7   *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "copy."
8   Latour and Lowe 2009, 278.
9   Lembersky 2012.
10 Cf. Hillebrand 1975, 224, and the *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "chaos."

Compare this to the next example sentence:

(2) Linguistics is fun!

The two sentences are identical, with regard to both their form and their meaning. Since language consists of both form and meaning,[11] properties on both levels emerge as the prerequisite for copying in language. Sentences (1) and (2) would therefore seem to qualify as an instance of copying. If one of the two conditions does not apply, by contrast, we are definitely not dealing with a copy: for example, it is possible to reproduce the meaning of a linguistic entity relatively closely for a specific context by using various synonymous expressions. The utterance

(3) I find the study of language entertaining!

may thus fulfil the same pragmatic function as sentences (1) and (2) in certain contexts, but this is not an instance of copying, since it differs with regard to the formal side of the message. For the same reason, translations are not considered copies, since the target text differs in form and also, to a certain extent, in meaning from the original.[12]

Conversely, two sentences or utterances may be formally identical but have different meanings in the contexts in which they are used. Since the noun *plane* can refer either to an aircraft or to a surface, sentences (4) and (5) are different in spite of their formal identity, because the differing contexts (signaled by the sentences in parentheses) result in differing meanings.

(4) Look at that plane! (It is coming in our direction.)

(5) Look at that plane! (It intersects with line B.)

Sentence (5) can therefore not be considered a copy of sentence (4). However, this is a constructed example. In everyday language use, such instances that only superficially resemble copies are extremely unlikely to occur.

Another aspect that may be considered in discussions of copying related to language is how to treat co-occurring potential copies. This is the case in example sentences (1) and (2) above, but more commonly in cases such as

(6) Come in, come in!

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11 Cf. e.g. de Saussure (1916/1959, 66–67) on the twofold nature of the linguistic sign.
12 E.g. because some linguistic associations or plays on words cannot be conserved due to the formal differences between languages.

and

(7) All right, all right!

which result in an intensification of the meaning.[13] When repetition occurs on the lexical level, that is inside a word, we speak of *reduplication*, e.g. in *ha ha* or *fifty-fifty*. Ghomeshi et al. present an interesting instance of this, namely contrastive focus reduplication, e.g. in

(8) That's not AUCKLAND–Auckland, is it?

This unusual juxtaposition "restricts the interpretation of the copied element to a 'real' or prototypical reading"[14]—in the example, to the famous city in New Zealand as against other places bearing the same name. Repetition and reduplication can thus be considered special instances of copying in language.

The first impulse in these cases is to claim that the original and the copy are used next to each other, just as one might want to argue that example sentence (2) is a copy of (1). However, the notion of copying in language is complicated by the twofold nature of language: one of the tenets of the school of structuralism is the necessary distinction between the levels of *langue* and *parole* in language. While *langue* represents the system of a language in the sense of an inventory of lexemes and a set of grammatical rules,[15] *parole* is defined as language usage in concrete utterances.[16] This is a very important distinction, since it affects whether linguistic entities should be evaluated as originals or copies. If we consider sentence (1) in this new light, we find that it consists of three words, namely *linguistics*, *is*, and *fun*. All of these words are established in the community of speakers of English and they are consequently part of the English *langue*. The question that now emerges is whether to consider each instance in which a language user uses a word like *linguistics* as a copy. After all, one might argue that each of these entities in the *parole* is the realisation of an element of the *langue* in actual usage. *Langue* and *parole* are related to each other via the minds of individual speakers. However, in view of the difference between the two systems, it is argued here that this is not an instance of copying but rather of some other transformative process, comparable to the way in which a spoken and a written sentence with the same content are not copies of each other. By contrast, all concrete realisations of a linguistic item in the same modality—e.g. *linguistics* in sentences (1) and

13 Ghomeshi et al. 2004, 318.
14 Ghomeshi et al. 2004, 307.
15 De Saussure (1916/1959, 9) defines *langue* as "both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty."
16 De Saussure (1916/1959, 13) characterizes *parole* as the "executive side" of language.

(2)—could be considered copies. Yet, strictly speaking, *linguistics* in sentence (2) is not a copy of *linguistics* in sentence (1). Rather, they share a common matrix in the *langue* that is in a certain way comparable to casting, in which a (quasi-)identical series of objects is produced by using the same mould.[17] While one might be tempted to argue that there is a difference between words and cast objects in that the production of a mould usually requires the prior existence of a positive model from which the negative mould is created, one should not forget that new words are used by an individual speaker on a singular occasion in that speaker's *parole*, and that it is through their use by other speakers that new words spread and finally enter the *langue* of a language.[18]

Copying as we shall consider it in the following sections thus primarily affects the *parole*. Note that some larger linguistic entities such as *Good morning* or *I am sorry* can be considered fixed expressions that are stored as single units in language users' minds, in spite of the fact that they can be analysed grammatically (e.g. *Good morning* as a noun phrase with a premodifying adjective). These complex units are therefore treated in a similar way to individual lexemes. Example sentence (1), by contrast, forms no common chunk but is the result of combining language-system-inherent words and rules (e.g. a singular verb form with the superficially plural noun *linguistics*). In this sense, sentence (1) is new and could be considered an original, and sentence (2) would be a copy of it. It is therefore arguable that linguistic copying, in the strictest sense of the word, only takes place if complex entities in the *parole* that are not single-unit entities in the *langue* (or at least not yet) are reproduced in parole again. It is in this sense that one may argue against Goodman,[19] and Latour and Lowe,[20] to claim that even prints of literary works go back to an original. That the copied entities usually follow the rules of the *langue* is a common correlation but not necessary, since it would also be possible to imitate nonsense words in the *parole*, or ungrammatical sentences contradicting the system of the *langue*.

However, the classification of a linguistic entity such as *Linguistics is fun!* as an original needs to be called into question if—as is the case here—it has been used before by the same author on another occasion, e.g. in a script prepared for teaching. Yet even if one were to retrieve the text in which a particular author wrote *Linguistics is fun!* for the very first time, one could only be certain to have come across the original with regard to production but not with regard to perception. After all, the author may have

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17 Cf. also Goodman (1969, 112–113), who describes a similar relationship regarding music when stating that "all accurate copies […] are equally genuine instances of the score" and calls music an *allographic* system contrasting with *autographic* painting, in which "even the most exact duplication" does not "count as genuine" (113).
18 Cf. de Saussure 1916/1959, 9.
19 Goodman 1969.
20 Latour and Lowe 2009.

read the sentence *Linguistics is fun!* before that occasion, without being aware of it now or then. This raises the question whether one can ever accept a linguistic utterance as an original, since any utterance may reproduce some other utterance that the language user or observer is currently unaware of. Therefore, in the context of this contribution, the independent production of the same novel utterance by different language users is defined as resulting in two originals, and one may even extend the notion of linguistic originality to the production of a linguistic utterance that is identical to another one produced previously, by the same language user, if that person is unaware of the earlier utterance.

The production of language will always require, at least to a certain extent, the reproduction of previously-used linguistic material (e.g. sounds, words, and grammatical rules) which, in their new combination, yield new instances of *parole*. Without potential reproducibility, a code such as language cannot function.[21] *Linguistics is fun!* is a relatively short utterance that observes the usual grammatical rules of English. As a consequence, the likelihood that one or more language users may have produced that sentence before is very high. In the past, it was assumed that language worked according to a slot-and-filler model, in which any grammatically suitable word may be inserted into the slots provided by syntax.[22] Modern linguistics, by contrast, recognizes the importance of chunks and prefabricated units,[23] and the open-choice principle has been largely replaced by an idiom principle.[24] As a consequence, one may expect that, in any given utterance, a certain proportion of chunks will be identical to chunks that have occurred in other utterances by the same speaker or by other speakers. While this would seem to suggest a very large degree of overlap between individual texts or utterances, there are also various factors that contribute to their potential uniqueness:

- increased length of the text or utterance
- infrequent vocabulary
- unusual collocations.

The longer a sentence (in terms of the number of words it comprises), the less likely it is to be produced as an original by different speakers on different occasions, e.g.

(9) Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed.

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21 Cf. Derrida 1999, 333.
22 Cf. the critical discussion in Sinclair 1991, 109.
23 Cf. Granger and Paquot 2008; Erman and Warren 2000.
24 Following Sinclair 1991, 110–115.

This sentence, the first from James Joyce's novel *Ulysses*, also fulfills the other two criteria: if a sentence contains infrequent words (e.g. *stairhead* with 14 hits in the 100-million-word *British National Corpus*), it also becomes more distinctive. The uniqueness of word combinations (so-called *collocations*) can be determined by using statistical measures such as *mutual information*, which compares the probability of encountering two lexemes in combination to the probability of encountering each individually in a corpus.[25] Thus *lie* is very frequent and *crossed* is relatively frequent, too, with 19,268 and 122 hits, respectively, in the *British National Corpus*, but their combination is quite unusual. A Google search for the sequence "lay crossed" on 7 November, 2016 yielded 44,500 hits, of which the majority of those viewed were quotations of Joyce's sentence. The more factors coincide, the more distinctive and original a text or utterance becomes and, as a consequence, the more likely its precise reproduction is to be a deliberate copy rather than mere coincidence. Where the boundaries should be drawn is, however, a matter of gradience. This is of particular importance in the detection of plagiarism. In their test of various types of plagiarism detection software, Weber-Wulff et al. find that some systems classify original texts as plagiarism "if the text uses many common phrases and the system reacts to four or five words in sequence as being plagiarism without examining a wider context."[26] Such false positives were returned, for example, for a text containing the sequences *Stieg Larsson was born in 1954* as well as *The rest of his childhood he lived* and *For the next birthday he got a*. Since most researchers would presumably agree that this is not original language use deserving to be protected by copyright, more refined algorithms are desirable to help decide what constitutes originals and copies in language, to support teachers in the detection of plagiarism.

Everything said about copying so far has been aimed at describing how it relates to language in general. In the next step, we will focus on modality-specific particularities. In principle, it is possible to copy orally, but this is less likely to occur than it is in written language, since long sequences in particular are harder to memorize and reproduce, due to the transitory nature of speech. According to Bakhtin, a large proportion of language users' communication consists of the re-telling of the text of others in their own words, but the formal modification combined with a certain semantic difference prevents such instances from being actual copies.[27] In the oral tradition, copying in the strictest sense mainly affects short utterances, such as slogans. The copying of whole texts in an oral tradition is most likely to occur with rhymed texts such as songs or poems, because these are easier to remember and reproduce verbatim.[28] However, even in these

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25 Cf. Church and Hanks 1989.
26 Weber-Wulff et al. 2013**.**
27 Bakhtin 1981, 338–341.
28 The situation described in Ray Bradbury's novel *Fahrenheit 451*, in which individuals memorize whole books, is therefore highly uncommon. Another interesting situation is provided by acting: stage actors usually attempt to

cases, one may ask how similar two texts need to be in order to count as legitimate copies. In the oral reproduction of text, identity can hardly ever be achieved, since many features vary for the following reasons:

- Each speaker has their own voice. An identical spoken copy would therefore need to be produced by the same speaker. Furthermore, the speaker's voice quality may vary due to age, illness, etc.
- Every time a linguistic unit is reproduced, even by the same speaker, a difference in loudness, speed, intonation, accentuation, or structuring by means of pauses may occur.
- The perceived vocal quality also depends on the situation where the speaking takes place, e.g. in a small room vs. a staircase.

We may therefore conclude that a copy may be quasi-identical on the level of the linguistic system, but that this can hardly ever be achieved on the level of concrete realization in oral speech. Every time an artist recites a poem, the result will slightly differ. The best auditory copies in this sense are produced by means of sound recording and subsequent copying to other data carriers. Note, however, that not even digital copies are one hundred percent identical: while the acoustic realisations of the same recording through the same loudspeaker in the same context will presumably be indistinguishable from each other (in contrast to gramophones, which produce a variety of accompanying noises), digital copies are at least distinct on the meta-level. Every time a file is copied, information on the copying process is encoded in the file's details, because the time at which a new file is created in the copying process is part of the dataset. Each copy is thus unique in a certain aspect, like a banknote with its serial number.[29] One may, however, argue that this aspect of the copy is irrelevant to its functionality and only applies on the meta-level.

While it would seem that it is almost impossible to copy longer stretches of spoken language with exactitude, written texts seem to lend themselves far more readily to copying. Indeed, two exemplars of an article in two hard copies of the same newspaper are virtually indistinguishable from each other. However, even written texts may differ with regard to a number of fine nuances:

- Handwritten texts pose the same problems as noted above: two identical sentences written by the same person are hardly ever one hundred percent identical formally. They will differ with regard to the material (the size of the paper, the writing instrument, the ink color, etc.), the

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reproduce the scripted version of a play word for word—thereby copying between modalities if one were to recognize this as copying—but note that their interpretation is considered an important aspect of the acting process.

29 Cf. Schröter, this volume.

amount of pressure used in writing, or the size of the letters. No two signatures are identical, either.

• The medium will even change the visual impression of a typed text. There is thus a difference between a digital text on the author's computer (even as a PDF) and the same text as a printed version using paper, toner, and printer ink.

Most of the time, however, most language users will happily perceive printed texts as identical copies of each other. On a general level, one may therefore distinguish between an absolutely faithful copy and a functionally faithful copy. While absolute identity between various copies of a text can arguably never be achieved in language because there will always be some differences (even on the atomic level of the paper used for printing), functionally faithful copies abound, particularly in writing. These are the copies Goodman has in mind when he states that "correct copies" of literary works are based on "sameness of spelling" and consist of "exact correspondence as sequences of letters, spaces, and punctuation marks," further asserting that "any sequence [...] that so corresponds to a correct copy is itself correct, and nothing is more the original work than is such a correct copy."[30]

Copying in academic quotations

Printed copies of a text are made in order to expand its potential readership. If a whole text is copied very frequently, this can be regarded as an indication of its popularity and/or importance. In academia, a subtype of copying is frequently observable within texts: *quoting* does not involve the copying of complete texts but merely of passages from texts by other researchers. The beginning and ending of a quoted passage are usually indicated by the use of quotation marks.[31] Quoting, which is usually defined as a verbatim reproduction of an original text, contrasts with paraphrasing, which implies the use of the paraphrasing author's own words to convey the paraphrased author's idea(s). Both in quoting and in paraphrasing, the source is indicated in order to make it clear that a specific idea is attributable to another author. In quoting, this extends to the wording as well. The reason for quoting rather than paraphrasing another author may be respect for that particular author, as well as the feeling that a specific wording is the best possible way to express an idea. Other reasons may

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30 In this sense, copies of literary texts differ from copies of paintings, whose correctness in copying is more difficult to determine due to the fact that the properties of pictures cannot be broken down into discrete features so easily (see Goodman 1969, 115–116).

31 This use of inverted commas in order to mark stretches of text as quotations is a relatively recent convention (Moore 2011, 1).

be the wish to state precisely a view that contradicts the author's,[32] or the necessity to provide the reader with a statement that will be analyzed in more detail (as when various definitions of a concept are contrasted with each other).[33] Since quotations are directly attributed to other authors, it is the quoter's responsibility not to modify the original text in any way.[34] Otherwise, the authors of the original text might be presumed responsible for the distorted ideas in supposed quotations of their text. As a consequence, it would seem that there is an opposition between identical reproductions—i.e. quotations—at the very extreme end of the scale of copying and a large degree of variation in the extent to which the original wording and order of ideas are modified in paraphrases, e.g. through replacement with synonyms, rearrangement of the clause elements, or the passivization of active sentences.[35]

Yet contrary to expectations, quotations in academic texts are not necessarily one hundred percent identical to the original passage. Not all features of the original are conserved, and in some cases, modifications are even required. The following collection of noteworthy aspects of quotes permits determining what is necessary in order to accept a text as a quasi-identical copy of another text in the context of academic quotations. It thus provides information on what constitutes the essence of language in the copying process:

- Any quotation necessarily conserves the meaning of a quoted passage. This is usually reflected in the reproduction of its letters, numbers, symbols, punctuation marks, spacing, capitalisation, small capitals, bold print, italics, and line breaks.
- By contrast, a quotation does not usually conserve the font type. A text in Arial may be quoted in Times New Roman without the need to mention this change. Font type is thus regarded as part of the standard formal background of a text. However, if an original text were to use various fonts in order to transmit a message, e.g. in a (constructed) original sentence such as

(10) Short passages are easier to read if typefaces without serifs are used (e.g. in *This is a serif typeface* as opposed to *This is a sans serif typeface*).

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32 Booth, Colomb, and Williams 2008, 97.
33 Cf. Schneider 2015 for a discussion of quoting as a positioning strategy, e.g. in order to express criticism.
34 Achtert and Gibaldi (1985, 71) demand that "in general, a quotation—whether a word, phrase, sentence, or more—should correspond exactly to its source in spelling, capitalization, and interior punctuation."
35 See also Booth, Colomb, and Williams 2008, 192–195.

one would expect a stricter observance of formal aspects in quoting than usual—at least for the self-referential text passage printed in the font type under consideration.

• Similarly, font size is disregarded in quoting. Once again, the standard of the original is legitimately captured by any standard of the copy. However, in word-processed texts, longer quotations are often signalled by indentation and sometimes also by a smaller font size and spacing between the lines than is present in the remainder of the text,[36] e.g. in the following passage:

(11) The unity of the chain of letters between two spaces in solid compounds can be regarded as an indication of how strongly they belong together.[37] Thus Haiman writes that

The distance between linguistic expressions may be an iconically motivated index of the conceptual distance between the terms or events which they denote. But the length of an utterance may also correspond to the extent to which it conveys new or unfamiliar information. Reduced form may thus be an economically motivated index of familiarity.[38]

To sum up, copied passages which are not framed by quotation marks are obligatorily modified in their formatting. If there is a marked difference in font size between parts of the quoted text, this is presumably conserved if it matters, e.g. in the case of self-referentiality. However, one aspect that is not usually conserved in quotations is the use of special initials. Thus, the edition of *Ulysses* used for the example quoted above actually extends the first letter of the first word <S> over two lines and spells the remaining sequence <TATELY> (in capital letters) as a continuation of that special style. Quoting this precise formatting would be very difficult. Since this formatting convention applies to all beginnings of all the parts into which the book is divided, one may also interpret this as a purely editorial decision, and one therefore lying outside the "original" text by Joyce. This supposition is supported by the numerous quotations of the sentence online, of which only a minute proportion uses capitalisation (and none the extra-large initial letter), possibly because they refer to some other version, but more probably in order to arrive at format that is easier to produce technically.

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36 These are defined in the 2009 APA style guide as quotations consisting of at least 40 words.
37 Cf. Erben 2007, 112.
38 Haiman 1983, 781.

- Line length plays no role in the production of a faithful quotation, either. Usually,[39] copied passages are quoted as flow text.[40] This raises the question of how to proceed with the end-of-line hyphenation present in the original text. Interestingly, the *MLA Style Manual*, which demands that "the internal punctuation of a quotation must remain intact,"[41] does not mention this aspect at all. In the majority of cases, the end-of-line hyphen is simply deleted, and a hyphenated original like *wa-ter* becomes *water* in the copy. Keeping the hyphen in a place other than at the end of the line in the target text would result in an unusual sequence and thus an unintentional variation from the original, e.g. in the unconventionally spelled

(12) The isle was surrounded by wa-ter.

The opposite strategy of conserving the hyphen's place at the end of a line would require the insertion of an additional paragraph break in most text layouts. However, this would disrupt the usual formatting of the quoting text, and it is possibly for that reason that this strategy seems to be highly unusual. Copying may therefore require the deletion of a sign (i.e. the hyphen) in order to conserve the intended form of the original text and thus to produce a functionally faithful copy. This task is made more difficult by the fact that some texts contain prefixations such as *co-operate* or compounds such as *bitter-sweet*, which are frequently but not always hyphenated.[42] In these cases, the copyist has to guess the original spelling preferred by the author in order to observe the principle of formal reproduction. In linguistics, this aspect is of particular importance to compilers of corpora, who must copy long passages from texts. In a forthcoming publication, I have found references to copying strategies in various manuals from the Brown corpus family: one strategy to resolve such ambiguous cases is to use the spelling of other instances of the same compound in the same text; another is to use an authoritative reference work.[43] Note that the copy-pasting of texts from PDF files into MS Word files deletes end-of-line hyphens by default. This is problematic if the end-of-line hyphen in the original coincides with the hyphen of a compound that is almost exclusively hyphenated in linguistic usage (e.g. *hard-working*).[44] If the hyphen

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39 Note, however, that up to three lines from poems (a genre in which the ends of lines play an important role) may be quoted by representing the line breaks by means of slashes with spaces on each side (Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 73) and that turnover lines in quoted poems (which are too long for the format of the quoting text's lines) are indicated by using the code [t/o] (Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 75).
40 The idea that this is no new phenomenon is supported by Wetzel (1981, 28–29), according to whom the scribes of earlier times did not reproduce original line length, either.
41 Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 80.
42 Cf. Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
43 Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
44 Cf. Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.

is deleted by default, the result (in the example, *hardworking*) will most certainly contradict the spelling intended by the author of the original text. As a consequence, end-of-line hyphens should only be deleted after individual consideration, and one cannot always be certain of having captured the intention of the original author, because some compounds or prefixations permit variation.

- If a feature of an original text cannot be preserved in a quotation due to some restriction of the medium (e.g. in typewriting or handwriting), there are usually conventions which permit the creation of an alternative that counts as a legitimate copy:

  — Italicisation may be represented by underlining,[45] bold print by framing a word or expression with asterisks (e.g. in *This is *great*!*), and small caps by using normal capitals.
  — Herbst and Klotz, for example (whose work is printed in black-and-white), indicate the use of color in quoted dictionary headwords by employing underlining accompanied by an explanation in parentheses.[46]
  — If an en dash < – > or em dash < — > is unavailable, either can be represented with a hyphen.[47] Note, however, that the replacement of an em dash (which is surrounded by letters) by an en dash or a simple hyphen may result in the insertion of spaces so as to distinguish it formally from a word-internal hyphen (which is surrounded by letters).[48] This needs to be considered in the analysis of text-only corpora, since attaching a hyphen to the end of a word may prevent it from being found by a search pattern that utilizes standard spacing.
  — Yet another issue to consider is the use of diacritics such as the cedilla <ç> or the hacek <ĕ>. Since these are distinctive and potentially lead to differences in meaning, their omission in the target text would reduce the accuracy of a copy. As a consequence, diacritics in typed texts have often been manually added to the paper copy of a quotation. Corpora frequently use special codes to represent diacritics.

- Since quotations need to be verbatim copies of the original text, this means that mistakes also have to be copied. However, it is possible to add the commentary [sic]—Latin for "thus"—in square brackets,[49] in order to show that a spelling mistake was not inserted by the copyist (which would be the reader's usual assumption). Such brackets

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45 Cf. Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 78.
46 Herbst and Klotz 2003.
47 Cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002, 1725–1726.
48 Cf. Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
49 Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 78.

can also be used to mark explanatory additions (e.g. who a personal pronoun in a passage refers to), omissions (signalled by [...][50]), or modifications (e.g. if capitals are changed to lower case or inflections are adapted in number or tense). Consequently, a legitimate, functionally faithful copy may deviate from the original as long as all changes are indicated in square brackets. These modifications on the meta-level do not make the quotation a paraphrase but simply a modified quotation. However, style guides differ in the extent to which they accept unmarked changes in a quotation: thus the American Psychological Association's style guide permits the conversion of the first letter of the first word in a quotation to upper or lower case and even states that "[t]he punctuation mark at the end of a sentence may be changed to fit the syntax" and that "[s]ingle quotation marks may be changed to double quotation marks and vice versa."[51] The *MLA Style Manual*, by contrast, demands the modification of capitalisation in square brackets, as exemplified in the preceding two quotations.[52] A problematic situation occurs if an original passage already contains square brackets. In such cases, a copyist may feel the urge to add a comment in another pair of square brackets in order to state that the first pair of brackets was already present in the original.

· Quotation marks also provide an interesting case. If a passage containing quotation marks is quoted, the usual convention is that the type of quotation mark inside the copied passage contrasts with the type of quotation mark used in the quoting text: if the meta-text uses double quotation marks, all quotation marks inside the quoted passage are rendered with single quotation marks, and if the meta-text uses single quotation marks, all quotation marks inside the quoted passage are rendered with double quotation marks.[53] This prevents confusion as to where the quoted passage begins and ends. When the quoting and the quoted text use the same type of quotation mark, this requires an adaptation of the quotation marks; if they use different types anyway, there is no conflict. An interesting question in this context is how to treat foreign quotation marks (e.g. from German or French original texts) in English texts. In contrast to English quotation marks < " > < " >, the opening German quotation mark < „ > is at the bottom, while the closing mark < " > corresponds to the English opening mark, and French quotation marks look completely different < « > < » >. As a consequence,

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50 Note, however, that neither the APA style guide (2009, 176) nor Achtert and Gibaldi (1985, 76) demand the use of brackets around omission points, which means that the readers will have to infer that these represent an alteration by the author of the quoting text and are not part of the quote itself.
51 American Psychological Association 2009, 176.
52 Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 79.
53 Cf. Achtert and Gibaldi (1985, 80), who only consider their own standard case of double quotation marks for the main quotation and single quotation marks for the embedded quotation.

these foreign quotation marks could remain unchanged—but most of the time, they will presumably be replaced with the standard quotation marks of the quoting text.

All of the above examples suggest that a copy of a linguistic utterance in the highly formal context of academic quoting may differ in certain ways from the original. Paradoxically, in some cases, the conservation of all original features—i.e. an absolutely faithful copy—would even result in a deterioration of the copy's functionality (e.g. in the case of end-of-line hyphenation).

The role of copying in language change

We have seen above that copying in language rarely leads to identical copies. At the same time, it is commonly recognized that variation in language represents the basis for linguistic change.[54] This raises the question of to what extent copying—and particularly imperfect copying—contributes to linguistic change.

A certain proportion of the variation observed in copies is the result of reduced cognitive ability (e.g. due to tiredness or inattentiveness). In children and language learners, failing memory regarding the precise form of an expression that has not yet been mastered completely may also play a role.[55] The proportion of language use affected by these obstacles must, however, not be overestimated.

According to Lass, "language transmission is replication" and language as such is "a replicating information system," in which "variance is 'copying error.'"[56] He states that some of the errors that "creep into the replication process" may be "stabilized by selection," while others are not.[57] However, the concept of error presupposes the existence of an alternative which is evaluated as being more correct (or at least as more appropriate) in a particular context than the variant used. Since the question of who can legitimately make such evaluative judgments is highly controversial, linguistic variation is frequently discussed on more neutral grounds in linguistics. In many cases, variation in the copy is deliberate, e.g. because the copyist wishes to make a particular point or to introduce his or her own view. This is for example the case when the title of a famous book, song, film, etc. is modified to make a pun.[58] As we have seen above, most instances in

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54 Cf. e.g. Holmes 2008, 205–206.
55 This finding was supported by an experiment by Kirby, Cornish, and Smith (2008), in which the imperfect reproduction of artificial linguistic stimuli was found to lead to systematic changes.
56 Lass 1997, 112–113.
57 Lass 1997, 112.
58 See Bolte's 2005 volume *Paradigms Lost*, whose title alludes to John Milton's classic *Paradise Lost.*

which language users refer to other language users' texts or utterances are therefore not copies in the strictest sense, but comprise form-meaning modifications of some kind and would therefore rather be classified as paraphrases, according to the definition used here.

Since language change on an abstract level presupposes change in the language of individual speakers, it makes sense to consider the role of copying in language change by adopting a cognitive linguistic perspective. One might be tempted to assume that the storage of identical copies of words (e.g. regarding denotative meaning, spelling, and pronunciation) in all speakers' mental lexicons is a prerequisite for successful communication. However, this is not the case: not only will the words in individual language users' minds differ with regard to the unique biographical experiences with which they are associated, but in a commonly-used analogy, the mind is compared to a corpus in which all previously encountered language is stored in some way or another.[59] Since every language user has experienced a unique combination of linguistic input, individual mental corpora must therefore necessarily differ from each other as well. It is only in the sense of a shared common ground for each lexeme that we can speak of some kind of copy (in the widest sense) existing in the minds of different speakers at all.

By contrast, the concept of copying also plays another role: according to Bybee's exemplar- and usage-based linguistic model of *emergence*, "certain simple properties of a substantive nature, when applied repeatedly, create structure."[60] The frequency of usage of linguistic expressions encountered in linguistic input—i.e. the occurrence of linguistic copies—thus shapes the mental corpora of the language users. Since individual language users base their own linguistic decisions (e.g. whether to use *whom* or *who*) on the frequency of linguistic phenomena in their mental corpus, the frequently repeated perception of copies in the past will consequently influence the future linguistic behaviour of individual speakers.

The frequency-dependence of change is also true for language in general. This is comparable (but not identical) to repeated photocopying: if an original text is inserted into a photocopier over and over again, the material on which the text is printed will deteriorate in the course of time, and this will influence future photocopies of the text, which will then differ from earlier photocopies in that they will also reproduce an increasing number of smudges, creases, etc. When transferring this principle to language, we can observe that if a word is frequently repeated

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59 Cf. Taylor (2005, 3), who also notes (13) that there are differences regarding the amount of detail presumably stored in memory compared to a linguistic corpus (e.g. regarding the context in which linguistic forms were encountered), the possibly different format (linear text vs. an assumed hypertext-like format in memory), and the differing temporal dynamics (involving the inclusion of new linguistic forms and the potential decay of memory traces compared to a stable conventional corpus).

60 Bybee 2003, 3.

in discourse, this leads to a reduction of its form in the pronunciation.[61] In some cases, such as *evening* (/ˈiːvnɪŋ/), this has already resulted in a standard pronunciation that drops the second syllable.[62] Similarly, English uses so-called *weak forms* for the majority of frequent grammatical words (i.e. pronouns, prepositions etc.):[63] thus the third person singular verb form *has* is hardly ever pronounced /hæz/ with a full vowel (with the exception of when it is used as a full verb, e.g. in *He has a car*). Usually, it is pronounced as /həz/, /əz/, or even /z/ or /s/, e.g. in *He has been here*.[64] This change is even reflected in the use of the contracted spelling *He's been here*.[65]

While it is possible to observe instances of imperfect copying in language use, the influence of copying errors in shaping language should not be overestimated. Instead, it is copying in the sense of repetition (which results in the increased frequency of use of linguistic expressions) that plays the most important role as a transformative power. This is also true of new language uses, i.e. the basis for linguistic change, which need not be imperfect copying but may rather represent alternative creations by different language users.

Conclusion

While this contribution is limited to observations concerning English, one may assume that many of the aspects touched upon are not language-specific and can be transferred to other languages without claiming universal status *a priori*.

To sum up, copying in language needs to consider two levels: that of the linguistic system and that of the concrete realization of language in utterances. This might distinguish copying in language from copying in at least some other systems. Depending on the size of the entities under consideration and the desired level of similarity, we find that, while functionally faithful copying in language is extremely frequent (e.g. if we consider that almost all words in a text have been used before in a language), it is practically impossible to create an identical copy of language use, due to situation-dependent variation, particularly in the spoken reproduction of longer passages.

Academic quoting represents a special case of copying in language. While absolute identity between the original passage and its reproduction

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61 Bybee 2003, 8–9; 58.
62 Cf. Wells 2008 at *evening*.
63 Cf. Eckert and Barry 2005, 215–216.
64 Wells 2008 at *has*.
65 Interestingly, for levels of language other than pronunciation, the failure to copy a particular expression frequently enough may also lead to its changing: thus infrequent irregular verbs, such as *weep/wept*, are more likely to be regularised (to *weeped*) than frequent irregular forms (e.g. *keep/kept*), which are more stable due to their stronger representation in memory (Bybee 2006, 715).

is explicitly demanded, the presence of certain features in a text—particularly punctuation marks—actually requires deviations from the original, in order to produce a functionally faithful copy.

Even if the influence of copying errors on language change should not be overestimated, we can still observe that copying as such plays an important role in language change: since repeated exposure to a linguistic pattern in communication incites language users to modify their own linguistic production, we can conclude that copying in language has strong transformative potential indeed.

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Alexander Schwan

"Beyoncé is Not the Worst Copycat:" The Politics of Copying in Dance

Abstract   Beginning with the example of Beyoncé's music video for her song "Countdown," which copied movements from Anna Teresa De Keersmaeker's early choreographic work, this article explores the role of plagiarism, reconstruction, and recreation in contemporary dance. With regard to theories of repetition (such as those of Søren Kierkegaard and Giorgio Agamben), a particular focus is placed on the ephemerality and corporeality of movement, arguing for the convergence of copying and repetition in dance. While, due to the restrictions of human anatomy and the responding characteristics of movement, dancing is always already interwoven with the process of copying, it is, however, the inevitable inexactitude of these copies that guarantees the non-iterability of dance, as well as its alteration and innovation.

Keywords   Beyoncé, Anna Teresa De Keersmaeker, contemporary dance, plagiarism**,** non-iterability

> *"The irreconcilable elements of culture, art, and amusement have been subjected equally to the concept of purpose and thus brought under a single false dominator: the totality of the culture industry. Its element is repetition."*[1]

Stolen dance moves

Beyoncé's video "Countdown,"[2] released in October 2011, provoked an extensive public discussion on the role of copyright in contemporary dance that began in social media and spread to newspapers, radio, and television before choreographers and performers countered with their response.[3] The discussion arose when Beyoncé and Adria Petty, the director of the video for "Countdown," were harshly accused of having stolen, plundered, or at least copied dance moves created by the Belgian choreographer Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker, namely from her two pieces *Rosas danst Rosas* (1983) and *Achterland* (1990), two of the most important choreographic works of European dance in the 1980s and 1990s, and which are now easily accessible on DVD and YouTube.[4] Compilation videos juxtaposing the so-called *original* movement material in De Keersmaeker's pieces and the allegedly copied moves were uploaded to YouTube shortly after Beyoncé released her video for "Countdown."[5] Finally, De Keersmaeker herself commented on Beyoncé's and Adria Petty's appropriation of her dance moves, judging it "rude" and stating that "what's rude about it is that they don't even bother about hiding it [...] this is pure plagiarism."[6] In the following, Beyoncé attempted to defend herself from these accusations by confessing that she was inspired by De Keersmaeker's work but also, ironically, extending her source of inspiration to many other artists as well:

> Clearly, the ballet *Rosas danst Rosas* was one of many references for my video "Countdown." It was one of the inspirations used to bring the feel and look of the song to life [...] I was also paying tribute to the film *Funny Face* with the legendary Audrey Hepburn [...] My biggest inspirations were the '60s, the '70s, Brigitte Bardot, Andy Warhol, Twiggy and Diana Ross. [...] I've always been fascinated by the way contemporary art uses different elements and references to produce something unique.[7]

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1 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 108.
2 "Beyoncé - Countdown," YouTube video, 3:32, posted by "beyonceVEVO," October 7, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/2XY3AvVgDns.
3 See for example La Rocco 2011.
4 "Rosas | ROSAS DANST ROSAS," YouTube video, 8:23, posted by "Kaaitheater," October 10, 2008, https://youtu.be/oQCTbCcSxis; "Danza Contemporanea / "Achterland" - Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker," YouTube video, 1:08:54, posted by "Ana Moyano," November 19, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/mTCIVAXDstk; see also Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012. For a recent, in-depth analysis of this controversy, see Kraut 2016, 263–280.
5 See for example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3HaWxhbhH4c.
6 Keersmaeker, quoted in McKinley 2011.
7 Beyoncé, quoted in McKinley 2011.

While Beyoncé insisted on the uniqueness of her appropriation—she nevertheless released an alternative video for "Countdown" a few weeks later, which excluded the copied dance moves—De Keersmaeker published another statement that extended the accusation of plagiarism against Beyoncé by also comparing her video to the film-version of *Rosas danst Rosas* shot by Thierry De Mey in 1996:

> When I saw the actual video, I was struck by the resemblance of Beyoncé's clip not only with the movements from *Rosas danst Rosas*, but also with the costumes, the set and even the shots from the film by Thierry De Mey. Obviously, Beyoncé, or the video clip director Adria Petty, plundered many bits of the integral scenes in the film [...] People asked me if I'm angry or honored. Neither. [...] I am glad that *Rosas danst Rosas* can perhaps reach a mass audience which such a dance performance could never achieve, despite its popularity in the dance world since [the] 1980s. And, Beyoncé is not the worst copycat, she sings and dances very well, and she has a good taste! [...] And, what does it say about the work of *Rosas danst Rosas*? In the 1980s, this was seen as a statement of girl power, based on assuming a feminine stance on sexual expression. I was often asked then if it was feminist. Now that I see Beyoncé dancing it, I find it pleasant but I don't see any edge to it. It's seductive in an entertaining consumerist way.[8]

But is it possible to plunder choreography, to steal a dance move, or take a dance movement from someone else when dance—as is often said—is highly ephemeral? Dance does not last, but vanishes almost instantly, and this ephemerality is one of the main reasons why the question of copying in dance is so precarious and delicate. The implicit understanding of dance as a highly transient art also influenced discussions about Beyoncé's video. By stressing the peculiarity of her alleged plagiarism rather than the hard facts of copyright infringement and its legal consequences, the critics, choreographers, and performers re-sparked historical debates on the "inferior" nature of dance, due to its temporal and ephemeral nature.

It is intrinsically difficult to connect dance with copying because dancing does not last. When a single movement or a series of movements is imitated, or "copied" one might say, the object of imitation has already vanished.[9] This transient character makes dance inherently un-copyable; it comes as no surprise that the world of contemporary dance rarely uses the exact term "copying." In fact, it negatively suggests an inauthentic and mechanical repetition of someone else's movements, without implying that this someone has ownership on his or her movements and could reclaim a

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8   Keersmaeker, quoted in La Rocco 2011.
9   On the related case of non-reproducibility in performance art, see in particular Phelan 1993, 146–66.

copyright. Rather, the "copier" would refrain from calling this reproduction a copy mostly because of the cultural history of Western dance aesthetics since the rise of Modernism advocated for individual expression in movement. Instead of the term "copying," dancers, choreographers, and dance scholars would rather speak of "mirroring," "quoting," "imitating," and "repeating." Dancing primarily prefers the latter term in the rehearsal process (which in French is even called *répétition*) as well as in performances, when a dancer repeats a single movement or a group of movements several times. One may also speak of repeating a movement when several dancers perform the same step, twist, turn, or leap synchronically or one after the other.

Copyright of dance

Copyright of dance does exist, however, and various politics of copying in dance reflect the economic and political circumstances of these copyright laws. Beyond the obvious differences between the contemporary politics of copying dance in the US and Europe that culminated in the Beyoncé-De Keersmaeker controversy, the history of copyright in dance reveals the entanglement of choreography with political, economic, and juridical aspects.[10] Choreography, from its outset, has been linked to the politics of power, due to the way that choreographic movements were literally prescribed: Dance moves were written down in dance notations that then distributed in order to restage or, as one may put it, "copy" the same choreography at another place and time.[11] This applies particularly to the Beauchamp-Feuillet notation, the most influential dance notation for Baroque dance. Commissioned by Louis XIV, devised by Pierre Beauchamp in the 1680s, and published by Raoul-Auger Feuillet in 1700, its main aim was not to capture evanescent movements, but to guarantee a similarity between realizations or copies of the same choreography. On the one hand, this similarity was sought between the different versions that were realized in different cities. On the other hand, it was perhaps even more crucial that each of these versions shared a visual congruence of distinctive similarity with the authorized master-choreography developed around the royal court in Paris. Only through this congruence could the imperative character of a royal choreographic work be guaranteed and realized.[12]

With the background of this copyright strategy, it would only be a few decades later, that the *Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques* (SACD), a copyright collecting society for authors initiated in 1777 by the French playwright Beaumarchais, extended the performing rights

10 On the history of copyright in dance, with a particular focus on the Northern American context, see Kraut 2016.
11 See Lepecki 2004, 126.
12 See Jeschke 1983.

to theatrical and choreographic works. Theoretically, from then on, there was the option to register a choreographic work for copyright. Nevertheless, a famous historical example of a denial of copyright for dance reveals the precarious relationship between movement-based performances and the claim of authorship. This is the case of the American dance pioneer Loïe Fuller, who wanted to prevent the illegal imitation of her *Serpentine Dance* and whose juridical invention against Minnie Renwood Bemis was dismissed by the US Circuit Court in 1892. This decision even set a precedent "that remained in place in the United States until the 1976 Federal Copyright Law explicitly extended protection to choreographic works."[13]

The court's argument reiterated the alleged inferiority of dance, historically constructed because of its increased evanescence that transcended even the transience of music and theatre performances which, unlike dance, could mostly rely on a written score or dramatic text. In the particular case of Loïe Fuller, the ephemerality of dance was even paired with a lack of narrative and a decisive tendency towards abstraction, both of which played leading roles in the court's decision. If nothing like a story or a dramatic structure exists, it is hard to define what the object of copyright actually consists of, when this very object—a movement or a series of movements—vanishes at the moment it is produced. Considering this alongside the notion of pleasure that this ephemeral art is connected with—an only slightly hidden link to the tradition of religiously-motivated prohibitions of dance—Loïe Fuller's claim to copyright for her work was dismissed. The court held that:

> An examination of the description of the complaint's dance, as filed for copyright, shows that the end sought for and accomplished was solely the devising of a series of graceful movements, combined with an attractive arrangement of drapery, lights, and shadows, telling no story, portraying no character, depicting no emotion. The merely mechanical movements by which effects are produced on the stage are not subjects of copyright where they convey no ideas whose arrangement makes up a dramatic composition. Surely, those described and practiced here convey, and were devised to convey, to the spectator no other idea than that a comely woman is illustrating the poetry of motion in a singularly graceful fashion. Such an idea may be pleasing, but it can hardly be called dramatic.[14]

The long history of dance notation since the fifteenth century and the increased importance of capturing movement through photography, film, video, and computer programs demonstrates that the mere equation of dance with traceless evanescence lacks sufficient complexity. Clearly, it

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13   See Kraut 2016, 43–83, here 43. Rancière 2013, 101.
14   "Fuller v. Bemis, Circuit Court S. D. New York, 18 June 1892." *Federal Reporter* vol. 50, no. 989 (1892): 926. Quoted in Rancière 2013, 102.

is true that dance does not exist beyond the very moment of its performance, and that any attempt to capture movement without any loss is prone to fail, but this does not mean that there are no techniques and aesthetics of copying in contemporary dance. However, these issues are mainly discussed under the terms of repeating and recreating movement rather than of copying, duplicating, or even stealing dance. Most of these choreographic methodologies deal with the cultural heritage of dance, and struggle not only with the ephemerality of movement itself but with the historic distance between the actual creation of a choreography and its recreation, often years later, with different dancers and under a different set of circumstances. Needless to say, these recreations, or "reconstructions" as they are called, face copyright infringement laws and claims of ownership for specific movements. The problem is exacerbated because any trained dancer can easily repeat them and will do so, inevitably and not on purpose, since the possibilities for bodily movement are limited; steps and leaps, even when under copyright, will be reproduced involuntarily.

Along with the question of how minute a movement has to be in order to be un-trademarked or "un-trademarkable," the phenomenon of unintentional copying applies likewise to Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker. Postmodern dancers like Yvonne Rainer, Lucinda Childs, and Trisha Brown influenced De Keersmaeker in the sixties and early seventies, and she may very well have copied specific dance moves or movement material from them. But the attempt to accuse De Keersmaeker herself of plagiarism and plundering postmodern dance pieces would be prone to fail, since the core of postmodern choreography includes simple, everyday movements—like walking, standing, kneeling, turning, and tossing or flipping the hair—all of which were inevitably and involuntarily copied by De Keersmaeker, as well as many other dancers and choreographers.[15] To make the whole nexus of copying and repeating, repetition and copy even more complex, De Keersmaeker's choreographic work—whether stolen, duplicated, or simply appropriated by Beyoncé—is in itself inherently structured by reiteration and alteration. The dancers in *Achterland* or *Rosas danst Rosas* repeat their simple dance movements systematically, with minimal choreographed variations that, along with involuntary slippages, amount to an inextricable network of highly similar yet always slightly varied movement sequences.[16]

Reconstructing dance

Now a major trend in contemporary dance due to increased funding, the reconstruction of influential works of the past tries to overcome the ephemerality of dance and seeks to retrieve what has inevitably been lost and what can be revived only to a certain degree from notations, sketches,

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15 See Cvejić 2012, 14.
16 See Laermans 2015, 84–89.

and the bodily memory of former dancers. Perhaps the most prominent example is Vaslav Nijinsky's choreography for *The Rite of Spring* from 1913, of which no notation survives, but which nevertheless was first reconstructed by Millicent Hodson and Kenneth Archer with the Joffrey Ballet in Chicago, in 1987, following a seven-year study of remaining sketches and notes by Valerie-Gross-Hugo, Marie Rambert, and Igor Stravinsky.[17] Since 1987, Hodson's and Archer's attempt to reconstruct *The Rite of Spring* was restaged several times, with a climax in the hundredth anniversary of the piece in 2013, and performances in the Théâtre des Champs-Élysée in Paris and the Mariinsky Theatre in Saint Petersburg.

Interestingly, Hodson and Archer are facing massive questions of copyright in their reconstruction of the work, which includes not only *The Rite of Spring*, but several other major Modernist dance works. At least in the case of Nijinsky's pioneering choreography, the legal status is quite clear: along with the composer Igor Stravinsky and the costume and stage designer Nicholas Roerich, Nijinsky declared the copyright for *The Rite of Spring* in 1913 with the *Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques* (SACD). With this declaration, the three contributing artists were given a copyright for the entire piece that would last for seventy years after the last among them died; this happened in 1971, with the death of Igor Stravinsky. For this reason, not only the music, but also the choreography for *The Rite of Spring*, is still under copyright protection; each performance would necessitate the payment of large royalties that Millicent Hodson and Kenneth Archer cannot afford.[18]

The case gets even more complicated; in the meantime, the French choreographer Dominique Brun has created another reconstruction of the same piece, rougher and less tamed than Hodson's and Archer's version, and therefore probably closer to the lost version from 1913 that caused the famous riot on 29 May, 1913. While Brun is apparently willing to pay the royalties—or has at least applied for the permission to perform *The Rite of Spring*—Hodson and Archer have chosen another method to deal with the question of copyright infringement: they do not claim to have reconstructed Nijinsky's epochal work, but rather speak of a "reasonable facsimile" that only approximates what the first work would have looked like.[19]

It seems to be futile to measure how much of Nijinsky's choreographic works remains in this facsimile and how authentic this legalized copy is or is not. The problem is more demanding: we have to keep in mind—and particularly in the case of Hodson's and Archer's attempt, it is hard to overlook—that contemporary movement training, as well as nutrition and other cultural determinants, have created dancers whose bodies move and dance differently than those from former centuries and decades. Solely with regard to physique, the muscularity and the movement capacities

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17 See Hodson 1996; Hodson and Archer 2014.
18 See Hahn 2013.
19 Hahn 2013, 27.

of contemporary dancers transform the reconstruction of an older dance work dramatically; hence it does not make sense to speak of an exact copy. This also applies to those cases when choreographers themselves re-enact their own works from decades ago. The problems that plagued dance pieces from early Modernism, such as Vaslav Nijinsky's choreography for *The Rite of Spring*, or later works from the mid-twentieth century like Mary Wigman's version of the *Frühlingsopfer*, set to the same musical score by Stravinsky, affect postmodern dance as well. A significant case is Lucinda Childs's work *Dance*, from 1979 which, unlike the case of Nijinsky's work, has been archived through film recordings. While skinny dancers flap their arms imprecisely in the 1979 version, the dancers in the 2009 version move their athletic and visibly-trained bodies almost without any loss of control.

Childs's attempt at self-copying is more exact than the piece that it approaches, yet it also lacks the fascinating tension of the earlier version which derived from the strong implication of a choreographic structure and the individual and involuntarily imprecise execution. Moreover, in the same manner that the physiques of the dancers have changed, so have the viewing habits of audiences. What was new and astonishing decades ago has become commonplace, or will now be analyzed in a much more detailed and sophisticated way. In shifting the focus from the process of copying in dance to the notion of a copy in dance, the question of whether any such copy in dance is possible or not also relies on the collaborative relationship between the dancers and the audience. The audience inherently influences and helps to generate a dance and is thus involved in the creation of the copy of a dance and, most importantly, in preventing its exactness. For, due to the ever-changing composition of an audience, which is structured differently at each performance, no exact repetition of the same dance event can be guaranteed.

Besides the attempts to accurately reconstruct former dance pieces, be they the choreographer's own or someone else's work, another trend in contemporary choreography creates performances that deal self-reflectively with the impossibility of restaging older works and the constrictions that come with wanting to quote from them. These works clearly mark the difference between the alleged original and the copy, often in an ironic way, e. g. by changing the gender of the main characters or by referring to looming copyright infringements in the performance itself. Josep Caballero García exemplifies this trend with his work on Pina Bausch's legendary version of *The Rite of Spring*, which her company still performs today, and from which foreign choreographers are only allowed to reproduce short sequences of dance movements. In his solo *SACRES*, from 2013, the male dancer Josep Caballero García incorporates iconic movements from Bausch's *Rite* that, in her version, are only performed by female dancers, such as the dynamic crunching of the elbows in the stomach while the upper body convulses. In other parts of the performance, Josep Caballero García, who has himself been a dancer in Pina Bausch's company, has his

head covered by a paper bag bearing a comic version of Pina Bausch's face, thus ironically indicating that now, as a solo male dancer, he would infringe on the copyright imposed on the movements while, as one of Bausch's dancers, he would not.

Responding to movement

I will now deal with the relationship between copying and dancing in a more general way, extending the idea of copying beyond the question of legally or illegally-repeated dance moves. First of all, we have to keep in mind that the question of copying in dance is not only related to the ephemerality of movement but has to deal with its corporeality as well, for in dancing, the process and product are indistinguishable: dancers expose themselves as moving bodies yet become the movement they fulfill. Thus the process of copying a dance move is nothing less or nothing more than its own product: the process of copying is the copy. In addition to this convergence of the repetition of a step and the repeated executed step, the condition of the body and its limited possibilities of movement always restrict the process of dancing. This constriction is much more general than any possible copyright may be, since the law of gravity applies to all human bodies as does the specific combination of bones, muscles, joints, and tendons that predetermine any movement, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to invent a movement that no one else has ever executed before. Thus we can say that copying always affects dancing and that a copy-free dance does not exist. From this we can also question the idea of originality in dance, especially the premise that no movement is ever entirely original since it has been executed many times before. In the case of a strongly codified dancing style like classical ballet, the almost alphabetical taxonomy of movements also prevents any originality of a figure or position.

While ephemerality reduces the amount of copying in dance by immediately extinguishing what may eventually be copied already at the moment of its emergence, the constrictions of the human body radically extend the idea of copying to almost general understanding. Any movement will always be at least partially a copy of other movements because the human possibility to move is limited and the sheer anatomy does not allow for radically innovative movements that have never been made before. However, with regard to the exactitude of the repetition, the relatively limited possibilities for a moving body paradoxically lead to an effect very similar to the mere singularity caused by dance's transience. Truthfully, these limitations impose traces of copying on each movement, yet the repeated performance of an already-executed movement also emphasizes its endless variations. Always slightly different, no movement is absolutely the same as another movement; it will inevitably be singular and exist in its own time. Each step is different from any other, and each turn is marked by the

conditions under which a particular body behaves in a particular place and time. By focusing on these differences, the complexity in the relationship between copying and dance suggests that, in dance, no exact copy exists at all. Due to the limited possibilities of movement, dancing eliminates concepts of originality; the same applies to the exactitude which dancers can never fulfill due to the individuality of their bodies.[20]

Thus copying in dance can be theorized in a two-fold way by pointing out the universal character of copying as well as the impossibility of exactness in its general repetitiveness. Dancing can't be entirely new and is simultaneously never the same. This dialectical approach to the relationship between copying and dance becomes more complex when we take into account the fact that no dancer dances in a vacuum, but is conscious of tradition, historical context, and, mostly important, of his or her audience. The latter is the exposure to spectacularity, to a situation of otherness, when people other than the dancer watch him or her moving.[21] On the one hand, this exposure is consistent with the singularity of movement, since the specific situation of the audience even stresses the particularity of each leap or step. That is, the various perspectives from the audience (i.e. front row vs. balcony) affect each audience member's visual impression of the dancers; those onstage can appear as slightly or strongly contorted, or as twisted and clenched. In this sense, everyone sees the movement in a singular way. On the other hand, the exposure to an audience reinforces the notion of copy, for the spectators watching a dance piece, with their own bodily experience and their knowledge of other situations of similar movement, testify that no dance is completely original.

To a certain degree, even the improvised solo in which someone dances alone in the studio and without an audience bears aspects of copying. Here, the dancer reacts and responds to an imaginative body and transfers phantasmagoric movements from the imagination to bodily reality. Laurence Louppe, the French dance theorist, has developed this idea into a theory of dance which posits that it is always a secondary and deduced movement, in which dancers read—or, we might also say, *copy*—what is already written in their imagination.[22] Understood in this general sense, dancing as copying is strictly relational and corresponds to others, whether they be imaginative or real counterparts, such as dance partners on stage or people in the audience.

In focusing on the reception of copying rather than on questions of similarity or imitation, the notion of dance as copying here almost converges with mimesis as a non-repressive and non-violent approach to the other. Following Adorno's and Horkheimer's idea of proper mimetic behavior,

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20 Regarding the inevitable fragmentation of choreography in a plurality of spatial inscriptions, cf. Derrida 1985. For the idea of "originals" as "works related to and derived from copies," see Elkins 1993, 120.

21 See Nancy 2008, 65.

22 See Louppe 2010. On the complex relationship between copying and writing, see also Sanchez-Stockhammer (this volume).

dancing can be described as a "snuggling" adaptation meant to preserve the non-identical in particular.[23] However, as an adaptation in that sense, dancing has a doubly critical character: it criticizes objectification of the other and is itself endangered and at risk of approaching otherness in a "non-snuggling" way, seeking to govern and rule the other by mimicking and degrading him to an object of imitative copying.

Strangely, contemporary dance theory tends to neglect the second aspect and is almost in denial about how dance violates the non-identical. Dance theory rather focuses on the first aspect, which sees dance as a powerful counter-model to oppressive social relations.[24] In consequence, copying in dance would lose its pejorative character entirely, almost to the degree that dance as copying is conceptualized as a new model of successful communication among individuals. This emphatic approach to dance comes particularly in view when we consider the current ideas about how dancers actually embody copying in dance, or how the copying process is conceptualized in terms of bodily response. Pivotal to these questions is the notion of *listening,* a term coined in the context of contact improvisation which describes a form of both conscious and subconscious perception.[25]

Part of a relational network between two or more dancers, bodies practice *listening* when they are receptive to the movements of others in a multi-sensorial way, including the senses of hearing, sight, touch, perhaps smell, and—most importantly—kinesthetic and synesthetic perception. Improvisation theories conceptualize listening as a process of mutual receptiveness and response that comprises approximation and alignment not only to another, but also to moments of bodily emulation and unintentional copying. Even beyond the willful imitation of the movement of others, the process of listening can become a way of copying, at least when copying not only applies to the constitution of visual similarity, but rather concerns a form of embodied mimesis. Perhaps rarely realized completely by entire bodies over a long period of time, but always partially by some limbs and for a few moments, a moving body taking part in a contact improvisation and listening to other bodies will copy foreign movements by paralleling his or her body to others. And that body will then be copied by others who respond to the response and copy the copy.

The vertiginous thrill of inexactitude

The difference between a first and second copy can be understood in terms of privation, losing, even of failure, as if the second copy loses an exactitude that the first copy might have had. This understanding of copying

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23 See Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 148.
24 See for example Husemann 2009.
25 See Brandstetter 2014, 221.

as privation, as lacking in exactitude, originality, and authenticity, coincides with a melancholic view on the impossibility of repetition. It is not by chance that, with regard to dance as one the most ephemeral art forms, this melancholic reaction to the impossibility of an exact copy may escalate to mourning, grief, and despair, especially on the side of the audience, as they are prominently reported to do in Søren Kierkegaard's reflection on repetition. Kierkegaard here focuses on the unrepeatability of dance and extends this principle to the general impossibility to regain exactly what has been lost:

> I was at the Königstädter Theatre the next morning. The only thing that repeated itself was that no repetition was possible [...]. The little dancer who had bewitched me the last time with a graceful manoeuvre that resembled the beginning of a leap, had made the leap. [...] After several days' repetition of this, I became bitter, so tired of repetition that I decided to return home. I made no great discovery, yet it was strange, because I had discovered that there was no such thing as repetition. I became aware of it by having it repeated in every possible way.[26]

In the field of dance in particular, we can also look at the impossibility of repetition in a much more welcoming and supportive manner by stressing the creative effect any incorrect repetition might have. For it sets free a whole dynamic of alteration resulting in the mere non-iterability of dance. In the course of repetition, and in the process of copying, physical constitutions and emotional and cognitive processes will always influence and change the way a pose is struck, a leap is set, or a figure is enacted. Thus, due to the fact that each dancer dances in a slightly different way and is not able to repeat even one dance movement without any variation, copying in dance is always already affected by inexactitude that results in the singularity of each movement.[27] It is here, in the non-interability of dance, or in the vertiginous thrill of inexactitude,[28] that the power of the copy is at work. For Giorgio Agamben, such repeating processes, always interwoven with alteration and never identical to themselves, even carry out a "messianic task,"[29] for they essentially involve creation as well as "de-creation:"

> Repetition is not the return of something identical; it is not the same as such that returns. The force and the grace of repetition,

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26 Kierkegaard 2009, 38.
27 See Schwan 2013, 223.
28 This expression refers to William Forsythe's ballet *The Vertiginous Thrill of Exactitude* (Premiere: 20 January 1996, Ballet Frankfurt), a dance piece exposing the virtuosity of dancers in their attempts to execute movements with as much precision as possible.
29 Agamben 2002, 318.

the novelty it brings us, is the return as the possibility of what was. Repetition restores the possibility of what was, renders it possible anew. [...] But it is not a new creation after the first. One cannot consider the artist's work uniquely in terms of creation; on the contrary, at the heart of every creative act there is an act of de-creation [...] it means de-creating what exists, de-creating the real, being stronger than the fact in front of you.[30]

However, with regard to the everyday character of movement, the ordinariness of dance training and the exhaustion of rehearsal, it is appropriate to put this more prosaic understanding of copying on a level with Agamben's emphatic embracement of the inevitability of difference and innovation. Particularly in postmodern dance, and since then in many forms of contemporary dance, everyday movements play a decisive role in choreography and mark a renunciation of singularity and exposed virtuosity. To frame the prosaicness of these movements theoretically, we may return to Kierkegaard—specifically, to the very beginning of his reflections on repetition, where he compares repetition with a snugly-fitting cloth and distinguishes it from recollection and hope. Though repetition—or copying—is not possible as an exact and pure reconstitution of what has been, it has

the blissful security of the moment. Hope is new attire, stiff and starched and splendid. Still, since it has not yet been tried on, one does not know whether it will suit one, or whether it will fit. Recollection is discarded clothing which, however lovely it might be, no longer suits one because one has outgrown it. Repetition is clothing that never becomes worn, that fits snugly and comfortably.[31]

Thus, summarizing the theoretical approach to the role of copying in dance, we can state the ambivalence of an impossible identical repetition on one hand, with all its aspects of melancholia and prosaicness, and a dynamic of alteration, difference, and innovation, on the other. And we have to keep in mind, that we cannot separate the product of moving from the movement itself, so that in the particular case of dance, much unlike in any other form of art, copying and repeating almost converge. This leads us to our next section's focus on how contemporary dance interweaves emulation and recreation, especially through multimedia-based publishing, as Beyoncé's appropriation demonstrates. It speaks to the power of the copy that, in the wake of the scandal, Beyoncé's appropriation found its own imitations and that De Keersmaeker's original choreography *Rosas danst Rosas* was creatively copied hundreds of times.

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30 Agamben 2002, 316.
31 Kierkegaard 2009, 3.

The power of re-creation

The discussion of the thin line between robbery and recreation took a completely unexpected turn when De Keersmaeker—supposedly in an attempt to show her support for creative responses to her work in order to prevent the impression that she objected to them—mounted the program *Re:Rosas! The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project*.[32] De Keersmaeker and her company released an entire website for the recreation of *Rosas danst Rosas* aiming to incite school classes and groups of younger people to re-enact the piece in their own surroundings, film it, and upload the new version to the website.[33] With the possibility to download the original music for the piece, the website for the *Re:Rosas! The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project* combines historic video recordings of the piece, the 1997 version filmed in an old technical school in Leuven by Thierry De Mey, and several documentary videos. Yet, the main focus is set on three training videos teaching the movement score for *Rosas danst Rosas,* the work's structure, and finally the entire choreography. Of course, all the uploaded recreation videos are also available, and among the hundreds of versions (346 as of April 2016), one can find contributions not only from Belgium, but from countries worldwide:

> 30 years ago, dance company Rosas put itself on the map with the production *Rosas danst Rosas*. This choreography has since been staged all over the world. And now it's your turn. Dance your own *Rosas danst Rosas*, make a video film of it and post it on this site. In the following videos choreographer Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker and dancer Samantha van Wissen will teach you the moves, step by step, from the second part of the performance. After that it becomes your dance: *you dance Rosas*. In a different setting, with a huge number of dancers... any way you like![34]

However, the motto "any way you like" does not mean an opportunity for the wild plundering of a famous dance score of the 1980s. On the contrary, the score is rather fixed and most of the recreation videos copy it decently, with evident variations in to what extent they follow De Keersmaeker's choreography in the exactitude of their movements. In addition, while the age spectrum of the participants ranges widely from kindergarten-aged children to university students, the recreation videos tend to be more exclusive in terms of gender variety. Clearly the vast majority of the participants

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32 The word "fabuleus" is the Dutch version of the English "fabulous." In addition to this, the particular spelling draws a connection to the theatre and dance company *f*ABULEUS with its specific focus on young audience and talent development. See "*f*ABULEUS." Accessed February 20, 2017. http://www.fabuleus.be.

33 See "Re:Rosas! The *f*ABULEUS Rosas Remix Project." Accessed February 20, 2017. http://www.rosasdanstrosas.be.

34 Introduction to *The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project*. Accessed February 20, 2017. http://www.rosasdanstrosas.be/en-home.

are female, and in recreating De Keeersmaeker's original flipping and tossing of long hair, they reinforce the ideological background of allegedly feminine movements symmetrically repeated as a statement of girl power. Only a few versions show male dancers reenacting this reputedly feminist score, interestingly reinforcing the sexual character of the movements by dancing them with bare chests and erotic, almost aggressive, dedication.[35] What began in 1983 as a statement of girl power has changed into a queer, voguing-like appropriation, not necessarily with a homoerotic subtext, but clearly transforming and transcending an all-too-narrow aesthetic equation of femininity with hair toss and sitting cross-legged.

An explicitly queer appropriation emerged with Ton Do-Nguyen's adaptation of Beyoncé's Video *Countdown*, which the then sixteen-year-old teenager from Pennsylvania uploaded to YouTube in July 2012.[36] The shot-for-shot recreation, which went viral shortly after the upload, shows Ton Do-Nguyen wearing a blue sleeved blanket (or "Snuggie") instead of the various elaborate robes and bathing suits in which Beyoncé moves in front of the camera. The material derived from De Keersmaeker's early dance pieces in particular appears as a grotesque deformation when danced by a sixteen-year-old male under a sleeved blanket. With this Snuggie, Ton Do-Nguyen unwittingly pays tribute to Kierkegaard's mention of repetition as a cloth that "fits snugly and comfortably," and this peculiar costume clearly marks the difference between his appropriation and the prefiguring video. Dancing in his Snuggie and always wearing his metal-framed glasses, it is clear that Ton Do-Nguyen is not Beyoncé in drag and that his copy fails deliberately.

This failure of copying Beyoncé, along with the immense meticulousness with which Ton Do-Nguyen has executed his shot-for-shot recreation, makes his video a distinguished example of what Judith Halberstam has coined the "queer art of failure." According to Halberstam, this art of failure "dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live. Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmarking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world."[37] In this sense, Ton Do-Nguyen's imperfect emulation, though a product of avid fandom, not only undermines Beyoncé's exposure of wealth and sexual attractiveness, but even ironizes and questions the commerciality of the emulated "original," which is of course itself a sample of borrowed inspiration and

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35 See for example "Cravos danst Rosas," Vimeo video, 4:17, uploaded by "Irene Bandeira," September 29, 2013, http://www.vimeo.com/75739022.

36 See for example "Countdown - Beyoncé (Snuggie Version)" Dailymotion video, 3:33, uploaded by "Spi0n," July 18, 2012, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xs8u08_countdown-beyonce-snuggie-version_fun. For queer appropriation of Beyoncé's videos in general, cf. Bench 2013.

37 Halberstam 2011, 2.

imitation.[38] His recreative appropriation, or pastiche, highlights the whole nexus of reference, repetition, and alteration that governs copying in dance, and which extends beyond a logic based on a single "original" and a plain "copy."[39] As a result of this, the emulation of a dance could even be better than the dance it emulates and can add humor to the repetition process. So, when Beyoncé herself finally responded to Ton Do-Nguyen's video on her website, she could only affirm its dynamics of difference and innovation by calling Do-Nguyen's copy "brilliant" and stating: "I think he did this video better than I did! Love. B."[40]

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38 For the relationship between YouTube aesthetics and copyright, see Hilderbrand 2009, 225–243. See also Vernallis 2013, 127–154. For the dialectics of appropriation between criticism and affirmation, see Crimp 1993, 127–137.
39 On the emptying-out-effect of the copy, see Graulund (this volume).
40 Beyoncé 2012.

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The Copy and Materiality

Philipp W. Stockhammer

The Dawn of the Copy
in the Bronze Age

Abstract   Contemporary everyday life is dominated by industrially reproduced serial objects that we perceive as easily replaceable in case of damage or loss. We are used to seriality, i.e. the existence of what we perceive as identical copies of a certain kind of object. Seen from a long-term perspective, humans have not been able to create visually identical copies in large numbers for the most part of their existence. Seriality only became possible to a larger extent with the invention of the bronze casting technique in the Near East in the early third millennium BCE, from where the technique was introduced to Central Europe in the late third millennium BCE. In my contribution to this volume, I want to elucidate the changes in the perception of the material world that were connected with the new technical possibility of casting large numbers of visually identical objects with casting moulds. I will demonstrate how the ability to produce almost identical copies resulted in the creation of new practices with objects and new ideas about the meaning and potential of objects in the world: the possibility to possess several identical weapons became the hallmark of the Early Bronze Age hero and groups of seemingly identical objects in the form of hoards were considered the most appropriate offering to the gods.

Keywords   Early Bronze Age, technology, casting, copy, seriality

Is the notion of the copy really relevant for prehistoric archaeologists like me? At first sight, the question seems to be a rhetorical one.[1] However, if you take a look at the topics that are generally discussed in prehistoric archaeology, the ideas and motivations that may lie behind the presence of copies in the prehistoric archaeological record have not received too much attention so far.[2] This lack of knowledge raises two obvious questions: how is the idea of the copy understood in prehistoric archaeology, and how relevant is the answer for us?

In the following pages, I will first discuss the particular role of the copy in prehistoric archaeology and compare it with other nomenclatures used to describe this phenomenon. This will include addressing the question of which characteristics are necessary for something to be described as a copy at all. In the second part, I will discuss secondary practices in Early Bronze Age Central Europe and shed light on the transformative power of new reproduction techniques, as well as the perception of serial objects that were produced with the help of these techniques.

The copy in prehistoric archaeology

One of the most basic archaeological methods is to identify objects that seem to be identical, or at least very similar, from a visual perspective. This is the major starting point for all further analysis. Our search for similar objects is governed by the wish to define types. A type is defined as a class of objects that possess at least two features in common; we regularly try to group together objects that are as similar as possible.[3] However, even if we are able to collect a certain number of almost identical objects, we do not use the term "copy" for them, but call them "objects of the same type."[4] This is due to the fact that speaking of a copy necessitates, as a first step, the definition of an original and, secondly, a diachronic approach. With respect to the definition of an original, we are faced with the problem of

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2   A most notable exception is Tim Flohr Sørensen's (2012) comprehensive ontological study of the so-called copy of foreign objects in the Scandinavian Early Bronze Age. The notion of the skeuomorph has been extensively discussed by Carl Knappett (2002) and Catherine J. Frieman (2010; Frieman 2012; Frieman 2013). The otherwise lack of conceptualization of the "copy" and related terms in prehistoric archaeology stands in contrast to the vivid discussions on this topic in classical archaeology, where the presence of Roman marble statues as copies of lost Greek bronze statues has resulted in the necessity to conceptualize "copy" and "original" since the beginning of the discipline (e.g. Bieber 1977; Ridgway 1985; Junker and Stähli 2008; Settis and Anguissola 2015).
3   Rouse 1960, 316; Eggert 2001, 133–134; Stockhammer 2004, 17–20.
4   Cf. Sørensen 2012, 45.

identifying prototypes within the class of objects of the same type. Considering the diachronic perspective, we are often lost from a methodological point of view: archaeological time only progresses when things change:[5] our archaeological clock only ticks forward when objects change in style throughout time. For archaeologists, the identicalness (or at least similarity) of objects indicates their contemporaneity.[6] This particular concept of time in archaeology basically impedes the identification of chronological difference between original and copy, especially if we define the latter as a "practice of the secondary,"[7] or the practice of reproducing something that has been there before in attempts to reach at least some similarity with the original. Thus the dialogue between a copy and typological dating methods has the potential for contradiction. When may we, therefore, speak of a copy in prehistoric archaeology? For designating an object as a copy, two prerequisites have to be fulfilled:

First, we must be able to define a class of objects on the basis of common stylistic features and identify their place of production. The latter is often based on the scientific analysis of the object's constituents and the geographical origins of the different sources of raw materials used therein, e.g. copper ores or clay deposits. Second, a copy would be quite similar visually, but slightly different stylistically, and found outside the region of production. Moreover, this object must be made of the same type of material, but from a different ore or clay deposit than that of the core region of production, e.g. Aegean-style pottery found on Cyprus or in the Levant, where it was made by using local clay deposits.[8] If this is not the case, we cannot identify differences in its constituent materials. We would, then, call it an imported object rather than a local copy. It is also possible that the copy is made out of a completely different material, e.g. using flint instead of copper. It follows from this epistemological definition that we need both similarity and subtle differences to designate something as a copy.[9] This distinctiveness or alterity is commonly based on the materiality of an object and/or its place of production. The more common understanding of "copy" today—as a slavish and possibly precise reproduction of an original—is not helpful for prehistoric archaeology, as we are unable to identify such kinds of copies in our material record. Therefore, the differentiation of "original" and "copy" poses an enormous problem for prehistoric archaeology, because objects that look identical were, in our view, produced at the same time and we are not able to introduce a diachronic perspective in this case. All identical objects of the past are either

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5   Kubler 1982, 47; Eggert 2001, 146–149; Sommer 2014, 42–45.
6   Cf. also Kubler 1982, who is aware of the problem of seriality and the associated lack of what he calls a "prime object" with regard to the measurement of time on the basis of material culture.
7   Fehrmann et al. 2004; Bartsch, Becker, and Schreiter 2010.
8   D'Agata et al. 2005; Mommsen, D'Agata, and Yasur-Landau 2009; Mountjoy 2011.
9   Sørensen 2012, 48.

all originals and none of them is a copy or they are all copies and none of them is an original. Both perspectives are justifiable in our search for the original (see also Rune Graulund's contribution to this volume) and will be addressed in the sections that follow:

Assumption 1: All prehistoric objects are originals and none are copies

All objects from the past—even if a large number of similar or identical objects exist from a particular space and time—are perceived as being authentic and original by the modern-day spectator. Over time, these objects become "originalized"—irrespective of whether they were perceived as originals or copies by past human actors. It is the act of excavating that endorses an object with authenticity (similar to the political act of endorsing copies with originality as discussed by Jens Schröter in this volume). If the same object would have been dug up by grave robbers and sold on the market, it would need a specialist to determine its authenticity. If we are identifying prehistoric objects as originals, we accept that they are copies and originals at the same time and thus dissolve these categories from an etic perspective.

Assumption 2: All identical prehistoric objects are copies, none of them is an original

One can also easily argue for the opposite point of view, namely that all serial (in my case, prehistoric) objects are copies in the sense of serial products of which none is original.[10] At least since the Early Bronze Age, sometimes hundreds—and often thousands—of seemingly identical objects that would definitely be identified as copies if they were made in the present day were produced throughout human (pre-)history, throughout the world. These objects were most likely understood as copies and their production seen as an act of copying by the prehistoric producer. Following Sørensen, serial products of the Bronze Age "have no *origin* and no *originals*. Instead, they only have a *beginning* and that beginning is characterised by repetition" (italics by Sørensen).[11] From an emic point of view, these objects are all copies—if we suppose that the differentiation of "copy" and "original" has always existed everywhere.

In my view, the use of the terms "copy" and "original" to explain past phenomena must be approached with utmost caution, and coupled with the insight that these categories may not have existed in the particular space and time under study. Nevertheless, we should determine if any hints point toward the act of copying as associated with a particular function and meaning in the prehistoric context.

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10 Cf. Baudrillard (1981) 1994.
11 Sørensen 2012, 57.

Another interesting phenomenon is the production of a number of very similar, sometimes almost identical, objects on the basis of a model or casting mould.[12] This is the usual case for cast metal objects—mostly bronzes—but sometimes also for figurines or vessels made out of clay. The necessary models or moulds cannot be termed an original, as they are not copied as such but just used to produce a series of almost identical objects, which you may call copies without an original. They are all originals and copies at the same time—like the prints produced with the same printing plate by an artist. They are a series and at the same time the basis for our definition of a type. Tim Flohr Sørensen speaks of "'seriality' in the production of bronzes … by which is meant a series of independent actions that produce individual artefacts on the basis of existing artefacts that serve as models, prototypes or sources of inspiration."[13] In my view, the ability to produce a large number of seemingly identical objects is a particular and most important practice of the secondary.

Technology and copying in the Early Bronze Age

Having elaborated on the notion of the type, the copy, and the series, I would now like to discuss the transformative power of the practices of the secondary in prehistory or, more precisely, in the Central European Early Bronze Age, which dates to ca. 2200–1700 BCE.[14]

The invention and spread of bronze casting technology, i.e. the casting of an alloy of copper and tin, was one of the most important steps in the development of the human ability to technically reproduce objects. This technology was invented in the Near East in the third millennium BCE and spread from there to Central Europe in the late third and early second millennia BCE. In the following section, I focus on the beginning of the Bronze Age in Central Europe, i.e. the time when this new technology was appropriated by different local actors—albeit with very different velocity and intensity.[15]

Bronze technology was the first technology devised by man that allowed the serial reproduction of almost visually identical objects in large numbers. This had not been possible with stone, clay, or wood, as the individual surface structure of each of these materials revealed the uniqueness of

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12 I am completely aware that even objects which were cast with one and the same mold can differ due to shrinking processes and forging that happen after casting (Sørensen 2012, 47). Therefore, the attributes of sameness and difference depend very much on the eye of the individual beholder. In order to shed light on past perceptions of sameness and difference, I start with my own perception as a heuristic basis and check its possible compliance with past perceptions in my analysis of archaeological contexts—being aware of the potential vicious circle in my argument.
13 Sørensen 2012, 47.
14 Stockhammer et al. 2015a; Stockhammer et al. 2015b.
15 Kienlin 2006a; Kienlin 2008.

an object to the naked eye. Copper was cast earlier than bronze, but was softer, harder to handle, and not suitable for producing large numbers of visually identical objects. Bronze was easier to cast, harder, and more durable, such that—with the help of casting moulds—it was possible to create many objects that were almost indistinguishable from one another.

The beginning of the Bronze Age produced a phenomenon of particular interest: the sudden and dramatic increase of the practice of depositing objects in the ground, i.e. the deposition of hoards. Hoarding practices already existed during the preceding Neolithic period,[16] but the quantity of Early Bronze Age depositions exceeded all previous hoarding practices by far.[17] The character and number of such depositions and the recurrent selection of bogs as places of deposition suggest a ritual motivation behind these practices—or at least for a large part of the Early Bronze Age hoards.[18] This practice of deposition seems to be closely connected with the introduction of novel bronze technology and requires an explanation.

This evidence leads us to reflect on the perception and appropriation of novel technologies in general and of bronze technology in particular. Science and technology studies (STS) as well as the sociology of technology have extensively demonstrated the constructedness of technology that integrates technical and social aspects. In this regard, I understand "technique" as, first, all artefacts that are necessary for its realization, second, all products that are produced with its help and, third, all knowledge with regard to the development and application of the technique.[19] Knowledge that is transmitted in the framework of the appropriation of a new technology comprises technical and social components that are intrinsically linked with each other and cannot be differentiated.[20] A crucial factor for successful appropriation is therefore the possibility to translate foreign knowledge into one's own world.[21] This depends on the compatibility of the world view of the local actor who aims to appropriate the technology with the world views that are transmitted with the technology. STS and Sociology of Technology have analysed many cases of the delayed appropriation or rejection of a particular technology by particular actors or groups of actors.[22]

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16 Görmer 2005.
17 von Brunn 1959; Stein 1976; Lorenz 2010.
18 Religious motivations for at least a large part of the Early Bronze Age hoards are also assumed by e.g. Stein 1976, 9–30; Menke 1978/79, 209–210; Krause 1998, 172; Krause 2003, 205–206; Hansen 2013. Kienlin 2006b and others have emphasized that other motivations for depositing objects into the ground might also have played a role.
19 Volti 1995, 6; Braun-Thürmann 2005, 27.
20 Pinch and Bijker 1984; Bijker 1994; Bijker 2001; Heinrich 2001, 1008-1009; Rammert 2007, 51.
21 Latour 1986; Bachmann-Medick 2009.
22 E.g. for medicine, Stern 1927; for shipping, Gilfillan 1935; for the QERTY keyboard, Rogers 1983, 9–10; for planes, Geels 2005; for the Xerox copier, Suchmann 2005.

These insights from STS and the sociology of technology are further affirmed by the work of the social anthropologist Mary Helms. In her study "Ulysses' sail: An ethnographic odyssey of power, knowledge, and geographical distance," she demonstrates that traditional societies perceive knowledge and objects from distant lands as something supernatural, mythical, and powerful.[23] This is due to the fact that the distant lands where these objects and this knowledge originate are also perceived as mythical, powerful, and potentially dangerous. In order to be able to integrate these objects and this knowledge, and to make use of them, they first have to be managed and tamed.

To conclude, based on insights from STS, sociology, and social anthropology, it is clear that the novel bronze technology must have been associated with comparable reservations when it spread over Eurasia. This calls for a revision of the still vivid, but much outdated narrative in archaeological research that assumes a linear development from the Stone Age to the Bronze Age and considers technological progress and the spread of technological innovations as inevitable processes. This linear and evolutionist perception of historical developments in large parts of archaeological research has led to downplaying all evidence that seems to contradict the general notion of historic progress and does not pay attention to the complex process of the transfer, translation, and appropriation of technological and non-technological knowledge. Archaeologists have already started to incorporate these insights into their study of the spread of past technologies[24]—especially with regard to prehistoric metallurgy, where Tobias Kienlin in particular has repeatedly argued for a more complex, non-linear history of diffusion.[25] I would like to expand these thoughts and explain hoarding practice as a ritual strategy of managing the non-technical aspects of novel technology in the process of appropriation.

I would like to suggest that hoarding can be seen as a form of innovation management in which the practice of copying seems to have been attributed with a particular meaning. Out of the hundreds of Early Bronze Age hoards from Central Europe, two hoards stand out: Hoard II from Melz, in Mecklenburg, Western Pomerania[26] (fig. 1) and the hoard from Kyhna, in Saxony (fig. 3).[27]

Hoard II from Melz contained several so-called halberds with metal shafting—their shape reminds us of the much later halberds of Medieval Europe. A Carpathian-type axe was deposited along with the halberds (fig. 1–2). This axe was shafted like the halberds before the deposition. For a long time, the axe was considered to be an import from Eastern Europe. However, recent metal analyses clearly point to a local manufacture like

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23 Helms 1988.
24 Gramsch 2009, 20.
25 Kienlin 2006a, 115; Kienlin 2006b, 528–529; Kienlin 2008; Kienlin 2010; Kienlin 2014, 453–454; Burmeister and Müller-Scheeßel 2013.
26 Schoknecht 1971; Wüstemann 1995, 75 No. 112–122; 79 No. 133.
27 Coblenz 1986.

Figure 1: Melz (Mecklenburg, Western Pomerania, Germany), Hoard II: halberds and axe of Carpathian type with metal shafting.

Figure 2: Melz (Mecklenburg, Western Pomerania, Germany), Hoard II: axe (1) and halberd (2) from the hoard and comparable axes (3–9) from the Carpathian basin.

Figure 3: Kyhna (Saxony, Germany), Hoard: vessel with slotted lance head, pins, amber beads, and other body adornments.

that of the halberds.[28] The axe from Melz is obviously not an import, but a local product and the copy of a foreign shape at the same time. Without scientific analyses, this copy could not have been distinguished from its Carpathian prototypes. My second example, the hoard from Kyhna, contained a slotted lance head for which the best comparisons can be found

28 Krause 2003, 246 fig. 224; 247

Figure 4: Kyhna (1) (Saxony, Germany), slotted lance head and comparisons (2–5) from the Eastern Mediterranean.

in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.[29] Similar to the axe from Melz, the lance head from Kyhna was considered an import for a long time (fig. 3–4). Quite surprisingly, however, metal analyses were able to demonstrate its local production in Central Germany.[30] Following my aforementioned understanding of the "copy" for prehistoric archaeology, it can be identified as a copy of a foreign type of object. Structurally similar findings from other Early Bronze Age contexts in Central Europe, and especially Northern Europe, are also known.[31] I am convinced that these and further, structurally similar findings need a particular explanation and that they help to shed light on the prehistoric perception and appropriation of bronze technology.

As already mentioned, science and technology studies, sociology, and social anthropology have demonstrated that foreign knowledge, technologies, and also objects are very often perceived as powerful and dangerous at the same time—and not only in traditional societies. I suppose the novel bronze technology spreading from the Near East to Central Europe

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29 Gerloff 1993.

30 Krause 2003, 245 fig. 223; 247. Gerloff 1993, 73 assumed that this object might be a local imitation of a foreign form, rather than an import.

31 Isotope ratio and trace element analyses are still missing for other seemingly foreign bronzes found in contexts of the Central European Early Bronze Age (e.g. the axe from Naumburg: Wüstemann 1995, 80 No. 134; Schwarz 2004). For practices of copying in the Scandinavian Early Bronze Age, see Sørensen 2012.

would have been similarly perceived. In my view, the ability to copy a foreign object in a quasi-identical shape can be interpreted as the attempt to take possession of the foreign. Those who were able to produce the foreign object in an identical manner were also able to control it. The anthropologist Michael Taussig called this practice the "mimetic faculty."[32] In his book, *Mimesis and Alterity*, he describes the practices of copying used by the Cuna Indians in Panama to manage the threat by Colonial powers. The production of objects that were understood by the Cuna Indians as copies of the foreign and the management of these copies played a crucial role in their encounter with the dangerous "Others." The philosopher Gunter Gebauer and the anthropologist Christian Wulf hold a similar opinion: "In mimetic processes, the actor constitutes the already acquired as something of his own and it becomes available through habitualisation."[33] Taussig, Gebauer, and Wulf give us important hints for understanding evidence from the Early Bronze Age. I would, therefore, like to propose that the practice of copying a Hungarian axe from Melz and an Eastern Mediterranean lance head from Kyhna—and their subsequent deposition—should be interpreted as evidence for the management and control of new and foreign techniques.

The transformative power of seriality in the Early Bronze Age

As mentioned before, new bronze technology suddenly enabled prehistoric man to produce series of almost identical objects, whereas objects in all previous periods of human existence were rather characterized by their singularity and individuality. This possibility raises the question whether the ability to mechanically reproduce objects changed human world views, which are always very much influenced by the surrounding material world.[34] Again, Early Bronze Age hoards are of particular interest when exploring this question. Many of these hoards are characterized by the deposition of objects of the same type but in large numbers. Six almost identical halberds were chosen for deposition in Melz,[35] while another ten halberds were placed in nearby Groß Schwechten.[36] Similar to halberds, daggers and hatches were also deposited together in large numbers, e.g. in the hoards of Malchin, Dobra, Gau-Bickelheim, and Ingolstadt—each of which contained several daggers,[37] or the hoard from Gröbers-Bennewitz, which held a large number of hatchets.[38] Many Early Bronze Age hoards

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32 Taussig 1997.
33 Gebauer and Wulf 2003, 9 ("In mimetischen Prozessen wird vom Handelnden bereits Erworbenes als Eigenes konstituiert und durch Habitualisierung verfügbar;" translation by the author).
34 Robertson 1992, 69–77; Maran 2012, 63.
35 Coblenz 1985.
36 Wüstemann 1995, 81–84 No. 139. 140. 146. 147. 153–155. 161. 162; 89 No. 181
37 Hundt 1971; Schwenzer 2004, 271–273; 303.
38 von Brunn 1959, 57–58; pl. 31, 32. For many further examples, see Hansen 2002.

contain more than one type of object. However, there are always several objects of the same type deposited together (as in Guben-Bresinchen).[39]

Interestingly, the same practice of selecting objects for deposition according to their similarity is visible in the so-called princely burials of the Early Bronze Age Únětice culture, in what is now eastern Germany, western Poland, the Czech Republic, and parts of Austria and Slovakia. The most prominent grave, which was constructed around 1940 BCE, was discovered in Leubingen, near Halle.[40] According to the descriptions by the excavator, almost all of the grave goods were present in multiple examples, with the hatchets and probably also the daggers placed in cross-like positions.[41] The deposition of several, often almost identical weapons in Early Bronze Age hoards and graves has already been emphasized by Svend Hansen and defined as *Überausstattung* (over-endowment).[42]

Svend Hansen pointed to the fact that this over-endowment required a particular motivation, which he relates to world views transmitted by the Epic of Gilgamesh, from late second millennium BCE (or possibly even late third millennium BCE) Mesopotamia.[43] Within the epic, Gilgamesh, king of Uruk, and his friend Enkidu are equipped with numerous heavy and obviously identical weapons.[44] Following Hansen, the equipment of the contemporaneous burials in Ur with several identical weapons indicates that ideas from the Gilgamesh epic influenced Mesopotamian burial practices. In this line of thought, the particular status of the deceased was emphasized by his over-endowment with weapons upon burial. Hansen assumes that related or similar myths were transmitted from the Near East to Central Europe with the knowledge transfer of bronze technology.

However, interest in serial objects had already begun before the Early Bronze Age in Central Europe (certainly by the early third millennium BCE and probably even by the second half of the fourth millennium BCE), as is indicated by the anthropomorphic stele from Tübingen-Weilheim (Baden-Württemberg) and stelae and engravings in the southern alpine region.[45] These stelae depict the over-endowment of individuals with a large number of weapons—especially daggers and halberds. The earliest systematic depositions of serial metal objects—in this case hatchets and axes made out of copper—can be found in the so-called Vučedol culture (roughly situated in parts of present Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Serbia). This serial production of copper weapons was enabled by the innovative casting technologies available in these regions.[46] Since the early third millennium BCE, local actors in different parts of Europe

39 Breddin 1969.
40 Höfer 1906; Becker, Krause, and Kromer 1989.
41 Höfer 1906; Sørensen 2005, 288–289; Meller 2011.
42 Hansen 2002.
43 Hansen 2002.
44 Maul 2005.
45 Anati 2008; Horn 2014, 76–91. Structurally very similar are the numerous engravings of daggers in the Nucu cave in Rumania (Soroceanu and Sîrbu 2012).
46 Born and Hansen 2001; Durman 2006.

had felt the need to possess a multitude of identical objects—or at least expressed the wish to possess serial objects by depicting individuals with many almost identical weapons. However, only the novel bronze technology enabled the comprehensive realization of this need.

There is no doubt that the multiplicity of the identical object, i.e. the serial object, was considered meaningful and it was the new casting technology that allowed the production of such objects for the first time. I propose that this new ability to reproduce objects also changed man's perception of the surrounding material world and—as a consequence—individual's life worlds,[47] even if the number of serial objects in an Early Bronze Age household was still rather low, and in stark contrast to our present-day situation and present-day households, which are particularly characterized by an enormous number of often identical objects.[48] In many parts of the world today, we take for granted the ability to acquire and possess a large number of identical objects—and to be able to replace a broken or lost object with an almost identical one in many cases. In the Early Bronze Age, these possibilities arose for the first time and may have exerted influence on general perceptions of and practices with objects. The selection of visually identical objects for deposition in hoards and graves and for pictorial representation shows that the identical was perceived as meaningful. A series of almost identical objects was considered an adequate means of honoring an eminent individual, whether in the form of images on a stele or of physical items in a grave, or a goddess in the context of offering practices. The transformative power that arose from the interplay between humans and this new technology of reproduction resulted in a new perception of the world of "things." The ability to produce almost identical copies was not only an expression of technological knowledge but also indicated a newfound competence to adorn outstanding humans and goddesses with something completely new: the first technically mass-produced objects.

This stands in a most interesting dialectic to Walter Benjamin's famous association of the "authentic" and the "original" in the past with magic or religious ritual: "The unique value of the 'authentic' work of art has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use value."[49] In Benjamin's view, "for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual," because asking for the authentic or original object "makes no sense" any more.[50] In the case of the serial objects of the Early Bronze Age, an industrialized state of mechanical reproduction had not yet been reached. Nevertheless, and maybe also due to the lack of an "original," the early serial object could occupy a position that Benjamin has restricted to the original.

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47 Schütz and Luckmann 1979; Habermas 1981; Habermas 2011.
48 Hahn 2005, 81–83.
49 Benjamin (1936) 1968, 224.
50 Benjamin (1936) 1968, 224.

Summary

In the beginning of my contribution, I showed that it is very difficult to identify an object as a "copy" in the prehistoric record. Consequently, archaeologists have not reflected much on this issue. The identification of a copy in prehistoric archaeology is usually closely related to the long-distance and transcultural exchange of objects and/or technologies from an epistemological point of view. This has to be kept in mind when we speak about practices of the secondary in my discipline. Nevertheless, there are cases where we are able to identify practices of reproduction, and these practices call for an explanation. Having focused on the Early Bronze Age in the second part of my contribution, I set out to demonstrate the societal impact of this novel technology which, on the one hand, triggered social practices of innovation management and, on the other hand, enabled mechanical mass production of serial objects for the first time in human history. Copying became a practice of innovation management as much as it changed human life worlds: new reproduction techniques not only offered new possibilities—such as the possession of visually identical objects and the replacement of one copy with another—but also changed the human perception of the material world which was now full of serial objects. This in turn led to the creation of new practices with and assigning new meaning to objects, as well as a particular valuation of mass-produced objects that is quite different from the public perception in our present age.

Figures

Fig. 1: With kind permission by Landesamt für Kultur und Denkmalpflege Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Landesarchäologie, A. Bötefür.
Fig. 2: After Krause 2003, 248, fig. 226.
Fig. 3: After Meller 2004, 187.
Fig. 4: After Krause 2003, 246, fig. 225.

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Charlotte Schreiter

The Power of Material and Context: Large-Scale Copies After the Antique in the Late Eighteenth Century

Abstract   Since the Renaissance, plaster casts of ancient statues have been, in a certain sense, the archetypes of artistic serial production: as such, they are copies par excellence. Their use and distribution underwent several surges in popularity over time, a fact that throws important light on their valuation as "copies" in the different regional and temporal contexts. In the short period between the middle and end of the eighteenth century, in the German-speaking world, a fundamental shift in the distribution and accessibility of large-scale ancient sculptures took place. Plaster casts, which had become available in previously unimagined quantities after the Seven Years' War ended in 1763, played a central role in this shift.

To display works in the open air, durable materials—such as papier mâché, terracotta, iron, so-called "firm earth," and stone, which were praised for being cheap and permanent—were needed. The technical possibilities and the materials used were the subject of a discourse which reflected on the effects of the industrial revolution. Through the division of labour, manufacturing and craft production—rather than the artist—came to the fore. In the evaluations during the period, the production technique itself, rather than the artistic achievement of a single person, gained importance. This paper is devoted to exploring these large casts and copied statues, the size of which was comparable to their ancient models, and to the question of how materials and production techniques, as well as the context of use, define both their status as "copies" and their influence on the reception of ancient sculpture in this era.

Keywords   Plaster casts, cast iron, Toreutica, Wörlitz, central Germany, eighteenth century

Since the Renaissance, plaster casts of ancient statues have been, in a certain sense, the archetypes of copies. Because they are created from moulds taken from an "original," they should seemingly be able to faithfully transmit its qualities. Their use and distribution underwent real booms that throw important light on how they were valued as "copies" in the contexts of different regions and periods.[1] This paper is therefore devoted to the question of which criteria—apart from "faithfulness"—have the power to push the copy beyond that of a mere effigy of an artwork that is considered "original."

Shifting from the notion of plaster casts as faithful substitutes for an absent original to the ossuaries of dead gods, the history of plaster casts is full of deep breaks and changes in their appreciation. The mass production of plaster casts in the nineteenth century, in particular, seems to be an almost ideal-typical illustration of Walter Benjamin's dictum of the loss of the aura of the original artwork in the era of its mechanical replicability. This finds its connection in the desperate efforts to get rid of the casts in the Victoria & Albert Museum in the late nineteenth century, or of the proposal, just a little later, to drop the casts of Berlin's Neues Museum into the Spree river.[2] These negative judgments have retrospectively cast a shadow over the use of plaster casts in previous eras, too.[3]

The history of scholarship adds further complications to the study of casts of ancient sculpture. In the tradition of classical archaeology, there is a deep-rooted idea that a copy of an artwork should be assessed above all for its closeness in style and motifs to the exemplary original—that is, for its "exactness." This notion was at the heart of the *Kopienkritik* of the nineteenth century, which aimed to sift through the profusion of Roman statues to identify the Greek originals hidden behind them. The results seemed to confirm Winckelmann's picture of the decadence of Roman art. According to Winckelmann's neoclassical concept, Greek art of the fifth and fourth century B.C.E. built the core of ideal, exemplary art. This ideal had a strong impact on contemporary art, which had to imitate the Ancients to become great.[4]

If we can set aside these notions when we consider post-antique copies of ancient sculptures, we can open up new, productive ways of viewing copies which allow us to understand them as intentional artworks. This helps us to gain a deeper understanding of their transformative possibilities in respective, contemporary contexts. In the introduction to the essay

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1   This essay is based on studies on the history of fabrication and the trade of plaster casts and copies around 1800 undertaken in the context of the Collaborative Research Centre 644: Transformations of Antiquity at Humboldt University Berlin. Many aspects are discussed in Schreiter 2014 b, which serves as a point of reference. The intention of this essay is to clarify those points which refer to a broader understanding of the transformative power of copies after the Antique—in so far as Antiquity is seen as a foreign and thus distant culture.
2   Schreiter 2012, 17 with references.
3   Schreiter 2011, 105–106.
4   Bartsch, Becker, and Schreiter 2010, 3–6.

collection *Das Originale der Kopie*, the authors attempted not only to ana-lyse relations of dependence between originals and their copies, but to establish the conditions in which the copies were created, their materials, and their contexts of use. The working assumption was that such copies underwent a transformation through an allelopoietic process, in which the original is first created as such through copying.[5]

Using the example of plaster casts and the large-scale copies of ancient statues they were able to produce, this article aims to explore in detail, through several steps, how copying constitutes a prototype as an "origi-nal." These casts are an expression of a commercial and artistic boom in the late eighteenth century, which saw a fundamental shift in the distribu-tion and accessibility of large-scale ancient sculpture after the Seven Years' War ended in 1763. In a kind of "second use," these works provided a stock of moulds that were used for creative imitations and copies in other mate-rials such as iron, terracotta and papier mâché.[6]

This period was shaped by the publication of the works of Johann Joa-chim Winckelmann, so it would be possible to approach these copies with a simplified explanatory model, namely as being secondary expressions of the appreciation of ancient art that was central to German neoclassicism. In this view, their cheap materials, serial production, and allegedly low artistic quality would preclude granting them the status of a serious sub-ject of research. Indeed, when these works were noticed at all, they were regarded as the "bread and butter" commercial business of court artists, which enabled them to make money on the side.[7] To the contrary, I wish to trace the development of these works' creation, distribution, marketing, and buyer interest, viewing this development against the foil of classicising art theory and using Italy and England as two points of reference.

In the eighteenth century, the attention of collectors and antiquaries throughout Europe was directed primarily toward Italy, the land from which many antiquities originated, and in particular on Rome.[8] From 1763 to 1796, that is, the period from the end of the Seven Years' War to the annexation of Italy by Napoleon, there was a sharp rise in the number of travellers to Italy and the frequency of their journeys. The acquisition of art and souvenirs was as integral to these journeys as were visits to ancient sites.[9] It was the English aristocracy in particular that ensured the continu-ing health of this market. Alongside the formation of larger collections, the acquisition of ancient art also became an element of furnishing a country house, where works would be adapted to the requirements of the collec-tor's own environment.[10]

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5   Bartsch, Becker, and Schreiter 2010.
6   Schreiter 2014b, 261–384.
7   Schreiter 2014 b, 13–15 (Introduction).
8   Here and for the following argumentation, see Bignamini and Hornsby 2011, 1–8.
9   Wilton and Bignamini 1996, 21–30.
10 Especially Coltman 2006, 135–147, and passim.

In order to grasp the specific use of "the Antique" in German duchies and princedoms, apart from Winckelmanian theorising, it is vital to answer the question of how available ancient sculpture—or at least large-scale plaster casts—was at the end of the eighteenth century. Germany was coming from a completely different position, as the possession of ancient art, especially sculpture, was less common in general. One of the few German collections of ancient sculpture was acquired in 1728, for the King of Saxony, August the Strong, to be housed in Dresden.[11] Alongside the few collections of original ancient sculptures and the combination of plaster casts and copies found in the setting of libraries and art collections, plaster cast collections became established in the last third of the eighteenth century through the foundation of small art academies and drawing schools. Probably the best known of these was the Mannheim Antikensaal, which opened in 1767.[12]

In the following period, participation in the distribution of ancient art, which spread to ever-wider circles, became of key importance. At first, supply was not sufficient to meet the demands that arose from the re-organisation and creation of courts and residences, as well as from art academies, which sought to be well-equipped. Business took a decisive turn with the appearance of travelling Italian plaster casters, the so-called *formatori*, who could be found in towns all over Germany from the 1760s on. It is in this context that we find the first mention of the *Fratelli Ferrari*. With their appearance on the scene, the situation changed. Originally from Milan, they appeared on the German art scene more or less out of nowhere in the mid-1760s. The Ferraris differed from other *formatori* in that they had their own, re-usable moulds.[13]

The range of items on offer consisted of busts and a few complete statues that were probably moulded from bronze copies after the antiques that were present in Germany, such as the Kassel bronze of the Dancing Faun. The Ferrari very soon won a reputation for having unparalleled artistic skill. Their range formed the basis for further copies, whose dependence on the original source was thus merely indirect.[14]

The Leipzig art dealer Carl Christian Heinrich Rost had a key role in the dissemination of their design repertoire and also made attempts to use other materials profitably. When the Ferraris travelled to Leipzig in 1777, he bought their moulds and made a contract with them that they would never trade in Leipzig again. He set up his own workshop to make plaster casts and advertised the products throughout the country in extensive, annotated catalogues.[15]

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11 Schreiter 2014 b, 394–395.
12 Schreiter 2010, 125–126; Schreiter 2014 b, 56–60.
13 Schreiter 2010, 127–133; for more detail, see Schreiter 2014b, 108–133, with complete bibliography.
14 For the specific range of sculptures sold by the Ferrari, see Schreiter 2014b,119–123 and 803–813 (Tabelle 1).
15 Schreiter 2010, 133–134 and Schreiter 2014b, 133–142 and 816–843 (Tabelle 2).

After setting up his plaster cast workshop, Rost began to expand the Fratelli Ferrari's programme. At the beginning of the 1780s, the Elector of Saxony granted him permission to make moulds from the statues in the Dresden collection of ancient art.[16]

A driving force behind the popularisation of Antique art was the widespread wish to adorn not only palaces and houses but, increasingly, parks and gardens with adequate decoration. This demand required the development of weatherproof materials. Of course Rost was one of the first to establish such materials but he was soon surpassed by others. He had the advantage that he could draw on his stock to produce sculptures in larger quantities, and in a material resistant to weathering—what he called a *feste Masse* (firm mass).[17]

Local art manufactories and court artists seeking to make money on the side tested a wide range of materials such as papier mâché, terracotta, iron, stone and firm earths, which were praised as being both a good value and durable. A hierarchy among the materials became ever more strongly established. Around the manufactory, which with its directly-employed workers formed the "core" of such production, there were a number of more or less free-lance artists and craftworkers who took on special tasks such as preparing moulds or gilding. In the manufactory, the division of labour, and not the artist, took centre stage. An assured command of production technique, rather than the artistic achievement of the individual, became important. The technical possibilities and materials used were the subject of a discourse of their own, which reflected on the effects of the industrial revolution.[18]

Enlarging the traditional question of the relationship to and "truthfulness" of a copy when confronted with its original or model, the study of copies becomes even more fruitful when additional aspects are considered. During the late eighteenth Century, the effects of an upcoming international art market, a growing consumer culture, technical developments in the art industry, and the use of "new" experimental materials shaped the relation to the Antique. Beyond the mere theoretic approach of art criticism, these developments reveal the widespread popularisation of ancient art as defined by its use in public and private surroundings. Transformed by their adaptation to the environments of the people concerned—which more often meant the up and coming bourgeoisie—the "business of copies" gets an impulse to flood Europe.

Again, it was comparisons with the English market that shaped references to taste and consumer goods. In 1787, a detailed notice appeared in the *Journal des Luxus und der Moden*, advertising architectural elements and sculptures made of Coade stone, a terracotta developed in the manufactory of Mrs. Eleanor Coade in Lambeth, London, which could be produced

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16 Schreiter 2014b, 143–155, figs. 58–82.
17 Schreiter 2014b, 182–185.
18 Schreiter 2014b, 424–431.

in large formats and was resistant to weathering. Through the advertisement, the Weimar businessman and editor of the journal, Friedrich Justin Bertuch, was attempting to establish these goods on the German market.[19] Bertuch published a complete list of the wares offered by the Coade Stone Manufactory, but evidently not a single item was ordered from Germany. This was in part because, parallel to the appearance of the journal announcements, Bertuch had the Weimar court sculptor Martin Gottlieb Klauer develop a competitive rival product locally. By 1789, statues were being locally produced from "toreutica," a hard-fired, weatherproof terracotta that cost barely a quarter of the English wares.[20]

Although the technical qualities of "toreutica" were derived directly from Coade stone, the selection of ancient prototypes drew primarily on the product range that Rost had on offer in Leipzig, and not on the range offered by the English manufactory. This duality of sources—England for the technical requirements, and Italy, or rather Saxonian Italy with the Dresden casts from Rost's art dealership for the formal prototypes—thus reflected how another specific development resulted in new levels of the established patterns and roles, ranging from *Italianità* to Englishness.

The various manufactories and workshops had close ties with one another, and not just through their shared dependence on Rost's stock of prototypes. It is thus no surprise that an important comment on toreutica ware comes from Count Detlev Carl von Einsiedel, who in December 1790 wrote to Bertuch: "zu der neuen gebrannten Masse habe ich ihrer Feinheit und Zähigkeit halber viel Vertrauen. Und ich freue mich, daß auch in dieser Art die alten Kunst=Stücke dauerhaft vervielfältigt werden sollen" (I have great confidence in the new, fired mass as regards its fineness and toughness, and I am pleased that the ancient artworks should be multiplied permanently in this way, too).[21]

The Count of Einsiedel ran an ironworks in Lauchhammer, where from 1784 he had been producing cast iron statues from models of ancient sculptures. He was well-travelled, but had not been to Italy. Ancient culture therefore reached him, too, only indirectly and he became one of Rost's customers like everyone else. His interest in technical developments provided the necessary basis for producing the iron sculptures (after the antique) that were made by his foundry.[22]

It was the reproduction of an ancient prototype, its multiplication, that extended the force of classical antiquity and disseminated it in the regional context. Reproduction and copy reinforced the positive qualities of the classical world that inspired them, while the similarity of the reproduced products reassured owners and users by including them in a regional system of references that encompassed both subjects and materials.

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19 *Ueber Herrn Coade's Lithodipira*, 1787 (Schreiter 2014b, 721, Dok. 30).
20 Schreiter 2014b, 338–346.
21 Weimar, Goethe-Schiller-Archiv, GSA 06/426, Brief 1 (September 1790); s.a. Schreiter 2014b, 344.
22 Schreiter 2014 b, 297–305.

What is particularly intriguing about these "functional antiques," however, is their range of uses. In the most varied contexts, different value was ascribed to them, but this did not cause them to be devalued or regarded as shop-worn in comparison to the exemplary originals on which they were based.[23] Multiplication in broader, manufactory-like workshops marked the way to an exuberant creativity in remodelling items to be suitable for their respective use. Copying thus helped realize the potential of the original without cutting the connection. Because the antique remained present even in the most surprising reinterpretations, its transformative power was developed even further.

An exceptionally popular piece was the so-called "Vestal bearing the sacred fire," the original of which is held in the Museo Capitolino in Rome. In Germany, the piece became widely known in the form of a creative imitation by the Gotha court sculptor Friedrich Wilhelm Doell, which he had created in Gotha after an imitation of the same piece by Jean-Antoine Houdon (fig. 1).

This item, along with other sculptures from Doell's workshop, was announced in 1797 in the *Buergerlicher Baumeister*, with a "Verzeichnis der Statuen, Büsten und Vasen, welche bey dem Herrn Hof-Bildhauer Doell in Altenburg von weissen gebrannten Thon für die beygesetzten Preise in Louisd'or á fünf Thlr. zu haben sind und sowohl zur Verzierung der Zimmer, als zum Aufputz der Gärten gebraucht werden können" (List of the statues, busts, and vases that can be had from the Court Sculptor Doell in Altenburg in white fired clay for the noted prices in Louis d'or at five thalers, and which can be used both for decorating rooms and for adorning gardens). There is also another reference to a comment about using the statue as an oven decoration: "23. Eine Vestalin, welche das heilige Feuer trägt, ganz bekleidet, vorzüglich zu Oefen geschickt" (No. 23. A Vestal which bears the sacred fire, fully clothed, eminently suitable for ovens).[24] By taking the bowl with the fire as an attribute of the vestal virgin as a guardian of the sacred fire and—as a priestess of Vesta—also of the domestic hearth, there is thus also a reference to her function. This work is a striking illustration of how this type of classicised new creation was accorded equal standing with the corresponding ancient original, and also of how well such works could be adapted to each context of use.

In 1791, in Wörlitz, an example was acquired from Rost in Leipzig and integrated into a quite different kind of context. Beneath the 'Stein', the artificial volcano, and down a spiral staircase, the visitor arrived in the Cabinet of the Night, which was described by August Rode in 1798 as follows (fig. 2): "Fußboden und Wände schwarz, mit rotgelblichen Figuren verziert: in der Mitte eine blendendweiße Bildsäule auf schwarzem Fußgestelle: Das Gewölbe der Decke, gleich dem nächtlichen Himmel, durch

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23 Becker 2009, and passim.
24 Schmidt, vol. 3, 1797, 20–21 (Schreiter 2014 b, 742, Dok. 41); for the Vestal, see also Schreiter 2014b, 417–419, fig. 147; 629–630, Kat. 218.

Figure 1: Vestale "Carrying the holy fire," *Kabinett der Nacht*, Wörlitz, plaster cast in Dessau (depot).

Mond und Sterne erleuchtet." (The floor and walls are black, decorated with reddish-yellow figures: in the middle there is a dazzling white ornamented column on a black, footed stand: the vault of the ceiling, like the night sky, lights up with the moon and stars).[25] In this example, the bowl was originally made separately, probably from a translucent alabaster. There was a candle in it which lit up the night.

The same prototype offered multiple possibilities for adapting and fitting it to a required form or content, as could also be shown with many other examples. Large numbers of abbreviations and transformations can

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25 Rode 1798, 213–214.

Figure 2: Vestale "Carrying the holy fire," *Kabinett der Nacht*, Wörlitz,
after a lost drawing by Friedrich Gilly.

be identified, and indeed they are one of the principal characteristics of mechanically replicated large-scale copies after the antique in this era and region. Despite the high level of recognisability of the individual piece, the contexts of use render the copy independent in *this* location and in *this* function. The copies take on a double function when they are also assigned functions of their own within their new context that extend beyond their source and their actual (or assigned) original meaning. The reference to the ancient prototypes is a kind of umbilical cord through which a range of possible interpretations can be nourished but also formulated anew in the context of a changed environment. This observation can be compared with Falser's analysis, also in this volume, of Angkor Wat plaster casts from the end of the nineteenth century, which confirms the importance of considering a changed environment in order to grasp the transformative power of the copy.

Copies after the antique in alternative materials can be described only partially by the choice of prototype and its meaning. The choice of material itself was debated, as a piece's permanence, which was necessary for display in the open air, was lent to the "regional" classicism created by the

establishment of local repertoires of prototypes. The fact that a material was available locally was often the decisive factor in the decision to attempt new techniques and produce objects from it. Whether the material was a "raw material" (e.g. iron, clay, or paper) was cheap, or at least cheaper than the materials hitherto used (e.g. bronze, marble, or lead), did not cause the end product to be regarded as being of lesser value. Materials were compared with each other and these comparisons were not aimed primarily to excuse them in relation to materials or regions that were assumed to be of higher value.[26]

This discourse about the permanence of the material was conducted, above all, in the journal articles of the era.[27] Copies in marble and bronze were rare, but manufactories offered their casts and copies in various colours, each of which aimed to create the illusion of being constructed from these or other materials. Plaster was blackened and iron or papier-mâché bronzed to give the impression of bronze. A white finish was assumed to resemble marble. Techniques such as gilding and the white enamelling of cast iron to imitate porcelain were also practiced. The material of the sculpture itself could generally not be perceived for its own sake (fig. 3). It was thus possible to set in the open air a sculpture that looked like marble but which was also durable. In this way, the quality of the given material was implemented visually, though it did not necessarily correspond to the quality of the actual material. Through this, too, copies after the antique were highly adaptable to suit their use.

The decisive criteria in creating copies after the antique were the link to the original, the production technique, and the choice of material; each of these aspects might become more prominent and debated according to occasion and need.

Only with the effects of the Napoleonic campaigns did this development come to an end. It was not military defeat or the explicit destruction of the manufactories that brought about this change, but rather the improved range of ancient prototypes that became available when the transport of Italian antiquities to Paris, and the moulds made in the Atelier de Moulage, pushed the regional range of designs into the background.[28] If we move beyond considering the relationship between an original and its copy, our view widens to include larger repertoires of sculptures produced in quasi-industrial processes and modelled on ancient prototypes; we see that their selection, design, and production were prompted by the impulse to disseminate classical antiquity in a way befitting its exemplary status, or, in the words of the Count of Einsiedel, "die Stärken des Althertums in der Sculptur sich zu vervielfältigen" (to multiply the strengths of antiquity in sculpture),[29] which means more than just classicising decorative figures to

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26 Cf. Schreiter 2014b, 424–427.
27 Schreiter 2014b, 424–427.
28 Schreiter 2014a, 37–38.
29 Ibid.

Figure 3: Ganymed (Praying Boy), Lauchhammer iron cast,
advertisement in *Journal der Moden*, October 1786.

fill up a scene. Against the foil of contemporary art theory and antiquarian discussions, sculptures that were also understood as commercial wares became established in ways that had their own logic.

Figures

Fig. 1:   Schreiter 2014, 418, fig. 147 c.
Fig. 2:   Schreiter 2014, 418, fig. 147 a.
Fig. 3:   *Journal der Moden,* October 1786, pl. XXX.

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Eberhard Ortland

Copies of Famous Pictures in Tadao Andō′s "Garden of Fine Art" in Kyōto

Abstract   The "Garden of Fine Art" is a conspicuously modernist concrete garden in Kyōto. Within a spectacular architectural setting designed by Tadao Andō, the facility displays copies of eight well-known masterpieces of fine art in their original size or larger, printed with extremely durable colours on ceramic panels. Each of the images displayed in the garden raises questions, as do the selection, the staging, the size and material properties of the copies, the relationship between the copies and their respective models, the interplay of site-specific with more general features of the place, and the appropriation and recontextualisation of European and East Asian art history with the traditions of Japanese gardens. These traditions are reinterpreted within the framework of international modern architecture in a way that appears utterly transcultural and is, at the same time, uniquely Japanese, late twentieth century.

Keywords   Ceramic copy, temporality, interpretation, ontology of art, sociology of art

Introduction

"Le beau exige peut-être l'imitation servile
de ce qu'est indéfinissable dans les choses."[1]

The "Garden of Fine Art" is a conspicuously modernist concrete garden located in the northern part of Kyōto, Japan.[2] It was designed by the architect 安藤忠雄 Andō Tadao (b. 1941) and completed in 1994. Its full Japanese name is 京都府立陶板名画の庭 *Kyōto kenritsu tōban meiga no niwa*, that is, the "Kyōto Prefectural Garden of Famous Pictures on Porcelain Panels." (fig. 1).

Figure 1: Tadao Andō: Garden of Fine Art, Kyoto;
entrance on Kitayama-Street, Kyōto Kita-ku.

Within a spectacular architectural setting, "the world's first outdoor art garden"[3] displays copies of eight well-known masterpieces of fine art in their original size, some even enlarged to four times their original size, printed with extremely durable colours on ceramic panels. Most notable—and utterly strange in this place—are the copies of two huge devotional images from the Italian Renaissance, *The Last Supper* by Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo's giant *Last Judgment*. Half of the works represented are garden or outdoor scenes by late nineteenth-century French post-Impressionists: one of Monet's later *Water Lilies*, Seurat's bourgeois leisure scene *A Sunday Afternoon* in a French park goes along with Renoir's two sisters *On the Terrace* and van Gogh's rather gloomy *Road with Cypress and Star*. This sample from a late twentieth-century Western canon of fine art is

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1   Valéry 1934, 167.
2   Cf. the "Garden of Fine Arts" official staff blog. Accessed September 18, 2016 http://toban-meiga.seesaa.net/. On the architecture, cf. Klein 2000.
3   The "Garden of Fine Arts" website. Accessed March 30, 2015. http://toban-meiga. seesaa.net/category/1668031-1.html.

complemented by two equally famous works of East Asian art: a copy of the panoramatic picture scroll 清明上河圖 *Qingming Shanghe Tu* ("On the River During the Qingming Festival") attributed to the Northern-Song painter 張擇端 *Zhang Zeduan* from twelfth-century China (actually, a copy of an eighteenth-century copy of the legendary scroll), and two of four hand-scrolls from the 鳥獣人物戯画 *Choju jinbutsu Giga* ("Caricatures of Birds, Beasts and Persons") series, attributed to the erudite Buddhist head priest 鳥羽僧正 *Toba Sōjō* (1053–1140) from Kyōto and renowned today as the origin of comic drawing and animation in Japan.

Compared to the world-famous temples, palaces, gardens, and museums in Kyōto, which draw millions of tourists every year, the "Garden of Fine Art" might be regarded as a minor attraction, a bit off the beaten path. Still, thousands of people from all over the world come to see this place every year. Many of them now post photos of whatever caught their attention on their travel blogs or on photo sharing websites like Flickr. These photos, too, are copies (of copies) of famous pictures and worthy of our attention if we want to grasp the transformative power of the copy. The images illustrating this article have been copied mostly from such sources. The photos taken by garden visitors show not only how the ceramic copies of famous pictures look—or what they looked like on particular occasions and under particular daylight and weather conditions—but also how different the photographic copies of the ceramic copies actually look from each other, from the copies they depict and from the copied paintings.

The garden's architecture has been quite aptly described as "a plaza with walls of cascading water designed by Ando Tadao in his familiar style of smooth concrete."[4] Note, however, that this "plaza" is not flat on the ground but extends over three different levels and goes two storeys underground (without ever feeling like a basement). The walls, up to 12 metres high from the bottom level eastern and western sides, separate the facility from its urban environment as well as from the adjacent Botanical Garden. Significant parts of the ground on all three levels are covered by water in shallow pools, reflecting the sky, the architecture, and—from certain angles—the pictures of the exhibition (fig. 2).

As one visitor observed, "The constant sound of falling water worked to tune out all the sounds of the surrounding city, thus providing a sense of detachment; [...] more than a barrier of nature Ando utilized a barrier of sound in his design."[5] The sounds and the interplay of the architecture and the artworks with the ever-changing daylight and weather conditions create a stimulating atmosphere of focused leisure.

With a clearly-defined path for visitors to follow, the space is designed as a stroll garden, even though the straight lines, right angles, concrete walls, and glass railings or the multi-layered, three-dimensional design

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4   Blankestijn 2012.
5   Angen 2012.

Figure 2: Reflection of Michelangelo's *Last Judgment* on the surface of the water basin on the ground of B2 in the Garden of Fine Art, Kyoto.

Figure 3: Garden of Fine Art, Kyoto, 2013.

with its slopes, stairs, and underpasses are not what one would expect to find in a traditional Japanese garden[6] (fig. 3).

"Every turn brings a different perspective. The facility itself makes you feel like you are inside an artwork, which makes for a much more engaging experience than in a typical museum."[7] Albeit not a typical art museum,

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6   Cf. Nitschke 1991, 208–240.
7   Yzzzz 2013.

this little theme park[8] is dedicated to enabling a particular kind of encounter with a selection of well-known works of fine art through high-quality reproductions.

Each of the images displayed in the garden raises questions, as do the selection, the staging, the size and material properties of the copies, the relationship between the copies and their respective models, the interplay of site-specific with more general features of the place, and the appropriation and recontextualisation of European and East Asian art history with the traditions of Japanese gardens. These traditions are reinterpreted within the framework of international modern architecture in a way that appears utterly transcultural and is, at the same time, uniquely Japanese, late twentieth century (fig. 4).

Figure 4: Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto. A stage for the art –
and a space for the audience.

A stage for celebrating classical artworks

Occasionally, the "Garden of Fine Art" is used as a stage for musical performances or other events.[9] But mainly it is a stage for celebrating classical works of fine art, just as the nearby concert hall (designed by 磯崎新 Isozaki

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8   Cf. Brumann 2008, 223–224.
9   See, for example, Kyoto Informational Circulations Co., Ltd. 2006 (documenting a "candle night" concert on June 22, 2006); more photos from this and other performances can be found at Foursquare 2015. Another major event at the Garden is, not surprisingly, a transformative copy of an American transformative copy of a traditional Celtic ritual, blended with various other elements of popular and commercial culture: the annual "Kitayama Halloween" festival at the end of October; see Kitayama Halloween 2009–2014 (with photos from last year's event and an account of the local tradition since 1998) and Marumo 2008 (with photos from Oct 29, 2008). Since 2010, the Garden of Fine Art has regularly hosted the "Kitayama Craft Garden" fair on the first (or second) Sunday of the

Arata and built almost at the same time as the Garden of Fine Art) is a stage for celebrating classical music. What does it mean for our understanding of what constitutes copies of individual works of fine art, if we assume that the copies exhibited in this art garden relate to the works they represent in a way similar to how certain musical performances present (a particular interpretation of) a work of classical music? What does this mean for our understanding of the works of fine art that are represented by these copies? And, in a more general way, what does it mean for our understanding of what a work of fine art is and what a copy of a work of fine art might be, when we assume that the copies relate to the works they represent in a way similar to how musical performances present (interpretations of) works of classical music?

At first glance, a comparison of ceramic panel pictures with musical performances must seem counterintuitive. Obviously, there are important differences, beginning with the temporality of transitory events like a musical performance in contrast to the durability of things like ceramic panels. But no one has ever claimed that things like ceramic panels resemble performances similar to playing a musical piece. One interesting claim, however, is that even in cases where it is usually assumed that a particular work of visual art—say, a painting—is identical to one (and only one) physical object, so that it would cease to exist as soon as the object was destroyed or lost, it might indeed make sense to conceive of such a singular artwork in terms that most people would usually apply not to material things but rather to abstract entities (or "types"), allowing multiple instantiations ("tokens") like, for example, the class of all piano performances that comply with the score of Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 29 in B flat, Op. 106.[10]

It might sound unnecessarily sophisticated and even confusing to talk of a painting as one (and the only one) instantiation of some mysterious "abstract entity"—the type of thing that complies with criteria specified nowhere but in the very painting itself. Wouldn't it be much more adequate to simply assume that, in singular artworks like painting, the individual work is identical to the physical thing?[11] The real thing is the real thing; everything else is something else. One difficulty with such a hands-on physicalist approach is, however, that it does not account for the normativity implied in our assumptions about what a work of art is. This becomes obvious, for example, when a physical object—say, a painting (usually, but, as we shall see, not quite adequately, spoken of as a "work of fine art")—has suffered some physical change which also affects its aesthetically relevant perceptual qualities to an extent that those who care about this irreplaceable work of art consider restoration necessary (fig. 5).

month; see the handicraft blog by Iichi, Inc. 2015 (with photos and recent news in Japanese), Kyoto Tedukuri ichi 2015 (with recent news in Japanese and recent photos), Poppins 2012 (with photos from several occasions in 2011 and 2012), and Ezy Cafe 2012 (showing an event on April 14, 2012).

10 Cf. Reicher 2003.
11 Cf. Kulenkampff 2003.

Figure 5: Leonardo da Vinci, *The Last Supper*, ceramic copy (1990),
420 × 910 cm, Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto, based on a photograph showing
the state of the Milan mural in 1990, during restoration.

An example of this kind of problem can be found in the mural on the northern wall of the refectory of the convent of Santa Maria delle Grazie, in Milan, usually taken to be Leonardo da Vinci's famous painting of "*The Last Supper*". Due to the materials and techniques used, Leonardo's painting—painted with tempera colours *a secco* onto a ground of dried plaster, which turned out to not be durable at all, given the micro-climate of the refectory hall—began to deteriorate soon after it was finished in 1498 and has been described as being in a deplorable condition since the early sixteenth century.[12] Nevertheless, the composition was highly-esteemed and the picture became was popular among art-loving circles in Europe from the sixteenth century through the production of numerous copies, engravings, prints from heavily-retouched photographs, and countless variations.[13] Had the work indeed been identical to the configuration of pigments found on that medieval wall or with the remaining traces of the colours originally applied by Leonardo (now assumed to cover only about 42 % of the surface[14]), there would be nothing one could—or ought to—do about its ongoing decay. The flaking and blurring would have to be accepted as an integral, if not intended, part of the work process. Any

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12 Cf. Khan Academy 2014. The website has been changed in the meantime and no longer shows the quoted content; the URL now forwards to https://www.khan academy.org/test-prep/ap-art-history/early-europe-and-colonial-americas/ renaissance-art-Europe-AP/v/leonardo-da-vinci-last-supper-1495-98 (accessed March 21, 2015), where an educational video on Leonardo's composition shows the restored mural in Milan, accompanied by a discussion between two erudite viewers, and applying several tools of digital iconographic analysis.

13 A climax, and already a reflection, of this stream of variations was the series of paintings and prints devoted to Leonardo's Last Supper by Andy Warhol in 1985/86; cf. Haden-Guest 1999; Lüthy 1995, 66–70.

14 Khan Academy 2014.

Figure 6: Leonardo da Vinci, *The Last Supper* (1495–98),
Santa Maria delle Grazie, Milan; tempera on plaster, 422 × 904 cm;
after the restoration was finished in 1999.

effort to stop the deterioration or repair the damage would be an attempt to replace Leonardo's venerated work with something else—legally speaking, it would be property damage (fig. 6).

Those of us who do think, however, that under certain circumstances a restoration effort might be necessary and legitimate in order to save or restore a damaged work of art, must have some idea of what the work ought to look like. Such normative ideas can be controversial,[15] but whoever enters into such a debate presupposes the objective—or at least intersubjective—relevance and validity of his or her understanding of what the work requires.

Luckily, in the case of Leonardo's ruined *Last Supper*, two early, large-scale copies, presumed to be work by Leonardo's assistants, have survived with a wealth of original detail still intact. These copies do not resemble each other in every detail, which makes things even more complicated. Nevertheless, they are an important source for our understanding of how Leonardo's painting might have originally meant to look (fig. 7).

The copy of *The Last Supper* from the collection of the Royal Academy of Art in London on display at Magdalen College in Oxford,[16] which has been attributed to Leonardo's disciple Giampietrino (active 1495–1549), is usually not considered an instantiation or a version of Leonardo's work, like there are several original instantiations of various versions of Rembrandt's etching

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15 Cf. Willan 1999.
16 See the catalog of the collection of the Royal Academy of Arts (2015) and London University of the Arts 2015.

Figure 7: Giampietrino, *The Last Supper*, copy after Leonardo,
ca. 1520; oil on canvas, 298 × 770 cm, Magdalen College, Oxford.

The Three Crosses (1653).[17] An accurate copy (or a copy believed to be accurate) like the Giampietrino canvas of *The Last Supper* can inform us about certain features of its original, even after the original may have been damaged or lost. It thus relates not only to one particular token, but to certain normative standards that are constitutive of the respective type of work.[18]

Not every instantiation of a work of art needs to be "perfect" in any sense in order to be regarded as an instantiation of the respective work, although there will obviously be, in any case, a threshold that separates the class of successful instantiations from an indefinite number of failed attempts. Perfect (or nearly-perfect) copies of instantiations of artworks might in some cases be accepted as instantiations themselves; think of cast bronze sculptures like Rodin's *Thinker*.[19] In other cases, authorised perfect or nearly-perfect copies might be demoted to mere "replica" status, while illegitimate copies may be ruled out as "pirated," "fakes," or "forgeries"—the better the copy, the worse it will be.[20] Decisions about which of these alternatives ought to be applied to such copies depend not only on certain objective qualities of the copy but rather on normative assumptions and power relations among stakeholders.

Since it is in most cases pretty difficult to produce "perfect" copies (except of digital data files and artefacts produced by digitally-controlled processes, like CDs), most copying and most copies will inevitably differ to some degree from their models. Copying produces not only likenesses, but also differences. This is one important reason for the transformative effects

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17 Cf. Hinterding, Luijten, and Royalton-Kisch 2000.
18 This is not the place to go deeper into the philosophical discussion concerning the necessity and legitimacy of ontological distinctions between works of art and the material objects or events involved in their respective instantiation. See Wollheim 1980; Currie 1989; Haar 1994; Pouviet 1997; Reicher 1998; Lamarque 2010; Schmücker 2014, ch. 5, 163–270, for further discussion.
19 For an overview of the versions, instantiations, replicas, and copies of Rodin's Thinker, see Roos 2004.
20 Cf. Elkins 1973, 115.

of copying. Less than perfect copies can, under certain circumstances, be regarded as particularly interesting interpretations of the works they represent.

Painting is normally taken to be an "autographic," "one-stage," or "singular" art in contrast to "two-stage" arts,[21] such as printmaking or classical music performances, which are typically capable of multiple instantiations. Along these lines, one might argue that copies are not necessary for a work of visual art in the same way that a musical work requires performances of a certain kind in order to actually—audibly—exist for its audience. A painting can be experienced perfectly well without the intervention of any copy or other media, at least by those who have the occasion to actually see the real thing. A musical work, on the other hand, cannot be experienced without the reproductive work of the performing musicians. A painting does not need to be staged in the way a drama text or a musical work needs a stage or a place where it can be performed for an audience. This is certainly true in a sense, but it is also misleading. Viewing individual paintings as self-sufficient objects ready to fulfil their function of being looked at by someone ready to be impressed fails to account for the role of institutions like museums, art galleries, art criticism, and art markets, as well as of relevant contexts like educational materials and the histories and theories of art in bestowing essential qualities such as meaning and value to them.

Works of art have always been staged; they seem to require some kind of framing, some control of the way they interact with their surroundings and engage their audience. The way this staging may be arranged is not arbitrary. Still, certain variations are considered acceptable—or perhaps particularly exciting—at a given time, with regard to the then-known and accepted alternatives and technological possibilities. The staging of artworks in museums and exhibition spaces is subject to changing at a remarkable pace—much faster than most of the exhibited objects themselves change. Most recently, the advent of the internet and the availability of digital images have begun to exert tremendous influence on the ways originals and copies of famous pictures are staged. The "Garden of Fine Art" in Kyōto is but one example of this ongoing development.

One advantage of copies compared to their originals is that you can do things with a copy which you could never do with the original. For example, you can touch ceramic copies,[22] which is—for good reason—prohibited for paintings on silk, paper, canvas, or fragile plaster. You can place a ceramic copy under water—a particularly fascinating option for a subject

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21 Cf. Goodman 1976, 114.
22 Cf. Cox 2014, 697–710, for a discussion of the desire for "tactile knowing" within the framework of "sensory vision" conceived more broadly. The display of at least some of the ceramic copies of artworks in the Kyōto Garden of Fine Art as well as in the Ōtsuka Museum of Art (see also footnote 27) encourages touch. Mind, however, that "the ceramic board surfaces of all the reproductions feel the same" (Cox 2014, 704).

Figure 8: Reflections of a Japanese winter afternoon sky on a water surface over a copy of a painting of reflections of a French summer morning sky on a water surface: Claude Monet, *Le bassin aux nymphéas sans saules, matin*, ceramic copy, 1990, 200 × 1275 cm, in the Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto.

like Monet's *Water Lilies*, which is all about the reflection of the morning sky in a moving water surface (fig. 8).

A copy also allows an image to be seen in another environment; hence it will interact with this environment. The results can, under certain circumstances, be aesthetically rewarding and/or intellectually stimulating. At least one might imagine the possibility. I guess this is why one might want to build or visit a garden of fine art in the first place.

The architecture of the place is designed to fit the works exhibited. The dominating aspect of water surfaces echoes the Monet painting. The stroll garden concept relates to the temporality of the mediaeval Chinese and Japanese handscrolls. The overall size—and height or depth (going two storeys below ground level)—of the structure was necessitated by the aim of allowing visitors to see the 1:1 copy of Michelangelo's giant masterpiece, *The Last Judgment,* as well as possible. There are three levels from which visitors of this garden can see the top, middle, and bottom regions of the

Figure 9: Visitor standing in front of the ceramic copy of Michelangelo's
Last Judgment at the Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto.

overwhelming mural. Details of the higher areas of the composition in particular can be seen much better in the copy in Kyoto than any tourist could ever see them in their original location in the Sistine Chapel. Still, it is almost impossible to grasp the entire composition—which may just be the point of the composition. Whatever the Day of Judgment may turn out to be like, it is definitely going to go beyond any individual human being's grasp (fig. 9).

Size matters. In a world where digital reproductions of famous pictures abound, it is still an impressive experience to be able to physically relate to life-sized images on such a scale as that of Michelangelo's *Last Judgment*.

Towards the end of the garden route, Andō designed a situation that most resembles an art museum exhibition space. The reproductions of two chamber pieces by van Gogh and Renoir are enlarged to four times their original size,[23] so that they almost reach the height of the Seurat painting that dominates the group. The enlargement of the smaller panels allows these pictures to meet at eye level, which would be impossible with the originals. It also enhances the visibility of the smaller images and thus allows for more distance between the image and the viewer. The impression, however, in particular regarding van Gogh's *Road with Cypress and Star*, is more like seeing a large poster than like seeing the actual painting. The people responsible for the design of the exhibition placed these

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23 The "Garden of Fine Arts" website asserts that they are "twice the original size," but if you double both the length and height of a rectangle, the result will be not two times but four times the original size. Accessed March 30, 2015. http://toban-meiga.seesaa.net/category/1668034-1.html.

panels in steel frames partly behind a massive concrete wall with windows in it, thus framing them a second time. The visibility of the panels is spoiled to a certain degree by reflections in the glass windows, as it often is with the most precious originals protected behind panes of glass in museum exhibitions. Since the ceramic copies in the outdoor exhibition in Kyōto would not need such a protection, however, the reasons for installing these window panes cannot have been anything other than aesthetic. Increasing the difficulties in seeing the picture can be a way to make the aesthetic experience more interesting. The difference in surface qualities between the originals and the ceramic copies seems to matter somewhat less if the copies are staged in an arrangement that would not allow visitors to see much of the texture of an original painting, either. As one can see in numerous photos posted on the internet, this framing arrangement entices many visitors and photographers to engage with particular details of these images[24] (fig. 10).

Figure 10: Nightwalkers, detail from Vincent van Gogh,
Road with Cypress and Star, 1890, ceramic copy, 1994.

Copies and their originals

Before we go on to discuss the works that have been deemed worth celebrating in the Kyōto "Garden of Fine Art," we should acknowledge that the famous paintings themselves are not actually in the garden. What is there, instead, are ceramic boards with large-scale photographic copies of the paintings. What, then, is the object of celebration? The absent/represented famous works of art? The present copies with their own spectacular qualities? Or rather the stage itself, the architecture by Tadao Andō

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24 Cf. Hashimoto 2008; Suryomengolo 2009; Kan 2012; Linolo 2010.

Figure 11: Leonardo, *The Last Supper*, ceramic copy, 1990;
detail: centre. The huge format is made up of large rectangular
ceramic panels, each measuring ca. 60 × 210 cm.

which has been appreciated, as we have seen, by many visitors as an art-work in its own right?[25] The latter is, one could argue, the only original in the place.

Concerning the copies, the garden's website explains: "A porcelain panel painting is a photoengraving from the positive film taken of the original painting. The porcelain panel on which the painting was transferred is then fired, bringing out its brilliant hues. These panels are combined to create one giant painting" (fig. 11).[26]

Ceramic copies are waterproof and extremely durable; they will not be affected by heat, humidity, sunlight, or other factors leading to the mechanical or chemical disintegration of their material substratum. The company that produced these ceramic copies[27] expects that they will retain

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25 "More interesting than the copies of the paintings on their own, is the combination with the award-winning architecture of Ando Tadao" (Blankestijn 2012).

26 "What is a porcelain panel painting?" For a more detailed description of the process, see the website of the Ōtsuka Museum of Art 2010. "Garden of Fine Arts" website. Accessed March 26, 2015. http://toban-meiga.seesaa.net/category/176 7603-1.html.

27 See the company's website, Otsuka Ohmi Ceramics Co., Ltd., 2015. The Ōtsuka company also funded and equipped the Ōtsuka Museum of Art, 大塚国際美術館 Ōtsuka Kokusai Bijutsukan in Naruto, Tokushima Prefecture, the largest exhibition space in Japan (and one of the largest in the world), which is entirely dedicated to exhibiting ceramic boards with copies of a comprehensive canon of art

their original appearance for more than a thousand or even two thousand years. So there is a chance that these copies might outlive the originals made from ephemeral materials such as plaster, canvas, silk, or paper. Proudly, the garden's website announces: "These porcelain panels neither fade nor erode, and so can be preserved indefinitely. Combining ceramics and fine art [sic] these porcelain panel paintings create a new genre."[28]

Steeped in an aesthetic culture which puts tremendous value on the original and tends to denigrate reproductions, we might be inclined not to take the latter claim at face value. But maybe it points to a difference that could be worth further investigation. What distinguishes ceramic copies from ordinary paintings and from other kinds of copies?[29] What kind of art-related practices might become possible to those who obtain such large-scale, high-quality ceramic copies? Perhaps there is a chance for the development of new art-related practices that no one so far has dared to think of, or will think of as long as we can only experience art under the conditions imposed upon us by the fragility of the materials in which works of art are typically produced. Maybe this development is already happening—and it is about time that philosophers of art take notice.

Surely, it is no news to the philosophy of art that paintings can be copied and that, therefore, not only paintings but also copies of paintings exist. But even though artistic practices, as well as the production and distribution of knowledge concerning art history could never have emerged and would cease to exist without the widespread use of copies, the presence and the relevance of these copies has been systematically marginalised in most contributions to the history or philosophy of art.[30]

Images have been copied ever since the first images were made—or rather the other way around: Copying came first, since representative images could hardly have been invented, had they not been derived from a mimetic behaviour originally related to objects of experience, of desire, awe, or fear.[31] Only in a secondary step can some of the traces of such mimetic behaviour attain the form of fixed images that are then taken up by ongoing mimetic behaviour, which in turn produce further images more or less like those which appeared impressive enough to occupy the mimetic attention. So images have always been accompanied by copies, but, throughout the history of human societies, different ways and

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history, a lavish materialisation of the "musée imaginaire" once dreamed of by André Malraux, that was opened in 1998. C; cf. Ōtsuka Museum of Art 2010; Cox 2014.

28 The "Garden of Fine Arts" website. Accessed March 26, 2015. http://toban-meiga.seesaa.net/category/1767603-1.html.

29 For my present purposes, I am more interested in the differences related to various media technologies or materials used in copying than in conceptual specifications concerning replicas, counterfeits, or fakes in their respective relationships to originals and copies. For an analysis of how these concepts might be distinguished, see Carrara 2010.

30 Notable exceptions are Riegl 1985; Benjamin (1936) 2008; Walker 1990; Pouviet 2003; Ullrich 2009; Bartsch et al. 2010; Augustyn and Söding 2010a.

31 Cf. Taussig 1993.

techniques of copying were developed and produced very different kinds of images, be they scratches or carvings in a bone, knots in a thread, patterns on a slope, drawings, paintings, tattoos, stamps, rubbings, casts, woodblock prints, copper engravings, etchings, mezzotint, lithographs, photographs, silkscreen prints, or digital images. Depending on the technical means and also on the qualities of the copied object deemed relevant, copies allow for different kinds of use and may, in some way or other, look more or less different from their respective models.

Some copies of paintings are also paintings. They may look very much like their models, so that one might even get confused about which is which. Such confusion could hardly happen to a visitor of the "Garden of Fine Art." No one would mistake a ceramic copy of a painting for an original. Nevertheless, even if there wasn't the slightest perceptible qualitative difference between a model and its copy, there would still be a significant ontological difference—namely that the copy is ontologically dependent on the model. Its relation to its model is what makes it a copy. The model, on the other hand, may be a copy itself (of some previous model), but it is not a copy of its copy, this object which resembles it so closely. For an artefact or a kind of behaviour to be a copy of another object, some significant similarities between them—that are arguably present in the copy due to the fact that that quality was, to a remarkable degree, present in the model—are required.

The model may be an original if it is not itself a copy of a pre-existing model; or at least this seems to be implied in the way the concept of an "original" is usually understood.[32] Many copies are not direct copies of originals in the strict sense, but are in fact copies of other copies. Something that figures as a model for one or several copies may itself be a copy of a previous model, and so on, in a chain of copies that can extend over many generations of more or less faithful reproductions.[33] Not every chain of copies must eventually be derived from an original in the sense that it demands that the original must not have been a copy of any pre-existing model, as was assumed for example in the Platonic tradition of Western thought.[34] There can be a great variety of copies that differ more or less profoundly from each other, even if they are ontologically dependent on a single "ancestor" model. This is the transformative power of copying processes.

With historical paintings like the ones reproduced in the "Garden of Fine Art," matters can become even more complicated because the originals do not exist in the way that abstract entities like types, forms, or ideas do. In

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32 For more technical discussions, see Elgin 2002; Elkins 1993; Augustyn and Söding 2010b.
33 Think of iconographic traditions like the image of the crucifix, classicist, Romanesque or gothic sculpture, or of the way bamboo and pine trees are painted in Chinese ink brush painting.
34 Cf. Boon 2010, 18–22.

one-stage arts[35] like painting, the original work of art is inextricably bound to a historical artefact, an individual material object which, like all material objects, is subject to change and eventual deterioration. A remarkable change in the way the "original" painting looks can be observed not only in the case of Leonardo`s *Last Supper* but also in Michelangelo's *Last Judgement* from the Sistine Chapel which was, like Leonardo's Milan mural, thoroughly restored from 1980 to 1994. Here, too, the ceramic copy documents an intermediate stage of the ongoing restoration from 1990; it shows neither the smoky grease we can see in photos taken before the restoration, nor the bright colours that surprised many viewers after the restoration was completed in 1994 (fig. 12).[36]

Figure 12: Michelangelo, *The Last Judgment*, 1535–41, ceramic copy, 1990, based on a photo documenting an intermediate state of the ongoing restoration. Detail: Charon's ferry.

A copy of a work of visual art may depict and preserve as accurately as possible the way the model looked (under certain measures of likeness) at the moment when the copying was done. Thus, as long as it exists, it will be a copy of the original at one particular time point of the original's existence. The original may change, and the copy may change, too. No physical thing can remain the same forever. Whatever similarities there were between a copy and its model or original at the time the copy was made will sooner or later be eclipsed by growing discrepancies. This is one of the reasons why we make copies and try to keep copies of valued but fragile originals.

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35 For a discussion of "one-stage" and "two-stage arts," see Goodman 1976, 114–115.
36 For a photographic documentation and discussion of the restoration project, see Vecchi and Collalucci 1996.

Particularly famous pictures have been copied again and again over the centuries, so that several copies of the same picture document different temporal states of their original. Which one of these ought to be regarded as the best or "closest" to the ideal state of its intended object? Which state of the original, which perspective on the picture, which size of reproduction, which detail, which hue ought to be distinguished as "ideal" or best? By making a choice and suggesting a view on what is relevant about a picture, copies present interpretations, just like musical performances present interpretations of their respective works. There is ample space for competition between various copies, both old and new. The measure of success in these competitions cannot be restricted to technical standards of accuracy alone, but will inevitably include questions of aesthetic merit and appreciation.

Famous pictures

Each of the pictures reproduced for the "Garden of Fine Art" had already been copied, printed, and circulated thousands, if not millions of times, even before the advent of the internet and the JPEG file interchange format made digital reproductions of almost any image available to almost everyone, everywhere. In this sense, the selection of the works displayed in the garden might seem redundant. Would it not have been better to use the space—and the funds—to display some fresh contemporary art, either from Japan or anywhere else in the world?

But this is not how the economy of attention works.[37] None of the works which have been so lavishly reproduced for this "Garden of Fine Art" would have been included in the collection had they not been copied extensively before. Never would such a sophisticated facility have been built and maintained for highly original, innovative works of fine art by more or less unknown contemporary artists.

Being copied—and being known for having been copied many times— is an important part of what constitutes the fame of these images.[38] This is not only true of images of works of art in the notorious "age of mechanical reproduction" since the nineteenth century; it was already true by the time of the late Roman Empire,[39] and probably even since the Neolithic Era.[40] Gabriel Tarde and others have argued that, for human beings, imitation and being imitated, copied, or depicted, is the most important component of fame, influence, or power.[41] Human beings pay attention to what other human beings pay attention to. What matters to others matters to us.[42] We

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37 Cf. Franck 1998.
38 Cf. Ullrich 2009.
39 Cf. Riegl 1985.
40 Cf. Stockhammer (this volume).
41 Cf. Tarde 1903; Gebauer and Wulf 1995; Boon 2010.
42 Cf. Tomasello 2009.

desire what is desired by others.[43] We copy, photograph, or buy what was bought, photographed, or copied by others. We share attention, we share copies.[44] In making, acquiring, and distributing copies we acknowledge the power that puts its stamp on these representations and thus try to relate to them; we somehow take part in the accumulation and sharing of power.

The selection of the pictures displayed in the "Garden of Fine Art" was made at the heyday of Japanese economic power, later termed the "bubble economy," when everything seemed available for Japanese buyers. Japanese businessmen flooded the international art market and bought whatever canvasses they could, especially from the highly-esteemed late nineteenth-century French Impressionists and Post-Impressionists: Manet, Monet, Renoir, Seurat, and the most expensive painter of all, the legendary van Gogh.[45] The particular appreciation of French Impressionist and Post-Impressionist paintings among the Japanese elite dates back to the Meiji-Era, in the late nineteenth century, when the long-isolated country opened itself up for contact with Europe and America and the export of Japanese 浮世絵 *ukiyo-e* woodblock prints, ink painting, lacquerware, and costumes triggered a wave of Japonism among the European avant-garde, while, in Japan (as in most European countries at the time) it was considered an asset to be familiar with the *dernier cri* of Paris.[46]

Suggestions for the artworks to be included in the "Garden of Fine Art" were made by the economist, successful writer, and politician, 堺屋太一 Sakaiya Taichi from Ōsaka (b. 1935).[47] Sakaiya is well-known in Japan. He began his career in the 1960s as an economist and bureaucrat at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but after publishing two best-selling novels in the 1970s, he quit his civil service job to focus on writing. He went on to publish over fifty books, including historical novels as well as 日本論 *nihonron*, or essays concerning the ongoing change of Japanese society, economy, and culture—many of which became best sellers.[48] From 1998 to 2000, he served as the Minister of State for Economic Planning of Japan. Sakaiya already had some experience with successfully organizing exhibitions when, in the 1980s, he approached 栢森新治 Kayamori Shinji, CEO of ダイコク電機株式会社 Daikoku Denki Co., Ltd. from Nagoya, an electronics manufacturer known for its production of pachinko gambling machines.[49] Sakaiya also knew that the 大塚オーミ陶業株式会社 Otsuka Ohmi Co., Ltd. from Shigaraki, could produce large-scale ceramic boards and had recently made advances in photoengraving technology. He suggested that Kayamori set up a temporary "Garden of Fine Arts" as

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43 Cf. Girard 1987, 283–298.
44 Cf. Hyde 2010.
45 Cf. Kurtenbach 1990; Four 2013.
46 Cf. Rimer, Takashina and Bolas 1987; Guth, Volk and Yamanashi 2004.
47 Cf. "Garden of Fine Arts" website. Accessed March 29, 2015. http://toban-meiga. seesaa.net/category/1668031-1.html.
48 Mahalo n.d. Only two of Sakaiya's books have been published in English: The Knowledge-Value Revolution (1991), and What is Japan? (1993).
49 See Daikoku Denki Co., Ltd. n.d.

the Daikoku Denki pavilion at the 1990 International Garden and Greenery Exposition (国際花と緑の博覧会 *Kokusai Hana to Midori no Hakurankai*) in *Ōsaka,*[50] with spectacular reproductions of four large-scale paintings on ceramic panels: Michelangelo's *Last Judgement, Leonardo's Last Supper*, Monet's *Water Lilies*, and Seurat's *Sunday Afternoon*. The first three of these are unquestionably extremely prominent, canonical works that Japanese art enthusiasts would have to travel halfway around the world to see in person, because these pictures would never be loaned for an exhibition abroad. The popularity of the Seurat painting in Japan was probably due to an earlier exhibition, "The Impressionist Tradition: Masterpieces from the Art Institute of Chicago," held at the Seibu Museum of Art in the fall of 1986. Obviously, the subject would seem fitting for an art garden at a garden exposition. Sakaiya's suggestion was welcomed by Kayamori, as was his suggestion to ask the Ōsaka-based star architect Andō Tadao to design the pavilion.

After the 1990 Expo was over, Sakaiya and his collaborators began to look for another way to put their ceramic copies to good use. They found this possibility in Kyōto, the ancient capital of Japan, which is visited by millions of Japanese and international tourists every year and was, at that time, preparing celebrations for its 1200-year anniversary in 1994. Kyōto prefecture offered the site, a lot between the entrance of the prefectural Botanical Garden and the prefectural archives, in an area that was already affected by large-scale construction work due to the building of the Kitayama underground station. For the permanent instalment of the Kyōto "Garden of Fine Art," Kayamori commissioned the enlarged copies of the other four works to complement the initial set and donated the entire collection to the prefecture.[51]

The rearrangement of the collection for its larger and permanent facility in Kyōto is instructive. Renoir and van Gogh do not come as a surprise, but the inclusion of copies of Chinese and Japanese mediaeval handscrolls adds a remarkable accent. It is, for one, a local accent: two scrolls from the collection 鳥獣人物戯画絵巻 *Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga emaki*, "Caricature scrolls of birds, beasts, and persons," that was probably painted in Kyōto during the Heian period, eight or nine centuries ago. The collection was traditionally attributed to 鳥羽僧正 *Toba Sōjō* (1053–1140), the forty-seventh head priest of 延暦寺 Enryaku-ji, the main temple of the 天台 Tendai sect of Buddhism, situated on the slopes of 比叡山 Mt. Hiei to the north-east of Kyōto. However, there is no evidence that the renowned cleric and astronomer actually had a hand in producing them. Modern, more critical opinion assumes that only the first two of the four scrolls may have been painted in the twelfth century at all, whereas the other two were most likely painted later,

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50 I am indebted to Professor Ōhashi Ryōsuke (Kyōto) for background information.
51 No information concerning who paid for the construction could be obtained. It was probably funded by one of the Japanese Government's massive, debt-financed programs for job creation that were launched in Japan in the 1990s in order to fight the looming crisis after the crash of 1992.

Figure 13: 鳥羽 僧正 Toba Sōjō [attributed], 鳥獣人物戯画絵巻
Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga emaki, Caricature scrolls of birds, beasts and
persons, twelfth century; enlarged ceramic copy of the first scroll,
showing adventures of rabbits, frogs, and monkeys.

in the thirteenth century, and by several hands.[52] The scrolls belong to the Buddhist monastery of 高山寺 Kōzan-ji in north-western Kyōto. Since they are classified as National Treasures (国宝 *kokuhō*), the original scrolls are kept at the Tōkyō National Museum for security and conservation reasons, and for occasional exhibitions, and the Kōzan-ji holds facsimile copies that can be shown to visitors without exposing the originals to any risk.

The first two scrolls of the collection were enlarged to four times their original size and printed on ceramic plates. Many details can be seen much better in these enlarged copies than in the originals.[53] Scroll 1 is the most comic and contains the most complex narrative. The drawings on it show monkeys, rabbits, frogs, and other animals frolicking and fighting; some of them seem to behave very much like Heian-era Japanese nobles or Buddhist priests. The way the brush is mastered in these early manga scenes is absolutely fascinating (fig. 13).

Scroll 2 is more of an album, depicting the appearance and movement of various birds and beasts, some of them from the world the painter lived in, and others from mythological realms (fig. 14). The relevance of the "Garden of Fine Art" as an exhibition space and as a relay station in the global circulation of copies of the famous pictures displayed in it is underlined by the fact that a considerable proportion of the digital copies of images from

52 *Wikipedia,* s.v. "Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga." Accessed March 30, 2015. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ch%C5%8Dj%C5%AB-jinbutsu-giga; see also Köhn 2005, 115.
53 Cf. one critic's claim that "You will never see the frolicking monkeys, frogs and rabbits as clearly as here!" (Blankestijn 2012).

Figure 14: 鳥羽 僧正 Toba Sōjō (attributed), 鳥獣人物戯画絵巻 *Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga emaki;* detail from the enlarged ceramic copy of the second scroll, showing a lion.

this twelfth century picture scroll that appear on the internet today are actually photos of the ceramic copies on display at the "Garden of Fine Art."

No less popular than these early medieval Japanese manga scrolls is the Chinese picture scroll 清明上河圖 *Qingming Shanghe Tu.* Its title is usually translated into English as "On the River During the Qingming Festival." This translation is based on the understanding that the characters 清明 refer to the Chinese Memorial Day, also known as "Tomb Sweeping Day," which is celebrated every year at the beginning of April, on the 15th day after the Spring Equinox. On *Qingming* day, Chinese people visit the graves or burial grounds of their ancestors; many people go on family outings, sing, and dance, while peasants are expected to begin the spring ploughing. But the *Qingming* painting actually contains little that might be read as hinting to the particular activities related to the rituals performed at burial grounds.[54] So the usual understanding of the title might be misleading. Yale historian Valerie Hansen has argued that 清明 *Qingming* need not refer to the tomb sweeping festival, but can also—in a more general sense—mean something like "clear and bright," and as a political term also refer to a "well ordered" government or "peace and order," so that the title of the scroll could be read as something like "Peace Reigns over the River,"[55] which would seem more fitting, given much of what can be seen in the painting.

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54 Cf. Hansen 1996b, 4.
55 Ibid, 5; see also Hansen 1996a, 196n24 (crediting personal communication with Wu Pei-yi for suggesting this title to her in 1995).

清明上河圖 *Qingming Shanghe Tu was originally painted* in the twelfth century by a Northern Song painter named 張擇端 Zhang Zeduan, of whom not much is known apart from the fact that he composed this impressive panorama and a couple of other landscape paintings. The painting depicts, in stunning detail, traffic on and along a river, usually believed to refer to 黃河 *Huáng Hé* (the Yellow River), and urban life and commerce in an ideal-ised city, usually believed to refer to the Song capital 汴梁 *Biànliáng* (later named 開封 *Kaifeng*). But the painter of the *Qingming* scroll did not bother to include any of the landmark buildings of the historical city of Kaifeng and never seems to have intended his picture to be regarded as an accu-rate rendering of the Song capital.[56] To make things even more confusing, a large theme park featuring over fifty ancient boats in various sizes and 400-plus houses in the Song style, meant to be "a faithful reproduction of the painting *Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival*," has recently been built in Kaifeng's Millennium City Park.[57] So if you go to Kaifeng now and see places that look similar to some of the places featured in the *Qingming* scroll, this may be so not because the scroll depicts the city of Kaifeng as it looked some 800 years ago, but because parts of the city have been turned into a copy of the legendary painting.

"Like the 'Mona Lisa,' 'Qingming Festival' is to some extent famous for being famous," an American critic remarked.[58] The painting by Zhang Zeduan "has been famous since the fourteenth century, when forgeries began to circulate." "The original was repeatedly stolen or misappropri-ated from the imperial collection, starting as early as the 1340s."[59] The painting "is famous partly for its involvement over centuries in palace intrigues, theft, and wars, and partly for its detailed, geometrically accu-rate images of bridges, wine shops, sedan chairs, and boats beautifully juxtaposed with flowing lines for the depiction of mountains and other natural scenery. It is routinely covered in courses on Chinese history, art, and culture, across China and in the West."[60]

According to some accounts, the twelfth century original was lost long ago, but several copies from the 明 Ming (1368–1644) and 清 Qing eras (1644–1911) have survived. This is what the author of the Garden of Fine Art's website seems to assume, too.[61] If this is true, the painting either ceased to exist or is instantiated in its surviving copies. But in which of the copies? There are considerable differences between them. Since the Yuan dynasty, 清明上河圖 "has been a timeless subject in painting, with more than fifty works on this subject or by this title surviving today, making it

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56 Cf. Hansen 1996a, 184–190. For a defense of the traditional assumption that the city shown on the scroll was indeed meant to be Kaifeng, see Tsao 2003.
57 See Cultural China n.d.; *Travel China Guide* n.d.
58 Bradsher 2007.
59 Ibid. Hansen 1996a, 191–192, refers to Whitfield 1965, 74–75, for an overview of the history of the painting.
60 Bradsher 2007.
61 "Garden of Fine Arts" website. Accessed March 30, 2015. http://toban-meiga. seesaa.net/category/1668034-1.html.

perhaps the painting with the most numerous versions extant."[62] Even so, new copies and new versions are still being produced. A large, computer-animated 3D copy of the scroll spreading over more than 100 metres attracted immense crowds at the Shanghai Expo in 2010.[63]

What the garden's website does not tell its readers is that the Palace Museum in Beijing (故宫博物院 *Gùgōng Bówùyùan*) holds a darkened silk scroll measuring 24.8 cm × 528.7 cm *recte*, painted with monochrome black ink (and some green and reddish hues), that is widely believed to be the original (or at least a major fragment of it) painted in the early twelfth century by the elusive Zhang Zeduan.[64] An American expert quoted in a *New York Times* article in 2007 confirmed: "Art scholars agree that the Palace Museum in Beijing does indeed own the original. The style and materials of the scroll—ink on silk—are consistent with work from the twelfth century, and the many chops, or seals, of its owners over the years are accurate."[65] I am not in a position to decide this question. Certainly the placing of the seals would be the first thing a forger would do his best to copy most accurately. Because of its fragility, the scroll is seldom displayed, even in Beijing, and has never been lent for an overseas exhibition (fig. 15).[66]

The ceramic copy exhibited in the Kyoto Garden of Fine Art under the name of this famous painting is clearly a copy not of the Beijing scroll but of another scroll not nearly as old as the work it is said to represent. This scroll, painted in full colours and remarkably rich in minute details, dates from the Qing era in eighteenth century China and currently belongs to the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Taiwan (國立故宮博物院 *Gúolì Gùgōng Bówùyùan*). The Museum in Taipei hosts major parts of the former art collections of the imperial court from Beijing and holds no less than eight versions of the *Qingming* subject in its collection.[67] These versions differ from each other in many respects. One of them in particular has long been recognised as the best version—or at least the best from the Ming and Qing dynasties. This particular scroll[68] was the model for the ceramic copy displayed in Kyōto. "This version has been the subject of a

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62 National Palace Museum 2013, 142.

63 For a photo of the event on July 16, 2010, see Wikipedia 2010. More about this computer animated copy and a show in Taipei in the summer of 2011 can be found at 5pit 2011 (with a video and explanations in Chinese).

64 Cf. Hansen 1996b. A high-resolution digital copy of the Beijing scroll can be found at Wikimedia 2013c; another copy, apparently digitised after a printed copy, can be compared at http://tools.wmflabs.org/zoomviewer/?flash=no&f=Alongtheriver+QingMing.jpg (accessed September 18, 2016).

65 Bradsher 2007, quoting Chinese art specialist Marc F. Wilson, the director of the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, MO.

66 Bradsher 2007.

67 Cf. National Palace Museum n.d.-a.

68 The painting is identified by the accession number 故畫 *Guhua* 1100. A high-resolution digital copy of this scroll can be found at National Palace Museum n.d.-b. Another copy of the same file is also available at Wikimedia 2013c.

Figure 15: 張擇端 Zhang Zeduan, 清明上河圖 *Qingming Shanghe Tu*, "On the River During the Qingming Festival", Northern Song, twelfth century, Beijing Palace Museum 故宮博物院 *Gùgōng Bówùyùan*. Detail: Rainbow bridge.

Figure 16: 清明上河圖 *Qingming Shanghe Tu*, "On the River During the Qingming Festival" [National Palace Museum, Taipei], eighteenth-century remake by 陳枚 Chén Méi, 孫祜 Sūn Hù, 金昆 Jīn Kūn, 戴洪 Dài Hóng and 程志道 Chéng Zhìdào of the famous scroll by 張擇端 Zhang Zeduan. Enlarged ceramic copy in the Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto, 1994; detail: Rainbow bridge.

documentary film, printed in postcard and jigsaw-puzzle form, published in a detailed study and as a children's book, produced as a multimedia disc, and even reproduced in full size."[69] In Kyōto, it is reproduced on porcelain panels in an even larger scale, enlarged to four times its original size— over 24 metres, altogether. Thus it enables visitors to take a closer look at the painting's details. As one visitor stated, "I've seen it once at the Taipei National Palace Museum, but this one is much easier to see clearly, for it is

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69 National Palace Museum n.d.-a.

twice the size of the Taipei one, and you aren't being jostled by hordes of tourists." (fig. 16).[70]

Measuring 35.6 cm × 1,152.8 cm, the Qing court version of the legendary *Qingming* panorama was completed in the first year of the reign of Emperor 乾隆 Qiánlóng (1736 CE), through the effort and collaboration of five artists from the Qing dynasty Painting Academy: 陳枚 Chén Méi, 孫祜 Sūn Hù, 金昆 Jīn Kūn, 戴洪 Dài Hóng, and 程志道 Chéng Zhìdào: "begun under the Yongzheng emperor and completed in the early reign of the Qianlong Emperor, it took nine years to paint."[71]

Borrowing a term from the twentieth-century movie industry, the relationship of the Qing court scroll to the Beijing scroll that is believed to be the original might perhaps be labelled as that of a bold "remake" of the subject rather than of a "copy" of the original. The Qing court version is more than twice as long as the Beijing scroll and covers vast areas of the river landscape to the east of the city and, in particular, the majestic palace in the west. None of these items appear in the Beijing scroll—or at least not in the state of the scroll as it is known today, which might be just a fragment after parts of the original were cut off some time ago. But even in those features of the composition that do maintain some parallels in both versions, the differences are striking and apparently not due to any kind of negligence.

Can a picture depicting the towing of a boat be a copy of a picture depicting the poling of a boat? Maybe such technical details are not what matters to those who are able to celebrate a copy for surpassing its original in brilliance and accuracy. Who are we to censure the Chinese about what ought to count as a "copy," or how to label different kinds of copies, according to the amount and kind of similarities and differences between them?

Obviously, the Qing court painters never intended to produce an exact copy of the historical original—or whatever might have been the model that represented the famous picture to them. Their understanding of their task was much more ambitious: they wanted not only to preserve a canonical model of an ideal state of a peaceful and well-ordered urban civilisation and pass on a revered masterpiece of the traditional Chinese art of ink brush painting, but to do their best to renew this tradition at the most advanced level of insight and capability available to them.

> With exceptionally fine and lively brushwork ... almost every aspect related to urban life has been rendered, ranging from tranquil countryside to raucous itinerant shows and the bustling rainbow bridge market as well as shops of every kind, crowded passageways, secluded mansion courtyards, and a grand imperial garden. The coloring throughout the scroll is spectacular, the scenery combining Chinese traditional painting methods and Western perspective

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70 Yzzzz 2013.
71 National Palace Museum 2013, 142.

to give the space a sense of depth and volume. … Many aspects of traditional life are also depicted, including street shows, a country-side banquet, and ladies going for a walk, the material for depiction here coming from the customs of the Qingming Festival practiced in Beijing at the time, thus offering a glimpse at the variety of life among commoners in the Qing dynasty.[72]

The scroll exhibits conspicuous traces—such as the use of colour and per-spective techniques—that seem to indicate that the artists who painted it had encountered Western art. "Architectural elements throughout the handscroll were all done using the principles of Western perspective, the buildings and streets distinctly rendered in appropriate proportion. The distance between near and far has been accurately grasped, and there is even Western-style architecture found in the painting."[73]

The painters were acquainted with European art and painting tech-niques due to the presence of Jesuit missionaries at the Beijing court. Most notable among these missionaries was the Italian painter Giuseppe Casti-glione (1688–1766), who came to China in 1715 and served as a court artist to the three Qing emperors 康熙 Kangxi, 雍正 Yongzheng, and 乾隆 Qián-lóng, for 51 years.[74] His blend of Western and Chinese painting styles was particularly in favour with Emperor Qiánlóng (1711–1799), an avid collector and connoisseur of fine art.

The Qing court painters' version of the *Qingming* subject is a remark-able document of cross-cultural learning from a Chinese perspective at the heyday of the Qing Empire. It was a deliberate attempt to present a synthesis of the best elements of Chinese tradition with Western achieve-ments, a synthesis that was meant to reinforce the Chinese Empire's claims of superiority.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the conspicuous differences between the Taipei Muse-um's Qing court version of the *Qingming* subject and any of its predeces-sors, including the Song dynasty original by Zhang Zeduan (whether this was identical with the Beijing scroll or perhaps still another painting), for the author of the Kyōto Garden of Fine Art's information website, there is no doubt that "the Taipei National Museum's copy captures (the painting's) original magnificence."[75] Two things are striking about this assertion: The author reacts to a demand to justify the choice of the copy from Taipei as model for the ceramic copy in Kyōto. Apparently it was not sufficient to

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72 National Palace Museum 2013, 142–143.
73 National Palace Museum n.d.-a.
74 Cf. Barnhart et al. 1997, 282–285.
75 "Garden of Fine Arts" website. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://toban-meiga.
    seesaa.net/category/1668034-1.html.

praise the Taipei scroll simply for the brilliance of its colours or the plenitude of scenes from everyday Qing life, or for its delicate blend of Chinese and Western influences. The scroll was produced as a copy of a famous model, so its excellence must be that of a perfect copy. But how could the curator from Kyōto assess the relationship between the copy in the Taipei collection and its original, which he has never seen and which he even believes was lost long ago? What are the objects of such a comparison? What kind of quality or object is the "magnificence" that seems to be, for this curator (but maybe not for this curator alone), the essential point in copying famous ancient paintings—so essential, indeed, that so many differences in the technical particularities do not seem to matter very much? Is this magnificence possible to capture and transfer through digital photography and interfaces like ceramic prints or LCD-screens? Or do we have to assume that it eludes such processes of technical reproduction, as Walter Benjamin famously argued was the case for the "aura" of people, places, situations, or historical artefacts?

These are admittedly philosophical questions. They have been engendered by the experience of occasionally strolling through the Garden of Fine Art, seeing what is there to be seen and reflecting on the relationships between various moments at this garden—the pictures that are so famous that it has become really hard to actually see them, the ceramic copies in their own materiality, the arrangement of the pictures along the garden route, the interplay between the pictures and moving water surfaces, juxtapositions of paintings which could not come so close to each other at any other place than this, changing weather and daylight conditions, other visitors and how they behave, the aging of the concrete walls, the pavement, the glass railings which were all brand new just twenty years ago—and, furthermore, by reflecting on the complex relationships between the garden and the world around it, between the copies in the garden and their originals in Rome, Milan, Paris, Otterlo, Chicago, Taipei, Tōkyō, and Kyōto, taking into account the way some of the originals have changed since their former look has been fixed for long-term conservation on ceramic boards, and so on.

Thanks to the internet, and to all the people who have posted photos or videos of their encounters with this place on countless websites, it is now possible to stroll through the garden not only if one happens to be in Kyōto, but also virtually, or at least to stroll through a virtual copy of this garden, which is of course not to be confused with the actual place in Kyōto. This virtual copy is at once less and more than the actual place: It is obviously less because most of these photos and videos are less than perfect copies of the pictures depicted in them, and even the best photos or videos can never replace the actual, multisensorial experience of being in a certain place, of moving freely, following your own curiosity, and taking your own time. But it is indeed remarkable that photos covering every square inch of the entire facility, including the restrooms, can now be found on the internet and can be studied from anywhere in the world that individuals

have internet access. The experience one can have in strolling through the virtual copy of the Garden of Fine Art on the internet, following the traces of the images offered by search engines upon entering different versions of the name of the place, also surpasses what can be experienced at the site in Kyōto on any given occasion. It encompasses many different times at once. And the painful absence of the possibility to spontaneously follow your own curiosity and turn your head, take a step to your left or take a closer look to the right at an obscure detail, is more than compensated for by the possibility of following the traces of so many other people's curiosity and seeing what they found remarkable about the place. The chance to share the experience, knowledge, and thoughts of other visitors might change your own experience and your own thought.

Figures

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The Copy and Power

Birgit Mersmann

Image Enhancement Through Copying? Global and Local Strategies of Reproduction in the Field of World Art and Heritage

Abstract   The digital and global cultural turn has created the effect that culture- and media-related strategies and practices of copying, as they have evolved and been conventionalized in the age of modernity, are subject to major transformations. Global cultures are often identified as "cultures of copy" which show a pronounced disinterest, even disregard in the modern idea of the sovereign, untouchable, and unreproducible original. This essay paper focuses on new global and local strategies of reproduction in the field of world art and heritage. It studies how the relationships of particular cultures (here Western, Asian, and Arabic) towards the concepts of original and copy, and creation and reproduction, are displaced, renegotiated, or even reaffirmed in the digital age of "copy and paste," given that the means of digital reconstruction allow for unlimited remake. The issue of image empowerment through copying of world art heritage is discussed on the basis of a) the replication and virtual reconstruction of the Buddha statues of Bamiyan, and b) "remakes" of the Parisian Louvre in Lens (Northern France) and Abu Dhabi. Using an individual art work and an art institution as objects of inquiry, the innovation potentials and iconoclastic conflict zones of the new "glocal" power of the copy are scrutinized. As a result of this case-based analysis, this study argues that, due to the pressure of the global cultural economy, copycatting has become a new cultural-economic and political strategy for image empowerment in the field of world art and heritage. Analogous to remediation processes in digital cultures, local and global copycats of world art heritage are empowered to remaster the original image. Innovative imitation is found to be a guiding principle for globalizing the heritage market. Given that copy(cat) ing implies geopolitical relocation, the transformative power of the copy is interpreted as a newly politicized right and cultural power to copy.

Keywords   Cultures of copy, iconoclasm, world cultural heritage, Bamiyan Buddhas, Louvre

Global cultures are often identified as "cultures of copy."[1] This definition implies that the increase and reevaluation of copying practices is a consequence of new reproduction technologies, in particular the digital media that have made the concept of the original completely obsolete. Contrary to the traditional stance in modern western culture and philosophy that the copy can never outpace the original, that it always includes the betrayal of authorship/creatorship as well as the infringement of intellectual property, the aesthetic, social, and economic media practice in global cultures has proven that copying in both its old analog forms and new digital variants has become a creative power for innovation, if not even a new norm and paradigm for transformation. This digital cultural turn has the effect that previous historical, culture-related, and conventionalized definitions, strategies, and practices of copying undergo major resignification. The research interest of this paper is guided by the question of how the relationship of particular cultures—here Western, Asian, and Arabic— towards the concepts of original and copy, and creation and reproduction is displaced, renegotiated, or even reinforced in the digital age of "copy and paste," given that the means of digital reconstruction allow for the unlimited remaking and resurrection of works and beings that have even ceased to exist in reality.

The following analysis will focus on two case studies in the domain of world art heritage. This field is particularly interesting for discussing global and local strategies of copying, because it comprises a conflict line that runs between the originality *and* the universality of world cultural heritage. Due to its declared uniqueness and human universality, the question of whether it is legitimate to reproduce and copy world art, including museum institutions that hold, preserve, and represent collections of world art and heritage, is a markedly delicate one that has stirred a heated debate over the last decade. This is mostly due to the fact that the globalization of culture and cultural heritage has not only revealed the diversity of cultures of copy, including their (in-)different views on the value relationship between original and copy, but it has also brought to bear the issue of who has (or doesn't have) the right and power of reproduction under certain conditions and in specific contexts. Besides being cultural assets, the question of authority on the multiplicity of the copy and the replication and reproduction of the original has become a political one.

Within the field of visual arts, the effect of global cultures of copy has become particularly evident in the form of the worldwide multiplication of well-established art institution formats such as the museums of modern

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1   The notion of "cultures of copy" became a much debated and well-established concept in 2011, when the Edith-Russ House for Media Art in Oldenburg, Germany, organized (in collaboration with the Goethe Institute of Hong Kong) an exhibition by this title that dealt with the phenomenon of the copy as a global cultural strategy. It alluded to an earlier publication by Hillel Schwartz entitled *The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles* (New York: Zone, 1996; revised and updated 2013).

and contemporary art (MoMA and MoCA), the art biennial, and the art fair—formats that have historically originated and evolved in the West. As a response to this new globalizing trend, the issue of image enhancement through copying will not only be discussed on the basis of a) an individual art work, namely the Buddha statues of Bamiyan, whose potential reconstruction in Afghanistan and "real" copy in China has sparked a hot intercultural debate on the material and immaterial values of copying cultural heritage, but also with reference to b) an art institution: the Louvre as *the* museum of world art that has been copied and remade in a local version in Lens, France, and a global version in Abu Dhabi. Using these examples, the conflict zones and innovation potentials of the new global power of the copy are scrutinized by a number of questions: Where do the decisive fault lines between intellectual and material property run? Wherein lies the power of transformation and innovation, as exerted by the global cultural translation of world culture symbols, their (trans-)historically shaped images? In what way does the copy displace and disgrace the original through the process of translocation? What differences between global and local strategies can be observed with respect to the contemporary remake and reactivation of world-historical art heritage, including its institutions of preservation and presentation?

Copying the lost, lost in copying: Reproductions of the Buddhas of Bamiyan

In this first part, the analyzed relationship between original and copy is defined by the physically destroyed and no longer existent original. With regard to the purpose of the copy, this case is distinct from a relationship wherein a copy can refer to an existing, material original (artefact) in its full grandeur and uniqueness. Each irretrievable loss of an original, aesthetically and historically unique work of art evokes the human desire to reconstitute it by a copy. This desire is expressed even more strongly the more powerful the destruction of the original image has been. Arising from the experience of loss is the question of what forms, practices, and functions of reproductions are technically considered and culturally accepted as substitutes for the lost or smashed original and how they are conceived to relate to the physically non-existent original work. The destruction of the monumental Buddha statues of Bamiyan by the Taliban in March 2001 is an impressive example of this image "recreation" effect. Hitherto, three concrete reconstruction attempts that represent culturally different models for rebuilding the destroyed art heritage of Bamiyan have been undertaken. They raise the challenging question of whether the reconstruction or replica of an art object or cultural object destroyed through an iconoclastic assault can have a healing, reconciling effect of "spiritual" transformation, or even be transmuted into another act of iconoclasm, as a second-order assault on the original.

In March 2001, the two monumental Buddha statues in the contested valley of Bamiyan, an important strategic point in the so-called "war against terror" in Afghanistan, were destroyed by Taliban militants. In addition to the two large Buddha figures in the center of the rock cliff, a smaller statue of a seated Buddha as well as another ten-meter-high Buddha statue in the neighboring Kakrak valley were blasted. Due to the monumentality of the larger Buddhas, the process of destruction dragged on for almost 20 days. Mullah Mohammed Omar, who claimed to have commanded the destruction of all Buddha figures in the Bamiyan valley, justified the act of violence by claiming he was acting within the law of Islam: "The breaking of statues is an Islamic order and I have given this decision in the light of a fatwa of the ulema and the supreme court of Afghanistan. Islamic law is the only law acceptable to me."[2] This legitimization was enforced by the subsidiary argument that "all we are breaking are stones."[3] The UNESCO, commissioned by the United Nations for the protection and conservation of universal cultural heritage, condemned the act of destruction as "crime against culture," and also spoke, in the same breath, of a "great loss of humanity."[4] An important, delicate point in this context is that UNESCO granted world heritage status to the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan only when they were threatened to be destroyed by the Taliban.[5]

As unique and unrepeatable as this act of destruction appears, due to its brutality being staged as a large-scale media spectacle, the iconoclasm against the Buddha statues of Bamiyan is not an unprecedented act of image devastation. The Taliban were copying iconoclastic strategies already used throughout history for the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha images: the smashing of the face was performed in the eighth century, as part of the Islamization of the region, and the bombardment of the full-body figures with canons and artillery fire also took place during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, according to the wishes of the great Mughal emperors Shah Aurangzeb and Nair Shah, as well as Abdur Rahman Khan, the Emir of Afghanistan. Given this historical dimension, the distinctiveness of the iconoclastic destruction of 2001 lies in its extent. Following an escalating spiral of political events, the aim of the Taliban was to completely eradicate the Buddha figures, and with them the history of Buddhist images and beliefs, from Afghan territory.

The iconoclasm was religiously motivated by the imperative to destroy any false copy of God, for which any representational image qualifies. The Islamic prohibition of images, which does not originate in the writings of the *Qur'an*, but in the *Hadith*, that is the collected traditions of the prophet

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2 Archaeological Institute of America 2001.
3 Archaeological Institute of America 2001.
4 The valuations by the UNESCO Director-General Koïchiro Matsuura are reproduced in *The World Heritage News Letter,* May-June, 2001, 30.
5 The Bamiyan district was inscribed in the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2003. This means that, as a result of the destructive iconoclastic action, the Bamiyan Buddhas were upgraded to world cultural heritage status.

Mohammed, is primarily based on the aspect of figuration. The text canon of *Hadith* agrees that all visual representations possessing (or casting) a shadow, including the depiction of God, are prohibited. In Islamic culture, God alone is reserved the right to act as *bâri* (i.e. creator) or *muçawwir* (image maker). The total identification between God and image, creator and creation, negates any principle of representation and thus prevents a fundamental differentiation between original and copy. Because only God is conferred with the power to create images, any visual figuration by man amounts to a copy of creation. Artists are often equaled with polytheists or iconodules. As a consequence of this aniconism, sculptures are untruthful idols that must be destroyed. The logic following from this view is that Mullah Mohammed Omar can state that, with the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, only stones have been broken, and not a monument of cultural significance. The iconoclastic strategy of defacement and disembodiment negates the idea that creation can be visually materialized and reproduced.

The focal point of this study is not to discuss the motives behind the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in the past and in the new millenium—this has already been done extensively[6]—but instead it is to explore the motivation for and the practices of reconstructing and copying the lost Bamiyan Buddhas in the aftermath of their destruction in 2001.

The material and symbolic loss of the Bamiyan Buddha images called for reconstitution and compensation in the Buddhist, Afghan, Asian, and Western world. The first step towards replicating the Bamiyan Buddha, undertaken in direct response to the brutal anti-Buddhist and anti-iconic destruction of the rock-carved originals, happened in Sri Lanka. When the Taliban initially threatened to destroy the Bamiyan Buddha figures, Sri Lanka, the seat of Theravada Buddhism, had already offered to finance an international operation in order to save the two monumental statues. After the destruction, the Colombo government expressed interest in buying the remains of the statues in order to rebuild substitutes. India partly joined this effort, assuring the Sri Lankan government that maps taken from a survey of the original historical site could be provided for the reconstruction of the statues. Because the remnants of the original Buddha statues were never transferred to Colombo, the Sri Lankan Buddhist organization bootstrapped by building a replica of the Bamiyan Buddha, financed by donations from both Sri Lanka's Buddhist community and its minority Muslim community. A stone statue-carving committee was established for proposing plans for the recreation of the statue. It entrusted the renowned Indian sculptor Padma Sri M. M. Sthapathi, from Bharantha, with the responsibility of carving the massive Buddha statue on the Western boundary of the Rambadagalla temple land. The sculptor decided not to reproduce one of the two standing Buddha figures of Bamiyan, but to reconstitute an image of the smaller seated Buddha figure in the Bamiyan valley.

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6   This has been accomplished by Falser 2010.

Originally, it was positioned between the two standing figures where it was also attacked by the Taliban. For maximum recuperation, the sculptor created the world's tallest granite Samadhi Buddha statue (fig. 1). While this near-superhuman recreation effort should directly compensate for the loss of the Bamiyan Buddhas, the image of the Buddha substitute was intended as a revivification of a historical, much-admired Sri Lankan Buddha figure, namely the Samadhi statue situated at Mahamevnāwa Park in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka, in which Buddha is represented in the position of the *Dhyana Mudra,* the posture of meditation associated with his first Enlightenment. It was created between the third and fourth century, later damaged during a landslide from a mountainous rock site, and then reconstructed. This adaption indicates that the original intent of reproducing the Afghan Buddha of Bamiyan was transformed into the recreation of a variation of a local Buddha. This act of reproduction is therefore about the reconstitution of the glory of Buddha, of his reawakening through relocation. The hardship associated with this large-scale recreation evinces the strong compassion many felt with regard to the destroyed Buddhas of Bamiyan. The visual continuity of the genuine replica is of secondary importance, given that Buddha's spiritual image is manifold, a transformative power in itself.[7]

The second case of reconstituting the world-renowned Buddha statues of Bamiyan by local copying strategies relates to the Chinese culture of copying. It is a radical example, for the pop-cultural commercialization and dehistoricization of world cultural heritage as part of the media flows of globally circulating, openly accessible images. Commissioned by the Oriental Buddha Kingdom Corporation, a thirty-seven meter high replica of the smaller Buddha statue of Bamiyan was erected in the mountains of the Buddha Theme Park in Leshan, Sichuan Province (fig. 2).[8]

Significantly, the Buddha Theme Park with the Bamiyan Buddha copy is located in an area that was granted UNESCO world heritage status due to being home to the largest stone-cast Buddha statue in the world, the famous Buddha of Leshan.[9]

In addition, the renowned Mahao cave tombs dating from the Han dynasty are found in the same area, thus falling under the protection of

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7 On July 24, 2013 it was made public that Rajnath Singh, an Indian politician, had pledged to build a replica of the Bamiyan Buddha at Kushi Nagar in Uttar Pradesh, where Gautam Buddha attained Parinirvana after his death. This announcement indicated that the replication of the Bamiyan Buddha continued for the purpose of recompense. For further information, see "Rajnath reiterates pledge to build replica of Bamiyan Buddha." *The Hindu Business Line.* July 24, 2013. Accessed February 15, 2017. http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/politics/rajnath-reiterates-pledge-to-build-replica-of-bamiyan-buddha/article4948040.ece.

8 The park showcases replicas of more than 3,000 world-famous Buddha statues from around the world, in particular India, Thailand, and Myanmar, directly in the neighborhood of the giant Leshan Buddha.

9 The "Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area" was listed as a UNESCO world heritage site in 1996. It also includes the Mahao cave tombs from the Han period.

Figure 1: Samadhi Buddha Statue in Sri Lanka, 2001.

Figure 2: Replica of the Bamiyan Buddha Statue under Construction
in Leshan, China.

the Leshan Giant Buddha world heritage site. In order to be able to erect the Bamiyan Buddha replica on the rock face of Leshan, numerous ancient, UNESCO-protected Mahao tombs are suspected to have been removed and also partly damaged by the workers of the theme park enterprise, Oriental Buddha Kingdom.[10] By this act of violence, a new form of global cultural, if not touristic iconoclasm through religious "theme park-ization" was introduced.

When the destruction of parts of the world heritage site became known, local archaeologists from the Mahao museum responded with an outcry. How could it happen that historically valuable monuments were replaced by a new—and even poor—copy of another (destroyed) original monument of cultural-historical significance? Their cynicism over the disregard for the historical value and UNESCO status of the world cultural heritage site was intensified by the fact that Liang Enming, the acting director of the Oriental Buddha Kingdom theme park who had had the idea of building the Bamiyan Buddha replica, previously held the position of the vice manager of the Leshan cultural office and was responsible for the protection of the Mahao rock tombs and their remnants. The conflict between universal global and local values reached a new peak in the given case. While aiming at preserving the original Bactrian image of the Bamiyan Buddha statues as a universal image of Buddhism on Chinese territory, Chinese national cultural heritage was sacrificed, its human universality disrespected.[11] The partial destruction of world heritage artefacts serves the purpose of image conservation; the act of face-saving contributes to image enhancement and image distribution. This bizarre logic is proven by the respective arguments for legitimizing the replica of the Bamiyan statue on the cliffs of Leshan put forward by Liang Eming, the director of the Buddha Park, and Chinese copyists: "The Buddha statue at Bamiyan Valley is the common wealth of humankind. The aim of building the replica is to make it possible for those who have never seen the statue to look for themselves at its great beauty."[12] According to the stone carvers, who were commissioned by the Oriental Buddha Park Corporation, the Leshan replica of the smaller Bamiyan Buddha statue should be better (in terms of design) than the original. In concrete terms, this meant that the destruction of certain facial parts, (supposedly) caused by Muslim invaders in the eighth century, was to be rescinded, thus revealing the Buddha's original face with its unfeigned features. Heads and faces of surviving Afghan Buddha

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10 According to Hannah Beech's article "The Shock of the New," published in the TIME magazine on March 9, 2003, an official entry in the UNESCO World Heritage list recording the destruction of some Mahao cave tombs is missing. This might be due to the fact that the demolition could not yet have been officially proven. However, it seems no coincidence that the replica of the Bamiyan Buddha was hidden from the public soon after the publication of Hannah Beech's article in the TIME magazine.

11 In 2003, the Oriental Buddha Capital Holding was subject to police investigation and was eventually charged with the destruction of world cultural heritage.

12 "China to Build Bamiyan Buddha Statue Replica" 2001.

statues are said to have figured as role models for the reconstitution of the face. Basically, the reconstruction was intended to efface the history of Muslim iconoclasm towards the Bamiyan Buddha figures and to recover their uncorrupted original image, removed from all historical battle scars. The material historicity und uniqueness of the original art work appears to be of minor significance compared to the idea of a full-body reproduction enabling the reconstitution—and surmounting—of the destroyed original image. Hence, the damage of numerous original Mahao tombs done by one singular copy of the Bamiyan Buddha, designed to be wholly true to the original, is acquiesced.

The high-aiming plan to trump the original with a copy in new splendor did not develop fully. The damage done to the UNESCO-protected Chinese Mahao tombs aroused strong anger from the side of national and inter-national culture preservers. In response to the worldwide protests, the replica of the Bamiyan figure had to be hidden from the eyes of the world. Until today, it stands unseen in the rock cliffs, covered by a large cloth. Supposedly, this veiling and locking away from public sight was done for preventive reasons, for fear that the Buddha replica would itself become victimized through iconoclastic attacks motivated by the fight over the original historical value of the cultural heritage site. Since the Bamiyan Buddha replica has disappeared from sight, a kind of double-veiling has taken place; the damage to the Mahao tombs on the Leshan world cul-tural heritage site has disappeared from public debate. The anti-iconic public strategy pursued by official Chinese cultural authorities in order to suppress the worldwide articulation of protest proves to be a strong political measurement and attack against those figures representative of copycat cultures, those who celebrate free copying as a legitimate strat-egy of image appropriation and who show themselves indifferent to, if not disrespectful towards, the values and protection rights of intellectual and material property in world heritage.

The third attempt of reconstruction presented in this paper is dichot-omous, as it concerns both the physical rebuilding and the virtual recon-struction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues. In 2004, the rescuing of the remains of the blown-up Bamiyan statues began under the direction of ICOMOS, the International Council on Monuments and Sites, subordinate to the UNESCO as evaluation authority. "Because the destruction was unavoidable, the main goal of UNESCO was to secure and preserve the remaining pieces that were not destroyed by the explosion, and to study the potential re-setting in place of the fragments that fell to the ground."[13] Around 9,000 pieces were recovered, the heaviest among them weighing up to 60 tons. The safeguarding of the original remains of the Giant Bud-dhas of Bamiyan became a strategy for the virtual reconstruction of the statues.[14] In 2010, Michael Jansen, a building historian from the RWTH in

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13 Margottini 2014, 1.
14 As documented in Petzet 2009.

Aachen, presented a "Cultural Masterplan" for the rebuilding of the Bamiyan Buddha statues using the original pieces. In archaeological terminology, this reconstruction technique is called anastylosis. In cooperation with his research team, he created an elaborate 3-D computer model of the Bamiyan statues based on the precise geological reconstruction of each fragment.[15] He proposed relocating each original piece at its precise position before the Taliban's iconoclastic attack, noting that "the faults shall remain visible" in the form of supplemental brick material in order to document the destruction "as part of the history of these ancient master works."[16] This conservatorial position is also applied to the faces of the Buddha figures, which shall be preserved in their iconoclastically damaged and effaced state. The reconstitution of the mutilated face of the original is carried out by the use of original pieces. It is conspicuous that many of the technique-oriented scientific reconstruction pictures show a faceless Buddha as a destroyed image. They include the image-annihilating gesture of the earlier, pre-Taliban act of iconoclasm into the visualization model, but at the same time present the Buddha figures as colorfully painted ancient

Figure 3: Reconstruction of the large Bamiyan Buddha by Michael Jensen and Georgios Toubekis (RWTH Aachen) in cooperation with the Chair of Conservation-Restoration, Art Technology and Conservation Science at the TU Munich.

15 Jansen 2011.
16 Jansen, quoted in Ell 2010. English translation by the author.

Figure 4: Textured Model of the Small Buddha of Bamiyan, as reconstructed by Armin Grün. View of the recovered camera poses of tourist images (left). Point cloud (centre) and textured 3D model, obtained with ETH Zürich's automated matching program.

cult statues—a paradoxical constellation which indicates basic reservations toward attempting a perfect reproduction (fig. 3).

In contrast to this partial reconstruction related to the historical condition of the statues before the iconoclastic Taliban attack, a pop music video about the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha figures, produced by the Afghan Hazara singer Bisharat Bashir in 2011, and again in 2013, envisages the complete reconstruction of the original Buddhist cult figures by full-fledged replicas.[17] The music video of the new Hazaragi song shows the virtual resurrection of all monumental Buddha figures in the Bamiyan valley, including the originally existing reclining Buddha in front of the standing Buddhas in the rock niches, in full golden regalia. The remodeling is not only focused on a full-body copy, but also on the complete recreation of the destroyed face. From the cultural perspective of the Hazara people, this re-facing aims toward the reconstitution of their own Buddhist tradition and history that can also be understood as a practice of face-saving. The Afghan Hazara seek to reconstruct their own origin as descendants of the Kushara with the deep and radiating power of the Buddha copies that fill the void of the missing originals.

The virtual reconstruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues as a reimagining of their original image in contrast to the real reconstruction by use of original pieces has also inspired scholars in the field of visualization. The most prominent attempt to virtually reconstruct the Bamiyan Buddha

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17　The version of the 2011 Hazaragi Song displaying the reconstruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas is available at YouTube. "Bamiyan'Hazaragi' song 2011," YouTube video, 3:26, posted by "javad Rajabi," March 4, 2012. Accessed October 6, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soI_v6wxGic.

figures was made by Armin Grün, of ETH Zurich and his team. He developed a photogrammetric reconstruction of the large Bamiyan Buddha with the help of new visualization techniques (fig. 4).[18]

A set of three different image types—internet images, tourist images, and metric images—was employed in order to produce a morphed composite image of the large Buddha that comes authentically close to the original image, in both its artistic quality and cultural value. This time, the power of the copy lay in the digital remediation. Image reproductions were used to reconstitute the authentic image of the original large Buddha, thus reversing the traditional relationship between original and copy. The aniconism symbolized by the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas stands in stark contrast to the image multiplication applied for the virtual reconstruction of the Buddha cult statues and their remediation. Because of the evidential power of photographic and scientific images, the spiritual and affective power of the Bamiyan Buddha image—that is, the triad of the cult image, the artistic image, and the world heritage image—can be reconstituted. In principle, the image-based 3-D reconstruction model of the large Buddha figure could serve for the physical reconstruction of the statue. However, the resurrection of the virtual Buddha in real space has not yet been conducted, most likely because of concerns that it would then be perceived as a "hard" copy of its virtual origin.

As demonstrated, the reconstructionists of the Bamiyan Buddha statues are subject to accusations of iconoclasm. In the case of the Chinese Bamiyan Buddha replica of Leshan, physical iconoclasm—that is destruction of the UNESCO-protected ancient rock tombs—is coupled with symbolic iconoclasm, the effacement of original art-historical value and the destruction of the original scene of the Buddha figure. Arguably, the relocational copying of the Bamiyan Buddha on the mountain slopes of Leshan took place out of pure greed and ignorance. Even the other two examples of reconstruction can be said to contribute to the demolition of the Bamiyan Buddha image, albeit unintentionally. On one hand, this argument can be maintained because the shattered "original" image is staged in its brokenness (anastylosis), thus continuing to inscribe the image history of destruction into the collective visual memory; on the other hand, it can be argued that the virtual reimaging through image reproduction, multiplication, and morphing attacks the artistic uniqueness and autonomous validity of the original image. Image reconstruction always implies image destruction. In that sense, iconoclasm is inherent to visual cultures of copy, be they scientific, artistic, political, religious, or touristic.

The presented examples of how nations compensated for the physical loss of the Giant Buddha statues of Bamiyan clearly illustrate that the characteristics of the "remade" versions very much depend on how the relationship between original and copy is defined in the given cultural

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18 For detailed information about the 3D modelling of the Bamiyan Buddha statues see Grün 2004 and 2013.

context. Regional cultures (whether Asian or Western) have the same share of influence as domain-specific cultures (e.g. religious culture, scientific culture, art culture, or commercial culture). The line of demarcation contouring potential areas of conflict thus runs between *reconstitution* and *reconstruction* strategies. The Asian attempts at replicating the (lost) original Buddha statues of Bamiyan—be it the religiously motivated Sri Lankan reproduction or the Chinese rebuilding of the Buddha figure for commercial touristic purposes, or even the Afghan Hazaragi virtual reimagination of the Bamiyan Buddhas as part of a music video—are all characterized by a strategy of reconstitution aiming at compensation and reconciliation. Relatively independent in their different cultural and social contexts, they don't consider authenticity as defined by the site- and area-specific material, artistic, spiritual, and historical value of the monument. This is one of the reasons why, for instance, the removal of authentic parts of a world heritage site (as in the Leshan case) was accepted because it made room for a replica of another, supposedly more attractive world heritage monument. As shown, compensation can also mean amendment and improvement. The copy is permitted to be more perfect than the original; it can either completely reconstitute the damaged, destroyed, or lost original in its full magnificence, or even enhance it. The transformative power of the copy lies in the survival and revivification of the original image beyond its site-specific location. The replicas line up to outpace the original by a process of outsourcing. The Afghan Buddha of Bamiyan can be resurrected globally, in renewed splendor, without any harm done to its local origin. This translocational potential can be related to the Buddhist concept of reproduction, which is markedly different from its religious, aesthetic, and media-technological understanding in Western (Christian) culture. Buddhist strategies of reproduction follow the model of reproduction in nature. It is not nature itself that is copied, but its strategies of reproduction. Buddha can multiply without losing identity. Buddha reproductions are substantially connected via the main Buddha, meaning that all of them are authentic incarnations of Buddha. This principle allows for multiple reproductions as creative acts of production. Reproducibility signifies diversity and abundance. At the same time, genealogical reproduction plays an important role for the replication of the Bamiyan Buddha statue.[19] By appropriating the original act of production, the intangible heritage and artistic practice of carving a giant stone Buddha statue out of a steep rock slope is kept alive. The historical survival and cultural transmission of the carving techniques and the reproductive features of Buddha imaging outrank the significance of the original, destroyed, or dead monument. Replication amounts to compensation, even redemption for the loss of the original. In this respect, it helps avert the loss of authenticity.

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19 See Mersmann 2004.

Contrary to this reproductive approach to the heritage value of copying, the described western strategies, pursued in the context of world heritage preservation as universal strategies, aim for reconstruction that avoids the notion of copying. The main goal of these reconstruction attempts consists of safeguarding and rehabilitating the site-specific original image. The physical remains of the original Buddha statue are integrated into the virtual reconstruction, thereby advancing the fragmentation and virtualization of the original. As the original is a historically broken image, it is not permitted to resurrect fully or perfectly. The concept of anastylosis,[20] as well as the proposal for a partial physical reconstruction of only the lower parts of the large Buddha statue while keeping the dust and rubble of the smaller Buddha in the niche,[21] indicate that the physical reality of the original can only be present—or *presented*—in a virtual space. In terms of faithfulness, the virtual remodeling of the original seems to substitute, if not dispense with its physical reconstruction. The scientific data preservation of the virtual reconstruction makes the physical conservation (including the remnants) of the original more and more obsolete. This virtual displacement of the original as a monument from material culture will likely have a strong transformative effect on how the authenticity, originality, and validity of world cultural heritage will be defined in the future of digital archaeology.

Coping with the copy: Offshoots of the Louvre

A new trend in the global network economy of culture is the copying of complete art and heritage institutions. Following Ribeiro's argument for the dependence of economic life on copying in this volume, the recent development reaffirms how heavily cultural production relies on cultural reproduction and replication. The multiplication of entire cultural institutions such as world art museums for consumption by remodeling existing templates amounts to a new institutional commodity fetishism. The Louvre museum in Paris, which marked the birth of the museum in Europe and advanced by definition to "the museum of museums" in the nineteenth century, is a good example among museums to demonstrate the motivations and economic power strategies connected with cultural-institutional replication. With the inauguration of the Louvre-Lens museum in Northern France in 2012, and the official opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi in the

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20 Article 15 of the UNESCO Venice Charter states that "All reconstruction work should however be ruled out a priori. Only anastylosis, that is to say, the reassembling of existing but dismembered parts can be permitted. The material used for integration should always be recognisable and its use should be the least that will ensure the conservation of a monument and the reinstatement of its form." (*International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites* 1964).
21 See Jensen 2011, 163.

United Arab Emirates in 2015, the central Louvre museum has donated a local and global copy of itself to the world. It is obvious that the corporation of the Louvre museum is copying the "Guggenheim principle," as first described by Hilmar Hoffmann in his book of the same title in 1999, in which he compared Guggenheim's opening of joint-venture museums all over the world with the franchising principle of McDonald's and spoke of a new era of hegemonic museum politics heralded by Guggenheim's capitalist imperialism.[22] By opening two new branches, the Louvre appears to have followed this cultural-economic strategy of global museum politics. It copies the Guggenheim model as an economic success model, hoping for the recurrence of the so-called Bilbao effect. The Louvre spin-off museums aim to bring the glamor associated with a world-class arts culture either to regions that are underdeveloped or to rising cities that aspire to become world cities. The production of the glamor factor is targeted by the group of the so-called GLAMUR museums, that is global art museums that position themselves as economic reactivators, among which are included the Tate, the Guggenheim, the Pompidou, and since 2012, the Louvre. They are able to produce an aura of glamor independent of the dreariness and insignificance of their location, because they bunker universal human treasures of art and cultural heritage from the distant past as well as contemporary times. According to Beatriz Plaza, the GLAMUR museum is characterized by

> global media visibility and sheer presence in the communications environment; outstanding architecture by a superstar architect; big blockbuster exhibitions and a large number of visitors; being magnets for tourists; requiring large capital cost investments and operating budgets; using expensive advertising and commercialization strategies; having a huge operative risk; [and] a hope for substantial impact on the local economy.[23]

Besides their cultural-educational objective, these museums function "to become an effective economic engine"[24] through the creation of employment and the generation of tourism.

Given the cultural-economic ambition of image enhancement through copying, how, in fact, is the relationship between the Louvre in Paris and the Louvre-Lens defined? Is it a temporal relationship between the original historical museum in Paris and the contemporary museum branch in Lens? Or is it a chronological relationship between "firstness" and "secondariness?" A genealogical relationship between progenitor and descendent, parent company and offspring? Or a technical and economic production relationship between role model and copy? Finally, is it a spatial, geopolitically

22 Hoffmann 1999, 14–15.
23 Plaza 2010, 155.
24 Plaza 2010, 155.

defined relationship between center and periphery, the national and the transnational, the local and the global?

The Louvre offspring museum in Lens was envisaged to contribute to the regional development of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.[25] It was designed to regenerate the stagnant local economy and become a magnet for regional art and heritage tourism. As a branching strategy, it drew on the asymmetry between the French periphery and its center. Using the local reproduction of the Parisian Louvre as a role model for the world art museum, including the transfer of renowned pieces of world art heritage from the Louvre to the Louvre-Lens, was meant to compensate for the wounds of regional history. The transplantation amounts to a rehabilitation project, the recovery of the ruined region of Nord-Pas-De-Calais from a series of historical, economic, and political disasters through the means of GLAMUR museum culture. In terms of the relationship between the museum institution located in the center and the museum institution located in the periphery, the Louvre-Lens is officially labeled as annex of the Louvre Paris. Henri Loyrette, the President and Director of the Louvre Museum Paris, emphasizes however that it is not dependent on and subordinate to the central historical Louvre museum, but that it is *the* Louvre in all the facets of its original identity: "This 'other' Louvre, this museum of glass and light, set deftly atop a former mine works, Shaft 9-9b of Lens, is not simply an annex of the Louvre, it is the Louvre itself. It is the Louvre in all its dimensions and all its components, in its geographic and chronological breadth, a universal museum"[26] (fig. 5).

In order to prevent the Louvre-Lens from being perceived as a local "dependent" and unqualified museum reproduction of limited, secondary importance, the argument of the universal museum is put forward. The sovereignty and uniqueness of the local museum branch is underlined by conceding it the right—and even the power—to redefine the Musée du Louvre in Paris with regard to content, concept, and function: "The establishment of the Louvre-Lens is an opportunity for the Louvre to rethink its vocation, to consider its collections and to step outside of its walls and look at itself from a little distance. An opportunity to experiment with things that are not possible within the restricted envelope and organization of

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25 In 2003, the Ministry of Culture and the Louvre Directorate launched a call to the 22 regions of France with the objective to implant a Louvre branch within one region. This initiative was part of a newly-introduced decentralization strategy of French cultural institutions that came in response to the long-lasting criticism that French art and culture were unfairly concentrated in Paris, and therefore privileging the capital's community. Only the Nord-Pas-De-Calais region applied for the regional Louvre branch and proposed six cities for the museum project. Lens was finally selected and officially announced by France's then Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Lens's coal mining wasteland was chosen as the location of the new museum. The Louvre annex site was planned for the top of shaft 9-9b. The newly-built museum, designed by the Japanese architectural firm SANAA in collaboration with New York architect Tim Culbert was opened on December 4, 2012.

26 Loyrette n.d.-a.

Figure 5: Museum Louvre-Lens.

the Paris location."[27] This statement highlights that the regional copy of the Louvre in Nord-Pas-De-Calais should help to renew and regenerate the original Louvre in the French capital with a fresh contemporary perspective of critical regionalism. With this goal, the process of museum reproduction turns into a process of creation by which difference and innovation are constituted at both ends of the Louvre museum's history, its past, and its present. A new identity of the old historical Louvre Paris unfolds in the contemporary Louvre-Lens. This is why Henri Loyrette can confidently claim "The future of the Louvre is now in Lens."[28]

The Louvre Abu Dhabi—its official opening, currently projected for late 2016, has been delayed multiple times—is the second offspring of the Louvre Paris. Considering that Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) known for its highly international community, ambitiously strives to become a leading global player in the Arabic world, the Louvre Abu Dhabi, appearing as a global reproduction of the French national Louvre museum in Paris, is a perfect investment to that end. Whereas the Louvre-Lens at the far north end of France reflects the decentralization of museum institutions in the nation state of France, the Louvre Abu Dhabi points to the decentralization of the Western museum monopoly in a globalized art and museum world. Based on the assumption that the Louvre is a universal museum to be shared by all people and cultures,

27 Loyrette n.d.-b.
28 Loyrette n.d.-b.

an inter-governmental agreement for thirty-years of collaboration was signed by the UAE and France in March 2007.[29] One of the characteristics of this treaty is that the cultural collaboration between the UAE and France is not restricted to the Louvre museum, but extended to a group of French museums that joined forces under the umbrella of *Agence France-Muséums*.[30] The contract prohibits the creation of any similar museum institution with the name of Louvre in any of the other emirates of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, or Iraq, thus protecting the French Louvre brand in the Arab world. The French museums will loan works for the permanent galleries and temporary exhibitions for the first ten years and also assist in developing the national collection.

The construction of the Louvre Abu Dhabi is part of ongoing plans for the touristic and cultural development of Saadiyat Island, a natural island alongside Abu Dhabi's coast. The cultural mega-project is supervised by the Abu Dhabi Tourism & Culture Authority (TCA Abu Dhabi) tasked with conserving and promoting the heritage and culture of the Abu Dhabi emirate and the Tourism Development and Investment Company (TDIC), an independent company of which the TCA Abu Dhabi is the sole shareholder. Besides the Louvre, Saadiyat Island will host the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi (designed by Frank Gehry), the Zayed National Museum (Foster + Partners), the Performing Arts Centre (Zaha Hadid Architects), and the Maritime Museum (Tadao Ando Architect & Associates). The architecture for the Louvre Abu Dhabi was designed by French star architect Jean Nouvel (fig. 6). In "combining modern architecture and inspiration drawn from the region's traditions," the design should reflect "the desire to create a universal museum in which all cultures are brought together."[31]

The Louvre Abu Dhabi deal has sparked much controversy. A petition against the deal was signed by 4,650 museum experts, archaeologists, and art historians, who insisted that museums are not for sale. Therein, the Louvre was accused of behaving "like a corporation with a clearly-defined

29 It was agreed upon that Abu Dhabi would pay over a period of 30 years for the privilege to display art works from French museums. France received 525 million US dollars for the use of the Louvre brand alone, as well as a gift of 33 million dollars to renovate a wing of the Paris Louvre in order to showcase Islamic art works in a newly-designed exhibit.
30 The International Agency of French Museums comprises the following museums or cultural heritage-related institutions: Musée du Louvre, Centre Pompidou, Musée d'Orsay, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Musée du quai Branly, Réunion des musées nationaux, Musée et Domaine national de Versailles, Musée Guimet, Musée Rodin, École du Louvre, Domaine national de Chambord, and the Établissement public de maîtrise d'ouvrage des travaux culturels.
31 Louvre Abu Dhabi 2014. The huge white dome spanning 180 meters in diameter and covering two thirds of the museum recalls the Arabian architecture of a mosque, mausoleum, and madrasa as well as the universal spherical symbol of the globe. The invention of a modern museum through variations of classical Arab forms makes clear that the "universalism of the Louvre Abu Dhabi represents a cultural mix" (Louvre Abu Dhabi 2014 a) characteristic of the hybridity of modern global cultures.

Figure 6: Museum Louvre Abu Dhabi, 3-D model.

strategy: profit maximization."[32] The responses to this critique from both sides, the Louvre leadership in Paris and the city government of Abu Dhabi, draw on the mission of intercultural dialogue and the universality of cultural values. Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, the Cultural Minister of France, argued: "We're not selling the French legacy and heritage. We want this culture to radiate to parts of the world that value it. We're proud that Abu Dhabi wants to bring the Louvre here. We're not here to transform culture into a consumer product."[33] Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE President and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi countered:

> This is a major achievement in Abu Dhabi's vision to become a world-class destination bridging global cultures. This accord further strengthens international dialogue, which will embrace all cultures. This initiative is a unique milestone in international cooperation and bilateral relations and a tribute to the longstanding and friendly ties our two nations have enjoyed. It also creates an enriching environment to be treasured by and to educate generations to come.[34]

The main argumentation applied by the Parisian Louvre directorate to legitimate what might be called a "remake" of the Louvre in Abu Dhabi is

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32 Statement by Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, President of Germany's Foundation for Prussian Culture ("Art in the Desert" 2007).
33 Krane 2007.
34 Online article from the Design Build Network: "Louvre Abu Dhabi," n.d.

heavily based on the modern idea of universalism. The Louvre Abu Dhabi is defined as "the first universal museum founded in the Arab world."[35] Its creation is related to the *Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums*, signed in 2002 by nearly twenty museums, including the Louvre, in order to reaffirm, through a code of conduct, the contemporary relevance of the universal museum model increasingly criticized as a Western hegemonic model rooted in colonial history.[36] According to the mission statement of the Louvre Abu Dhabi, the "universal approach suits Abu Dhabi well, reflecting the city's position at the crossroads of east and west, and its vital ancient role in the days of the Silk Route, when the region linked Europe and the Indian Ocean, opening up exchanges between Asia and Africa. The museum will reflect the region's role as a crossroads for civilisations."[37] The "Birth of the Museum" in Abu Dhabi strategically copies the birth of the Parisian Louvre as the encyclopedic and universal museum in the intellectual and cultural climate of the Enlightenment. It presents itself as an even more universalizing museum, as it breaks with classical departmental divides, the categorization of art works by technique or civilization, in favor of a display of the continuity of universal art as a chronological and thematic narrative from the archaeological to the contemporary, enabling the visitor to form a shared universal memory of historical cultural entanglement in a global perspective. This comparative historical approach will open up

> new horizons [...] underlining how much—before the effective rise of Westernization—the multipolar world that we see as a contemporary fact is an ancient reality. The multiple perspectives introduced by this comparative exercise undoubtedly disrupt a certain world view that the West has imposed and are, of course, essential to the relevance of the universal ambition of the Louvre Abu Dhabi.[38]

Regarding this cross-cultural art-historical approach, the double-bind resulting from the definition of the Louvre as both universal *and* singular reveals its deeper meaning. The Arab relocation, reassembling, and representation of original copies of world art and heritage from the Louvre Paris adds diverse uniqueness to their universality. The original works surrounded by an aura of human universalism are reconstituted and reaffirmed as singular originals through their museum-cultural translation into the Abu Dhabi context. Likewise, the reproduction of the universal museum at its new location in the Arab world results in a single—and singular—museum that defies its actual origin as a multiplied or "copied" museum.

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35 Des Cars 2014b, 27.
36 Des Cars 2014b, 27.
37 See the definition of the Louvre Abu Dhabi as universal museum on the website itself (Louvre Abu Dhabi 2014b).
38 Des Cars 2014b, 31.

Remastering the copy: Global and local transformations

The concept of *remastering* is used in this concluding part in order to assess the global expansion and appreciation of the copy as a new masterpiece. This increased valuation of the multiplied copy to the singularity of a new original can be related to both its capacity for technical reproduction and its transformative power for innovation. The practice of remastering, in fact, originated as a media technique of post-processing. Usually, remastering techniques are used to remake and enhance older, outdated, or damaged audio and video recordings into newer (digital) reproductions. They can be applied to the full scale of reproduction techniques, from *restoration* to the remaking of original material. As proven in the discussed examples, the remastering of original historical works and institutions in the field of world art and heritage is placed in a range between reconstruction (anastylosis, virtual remodeling of the Bamiyan Buddhas), reconstitution (Sri Lankan and Chinese replicas of the Bamiyan Buddhas), and renewal (Louvre-Lens and Louvre Abu Dhabi). In all cases, the copying of the material object tends to play a secondary role. The sheer materiality of the art object appears worthless for reproduction. The object of copying is of immaterial quality, encompassing the aura, image, brand, or value (i.e. cultural, religious, economic, or scientific) of artifacts and art institutions that have achieved the prestigious and distinctive status of universality in world art and heritage.

The favoring of strategic and conceptual "image" copying is a characteristic element in so-called "copycat cultures."[39] Generally, the term copycat culture is used to designate the copying of business ideas and plans for launching startup enterprises. Although this strategic principle of copying proven business models is despised by many—it is often seen as bad business practice in violation of intellectual property principles—it has experienced significant popularity growth in recent years. Oded Shenkar,[40] the author of "Copycats: how smart companies use imitation to gain a strategic edge," unfolds a particularly positive view on the business practice of copycatting. He claims:

> We need to lose the mind-set that imitation is an embarrassing nuisance residing at the margins of business life, and bring it to center stage strategically and operationally. Business leaders need to appreciate the value of imitation but also be aware of its costs and

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39 The English term "copycat" signifies "mimicry". The term "copycat culture" arose in the context of genetic reproduction after the first cloned cat was born on December 2, 2001, at the veterinary faculty of Texas A&M University. The cloning was carried out by Mark Westhusin in cooperation with the Korean geneticist Taeyoung Shin. An alternative naming for the cloned cat was "carboned cat."

40 Oded Shenkar holds the Ford Chair in Global Business Management at the Fisher College of Business at Ohio State University.

risks, and learn to see imitation not as an impediment to innovation but as a driver of innovation, if done right.[41]

The author even introduces a new term for the beneficial side of copycatting: "imovation" or "a fusion of imitation and innovation to create a competitive advantage."[42]

There is no escaping the fact that, over the last decade, copycatting has been adopted widely as a new practice of and paradigm for the global cultural economy. In China, for instance, *shanzhai* copycatting has transformed from a knockoff practice of consumer good imitation to a wider cultural phenomenon of reproduction since around the time of the Beijing Olympics, in 2008.[43] Meanwhile, its use has not been restricted to the copycatting of brand products, but has expanded to all areas of social and cultural life, including places and institutions (i.e. media formats, restaurants, stores, buildings, and even towns).[44] Some scholars argue that *shanzhai* is a phenomenon of counterculture targeting, aiming to deconstruct the dominance of official Chinese culture and the global hegemony of Western culture.[45] It is evaluated as a form of "grassroots innovation" that "takes place outside of government control, not within it."[46] The violation of intellectual property rights is regarded as its necessary condition.[47]

In the light of these interpretations, the replication of the Bamiyan Buddha in China and the reproduction of the Musée du Louvre in Lens and Abu Dhabi can be qualified as glocal strategies of copycatting. The replica of the Bamiyan Buddha in the Buddhist theme park of Leshan is a clear example of *shanzhai* copycatting in the field of world art heritage.[48] The Chinese Buddha copy represents what Hennessey, in his analysis of the Chinese

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41 Shenkar 2010, 4.

42 Shenkar 2010, 4. The author lists "Rules of Imovation" by which he encourages firms to "not reinvent the wheel," but to "put the buzz in imitation." He calls for "removing the stigma attached to imitation and making it as exciting and fashionable as innovation."

43 *Shanzhai* literally means "mountain village" or "mountain stronghold." In Chinese history, it was referred to hideouts of bandits and outlaws. Its contemporary usage relates to the loss of official control. *Shanzhai* as a new cultural phenomenon of copycatting began with name-brand knockoffs, such as the copying of smartphones, laptop computers, and designer fashion. See Yao 2008, for further information.

44 For the broad range of Chinese *shanzhai* copycats, see http://www.businessinsider.com/things-that-china-copied-from-the world-2013-8?op=1 (accessed June 15, 2014), where the Bamiyan Buddha replicas in Leshan are also mentioned. The website documents that, besides a Florentine village copied on the outskirts of the Chinese city of Tanjin, the UNESCO world heritage site of the Austrian village of Hallstatt was also replicated in the province of Guangdong.

45 See Hennessey 2012, who gives an excellent overview on the different historical notions and contemporary interpretations of *shanzhai*.

46 Representative examples for this approach can be found in Zhu and Shi 2010.

47 In this sense, copycatting contributes to a non-hegemonic world system. Along the lines of Ribeiro (in this volume), it can be categorized as a strategy of "economic globalization from below."

48 Even though the copying happened before the official acknowledgement of the era of *shanzhai* culture, it possesses all of its characteristics.

cultural practice of *shanzhai*, has interpreted as a shift from the Confucian "culture of emulation" to the neo-Confucian "culture of imitation."[49] The remastering of the original is the main aim of the laborious copying process. Perfect imitation of the original production process shall enable the attainment of a new, reawakened originality. The copycat is born as a new masterwork—in this shift of gravity lies the supremacy of the copy, including its power of resistance against further copying attempts. As discussed earlier, the Chinese copying of the Bamiyan Buddha statue is a strategic move of a commercial counterculture mimicking the universal values of an unreproducible "high culture." It appears, unwittingly or not, as a parody of the contemporary trend in Chinese cultural policy to destroy national heritage in order to make room for innovation and economic success while, at the same time, subscribing to the UNESCO principles for protecting world cultural heritage.

The reproduction of the Louvre museum in Lens and Abu Dhabi reflects the imovative business strategies of copycats, as described by Shenkar. It happens under the assumption that the museum model of the Louvre sells globally, in whatever regionalized or locally-assimilated form, due to its legitimization as a universal museum brand. Innovation is expected from imitation in different local cultures and global contexts. Through relocation and remodeling, the universality of the universal museum, incorporated in the Louvre, is multiplied into diversity. The cultural-political implications and economic effects of copycatting the historical Louvre are as of yet inconclusive. Viewed from the perspective of French state culture and its claim to world supremacy, the imovative copying of the Louvre museum brand serves the purposes of a neo-colonial empowerment of the modern colonial art institution—the universal museum of world art and heritage—in the contemporary age of globalization.[50] The replication effect of the Louvre branches in Lens and Abu Dhabi aims to exert a profitable regional and global impact of the French cultural economy in the global world. It will empower the French Louvre (including its affiliated museums and exhibition market) to become a global, transnational player in the world of museum corporations. The historical power of the modern Parisian Louvre, threatening to vanish in an increasingly globalized art and museum world, is revived and reauratized through its contemporary,

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49 Hennessy 2012, 438.
50 This copying can be interpreted as a global extension and enforcement of the European, and in particular French, politico-cultural translation privilege as carved out during colonial history. Cultural-economic agents, such as the Louvre museum corporation, seek control of their right to copy as a transcultural translation process. They determine how the heritage of world art, including its values and aesthetic norms, is translated globally. This strategy is not far off from Delaporte's temple translation of Angkor Wat for the French metropole Paris, as a colonial act of cultural heritage appropriation and metonymical translation (see Falser, in this volume). The main historical difference is that, in the case of the Louvre offspring museums, no copies or substitutes of artifacts are tolerated, such that even the "copy versions" of the Louvre museum are defined themselves as "original" museum sites with new, genuine identities.

local, and global variants of reenactment. In this respect, copycatting functions as a compensation strategy for the loss of French world power in the global cultural economy of art and heritage. On the other hand, the state approval for franchising and copying the Louvre museum amounts to the betrayal of historical originality and a disregard for intellectual property rights, although museum representatives have claimed that these are to be maintained. Particularly the outsourcing and relocation of the Louvre to Abu Dhabi can easily be identified with cultural expropriation; this is why it was heavily criticized by the French establishment and public as a sellout of national cultural heritage. The potential of image enhancement is shifted from the French to the Arab museum world, whose representatives are put in possession of the power to remake the original. They can remaster the original Louvre by remaking the birth of the museum in the Arab world,[51] and thus gain the right to reinterpret the French legacy of world art history from their national, regional, or local point of view. It is in this vein of role reversal that the transformative power of the copy can produce mighty effects of transculturation.

Strategic image copying, characteristic of copycat cultures, has led to a redefinition of the copy itself. In this age of digital and genetic reproduction, where originals and original identities can be recreated and remodeled virtually, the ontological idea of an analogy between original and copy has been replaced by the post-production notion of the copy as a reconstruction and remediation,[52] or a remake of images. The moment of transformation is positioned between past and present, historical master and contemporary remastering. Imitative innovativeness prevails over originality; authorship and interpretive sovereignty are multiplied. Enhanced through mobility, virtuality, and networking, copies have the power to reenact and redirect the original in relation to themselves. In this changed perspective, the local and global strategies of decentering and displacing the value of the original will exert the strongest impact on transforming culture-related concepts of original and copy.

Figures

Fig. 1: Accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.samadhibuddhastatue.lk/.
Fig. 2: © REUTERS / Guan Niu.
Fig. 3: © Arnold Metzinger / TU Munich.
Fig. 4: Photogrammetric Reconstruction of the Great Buddha of Bamiyan, Afghanistan (PDF Download Available). Accessed January 23, 2017.

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51 "Birth Of A Museum" was the title of the first exhibition (April 13–August 22, 2013) and catalogue of the museum Louvre Abu Dhabi. See Des Cars 2014 a.
52 See Bolter and Grusin 2000, who argue that new digital media gain their cultural significance by refashioning older media.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227635047_Photogram
metric_Reconstruction_of_the_Great_Buddha_of_Bamiyan_Afghanistan.
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Fig. 5:   © K. Sejima + R. Nishizawa / SANAA, Imrey Culbert, Catherine Mosbach
Paysagiste. Photo: © Philippe Chancel.

Fig. 6:   AJN_HW_Abu_Dhabi_Louvre_04. © TDIC Architect A.

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Christoph Brumann

How to Be Authentic in the UNESCO World Heritage System: Copies, Replicas, Reconstructions, and Renovations in a Global Conservation Arena

Abstract The institutional framework of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention of 1972 has become a major influence on heritage institutions, discourses, and aspirations world-wide. This essay explores how the World Heritage arena has dealt with copies, replicas, and reconstructions of built heritage, given that the authenticity of a site has been a prerequisite for inclusion in the prestigious World Heritage List from the outset. Initially, World Heritage decisions were meant to follow the strict emphasis on original material, fabric, and design outlined in the Venice Charter of 1964. For the reconstructed historical centre of Warsaw, however, compromises were being made early on, and the Nara Document on Authenticity adopted in 1994 significantly widened the scope of authenticity criteria. Subsequent World Heritage recommendations and decisions, however, have shown little consistency and oscillated between liberal interpretations of authenticity and Venice Charter purism. The essay argues that this is partly due to the vested national interests in the World Heritage arena, making many decisions dependent on political lobbying rather than principles. To a significant degree, authenticity continues to be underdetermined, and delegates act according to what feels authentic rather than on the basis of clear guidelines.

Keywords UNESCO World Heritage, authenticity, reconstructions, restorations, material continuity

> *"L'emploi du mot 'authenticité', non assorti d'une spécification appropriée, est vide de toute signification valable. (The use of the word 'authenticity', when not properly specified, is devoid of any valuable meaning.)"* [Greek delegate in the 1998 session of the World Heritage Committee][1]

The UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage adopted in 1972 has experienced a spectacular rise. With 192 participating states, it enjoys almost universal ratification. The inscription of a site on the World Heritage List can work wonders for tourism, national and local prestige, development funds, and sometimes also conservation, so that nation states keep bringing in new candidates. As of 2016, the list comprised 1,052 sites in 165 countries. The convention is clearly the flagship activity of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), outshining the organisation's official priority in education. The annual World Heritage Committee sessions have grown from small gatherings of a few dozen conservationists to global events, with 1,200 participants from more than 150 "States Parties" (i.e. treaty states) assembled at the 2014 meeting in Doha, Qatar. Visibility in the mass media and on the internet has grown sharply since the mid-1990s, and World Heritage university programmes and training centres are opening around the world. Even war has been waged over World Heritage: the 2008 listing of the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear on disputed territory provoked several bloody clashes between Cambodian and Thai troops. Heritage sites have also been attacked precisely for being on the famous list: during the 2012 Committee sessions, Islamist rebels then in control of northern Mali started to destroy Sufi tomb and mosque entrances in Timbuktu, in express defiance of a Committee decision a few days earlier that had placed Timbuktu on the List of World Heritage in Danger. Paradoxically, the World Heritage title guaranteed that this iconoclastic act was rewarded with global media headlines.[2]

The World Heritage arena has become the single most important clearinghouse for and disseminator of conservation discourses, policies, and practices, particularly for cultural heritage. Given that originals and copies, reconstructions and authenticity have been central to conservation discourse from the outset, the World Heritage system also has had to come to terms with this aspect. In fact, it has kicked off a major conceptual revision of authenticity that has influenced heritage conservation policies the world over. My goal in this essay is to trace this development and to determine how much of it is due to substantive programmatic shifts, as opposed to the conceptual fuzziness and improvisation that characterise much of what happens in the World Heritage arena. My research in that arena since

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1 WHC-98/CONF.203/18, 128. Here and in the following, I cite UNESCO documents with their permanent identification code. These documents are all online and easily located when web-searching for that code, whereas their specific URLs may change over time.
2 Brumann 2016, 309–314.

2009 is based on an ethnographic approach which combines participant observation of World Heritage meetings, interviews with key players, and a study of the written and audio-visual record, an approach which, in a play on George Marcus,[3] I have termed "multilateral ethnography."[4]

The emergence and institutional framework of the World Heritage Convention

The World Heritage Convention was dreamed up in the 1960s, when economic growth and high modernity came to threaten the world's cultural and natural wonders and UNESCO orchestrated a number of safeguarding campaigns, most famously for the Nubian monuments at Abu Simbel.[5] This helped to establish the idea of a global right to, and also responsibility for, humanity's most important heritage, paralleling other attempts in international law to install "mankind" in its entirety as a rights-holder.[6] Since 1978, the World Heritage List has been progressively filled.

To have a site listed as World Heritage, a treaty state has to submit a nomination file to the secretariat of the convention, the World Heritage Centre, at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris. This unit then forwards the file to the advisory body in charge, the International Council for Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) for cultural sites, or the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for natural sites, both of which are international NGOs. Through an evaluation based on expert opinions and an inspection of the site, ICOMOS and IUCN give their recommendation on whether, for meeting at least one of six cultural and four natural criteria, the candidate has the "outstanding universal value" or "OUV" stipulated by the convention for entry into the World Heritage List. The final decision, however, is taken by the World Heritage Committee, a body composed of 21 treaty states elected by the biannual General Assembly of all signatories for four-year terms. In its annual 11-day session in changing locations, this Committee also decides on all other matters concerning the convention, such as conservation issues of the already listed sites, the use of the (rather limited) World Heritage Fund, and general policies. World Heritage is largely a title, and the nominating nation state itself remains in charge of protecting the site, with little that the Committee can impose against its will. The symbolic weight of inclusion in the list, however, is significant enough to attract a huge global interest and a corresponding amount of political pressure and lobbying. Since 2010 in particular, the Committee and its nation-state representatives have asserted their independence against the

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3   Marcus 1995.
4   Brumann 2012.
5   Allais 2013; Betts 2015.
6   Wolfrum 2009; Rehling and Löhr 2014.

expert bodies, frequently overruling their recommendations in pursuit of more World Heritage listings and less stringent conservation demands.[7]

The World Heritage Convention deals only with sites, that is, clearly delimited tracts of land or sea and what is found on them; movable artefacts are excluded, and practices, performances, and skills are treated by the separate UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage of 2003.[8] With sites, one could argue that there can be no copying in the strict sense, as even a perfect replica of what is on a given site cannot be in exactly the same place. A copy of the town of Hallstatt—part of a World Heritage cultural landscape—has been built in Guangdong Province, China[9], but as it does not occupy the original location in Austria, there is no confusing it with the original. Yet when parts or the entirety of a lost building are reconstructed on the site proper with the ambition to create something similar to the original building, we have the quest for identity that defines the copy, "a thing made to be similar or identical to another."[10] And just as with reconstruction, piecemeal restoration over the centuries too will raise the question whether the contemporary structure still *is* the original and not something else, not strictly a copy perhaps but a dubious hybrid whose relationship to the original is no more certain than that of Theseus's ship famously described by Plutarch.[11] Originals, copies, restorations, and reconstructions all inhabit the same conceptual field of authenticity, physical identity, and physical continuity over time and it is this connected semantic domain—larger than just "copies" but inseparable from them—that I will explore in the following. I do so on the understanding that, beginning with the way atoms are structured, perfect physical continuity over time is impossible to achieve for any empirical entity. So not only are two things out in the world never completely alike, accepting the identity of a thing with its own earlier forms, too, requires a leap of faith that benignly ignores the differences, however minute and imperceptible they may be. "Originals," "copies," and how these are valued, therefore, are not givens but products of symbolic construction, and the societal standards for such construction change over time, as my case study vividly illustrates.

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7   Brumann 2011 and 2014b; Meskell 2014.
8   Smith and Akagawa 2009; Bortolotto 2010 and 2011b; Hafstein 2009.
9   Tatlow 2012.
10 *Oxford Living Dictionaries*, s.v. "copy."
11 "The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same" (classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.html).

Authenticity prior to 1994

The text of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, as adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 1972, does not mention copies or authenticity in its substantive part,[12] but the first Operational Guidelines adopted in 1978—the "code of law" of the convention that, in contrast to the convention text itself, is regularly updated—already stipulated that "the property should meet the test of authenticity in design, materials, workmanship and setting."[13] They further stated that "authenticity does not limit consideration to original form and structure but includes all subsequent modifications and additions over the course of time, which in themselves possess artistic or historical values [sic]."[14] This formulation clearly breathes the spirit of the Venice Charter of 1964,[15] the foundational document of modern conservation adopted by an international conference of conservationists that also decided the founding of ICOMOS. When discussing restoration and archaeological excavations (articles 9 to 15), the Charter emphasizes the conservation of original materials, including any layers superimposed onto the building by later historical periods. For archaeological sites, it prohibits reconstruction entirely except by anastylosis,[16] and for everything else, it allows it only in exceptional circumstances and when based on solid historical documentation and clearly distinguished from original materials. As Jones and Yarrow formulate it in a recent article, historic buildings are preserved here as "documents embodying evidence" rather than as aesthetic entities.[17]

I think we are so used to this ideal of minimum intervention as the mainstream of modern conservation, having it seen it implemented in countless monuments, that we tend to forget how new it actually is. When, at the end of the eighteenth century, an interest in the preservation of historic—mainly Medieval—buildings arose in Western Europe, this was often realised through what came to be called "restoration," that is the realisation of the presumed intention of the original builders, both by completing unfinished parts and by removing post-Medieval additions. As one

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12 Curiously, it speaks of copies, authenticity, and truth in a technical postscript to the 38 articles: "Done in Paris, this twenty-third day of November 1972, in two authentic copies bearing the signature of the President of the seventeenth session of the General Conference and of the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all the States referred to in Articles 31 and 32 as well as to the United Nations" (emphases added).
13 Accessed February 16, 2017. whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide78.pdf, 4.
14 Accessed February 16, 2017. whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide78.pdf, 4.
15 Accessed February 16, 2017. www.icomos.org/charters/venice_e.pdf.
16 "Only anastylosis, that is to say, the reassembling of existing but dismembered parts can be permitted. The material used for integration should always be recognizable and its use should be the least that will ensure the conservation of a monument and the reinstatement of its form" (Article 15).
17 Jones and Yarrow 2013, 11.

of the leading figures, Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, put it in a widely-cited phrase, "restaurer un édifice, ce n'est pas l'entretenir, le réparer ou le refaire, c'est le rétablir dans un état complet qui peut n'avoir jamais existé à un moment donné (to restore an edifice is not to maintain it, repair or rebuild it, but to re-establish it in a complete state that may never have existed at a particular moment)."[18] He put this into practice in the reconstruction and completion of Notre Dame in Paris and the cathedral and fortification wall of Carcassonne in southern France. Opposition arose around the mid-nineteenth century, led by figures such as William Morris and John Ruskin. No less widely cited, Ruskin claimed that "it is [...] no question of expediency or feeling whether we shall preserve the buildings of past times or not. We have no right whatever to touch them. They are not ours. They belong partly to those who built them, and partly to all the generations of mankind who are to follow us."[19]

The principal question of what to preserve—the original vision and visual appearance or the original material—has remained a burning one in conservation practice. In the detailed day-to-day decisions that conservation and planning practice constantly require, it often aligns itself with professional sensibilities, such as those of curators who go for original materials, as opposed to architects and urban planners, who often side with visual integrity.[20] Yet on a theoretical level, the emphasis on original materials became mainstream and was enshrined in the Venice Charter, finding its way from there into the World Heritage Operational Guidelines. Partly, this was because of personal continuity, as one of the drafters of the Venice Charter, the Belgian Raymond Lemaire, also chaired the expert meeting that drafted the first Operational Guidelines. He insisted on using the term "authenticity," rather than the more open "integrity" that was also discussed, as some experts feared that this would legitimise nineteenth-century stylistic restoration.[21]

Almost immediately upon starting the World Heritage List in 1978, however, the World Heritage Committee betrayed these purist principles. When the Historic Centre of Warsaw was nominated, the Committee hesitated at first because of the lack of authenticity of what was, in more than 85 percent of that case, a post-war reconstruction of what the Nazis had deliberately laid to ashes.[22] An ICOMOS expert, however, suggested the possibility that "a systematic 20th Century reconstruction [can] be justified for inclusion on grounds, not of Art but of History,"[23] and, swayed

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18 Viollet-le-Duc 1875, 14. It is here where I see some of the transformative ambition that anthropologists have seen at the root of much mimetic action in ritual and other contexts: through imitating something, one actually brings it into being (see chapter Ladwig). Anachronistic though it is, the term "remastering" (see chapter Mersmann) also suggests itself for the restoration approach.
19 Ruskin (1849) 1920, 206.
20 Jones and Yarrow 2013; Brumann 2007, 229–232.
21 Gfeller, forthcoming.
22 CC-79/CONF.005/6, Annex II, 5.
23 CC-79/CONF.003/11, Annex.

by the symbolic weight of this reconstruction, the Committee eventually inscribed Warsaw on the World Heritage List in 1980.[24] The Bureau, a sub-body of the Committee, however, hastened to emphasize that "there can be no question of inscribing in the future other cultural properties that have been reconstructed."[25] And indeed, the nomination of Viollet-le-Duc's pet project of Carcassonne in 1985,[26] and that of the Baroque ensemble in Dresden of 1990,[27] were rejected as the reconstructed parts were found to lack authenticity. But Speyer Cathedral was inscribed in 1981, despite extensive neo-Romanesque restoration in the nineteenth century; on the contrary, its influence on the evolution of the principles of restoration was expressly acknowledged.[28] For Rila Monastery in Bulgaria, in 1983, the Committee overruled ICOMOS's advice against listing,[29] recognising this nineteen to twentieth-century reconstruction as a symbol of the Bulgarian Renaissance and its quest for an unbroken link with the Slavic past.[30] The church of St. Michael in Hildesheim, destroyed to a considerable extent in the Second World War, was rejected in 1982,[31] but then inscribed in 1985, now as a joint property with St. Mary's Church in the same city.[32] The ICOMOS evaluation only notes, without going into detail, that ICOMOS changed its mind and was in full support of the inscription,[33] but it can be surmised that reconstruction was censured at first but tolerated the second time around. In 1988, the Committee inscribed the Medieval City of Rhodes,[34] despite ICOMOS's dismissal of its early-twentieth-century reconstruction as "pseudo-medieval monuments" and "grandiose pastiches […] devoid of archaeological rigor" that could only find some consolation in the fact that the plans to rebuild the Colossus of Rhodes had been abandoned.[35] It should be noted that all these exceptions to the Venice Charter's rigour were made for European sites.

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24 CC-80/CONF.016/10, 4.
25 CC-80/CONF.017/4, 4.
26 SC-85/CONF.007/9, 11.
27 CC-90/CONF.003/12, 13.
28 CC-81/CONF/003/6, 4. Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/168.pdf.
29 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/216.pdf, 2.
30 SC/83/CONF.009/8, 6.
31 CLT -82/CONF .014/6, 6.
32 SC-85/CONF.008/9, 8.
33 Cf. Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/187bis.pdf, 2.
34 SC-88/CONF.001/13, 17.
35 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/493.pdf, 3.

The Nara Document

A full conceptual debate only arose with one of the first Japanese World Heritage nominations in 1993—the Hôryûji, near Nara. This temple complex contains the allegedly oldest wooden buildings on earth, dating from the seventh and eighth century, but was extensively restored in the thirteenth, seventeenth, and twentieth centuries. As is possible with traditional wooden buildings in Japan, they were partly or wholly dismantled and then reassembled, allowing the replacement of much damaged material,[36] which led some European experts to question their authenticity. A fundamental reconsideration of that notion thus seemed called for, and Japan offered to host an international workshop in Nara, in 1994. This workshop resulted in the "Nara Document on Authenticity,"[37] widely cited and praised today as the most significant conceptual contribution to this issue by the World Heritage institutions.

Whether the Nara Document provides clear guidance is debatable. §13 of the document states that authenticity can manifest itself in "form and design, materials and substance, use and function, traditions and techniques, location and setting, and spirit and feeling, and other internal and external factors." This list adds quite a number of aspects, including rather ephemeral ones, to the "design, material, workmanship, and setting" formulation of the original Operational Guidelines. Further, §11 claims that "it is [...] not possible to base judgements of values and authenticity within fixed criteria. On the contrary, the respect due to all cultures requires that heritage properties must be considered and judged within the cultural contexts to which they belong." How such cultural relativism can be reconciled with the "outstanding universal value" demanded by the convention is an obvious question. It appears to me that, rather than pinning down what authenticity is, the formulations of the Nara Document broadened the range of what it might be taken to mean.

The main actors behind this development were not the imagined beneficiaries, that is representatives of non-European countries with wooden or earthen architecture, but rather representatives of what, borrowing from Immanuel Wallerstein,[38] could be called the "semi-periphery" of the "world system" of heritage conservation. 19 out of 23 conservationists who drafted the Venice Charter in 1964 were European and 16 of these were Western European. Thirty years later, however, the main contributors included the Japanese, of course, but also several Norwegian experts who likewise had wooden buildings on the World Heritage List and knew Japanese conservation techniques from extended visits. The Canadian General Secretary of ICOMOS, Herb Stovel, who was perhaps the single

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36 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/660.pdf, 3–4.
37 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/document/9379.
38 Wallerstein 1974.

most important driver, and Australian participants also played considerable roles. The abovementioned Belgian Raymond Lemaire drafted the document together with Stovel but later claimed to have condoned what he did not fully support; other than him, no one from Western European countries, with their time-honoured conservation systems predicated on stone architecture, was centrally involved.[39]

A Japanese participant told me how the European and American participants at the Nara Conference appeared to her as longing for something different—redemption from Venice Charter constraints, so to speak—and were almost disappointed to learn through her presentation that Japanese conservation practices are not so different after all. I am sure that expectations were influenced by the *shikinen sengû*, the ritual renewal of the most important Shinto shrine in Ise every twenty years, on one of two alternating plots of land; the previous buildings are dismantled in the process. This case is a staple when, in books on conservation, alternative philosophies to those of mainstream European conservation are introduced. Almost invariably, the practice is exaggerated then, for example by ascribing it to Japanese shrines and temples in general when, in actual fact, it applies to less than a dozen Shinto shrines. The conservation of the Hôryûji, by contrast, differs from Venice Charter ideals only in degree, not in kind, as material replacement is kept to the necessary minimum and copying damaged wooden components does not even allow conjecture, given the modular construction and sophisticated joinery of traditional Japanese architecture that requires a replacement piece to fit perfectly. Whatever differences from the conservation practices of European cathedrals may arise here are almost entirely due to the building material, not to fundamentally different conceptions of authenticity and continuity. Accordingly, the Japanese convenors of the workshop would have been happy with minor modifications of the Operational Guidelines, as my informant said, and it was others who urged for a more comprehensive overhaul.

They stopped short of abolishing authenticity altogether, however; Gfeller emphasises how, thereby, they also guaranteed expert control over its application within the World Heritage framework.[40] A comparative look at the other well-known UNESCO convention on intangible cultural heritage adopted in 2003 seems to prove her right: there, at the insistence of the involved experts, authenticity was banned both from the convention text and the Operational Directives as not applicable to living heritage and the incremental changes such intangible heritage undergoes in every performative, ritual, or practical iteration. I still think, though, that while

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39 Gfeller, forthcoming. Gfeller points to the fact, however, that a need for widening authenticity conceptions had already been acknowledged by ICOMOS representatives from these countries, and indeed, the abovementioned French ICOMOS expert who advised the World Heritage Committee on how to deal with the Warsaw nomination in 1980 had referred to Japanese temples and the possible rehabilitation of nineteenth-century restorations back then.

40 Gfeller, forthcoming.

retaining the concept, the adoption of the Nara Document has opened the door for all kinds of yardsticks, and whether these are innovative or simply interest-driven is often a matter of perspective.

Pre-Nara holdouts

The Nara Document has certainly been widely and favourably received throughout the world. I recall a conversation with the chief conservationist of a German federal state—art historian by training, in one of the heartlands of institutional conservation—who nonetheless told me that, to her, it is a valuable text that helps her in her day-to-day work. Within the World Heritage Committee arena, however, the Nara Document was not immediately adopted. The ICOMOS General Assembly approved it in 1999;[41] later that year, the Committee decided to include it in the revision of the Operational Guidelines where,[42] however, it only appeared in the 2005 version,[43] a full 11 years after Nara.[44] In the Operational Guidelines, the formulations based on the Nara Document (§81–83 in the 2013 version) continue to be immediately tempered by the admonition that "in relation to authenticity, the reconstruction of archaeological remains or historic buildings or districts is justifiable only in exceptional circumstances. Reconstruction is acceptable only on the basis of complete and detailed documentation and to no extent on conjecture" (§86 in the 2013 version).[45] This means that a Venice Charter logic still applies, whatever the Guidelines say about authenticity residing in spirit and feeling.

Venice Charter thinking is also undeniably present when ICOMOS and/or the World Heritage Committee admonish recent or ongoing non-standard reconstructions and "over-restoration" in World Heritage properties, as they have done over the past twenty years for the historic centres of Quito,[46] Istanbul,[47] Zabid (Yemen),[48] Bukhara, and Samarkand (Uzbekistan),[49] the Tabriz Bazaar complex (Iran),[50] churches in Mtskheta (Georgia)[51] and Manila,[52] mosques in the old cities of Cairo[53] and Damascus,[54] the

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41 WHC-99/CONF.209/22, 39.
42 WHC-99/CONF.209/22, 45.
43 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide05-en.pdf.
44 For more detail on this process, see Cameron 2008, 21−22.
45 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf, 22.
46 WHC-08/32.COM/24, 138−139.
47 WHC-94/CONF.003/16, 40, WHC-06/30.COM/INF.19, 131.
48 WHC-96/CONF.201/4, 20, WHC-97/CONF.208/4B, 27.
49 WHC-97/CONF.208/4B, 26.
50 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/1346.pdf, 5.
51 WHC-07/31.COM/24, 112, WHC-09/33.COM/20, 139.
52 WHC-98/CONF.203/5, 61−62.
53 WHC-95/CONF.203/16, 25.
54 WHC-97/CONF.204/11, 36.

palaces of Beijing[55] and Lhasa,[56] Bahla Fort (Oman),[57] the reconstruction of archaeological remains in Abu Mena (Egypt),[58] the Negev desert cities on the Incense Route (Israel),[59] the At-Turaif District in ad-Dir'iyah (Saudi Arabia),[60] Samarra (Iraq),[61] Al Zubarah (Qatar),[62] Hampi (India),[63] and Lumbini (Nepal).[64]

One of the more spectacular recent cases was the monumental reconstruction of the half-ruined Bagrati Cathedral in Kutaisi, Georgia. The Committee placed the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2010 when the plans were announced but work was completed in 2012 nonetheless;[65] according to the World Heritage Committee, "the Bagrati Cathedral has been altered to such an extent that its authenticity has been irreversibly compromised." Contrary to ICOMOS's advice, remaining original stone blocks were not re-used, and new building parts of reinforced concrete were implanted in an irreversible manner into the historic fabric. Therefore, Georgia is now being urged to remove the cathedral from the World Heritage List.[66] (This is, incidentally, a serial property, with the unproblematic Gelati Monastery as the other component.) One cannot help noting that almost all of the above-mentioned cases are non-European. One also cannot help noting that the reconstructions of the Bagrati Cathedral or those in Lumbini, Buddha Siddharta Gotama's birthplace, have contributed to the appeal of these sites as pilgrimage destinations so that a Nara Document logic might see the authentic *usage* as being augmented rather than diminished.

The rehabilitation of Romantic restorations

In comparison, ICOMOS and the World Heritage Committee have been significantly more tolerant of reconstructions predating the World Heritage inscription of the given site, particularly those inspired by nineteenth-century Romanticism. Sometimes, the issue is simply circumvented, such as in ICOMOS's evaluation of the Mehmed Paša Sokolović Bridge in Višegrad, Bosnia and Herzegovina, inscribed in 2007. The text mentions significant reconstructions with non-authentic materials and in non-authentic forms after both world wars but, in a confusing turn, concludes that "the

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55 WHC-06/30.COM/19, 101.
56 WHC-96/CONF.201/21, 39, WHC-03/27.COM/INF.24, 80.
57 WHC-95/CONF.203/16, 23–24, WHC-96/CONF.201/21, 23–24, WHC-2000/
    CONF.202/17, 14.
58 WHC-13/37.COM/20, 33.
59 WHC-04/28.COM/26, 219.
60 WHC-10/34.COM/INF.20, 585.
61 WHC-11/35.COM.INF.20, 60.
62 WHC-13/37.COM/20, 181.
63 WHC-99/CONF.208/8, 36.
64 WHC-04/28.COM/26, 264, WHC-05/29.COM/22, 79.
65 WHC-10/34.COM/20, 143–146.
66 WHC-13/37.COM/20, 44.

authenticity seems excellent" and that "the visible alterations to form and material are secondary, and can be put right by appropriate restorations."[67] For the German limes that was added to Hadrian's Wall in England in 2005, thereby producing the serial property "Frontiers of the Roman Empire," the ICOMOS evaluation bemoaned that "in many cases [...] the authenticity has been compromised by unacceptable reconstructions." Yet as an inventive solution, these reconstructions were excluded from the World Heritage property and declared its buffer zone,[68] in line with the common practice to designate such a zone around a site. Here, however, the buffer zone sits on top of the site, that is the original wall sections under the ground.

In a number of further cases, including the historical churches of Mtskheta (1994),[69] Wartburg Castle (1999),[70] the castles and fortifications of Bellinzona (2000),[71] Tiwanaku in Bolivia (2000),[72] the upper middle Rhine valley with its many medieval castles restored in the nineteenth century (2002),[73] and Kuressaare Fortress in Estonia (2004),[74] the ICOMOS evaluations of the candidates simply downplayed reconstruction as "typical of the time," "religiously motivated," and "not of recent date," or by focusing on the entire landscape rather than single buildings (in the case of the Rhine valley). Dresden was brought back as a cultural landscape, too, so that ICOMOS could now argue that "while recognising the unfortunate losses in the historic city centre during the Second World War, the Dresden Elbe Valley, defined as a continuing cultural landscape, has retained the overall historical authenticity and integrity in its distinctive character and components."[75] This led to its inscription in 2004, for what became a mere five years of World Heritage glory.[76] There is even a World Heritage property that continues to be under construction today: in 2004, the famous Sagrada Familia, Antoni Gaudí's cathedral in Barcelona, was added to a collection of works by the Catalan architect that together form a single serial World Heritage property. The ICOMOS evaluation notes the authenticity of the parts of the church completed by Gaudí and says that the ongoing construction follows his plans on the basis of "scientifically elaborated guidelines,"[77] finding no

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67 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/1260.pdf, 115.
68 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/430ter.pdf, 165, 167.
69 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/708.pdf, 16.
70 WHC-99/CONF.204/INF.7, 68.
71 WHC-2000/CONF.204/INF.6, 150−151.
72 WHC-2000/CONF.204/21, 41.
73 WHC-02/CONF.201/INF.2, 44−45.
74 WHC-04/28.COM/26, 217.
75 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/1156.pdf, 88.
76 In 2009, the Dresden Elbe Valley was removed from the list due to the construction of a new bridge not approved by World Heritage authorities.
77 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/320bis.pdf, 172.

reason for concern. One cannot help noting that this roster of tolerated reconstruction—or even tolerated construction—is a rather European one.

With this downplaying of Venice Charter authenticity come inscriptions—all of them European too—where the Romantic restorations have been explicitly valued as testimonies of an important stage in the history of heritage conservation, thus adding to authenticity rather than diminishing it, such as with the Luther memorials in Wittenberg and Eisleben (1996),[78] the castle of the Teutonic Order in Malbork (Marienburg), Poland (1996),[79] and the historic centre of San Marino (2008).[80] When Carcassonne was resubmitted in 1997, Viollet-le-Duc's restorations were valued as a landmark in conservation history, thus resulting in its inscription.[81] It is striking that the true discursive impact of the Nara Document has been with the Romantic restorations, since in the cases of Carcassonne,[82] Malbork Castle,[83] and San Marino,[84] ICOMOS evaluations and delegates' comments referred to the text in order to justify inscription. And in the acceptance speech for Malbork Castle, the Polish delegation expressed satisfaction that "notre fondamentalisme ouest-européen [...] qui nous a amenés à la définition de la notion d'authenticité, limitée exclusivement à la substance matérielle; une idée que nous avons voulu octroyer aux autres régions culturelles du monde (our West European fundamentalism [...] that has brought us to the definition of authenticity limited exclusively to the material substance; an idea that we have wanted to impose on the other cultural regions of the world)" was now put to rest.[85] Making reference to the Nara Document for the timber and earthen structures for which it was originally designed, by contrast, is much rarer in the World Heritage records, even though authenticity-related objections to such candidates are no longer raised and one finds argumentations that clearly breathe a Nara spirit. For example, when recommending inscription of the Tombs of Buganda's Kings at Kasubi, Uganda, in 2001, ICOMOS argued that "buildings such as these are maintained over time and their authenticity lies more in the reflection of traditional material and practices that in the age of their component parts."[86]

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78 WHC-96/CONF.201/21, 66.
79 WHC-97/CONF.208/17, 47.
80 WHC-08/32.COM/24, 178.
81 WHC-97/CONF.208/17, 42.
82 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/345.pdf, 28.
83 WHC-96/CONF.201/21, Annex VI.2.
84 WHC-08/32.COM/INF.8B1, 187.
85 WHC-96/CONF.201/21, Annex VI.2.
86 WHC-10/34.COM/INF.20, 260.

Political reconstructions

Warsaw as a case of what, in memory of Pete Seeger, one could call the "We Shall Overcome" type of reconstruction, also did not remain alone. In 2003, the Committee inscribed the Bamiyan Valley on the World Heritage List, two years after the Taliban had blasted the two great stone Buddhas. Bamiyan was a major mishap of the World Heritage machinery: nominated by Afghanistan in 1983, the candidate had not been accepted because of minor technical issues and never been followed up on; so that when the Taliban announced their plan of destruction, there was not even the symbolic weight of a World Heritage title to give them pause.[87] With the Buddhas gone in 2001, the ICOMOS evaluation stressed the authenticity of the remaining parts of the valley as a cultural landscape and pre-emptively expressed its support of a possible reconstruction of the statues from the fragments by anastylosis, obviously not seeing this as a threat to the overall authenticity of the site.[88] So far—and not least because of the security situation—little actual progress has been made, but some form of reconstruction continues to be envisioned (for more detail, see Mersmann's contribution to this volume).

In 2005, as the most intensely debated reconstruction so far, the Old Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar in Bosnia was inscribed on the World Heritage List. The iconic bridge collapsed in 1993, after being deliberately shelled in the Balkan War, and was reconstructed with the support of UNESCO and the World Bank in 2001–2004. The Old Town was first nominated in 1999, that is before reconstruction, and with the bridge being only a symbolic presence in the proposed name of the property, "The Old Mostar: A Bridge of the Worlds."[89] Due to the lack of a management plan, uncontrolled building activity in and near the old town, unclear nomination criteria, and the need to await completion of the bridge, the decision was postponed three times in 1999, 2000, and 2003,[90] although ICOMOS had recommended inscription from the outset.[91] When the Committee debated for several hours over the proposed inscription of a reduced section of the Old City in 2005, some delegates complained that the ICOMOS evaluation had concentrated only on the bridge and its reconstruction. The delegate of Saint Lucia poignantly reminded everyone "that it was not only the Bridge and certainly not the International Community that were being inscribed, but the old town of Mostar."[92] Other delegates were more welcoming, however, pointing in unspecific ways to the Nara Document or

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87 WHC-01/CONF.208/24, 4–7.
88 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/208rev.pdf, 3.
89 WHC-99/CONF.204/15, 46.
90 WHC-99/CONF.208/8, 70-71, WHC-2000/CONF.202/17, 47, WHC-2000/CONF.204/21, 51, WHC-03/27.COM/24, 116.
91 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1999/whc-99-conf209-inf7e.pdf, 141.
92 WHC-05/29.COM/INF.22, 185.

playing with the symbolism of the structure by citing a poem about bridges or evoking the bridge between religious communities that had now been rebuilt.[93] The final decision was a compromise between Venice and Nara: the buildings as such, which are all of 2000s vintage, were denied World Heritage honours in that none of the respective criteria were declared to be present. Also, the special features of the original architecture and the quality of the reconstruction—which some delegates called into question— were not mentioned in the official justification for OUV, as originally pro- posed, but only in a separate part of the decision text.[94] Instead, inscription came to rest solely on criterion vi, which emphasises the symbolic value of a site and is usually reserved for combined use with other criteria.[95] The short justification text for inscription transforms the reconstruction into the very basis of OUV, arguing that it strengthened the Old City's value as a symbol of peaceful multi-ethnic and multi-religious co-existence over the centuries and associating it—in a somewhat nebulous phrase—with international peace and cooperation.[96] Clearly, the mimetic act of recon- struction is ascribed considerable transformative force here (see Ladwig's contribution), aiming for the "healing, reconciling effect" that Mersmann (also in this volume) sees as the hope behind comparable reconstruction plans for the victims of iconoclasm.

Conclusion

The application of authenticity requirements within the World Heritage system—whether meant in its Venice Charter or Nara Document incarna- tion—has been uneven, to say the least. By 1998, an Australian delegate to the Committee proposed formulating separate yardsticks for authen- ticity for each of the six cultural criteria,[97] but this was never put into prac- tice. In 2005, it was decided to separate authenticity and integrity, which heretofore had been treated jointly for cultural properties. (For natural World Heritage properties, only integrity is considered.) In the nomina- tion manual, integrity is defined as the completeness and intactness of the property, whereas authenticity is defined as the ability of the property to convey truthfully and genuinely the OUV for which it is inscribed.[98] This conceptual clarification was motivated by the insight that these two aspects

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93   WHC-05/29.COM/INF.22, 183–187.
94   Cf. WHC-05/29.COM/22, 141.
95   WHC-05/29.COM/22, 140.
96   "With the "renaissance" of the Old Bridge and its surroundings, the symbolic power and meaning of the City of Mostar—as an exceptional and universal symbol of coexistence of communities from diverse cultural, ethnic and reli- gious backgrounds—has been reinforced and strengthened, underlining the unlimited efforts of human solidarity for peace and powerful co-operation in the face of overwhelming catastrophes" (WHC-05/29.COM/22, 141).
97   WHC-98/CONF.201/9, 20–21.
98   UNESCO 2011, 61–67.

may not necessarily coincide: Viollet-le-Duc's restoration of the half-ruined fortification walls of Carcassonne, for instance, increased its integrity but decreased its authenticity as a Medieval fortress. Not too much has been made of this new conceptual pair so far, despite its potential for reappraising reconstructions and copies.[99]

There is a tendency to stylise the Nara Document on Authenticity into a major achievement of the World Heritage institutions, a supersession of the restrictive Venice Charter framework for something less Eurocentric and more universally applicable and meaningful. I do not want to deny that it has been perceived as a liberating move in conservation regimes the world over and that the willingness to consider alternative standards of authenticity has increased. When looking at what the World Heritage institutions themselves have made of it, however, there is little consistency, and it rather seems that now, in terms of restoration, reconstruction, and copying, anything goes. Committee decisions and admonitions and ICO-MOS evaluations run the gamut from unflinching Venice Charter purism to an extreme liberalism, with or without reference to the Nara Document. From my ethnographic observation of the Committee sessions, this is not surprising. Principal questions are rarely addressed, and whatever general policies arise do so only through the concrete discussion of individual sites. This discussion is always hurried due to severe time constraints, delegates often lack specialised knowledge and preparation, and many of them are ordinary career diplomats with no more than lay perceptions of heritage issues. There is also little institutional memory in place, so that even obvious precedent cases fail to be brought up. Most importantly, however, there is the lobbying and deal-making among Committee delegates whose main objective is to bring home more World Heritage inscriptions, usually by backing each other's bids on a quid-pro-quo basis. When such support has been secured in the run-up to the decision, rather weak and improvised arguments often suffice to organise majorities.[100] This is why I think the potential of the Nara Document for justifying reconstructions and stylistic restorations has not been fully exploited: there is no real need to do so, as less demanding strategies often suffice.

Yet within the ICOMOS evaluations, there is also little consistency and I suspect that here as well, the final recommendations are influenced by lobbying and non-substantive considerations. I find confirmation here in the geographical grading of authenticity judgments where the abovementioned examples suggest that European violations of Venice Charter purism have been more benignly treated than the non-European ones. This

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99 Authenticity becomes even murkier when it is applied to the category of cultural landscapes added in 1992, given that, due to the interaction between humans and nature that is emphasized here, the incremental change of the physical features is expected. As there is usually no copying or reconstruction in the narrow sense, however, I do not treat cultural landscapes in this paper.

100 Brumann 2014b.

diagnosis squares with ICOMOS being an organisation where, to this day, the presence and influence of Europeans is significant.[101]

Anthropologists in particular have enthusiastically engaged in deconstructing popular notions of authenticity, usually pointing out the political, commercial, or other interests behind what they see, in essence, as an arbitrary claim,[102] often connecting it with elite interests and an expert point of view. As I have argued elsewhere,[103] however, authenticity is also very much a popular and lay concern; Bortolotto vividly describes how it can creep in through the back door, even in an environment from which it has been officially ousted, such as among the nominations to the lists of the 2003 UNESCO convention on intangible cultural heritage.[104] But this is also because authenticity is a polysemic term with which people associate many different things, starting with authentic experiences or personalities. When one scrutinises what the World Heritage institutions really look for, it is in fact *continuity* over time, be it continuity of material, form, usage, or some other aspect mentioned in the Venice Charter or the Nara Document. But this is never so clearly stated, and authenticity (as a term) stays in place. It would be conceivable to specify requirements for each of these different continuities, and how to weigh deficiencies in some of them against the merits of others. If not that, it would at least be conceivable to *define* authenticity. Yet even the latest version of the World Heritage Operational Guidelines, in the 16 paragraphs it dedicates to authenticity and integrity,[105] has still not gotten around to saying what the word actually means. This conceptual void forces actors within the World Heritage arena to rely on their intuitions and gut feelings, and when a long and emotional debate about the bridge of Mostar, a symbol of peaceful multi-ethnic co-existence, rebuilt by the collective efforts of the international community, culminates in its World Heritage coronation, I suppose—and delegates confirm—that it is almost impossible not to have very *authentic* feelings, however discontinuous with the past the rebuilt bridge may actually be.

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101 Brumann 2017.
102 E.g. Bruner 1994; Gable and Handler 1996; Handler and Linnekin 1984.
103 Brumann 2014a, 80–81.
104 Bortolotto 2011a.
105 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf, 21–24.

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Michael Falser

Colonial Appropriation, Physical Substitution, and the Metonymics of Translation: Plaster Casts of Angkor Wat for Museum Collections in Paris and Berlin

Abstract   Tales of stolen cultural objects and their restitution regularly generate nationalistic and polemic headlines in newspapers worldwide. However, there is a related practice of colonial appropriation that is slowly becoming the focus of art historical research—the technique of plaster casting. This paper conceptualizes the precise moment around 1900 when French colonial projects in Paris and German initiatives in Berlin commissioned plaster casts of the Cambodian temple of Angkor Wat for display in national museums. This mammoth act of architectural translation included exact copies of the temple's bas-reliefs as well as entire hybrid building pastiches. Forgotten for decades, these plaster casts are now being rediscovered as the unique transcultural products of a colonial enterprise.

From translation to transculturality within the transfer of architecture

1. In *The Metonymics of Translating Marginalized Texts*, Maria Tymoczko asks how a translator can make non-canonical or marginalized literature understood by his or her audience.[1] She judges that "metonymic aspects" (the recognition of the whole by reading its associative parts) are essential in assimilating new literal formats or variations. The translator has to "either make some decisive choices about which aspects to translate—that is, do a partial translation of the literary information in the text—or seek a format that allows dense information transfer through a variety of commentaries on the translation." Following norms and aims, his work would result either in "popular or scholarly translations," where

> the former are usually severely limited in their transfer intent and minimally representative of the metonymic aspects of the original, while the latter allow a good deal of metatranslation to proceed, presenting quantities of information through vehicles such as introductions, footnotes, appendices, parallel texts, and so forth. In a scholarly translation the text is embedded in a shell of paratextual devices that serve to explain the metonymies of the source text, providing a set of contexts for the translation. In the case of a popular translation, by contrast, the translator typically focuses on a few aspects of the literary text which are brought to a broad segment of the target audience.[2]

Tymoczko's "popular or scholarly translations" mirrors what Walter Benjamin had defined earlier as "free or literal" translations—both depended on the translator's choice of the unit of translation.[3]

2. Translation, however, does not only lead to new translation products, but has *concrete consequences for the original text* itself: the translation "canonizes the foreign text, validates its fame by enabling its survival," in fact "creates it [and] reconstitutes it" and "freezes it, shows its mobility and its instability."[4] The source text and its translation form a dynamic and mutual relationship, in which popular/scholarly or free/literal translations each reconfigure the original differently. The *translational turn* addresses the shift from a linguistic approach to translation toward

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1 This paper is the result of a presentation during the CIHA Conference in Nuremberg, Germany, in 2012 and a slightly reworked version from the CIHA conference proceedings of 2013.
2 Tymoczko 1995, 11–24, 18.
3 See Benjamin's 1923 differentiation in *Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers* between *Treue* (fidelity), *Wörtlichkeit* (literalness), and *Freiheit* (freedom), for an "ideal echo of the original," an "interlinear version" (Benjamin 2012).
4 Venuti 1992, introduction 7, 9–11.

a broader context that describes different power relations in cultural contact situations and processes of exchange and transfer between cultures. Both individual translators and whole institutional complexes alike become agents of a larger practice of knowledge production. Thus, source texts and their translations are placed in a *transcultural framework* to constitute each other that might comprise the whole cultural complex or sections of culture within a larger translational flow, including social culture (institutions like museums), mental culture (cultural stereotypes), and *material culture* (artefacts, architecture).

3. European colonialism as an "uneven power relation" is a specific "politico-cultural translation history,"[5] in which the exchange and transfer between and of cultures, as well as the conditions and aims of knowledge production, are inscribed in coercive "translation memes" that follow imposed norms and values.[6] In our case, a European hegemonic "translation privilege" not only stereotyped Asian sources as primitive, exotic, and the "Other" (Orient),[7] but also influenced the self-representation of the Own and the Self (Occident) within a dynamic "process of strangeness and familiarization."[8] Using *power* as the key term in the colonial context implies the assertion of an asymmetry in translational flows of knowledge accumulation and partial representation modes of the colonized source text. The dominant authority or regime controls the translation process, which is "not simply an act of faithful reproduction, but, rather, a deliberate and conscious act of selection, assemblage, structuration, and fabrication—and even, in some cases, of falsification, refusal of information, [and] counterfeiting,"[9] namely, a manipulation of the parts being translated as "orientalised" texts to conform to the norms, values, and expectations of the occidental target culture. In contrast to this postcolonial critique of cultural appropriation, the analysis of the mere ontological status of material translations enable us, however, to appreciate these translational products as new and creative texts per se, as "continuers of the [Eastern] originals."[10]

4. In a typically colonial process of "code-switching,"[11] original objects from *the Orient* passed, by violent extraction, from their socially embedded use value at their original emplacement and their transfer over long distances and cultural political spheres and borders, into their new "representation [as] classified artefacts" for the target culture. Their new, institutionalized settings were often ethnographic or art or architecture museums. In this context, they were themselves cultural translations "by the virtue of their job in representing cultures through

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5   Bhatti 1997, 5.
6   Chesterman 1997.
7   Lepenies 1993, esp. 66.
8   Carbonell 1996, 79, 84.
9   Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002, xxi.
10 Hermans and Koller 2004, 26.
11 Hermans and Koller 2004, 24–25.

the medium of objects […] a translation from the originating world of the objects into a new network of meanings and interpretations."[12] What has been largely overlooked in the discussion of colonial art history is that whole Oriental architectures were also transferred into the colonizer's or Occidental collector's museums. These monumental translations were not only the most spectacular modern-time operations in the field of material culture translation between the Orient and the Occident, but are also unique case studies with which to open up the classical field of architectural historiography to a truly transcultural and global perspective. The object of our transcultural inquiry is the largest religious stone monument in the world—the twelfth Hindu, and today Buddhist, temple of Angkor Wat in Cambodia. Our time frame is the era of European imperialism around 1900, which encompassed competition between the established colonial power of France and the emerging cultural power of Germany. Our investigation queries the processes, the concrete agency, and the varying museographical end products of these translational operations. Before discussing these details, however, we must first formulate some theoretical observations that are valid for both cases:

(Ad 2–4) Beyond the transfer of small-scale artefacts from the *Orient* to the *Occident* and their commodification as museum objects of Western curiosity, translated monumental architecture like Angkor Wat was used as a powerful means by which to visualize the Western image of the East as being made up of ancient, powerful, but lost civilizations within a powerless and chaotic present. Whereas partial or full-scale reconstitutions of the once glorious architecture were represented in Occidental displays in an ideal or restored condition, the "original site" was depicted and canonized as being an "eternal ruin." This truly transcultural narrative simultaneously presented one and the same architectural complex as both an Oriental ruin *and* a restored monument within its Occidental display, thus enabling the birth of an aesthetic concept that "reconstituted the original and enabled its survival"—namely, *cultural heritage*. Following what James Clifford called the "salvage paradigm, reflecting the desire to rescue something 'authentic' out of destructive historical changes,"[13] this concept mirrored the European nation's dual self-representation both as the guardian of a progressive modernity and of a civilizing mission towards the *degenerated Orient* with its forgotten cultural heritage.[14] This translation of Oriental architecture also enabled the inclusion of the same in the colonizer's own canon of cultural heritage. Given the original connotation of the term "heritage," Angkor Wat was therefore "inherited" by the colonial power through its translation, transfer, and ideal reconstitution. The

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12 Sturge 2007, 131.
13 Clifford 1989, 73.
14 For the role of cultural heritage in colonial civilizing missions, see Falser 2015.

local stakeholders (religious communities, monks, and pilgrims) were dispossessed of and excluded from their own property.

(Ad 1) A crucial question concerning the "translatability" of architecture relates to its size, accessibility, and ownership; architecture is, after all, generally defined as immobile. While single original fragments from architecture were appropriated for European museums, large-scale architectural translations were seen as special "transfer operations" between the "repetition through identical text processing, recycling, borrowing, copying, the compilation of various text fragments, adoptions and, finally, large-scale collages and pastiches ranging from a mishmash of fragments to the mimicking a certain style in a virtuoso manner *à la manière de* with the risk of overinterpretation."[15]

As metonymic strategies of free or literal and popular or scholarly translations, respectively, they followed either the "principal of equivalence" (similarity) or the "principle of contiguity" (referential connection).[16] However, monumental architecture translation cannot be executed by a mere transfer of *original* architectural fragments. Thus, all kind of *mimetic operations* function under the term *substitution*. Current definitions of substitution help to conceptualize material translation:[17] from the Latin *substitutio*, substitution means the "action of placing something or someone in place of another [and/or] the appointment of a person as alternative heir." Applying a legal perspective, the "action or act of putting one thing in place of another" lets the translating (here colonial) agency "inherit" an object through the "transfer of any associated rights and duties." Through the substitution of the original architecture in a colonial museum, "the selling of an inferior or cheaper product in place of the one desired by the purchaser" takes place. Since the desired original large-scale monument could not be acquired by colonial power per se, substitution necessitated adopting a specific translational strategy—namely, *plaster casts*—a technique of making negative moulds of the original surface to produce a three-dimensional copy from the original in plaster. Subsequently, a limited number of translated elements were reassembled in Europe as displays that represented the whole architectural structure. The heyday of this Europe-wide practice of material translation occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century; by the first half of the twentieth century, the practice was abolished in favour of a focus on authentic originals. In the postmodern 1980s, plaster casts were rehabilitated as valid "substitutes in museums" for the purposes of public education,[18] the protection of the original artefact, and the democratization of the same through its display in multiple museum settings. However, a focus on European sculpture has meant that a discussion of the plaster casts of architecture has only recently begun,[19]

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15 Gorp 2004.
16 Gorp 2004, 62.
17 *Oxford English Dictionary,* s. v. "substitution."
18 Cf. Sofka 1988 and (for a more general view) Sofka and Schärer 1985.
19 Frederiksen and Marchand 2010; Lancestremère 2016; Haak 2016.

and the discussion of the colonial political implications of plaster casting *Oriental architecture* for *Occidental museums* continues to be a scholarly desideratum.

On the importance of imprints in relation to authenticity and power, Georges Didi-Huberman's reflection that the process of "impression" leaves the trace of an original object in a foreign medium is a useful one to explore the hypothesis that plaster casts were a powerful tool in the translation, appropriation, and representation of architectural heritage.[20] While the original object will alter in its physical appearance over time, the trace might technically be fixed as a permanent, anachronic marker—an unchangeable imprint represented by a moulding as the basis of plaster casting. This moment of direct and intimate contact with the original in the process of translation imbues the imprint/moulding with authenticity and authority. Like coinage, possessing representative mouldings was the central key or generic code for producing authentic re-translations in the form of plaster casts. This rematerialization empowered the "inheritor and owner" to display, reuse, and even circulate licensed copies of the object in any desired place, context, duration, or function according to his political intentions.[21]

How did the products of the European translations of Angkor Wat around 1900 look when the site itself was not yet owned by a colonial power of Europe, but by Cambodia's neighbouring kingdom of Siam (today Thailand)? As we shall see, France and Germany's differing cultural and political intentions led to different results in the representation of Angkor Wat in museums in Paris and Berlin.[22]

The invention of the Angkor pavilion: The *Musée Indo-chinois* in the *Palais de Trocadéro* in Paris

Angkor Wat, built in the twelfth century AD, was the largest single temple structure in the ancient city plan of Angkor (later sacked by the Siamese in the fifteenth century and left by the Khmer king for a new capital). Despite being completely abandoned, it survived as a pilgrimage site and Buddhist monastery. Consequently, the narrative of a "discovery of the ruined temple in the jungle" is a French-colonial invention of the late nineteenth century.[23] The first casts of Angkor Wat were made as a byproduct of a French explorative mission concerning the navigability of the Mekong river into

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20 Didi-Huberman 1999.
21 For the dialectics between the authority of the copy and its replication, the issue of substitution, and the reciprocal dependency between the surviving original and its replica, see also the contribution of Birgit Mersmann in this volume (compare this case study to Falser 2011a).
22 Cf. Falser 2013a.
23 This debate is part of the first part in the upcoming publication of Falser, forthcoming.

China in 1866–1868. They were sent directly to France and were integrated into the Universal Exhibition of Paris in 1867, not as specimens of exotic architectural decoration, but—in their function as a substitute for original objects in general—for the section on techniques of mechanical reproduction. This occurred right at that moment when the first pan-European translation and exchange project was initiated by the director of the South Kensington Museum in London and signed during the event in Paris by all monarchies in the form of the so-called *International Convention for the Exchange of Reproductions of Works of Art*.[24]

One of the mission's members, Louis Delaporte (a naval captain and talented draughtsman), became fascinated with Angkor and, in 1873, organized a special mission to Angkor which was at that time situated a few kilometres north of the French protectorate of Cambodia, in Siamese territory. His decision to bring back either original works or mouldings from the site depended mostly on the *translatability* of the desired objects with respect to transportation infrastructure. Although his staff continued to take away a few heavy originals in sandstone, he assured the Siamese authorities (who strongly forbade any removal) that they were only using the substitute technique of creating "plaster casts of sculptures and bas-relief"[25] from the temples. What he finally brought back was an initial, massive "trans-lation" of Angkor for the French *métropole* containing about seventy original sculptures and architectural fragments, 80 mouldings of the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat and other temples, as well as plans, drawings, and photographs. When these translational products arrived in France in 1874, and were not accepted for the Louvre museum, Delaporte found an interim solution for his *Musée Khmer* in the castle of Compiègne, northeast of Paris.

His first great success, however, came during the Universal Exhibition of 1878, in Paris. Within the exhibition's overall objective to place the French nation at the pinnacle of world civilization, its colonial project in Indochina was already well represented. The colonial section continued to display exotic findings (with casts from Angkor), but a special section on scientific missions was prominently placed: Delaporte's Angkor trip with plaster casts, drawings, photographs, and—originally conceived as a full-scale version to counterbalance the gigantic British-Indian pavilion next door—a 1:10 scaled plaster cast model of a *porte d'entrée* of the ancient city of Angkor Thom,[26] north of Angkor Wat, was featured. Delaporte's Angkor project underwent a small but significant change between the 1867 and 1878 exhibitions: during the former, it was embedded in the context of industrial arts in the age of mechanical reproduction and, during the latter, in the colonial-scientific propaganda which classified world civilizations

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24 Falser 2014a.
25 Delaporte 1874.
26 A depiction can be found in Soldi 1881, 269–330. For more on the first Angkor model in Europe, see Falser 2013b.

into different degrees of progress and claimed the (still Siamese) temples of Angkor as part of the French *patrimoine culturel*.

When Delaporte, in a third setting inside the section *Ethnographie des peuples étrangers* in the Trocadero palace and next to exhibits from Egypt, China, and Japan, successfully staged the giant original balustrade of the Angkorian Preah Khan temple, he was closer than ever to his ultimate goal—the "installation of a permanent Khmer Museum in Paris."[27] For this project, Delaporte was heavily influenced by the architectural museum projects of France's strongest rival in the colonial project in Asia—Great Britain. In 1874, the newly-built *Architectural Courts* of the South Kensington Museum opened: life-sized plaster cast replicas of cultural heritage icons manifested Great Britain's political rhetoric in the form of a veritable "three-dimensional imperial archive" that stretched from Trajan's Column in the western court to the gate of the ancient Buddhist site of Sanchi in the eastern court,[28] representing Great Britain's civilizing mission to inherit India's ancient cultural heritage as part of British India. Delaporte's *Musée indo-chinois* opened at the same time as the Parisian Universal Exhibition of 1889 (fig. 1). Located at the end of the southern wing of the Trocadero palace, his reconstitution of Angkorian temple architecture was also an answer to Viollet-le-Duc's concept of the *Musée de sculpture comparée*, with its 1:1 scale plaster cast facades of (mainly) French Gothic sacred architecture.[29]

Three other missions to Angkor before 1900 had not only brought more than 1,000 plaster cast elements for Delaporte's substitute version of the monumental temple architecture of Angkor in front of the visitor: in front of and directly attached to completely black walls, which formed a neutral and homogenizing background, 1:1 copies as "word-by-word translations" and original exhibits were merged into a metonymic collage of larger architectural temple units and stylistic entities. At both ends of the staircase into his Indochina Museum, Delaporte reconstituted two temples from Angkor as free-standing structures on the basis of several hundred "authentic" plaster cast elements. Whereas one pavilion-like structure was a literal translation in the form of a life-sized section of the lower east side of the central tower of Angkor Wat, the second model was a free translation that formed a veritable "pastiche à la manière" of the Bayon temple.[30] Delaporte himself asked museum visitors to "virtually reconstitute the grandiose ensemble in their imagination" by wandering from the metonymic displays on the walls to the free-standing pastiche models—only to conclude with the emotional and political statement that the "real but heavily-decayed site" could still be saved, not by the "neglecting Siamese,

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27 Delaporte 1880, 249–250.
28 Barringer 1988, 11.
29 For a study about the French and British versions of staging their own and Oriental architecture in museums, cf. Falser 2013c.
30 For a detailed analysis, cf. Falser 2011b.

Figure 1: Louis Delaporte's *Musée indo-chinois* in the Parisian Trocadéro palace around 1900.

but maybe by the French who did not (yet) own it."[31] Through Delaporte's physical translation of the temple for the French *métropole*, their ideal (or idealized) architectural reconstitution, and their inclusion in the *performative museum parcours*, the visitor was familiarized with and initiated into the French-colonial vision. The vast archive of "authentic" plaster casts elements from Angkor, as much as Delaporte's first free-standing reconstitutions, served as a generic code and inspiration for the Angkor pavilions at the following universal and colonial exhibitions. The "real" site of Angkor was mentally converted from a living religious site to a dead archaeological ruin and canonized as French cultural *patrimoine*—even before Siam's retrocession of Angkor to (French) Cambodia in 1907.

Competing translations: "Not for the show but for the sciences"—Angkor in the *Völkerkundemuseum* in Berlin

"It will be a pleasure to prove to our dear friends of the Seine that a German museum can possess and exhibit what a French museum is hiding in childish and stingy pettiness."[32]

With the political vacuum hanging over Angkor in around 1900, other European nations began to be curious about the site. Surprisingly, by that time, it was not Delaporte's museum that owned the largest complete "facsimile" of Angkor Wat, but rather the Ethnographical Museum in Berlin, which possessed altogether 300 mouldings (totalling 200 meters in length and up to three meters high) of its famous bas-reliefs.[33] The German Empire did not try to augment its Indian collections in Berlin with specimens of *Hinterindien* in the context of a direct colonial interest like the French, but rather did so for the cultural and scientific prestige befitting a rising European power. As a consequence of this different, and not propagandistic but supposedly "scientific" reason, Berlin's display of Angkor was completely different from the French one. Commissioned by the director of the museum, Adolf Bastian, along with the head of the Indian section, Albert Grünwedel, these mouldings were created in Angkor, in 1898, by the rather dubious adventurer Harry Thomann, and were displayed from 1904 until the destruction of the museum during World War II (fig. 2).

From the beginning, the German argument for the Angkor mouldings was formulated in terms that were directed against the French project (see introductory quote for this sub-chapter). In March 1898, Grünwedel

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31 Delaporte 1901, 39, 40, 46.
32 Thomann, Harry. 1897. Letter to Albert Grünwedel, December 8. Files regarding the acquisition of ethnological artifacts by H. Thomann. Berlin, Ethnologisches Museum, Archiv, Pars I.B.31.
33 A 400-page file from the museum's archive is cited in the following discussion. (Thomann 1897) For a detailed analysis, see the two subsequent parts of an article about this story in Falser 2012–2014.

Figure 2: The bas-reliefs of Angor Wat inside the Ethnographic Museum in Berlin, Stresemannstraße, after 1905.

reported that "Bastian had tried several times in vain to purchase copies from the *Musée Khmer*, which was hidden in an artillery school at Compiègne, but that a unique opportunity arose to acquire maybe some originals, certainly paper mouldings (*Abklatsche, Papiermulden*) and photographs from Angkor on the Siamese territory."

The agent for this job knew how to bypass the French port authorities in Saigon by using a fake name and nationality. Thomann left Genoa in April 1898 under his new name "A. Gillis" and, three months later, reported on the progress of his campaign in Angkor, where he attempted to make casts with two assistants and 120 "lazy natives." He took "more than 300 mouldings from the most famous bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat, 120 additional paper mouldings, and 130 photos, for a total purchase price of 110,000 Marks."[34] In order to finance this purchase, what followed was a curious strategy exercised by Grünwedel that included a critique of the French translation technique and purpose. Arguing that "the French had moulded only a few parts directly from unclean stone and only from selected scenes, without any scientific basis and just for an instant show effect (*Momenteffekt*)," he utilized the "*Maudsley* procedure to get more details and larger areas" and suggested that the "controlled multiplication" (see Didi-Huberman) of the collection be "offered to other museums in England or the USA." The purchase of Thomann's Angkor collection would, according to

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34 Thomann, Harry. 1898. Letter to Albert Grünwedel, November 24. Files regarding the acquisition of ethnological artifacts by H. Thomann. Berlin, Ethnologisches Museum, Archiv, Pars I.B.31.

Le Temple d'Angkor-Vat. — La façade principale illuminée.

Figure 3: The 1:1 replica of Angkor Wat during the International Colonial Exhibition in Paris, 1931.

Grünwedel, "help to close this intolerable gap inside the Berlin Museum […] and to dwarf the French Angkor project […] an absolutely necessary measure of German patriotism and for the leading role of the [German] museum with its collection and research of the Far East." The Thomann inventory of 442 entries was bought in its entirety in 1903 and displayed as flat, complete and 1:1 scale copies of the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat along the inner gallery walls of the second, and later of the first, floor. Along with the Schliemann and Turfan Collection, the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat contributed to Bastian's comparative vision of a "universal archive of humanity." This completely two-dimensional and clinical display of the bas-reliefs from Angkor Wat in Berlin, in the form of a "scholarly 1:1-translation" (compare Benjamin) with a (supposedly) purely scientific claim, couldn't have been more different from Delaporte's "free translation" within a French-colonial heritage *parcours* in Paris.

However, both versions offered valid strategies with which to substitute the "Oriental text" of monumental Angkor and helped to pre-define Angkor Wat as a UNESCO Cultural Heritage site almost a century later.[35] Tragically,

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35 For the discussion of the UNESCO nomination politics and standards of originality and authenticity, see the contribution of Christoph Brumann in this volume (compare Falser 2010, 2015b).

Figure 4a: Delaporte's 1900 plaster cast replicas from Angkor next to
the original sculptures in the same interior display in a 2013 exhibition
in the Musée Guimet in Paris.

Figure 4b: The copies of the original plaster casts from Angkor Wat
for the former Ethnographic Museum of Berlin, recently rediscovered and
restored for the future Humboldt-Forum.

both collections were almost completely lost in the first half of the twentieth century, but the parts that survived are now being slowly rediscovered and are considered two different accounts—and rare relics of—the *colonial translations of the Orient.* The French story continued until 1937, when Angkor was reconstituted in several universal and colonial exhibitions in Paris and Marseille. During the 1931 International Colonial Exhibition in Paris, Delaporte's small-scale Angkor Wat version had developed into an ephemeral 1:1 replica comprising a surface area of 60 × 60 meters and a total height of 65 meters—the largest *translation qua substitution* of non-European architecture on the European continent ever (fig. 3). The rediscovery of the plaster casts from Angkor has been in full swing in recent years. The Musée Guimet in Paris opened an exhibition about Delaporte's achievements in October 2013 (fig. 4a) and the former plates of the Ethnographic Museum in Berlin have recently undergone a restoration process, and will be incorporated in the future Humboldt Forum (fig. 4b).[36]

Figures

Fig. 1: Book cover of *Le Musée indo-chinois. Antiquités Cambodgiennes*, from around 1900, by the editor Armand Guérinet.
Fig. 2: Photo: Zentralarchiv der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin-Preußischer Kulturbesitz.
Fig. 3: Photo from *Livre d'or de l'Exposition coloniale internationale de Paris 1931*. Paris, 1931, p. 121.
Fig. 4a: Photo: Author, 2013.
Fig. 4b: Photo: Author, 2013.

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36 Compare Falser 2013d, 2012–2014, 2014b; Haak 2016.

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The Copy and Competition

Roland Prien

The Copy of an Empire? Charlemagne, the Carolingian Renaissance, and Early Medieval Perceptions of Late Antiquity

Abstract   The term "Carolingian Renaissance" was coined by the French historian Jean-Jacques Ampère in 1830, but its wide-spread use goes back to his Austrian colleague Erna Patzelt and her essay "Die karolingische Renaissance" written in 1924. Since that time, it has served as an icon for the cultural revival in early-medieval times and has been heavily utilized by historians, art historians, and archaeologists. Based on passages from Carolingian key authors like Alcuin and Einhard, who praised their emperor for his revival of antique laws, customs, and building traditions, it is believed that ninth-century Frankish society made large-scale investments in the creation of copies of antique art and architecture. A topic hitherto unresearched is the question of a Carolingian concept of copies. How were (late) antique art and architecture perceived in the ninth century? Were they understood as "heritage", as a reminder of a glorious past worth copying? The *Marienkirche* in Aachen is often interpreted as a Frankish attempt to establish equality between the "old" eastern and "new" (recreated) western emperor by architectural means, its main instrument being copying existing imperial architecture. But how much of sixth century Ravenna was needed as inspiration for ninth-century Aachen?

Keywords   Carolingian Renaissance, Charlemagne, late antiquity, palatial architecture, copies of ancient art

Within the systematic study of the Early Middle Ages, the Carolingian Renaissance is one of the topics that has received extensive and widespread attention and has been the focus of intensive debates by historians, art historians, and archaeologists for more than a century. The fascination this particular subject holds is not only illustrated by the large scope of monographs and articles related to it, but also by grand exhibitions attended by a broad audience. The 2014 exhibition on Charlemagne, which was staged in Aachen on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of the great Frankish ruler, was only one of many that took place within recent decades.[1] The tenor of both the scientific research and the public display of such exhibits is usually the same: Charlemagne is depicted as the most important of all early-medieval rulers, the one man who (with some help from the most prominent intellectuals of his time) brought back the somehow lost chief achievements of antique art and science, thus founding the culture of the European Middle Ages. In a cultural—but also political—way, he is deemed the *Pater Europae*. This alone should be sufficient to justify another re-examination of the Carolingian Renaissance, but in the context of the workshop "The Transformative Power of the Copy," upon which the present volume has been based, there is even more need, since "copies" seem to act as the basis of this particular Renaissance.

Did the Carolingians create their new Roman Empire by means of copying material objects? The use of the term "Renaissance" seems to indicate this—at least if that term is understood in the way Giorgio Vasari, the Italian painter, architect, and writer coined it in 1550. His definition is usually closely tied to the fields of art and art history, but since the term is also used in archaeology, the question arises whether we—that is, archaeologists—should use it in the same way, too (as we currently do). This question is to some degree connected with different concepts of copies. These play a fundamental role when examining the question of what relevance such Renaissances—and copies—have for historical archaeology.[2] Archaeology seldom focuses on the Renaissance other than in a chronological way, since archaeologists believe that Renaissance itself does not affect their field of research. Renaissance only happens to other people, most of them being art historians. When asked about the fundamental changes Italy experienced in the Quattrocento, for example, an archaeologist might reply that, since the material culture from that century does not differ much from that of the fourteenth century, the period could hardly be argued as comprising the dawning of a new age. On the contrary, he or she will use the term and terminology introduced by Vasari without hesitation when applying it to different ages and/or examples. Historical archaeology is in fact full of Renaissance—that is "rebirths": there is Ottonian Renaissance,

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1   *Karl der Große—Charlemagne. Macht Kunst Schätze.* Aachen June 20–September 21, 2014.
2   "Historical archaeology" in the context of this paper means the study of material culture of all periods of human history that have also generated written sources.

Byzantine Renaissance, and Carolingian Renaissance. All these examples have a certain concept in common—the "rebirth" of an age, a culture, or a political system, that somehow got lost—and they all belong to a period that, according to Vasari, certainly could not be connected to his understanding of Renaissance because they belong to the dark "Middle Ages" that lay between the glorious epoch of antiquity and the beginning of the Quattrocento. Also the idea that copying certain objects, like pieces of art, played an important role in all these different rebirths is widely accepted in Archaeology. The aim of this essay is to analyze one of these examples and the role copies might have played in this context.

Shortly after Vasari's term "Renaissance" was adopted by French and German art historians in the first half of the ninteenth century, its usage began to spread into neighbouring academic fields. Among the first to use the term in a modified way was French historian Jean-Jacques Ampère, who compared changes and developments in literature and fine art in the ninth century with those of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, thus forging the idea of a "Carolingian Renaissance."[3] Erna Patzelt's essay "Die karolingische Renaissance" (The Carolingian Renaissance) written a hundred years later marked the beginning of the wide-spread use of the term by historians and, eventually, by archaeologists despite the fact that Patzelt heavily criticized Ampère's views.[4]

Ever since, the so-called Carolingian Renaissance has served as an icon for cultural revival in early-medieval times and the term has been used by historians, art historians, and archaeologists alike. Its broad acceptance is based not only on observations made by Ampère and later colleagues, but also on authentic Carolingian texts written by the most famous and well-known authors of ninth-century Europe like Alcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, and especially Einhard, head of the so-called *Hofschule* and Charlemagne's biographer. These writers praised their imperial patron for reestablishing a Christian Roman Empire by reintroducing ancient laws and customs and by implementing a large-scale building program. The testimony of these written sources outlines a significant number of reforms Charlemagne imposed on his subsects and on his entire realm that culminated in a reenstatement of the Roman Empire with himself as the new (western) emperor.[5] By the end of the eighth century, despite all attempts by the Merovingian kings and their Carolingian successors to maintain a form of government that was ultimately based on Roman rule, the Roman Empire was considered to belong to an age that was long gone—hence the opportunity to reestablish this realm.[6]

However, ninth-century texts never speak of rebirth but of renovation: Einhard calls Charlemagne's rule *renovatio romani imperii*—the restoration

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3   Ampère 1839.
4   Patzelt 1924, 31.
5   Reudenbach 2009, 18–20.
6   Müller 2009, 192.

of the Roman Empire. By establishing this term, Einhard created a powerful vision and image of his era not only for his contemporaries but for all who subsequently studied the ninth century. Among others, Einhard specifies the physical means by which his imperial patron re-erected the Roman Empire: the building of churches, palaces, bridges, and even canals. The so-called *Paderborn epos*, composed around the year 800, goes even further and reports on Charlemagne reconstructing Rome itself— not actually in Rome, but in his new capital Aachen, which is referred to as *Roma Secunda*, the second Rome.

On the other hand, Einhard's chef-d'œuvre, the *Vita Karoli Magni*, is strangely full of coincidences: Charlemagne founds his beloved Aachen in the wilderness near a hot spring he accidently discovers. He never expected to become emperor and, while praying in Rome on Christmas day, was taken by surprise by the pope who wished to crown him. Naturally these anecdotes serve to underline Charlemagne's modesty—a key virtue in any medieval ruler. But still, Einhard leaves us with an ambivalent picture of his beloved patron: in all his life, Charlemagne prepares himself to become emperor, but the title becomes his by chance. However, other written sources and the remaining material of his age tell a different story: Charlemagne spent most of his life conquering much of the territories of the former Western Roman Empire and beyond. By uniting them under his rule, he created a powerbase equally strong to that of the eastern (Byzantine) emperors, who until then had successfully opposed all potential rivals to the title from the west. But commanding large armies and ruling vast territories alone was clearly not what made a "barbarian" king become a Roman emperor. Why indeed should he be attracted to such a position? At first glance, the benefits of the imperial crown may have been outweighed by the problems it created: the elevation above all other kings in western Europe stood against a confrontation with the other great empire on the continent. The Byzantine emperors would hardly welcome a new *augustus* in the West. Apart from this, there was further, surprising evidence to be considered: despite 300 years of disruption, the very idea of western imperial rule had survived.[7] Charlemagne did not want to become another "Byzantine" emperor—he instead based his legitimation as imperial ruler on the ancient city of Rome itself. This made him not "Roman emperor" but "emperor of the Romans"—a significant difference that was also stressed by all of his successors. This important detail should also be kept in mind when art and architecture of the Carolingian Renaissance are examined later in this paper: In terms of politcal ideology, Charlemagne's frame of reference should have been ancient Rome. Thus copying Roman art should provide the means of transporting his new status into Carolingian society.[8] Additionally, this new Roman Empire required an understanding with those who actually ruled the city of Rome, i.e. the popes. Support from

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7   Bullough 1999, 42.
8   Reudenbach 2009, 16.

the most important religious figure in the Latin West enabled the Frankish king to style himself as supreme Christian ruler.

In order to embody the idea of a western emperor, Charlemagne had to create objects that functioned as visible markers of his new position. The nature of these objects is thought to have already been predefined: In Roman times, the presence of imperial power was connected to certain places, monuments, and much circulating items that could serve as bearer of images and propaganda. Among these, coins were the most important. Coins issued by Charlemagne from 800 onwards are closely related to those of late antique emperors: both their images and inscriptions are very similar, though not identical.[9] Also, significant differences from contemporary Byzantine coins can be observed. Late antique or Byzantine coins were not copied, although this could have easily been done. Instead, Charlemagne's coinage appears as a mixture of features taken from various examples from the reign of Augustus to the end of the fourth century. Apart from coins, we know of no other non-artistic objects that were reintroduced during Charlemagne's reign as a display of the *renovato imperii*—ninth-century Frankish material culture differed strongly from Late Antiquity and no efforts were made to change this. Visualization of imperial power was limited to art and architecture and both seem to have been displayed only at his residences and partly at important monasteries.[10]

As a travelling king of the Early Middle Ages, Charlemagne had no capital to rule from. Power had to be exercised in person, by the ruler or by his appointed representative. Taxation, revolts, wars, and political crises—but also ecclesiastical matters—required the presence of the king/emperor in various parts of his vast realm. Also nearly all existing cities or rural estates lacked an infrastructure that could sustain the royal court permanently. The Merovingian kings had already adapted a system of geographical mobile rule based on royal palaces (*palatia*) and estates that could temporarily host their court. While, in the sixth century, most of these *palatia* were located in cities, the first half of the seventh century saw the rise of some rural places to full seats of power with architectural furnishings comparable to those of the city palaces.[11] This system was enhanced in Carolingian times and led to a diversity of *palatia*, some of which were used for a single purpose, like hunting.[12] Moreover, written sources show a clear increase in number of these sites from the middle of the eighth century onwards.[13] Knowledge about the Carolingian *palatia* and their Merovingian predecessors was, for a long time, almost entirely based on the testimony of written sources. Even today, nearly all of the sites in what is today Belgium and France have not been subject to archaeological research; for

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9   Reudenbach 2009, 20.
10 Reudenbach 2009, 24; Meckseper 2014, 160.
11 Renoux 2001, 29.
12 Zotz 1997, 100–101.
13 Zotz 2001, 17.

some even their exact location is still unknown.[14] This includes important places such as Attigny—according to written sources, one of the major power-centers from the seventh century onwards—and most of the *palatia* in the valleys of the Oise, Aisne, and Marne rivers. Only two exceptions are known: Qierzy and Samoussy were both briefly excavated by the German art historian Georg Weise, during the First World War. Weise worked under very difficult conditions (both sites were close to the front and partly used as army camps) and his brief publication of the results of his excavation is somewhat obscure and—concerning the overall layout of the *palatia*—inconclusive.[15] French archaeologists have rejected his work as being unscientific, but still refrain from carrying out their own fieldwork despite the fact that both sites (and probably many more, including Attigny) are easy accessible, since they were never built on after their destruction in the late ninth and tenth century. Only in St. Denis, a prominent monastery, have modern French excavations brought to light a building complex that might have served as a palace. In Germany, three important *palatia* have been excavated and studied in detail during recent decades: Aachen, Ingelheim, and Paderborn have all yielded many insights into Carolingian architecture.[16] In the Netherlands, the Valkhof palace in Nijmegen has been studied to some extent. Apart from written sources, all information about Frankish palaces comes from sites that were founded during the rule of Charlemagne. While our current understanding of these *palatia* is quite good, it remains impossible to compare their layout and architecture to older examples from Merovingian or early Carolingian times. As will be demonstrated later in this paper, the palaces of Charlemagne are often linked with other contemporary—and even older—residences outside the Frankish realm, but we know nothing about the already existing building traditions the ninth-century builders inherited from their predecessors of the sixth to eigth centuries. It is generally assumed that the Merovingian kings used late antique palaces that already existed in many cities in their kingdom, but here again, the archaeological sources are lacking. Despite large-scale excavations in the palaces of Cologne and Trier, very little is known about their early-medieval phases.[17] So the question whether the residences of Charlemagne represent a new type of architecture or follow older Frankish traditions remains unanswered. The same goes for comparisons with later Carolingian *palatia*. Under the rule of Charles the Bald, Quierzy, for example, is said to have been remodeled to serve as a substitute for Aachen (to which the western-Frankish kings no longer had access), and was even renamed "Caropolis," but unfortunately we know nothing about the physical appearance of this "city of Charlemagne."[18] This leaves

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14 Renoux 2001, 31.
15 Weise 1923.
16 Two more examples from Frankfurt and Zürich are known, but much less has been excavated from these sites.
17 Clemens 2001, 43.
18 Renoux 2001, 32.

for an analysis the three *palatia* founded under the rule of Charlemagne mentioned above; among them, Aachen is the most prominent and also the place which is said to have contained numerous copies, which shall be examined below.

The prominence of the Aachen *palatium* is based on three pieces of evidence:

1. Under the reign of Charlemagne, a new palace that subsequently served as his most favoured domicile was constructed. Towards the end of his reign in particular, he spent more time in Aachen than in any other *palatium*.
2. The resources committed to the erection of the *palatium* were immense; the new buildings had no parallels elsewhere in the Carolingian world.
3. The emperor died at Aachen and was buried in the palace church.

Einhard's descriptions of the palace and church have for a long time dominated our views about ninth-century Aachen. He and other authors write of a large *aula* and a palace church equipped with late antique *spoliae* columns that were brought from Ravenna together with a bronze statue showing Theoderic the Great on horseback. The presence of many distinguished objects of Roman art in Aachen even today seems to support Einhard's statement that the king (and later emperor) wanted to furnish his residence with everything that was expected to exist in an imperial capital. From this many scholars have drawn the conclusion that Charlemagne wanted Aachen, his *Roma Secunda*, his Rome north of the Alps to resemble—in a small way—Rome and Constantinople.[19] This view is based on statements from different texts that cannot necessarily be connected. First, the often expressed view that Charlemagne's residence was built according to some kind of predefined plan must be called into question. According to a letter from 787, Charlemagne asked Pope Hadrian I for permission to remove valuable *exempla* (marble floors, mosaics, and other marble furnishings) from palaces in Ravenna. It is thought that most of these materials came from the palace of Theoderic the Great, which can probably be identified with as a large building complex east of the church of Sant' Appollinare Nuove excavated by Corrado Ricci between 1907 and 1911.[20] It remains unclear whether these *spoliae* were brought to Aachen. Only much later did Einhard write that some columns (*columnas atque marmora*) used in the Aachen palace church had been obtained in Ravenna and Rome because they could not have been found elsewhere. The statue of Theoderic appears first in a description of Aachen written by Walahfried Strabo around 829. It was said to have been transferred from Ravenna, were there seem to have existed two such monuments, in 801.[21] Only the Paderborn epos calls Aachen Charlemagne's *Roma Secunda*. Other texts,

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19 Jacobsen 1994.
20 Porta 2003, 103.
21 Ranaldi and Novara 2014, 116.

and Einhard's *vita karoli magni* in particular, make no reference to the *renovatio* in connection with Aachen.[22]

Surprisingly (and despite some early excavations undertaken by Erich Schmidt in 1910–1911 in and around the palace church), all reconstructions of the buildings belonging to the Aachen *palatium* were until recently based on written sources and studies of the remaining architecture. Recent excavations, building surveys on the palace church (which today serves as cathedral), the remains of the *aula* (later incorporated into the medieval town hall), and a reexamination of the results of early fieldwork have produced an entirely new picture of this magnificent structure, thus challenging many old views. But some older positions have also been confirmed: According to written sources, the palace church was built between 796 and 804. This dating is also attested by dendrochronological data from the foundations (798±5° AD) and the ring armature beam of the dome (803±10° AD).[23] Roman *spolia* columns were used for the octagon of the interior; the capitals above are part Roman, part Carolingian copies, while the pilaster capitals from the façade are entirely works of the early ninth century.[24] Many pieces of architectural sculpture that have previously been regarded as original Roman objects can now be identified as works of the ninth century. They were worked from the same Lorraine limestone as the Roman specimens and their quality is surprisingly high: some pieces can be distinguished from works of the second or third centuries only by modern scientific analysis and the same is true for much of the bronze work. The five bronze doors of the palace church bear close resemblance to late antique works, like the door of the temple of Romulus on the *Forum Romanum*, but are also contemporary Carolingian works that were manufactured in Aachen, where a bronze heat was excavated close to the church[25] (fig. 1).

Many scholars have pointed out that the layout used for the Aachen palace church is very similar to well-known early Byzantine churches like San Vitale in Ravenna, the church of Sergios and Bacchus, and the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople or even the Church of the Holy Sepulchre or the early Islamic Dome of the Rock. All these buildings are centrally planned and domed chapels, but only San Vitale was actually visited by Charlemagne himself, while all other monuments were probably known only by accounts from embassies to foreign courts. Therefore Ravenna seems the most likely antetype to be copied by the Aachen palace church, but this view has recently been questioned. Although San Vitale and Aachen share many architectural features, the buildings themselves served different purposes.[26] While the Aachen church functioned as a palatine chapel, San Vitale was founded by bishops and never used by the Byzantine emperors,

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22 Meckseper 2014, 165.
23 Heckner 2012, 40; Müller et al. 2013, 151.
24 Schaab and Heckner 2012, 197–199.
25 Ristow 2012a.
26 Ranaldi and Novara 2014, 118.

Figure 1: Aachen. Carolingian Bronze Door of the Palatinate church.

despite the fact that emperor Justinian and his wife Theodora were pic-
tured on mosaics in the main apse. Even if Charlemagne himself admired
the building on the occasion of one of his visits to Ravenna, he certainly
would not have recognized the building as a palatine chapel. Also the
question remains as to why the emperor should have aimed to imitate a
church like San Vitale or even the Hagia Sophia that was closely connected
to his Byzantine rivals. Other examples for centrally-planned churches
were much closer at hand, like the late Merovingian church of St. Gereon
at Cologne.[27] This late antique building, which was probably converted
into a church by the sixth century, resembles the palace church in many

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27 Müller et al. 2012, 233.

ways. The Aachen palatinate church clearly stands in the tradition of late antique domed buildings, but it was designed not as a copy of an existing church, but as an enhancement of a concept that had already existed for a long time.[28]

The second important structure within the Aachen *palatium* was an *aula* that very likelyprobably served as an audience and banquet hall. While we know nothing of its furnishings or internal construction, its overall layout has survived in the foundations and ground floor of the late medieval town hall. According to a recent building survey, the so-called *Granusturm*, a tower at the east end of the *aula*, served as a monumental staircase and likely connected three storeys. Large *aulae* are frequently known from late antique and early-medieval palaces. Indeed all other Carolingian *palatia* must have included such a building, as can be demonstrated by comparisons with Ingelheim and Paderborn. The palace *aula* of Trier, built in the beginning of the fourth century, has often been named as a prototype, but this building has much larger dimensions. Further, its condition during the ninth century is entirely unknown. By the eighth century, most late antique *aulae* within the Frankish realm were probably in ruins and therefore no longer in use.[29] Another source of inspiration might have come from contemporary residences outside of Charlemagne's kingdom: In Italy, the emperor himself visited the palaces of the newly-conquered Lombard kingdom shortly after 774 and—even more importantly—the residence of the popes in Rome. Here, he witnessed the large-scale remodeling of the Lateran Palace under the aegis of Leo III, including the erection of the famous *triclinium*, the appearance of which is unfortunately only conveyed in later descriptions.[30] Since both *aulae* were constructed at the same time, the Lateran *triclinium* could not have been a direct model for Aachen, but may have inspired Charlemagne to build something even lager for himself. In conclusion, the Aachen palace hall very likely imitated contemporary *aulae* instead of late Roman buildings. We know very little about other parts of the Aachen palace. The *aula* and church were connected by a covered walkway that was part of the original layout; a tower-like building in the middle of the walkway has, for a long time, been interpreted as a monumental entrance gate, but recent research has shown that it dates into the forth decade of the ninth century and never served as a gateway.[31] Its precise function—as well as the location of the imperial living quarters and other parts of the palace—remains unclear.Today, it is clear that, when the emperor died in 814, only the palace church and possibly the *aula* were finished, while much of the other buildings were erected later, or in some cases even earlier: One of the annex chapels flanking the palatine church

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28 Heckner 2014, 357.
29 Ley and Wietheger 2014, 241.
30 Luchterhandt 2014, 104.
31 Ristow 2012b, 2014.

Figure 2: Aachen. Bronze sculpture of a bear (?), now in atrium of the cathedral, third century or eleventh century.

seems to have been erected in the middle of the eighth century, indicating that Aachen was also of some importance to Charlemagne's predecessors. Carolingian and later written sources refer to the existence of precious works of ancient art that Charlemagne transferred to Aachen in order to underline the status of his new capital—among them the abovementioned statue of Theoderic which has not survived into later times. Two other bronze sculptures—of a bear and a pine cone—that can still be found in the entrance hall of the Aachen cathedral have often been attributed to this group of artworks. The sculpture of the bear was for a long time thought to depict a wolf and thus believed to have been transferred to Aachen on behalf of Charlemagne in order to demonstrate his claim to a second Rome (fig. 2). It was dated to Roman or even ancient Greek times, but recent stylistic analyses claim that the work belongs to the eleventh century.[32] Similar dates have been discussed concerning the bronze pine cone, with its 129 perforated scales that would originally have served as a waterspout on a fountain (fig. 3).

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32   Künzl 2002, 33; Maas 2013, 30.

Figure 3: Aachen. Bronze pine cone, probably dating to the eleventh century.

Since a similar bronze pine cone is know from an atrium of the Lateran in Rome, it might have been placed in the atrium of the Palatine chapel in Carolingian times. Still it bears an inscription that can be firmly dated to Ottonian times, indicating that it may have been transferred to Aachen much later than the reign of Charlemagne.

The long-favored concept of Aachen being Charlemagne's *Roma Secunda*, furnished with copies and originals of Roman art and copying ancient Roman palaces as a whole has already been questioned a decade ago.[33] In light of new research, this claim becomes even more unlikely. When Constantine the Great founded his new residence in Constantinople, he transferred numerous examples of ancient art to his capital, where they were then displayed. Whether Charlemagne had similar plans for Aachen, however, remains unknown. At least the statue of Theoderic shows that he considered the presence of large bronze sculpture a necessary component of a residence. This idea was probably not based on the assumption that this was a typical attribute of a Roman imperial palace, but was more likely influenced by contemporary examples: In the Lateran palace in Rome, there stood the statue of emperor Marcus Aurelius (then mistaken

33 Lobbedey 2003; Untermann 1999, 162; Untermann 2006, 123.

for Constantine the Great) before it was transferred to the Capitoline hill in the sixteenth century.[34] Again, this could have been an inspiration for Aachen, were the *palatium* was (in later Carolinigian written sources) also called "Lateran."

In conclusion, there is little remaining evidence to support the picture of Aachen as a second Rome modeled after Roman palaces. But then again, Aachen is not the only residence to discuss in this context. The Ingelheim *palatium* is claimed to be a much more accurate copy of late antique palaces, in contrast to Paderborn, which is seldom mentioned in the debate.[35] In recent times, Ingelheim has become the most widely-investigated Carolingian palace. Many new excavations have brought to light significant data that have improved the current state of research, although many results from older but also from most recent investigations remain unpublished. The basic layout of an *aula* in the west and a large *exedra* in the east seems to have been already established under the rule of Charlemagne, but many of the buildings were probably not finished until the time of Louis the Pius. The reason for this may be that, during the later years of his rule, Charlemagne concentrated on Aachen (he visited the place after long stays in 787–788 and only once more in 807), while his son stayed there on ten different occasions between 817 and 840.[36] The main difference between Aachen and Ingelheim is the absence of a distinguished palatine church. Despite the fact that Charlemagne and his successors attended many Easter and Christmas masses in Ingelheim, no large religious building is discernable from the interior of the palace complex. Only a small *trikonchos* in the middle of the compound can possibly be identified as a church, but its limited size would have made it unsuitable for offering mass to larger audiences. Given the fact that the Ingelheim *palatium* was a comparably large and magnificent building complex, the absence of a prominent church is quite surprising. In later times, under the rule of the Ottonian and Salian emperors, this shortcoming was adressed by the erection of a large church on the south wing of the compound. Recent excavations have shown that, in Carolingian times, the church of St. Remigius approximately one kilometer west of the palace may have been used as the palatinate chapel.[37]

The round towers in front of the palace façade were for a long time interpreted as elements of defense, but today it has become clear that the *palatium* was no fortress and the turrets might have only be used for decoration. Many other parts of the palace seem to bear close resemblance

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34 Ranaldi and Novara 2014, 116.
35 Despite our knowledge of this site, it is usually assumed that Paderborn was not built as a copy of Roman architecture, since in newly-conquered Saxony this reference could hardly be understood by Charlemagne's new subjects. The existence of monumental stone buildings in a landscape with an abundance of such constructions is thought to have been sufficient to impress the unruly Saxons (Gai 1999, 195).
36 Grewe 1999, 151.
37 Grewe 2014, 195.

to Roman palaces The *aula*, thought modest in its dimensions compared to Aachen or Trier, was furnished with an *opus-sectile* floor and decorated with wall paintings depicting biblical and Frankish kings, according to a description by Ermoldus Nigellus from the first half of the ninth century.[38] The *exedra*, with its *porticus* decorated with Roman *spoliae* columns and capitals and some pieces of Frankish architectural sculpture, appears to be a genuine copy of Roman architecture. But, then again, *exedrae* of this size in Roman palaces are unknown; the only direct comparisons can be found in Roman *forae*, notably the Traian Forum, in Rome.[39] In the context of early medieval architecture, it is a solitairy piece. Another very "Roman" feature was the construction of an aqueduct as a water supply for the palace. Its construction is unique for the seventh to tenth century and it clearly stands in a Roman tradition. Compared to Aachen, the reception of antiquity seems to have played a much larger part in the planning of the Ingelheim palace. But still, it was no copy of a Roman imperial palace. The recent excavator Holger Grewe called it a palace built from "ideas and material from antique buildings," that was combined with Carolingian innovative capacity.[40] This clearly marks Ingelheim as a genuine creation of the Carolingian period that is also demonstrated by the choice of its building plot: the site was "virgin" with no older representational architecture occupying that space prior and presumable only little Roman remains that could have used to compare the buildings of the "old" and the "new" Roman Empire.

In sum, it can be asserted that the *palatia* of Charlemagne—as we know them today—were not copies of Roman imperial palaces, nor were they meant to imitate them. As an increasing number of other scholars have recently detected, the builders of the Carolingian palace drew their inspiration from both late antique and contemporary architecture, thus creating something novel.[41] While the layout of single buildings may indeed have been inspired by older Roman architecture, the complex as a whole has no parallels elsewhere. Single parts of architectural sculptures are of a remarkably high quality that makes them nearly indistinguishable from older Roman works. The palaces at Ingelheim and Aachen cannot be compared to older imperial residences like Rome or Constantinople because of their different function and size. The Great Palace in the city of Constantine served as a permanent seat of government, while Carolingian *palatia*—like their Merovingian predecessors—were neither permanently in use nor did they predominantly function as government buildings. Charlemagne's main activities at these locations were bathing, hunting, and resting—in short: they were places of leisure. But since kings and emperors are never really absent from office, certain aspects of government were always

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38 Grewe 2001, 158.
39 Grewe 2014, 191.
40 Grewe 2014, 193–194.
41 Lobbedey 2003; Slot 2009.

included in their stays at these palaces. It also must have been clear to Charlemagne that he could have imitated Roman or Byzantine palaces, but that would never have been able to match their size.[42]

From the Upper Rhine Area comes another example of Carolingian architecture, which has for a long time served as a distinguished example of a ninth-century copy of classical Roman design: the so-called "Torhalle" (or entrance hall) of the Lorsch monastery, probalby erected under the reign of Charlemagne's son Louis the Pius, has often been compared to Roman triumphal arches, but this view was already been questioned some time ago.[43] The form of the basement with its three arches flanked by columns crowned by composite capitals is indeed reminiscent of classical Roman arches, but the upper floor with a room decorated with paintings that evoke associations of open, pavilion-like architecture clearly demonstrates that this building had a different meaning and served different functions[44] (figs. 4–5).

Again, the layout of the façade is unique and can only be compared with Merovingian and subsequent Carolingian architecture, but not with that of ancient Rome.[45] The primary function of this building remains unclear, but as its comparably low arches make it appear unsuitable for a ceremonial entrance monument; it may have served as a scene for judicature.[46] Still, Carolingian artists were familiar with the concept of triumphal arches, as can be illustrated by the so-called "Einhardsbogen," a now-lost silver miniature from the St. Servatius church treasury at Maastricht, its appearance conveyed in a seventeenth-century drawing. But even this small model arch is not a copy of a Roman monument, but rather an inventive combination of an antique example of architecture with contemporary religious iconography. Like that of the Lorsch "Torhalle," its original function remains unknown. Triumphal arches were hallmarks for the visualization of imperial power in antiquity, yet no Carolingian copy of them is known. The reason for this may lay in the fact that this type of monument lost its role in course of the sixth century. Beyond that time—with the exception of Byzantium—no triumphal processions including arches are known from written sources.

The examples of Carolingian architecture and art discussed in this paper are not very numerous, yet they represent ain large part of those buildings and objects on which the thesis of a *renovatio romani imperii* under the Rule of Charlemagne is usually based. Many of them have traditionally been understood as copies of Roman originals, but a closer look at these "copies" shows that neither Carolingian art nor architecture can be merely understood as replicas of antique examples. On the contrary,

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42 Ley and Wietheger 2014, 245.
43 Binding 1977, 289.
44 Untermann 2011, 201.
45 The earliest comparison of some details of its decoration can be found in the façade of the baptistery St. Jaen in Poitiers.
46 Untermann 2009, 137.

Figure 4: Lorsch. Limestone composite capital on the façade of the "Torhalle".

they appear to be genuine and innovative products of a period charac-
terized by artistic traditions that were deeply rooted in Late Antiquity, but
combined with an understanding of art and building traditions that were
fundamentally different from those of their predecessors. In this context,
copies played literally no role, because there was no Carolingian con-
cept of copies. They are not mentioned anywhere in ninth-century texts.
Instead, Einhard and his fellow authors often write about buildings erected
under the reign of Charlemagne that are worthy of or appropriate for a
Roman emperor but never comparable to already existing architecture. If
a comparison to ancient buildings is made at all, it only serves to illustrate
that the newly-erected monuments were superior in size, quality, and even
beauty.[47] Likewise, we do not know if sculptures that appear to resemble

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47 Meckseper 2014, 166, 168.

Figure 5: Lorsch. Limestone capital on the façade of the "Torhalle".

older Roman art were perceived as copies in the sense that eighteenth or ninteenth-century art historians understood them. As stated above, most Carolingian objects of art and architecture were based on artistic traditions dating back to the Merovingian and Late Antique periods. Roman art from the second or fourth century was not perceived as "ancient" or even "more valuable" than contemporary art. It was simply part of the cultural frame-work of the ninth century and probably seen more as a quality standard that Carolingian artists tried to follow. In short, Charlemagne's *renevatio imperii* was an attempt to improve the current state of his realm by raising standards. It was not an attempt to revitalize the corpse of an empire fallen long ago by imitating its art and architecture. But such a futile undertaking is know from later times, when Eastern Frankish kings styled themselves as Roman emperors and, in turn, tried to revive the Carolingian Empire by copying its most prominent monument: Some eleventh century copies of the Aachen palace church have been identified, among them the church of *St. Pierre et St. Paul* at Ottmarsheim, which is a very accurate replica of Aachen, only on a slightly smaller scale.[48] But this is a different story of different copies.

In conclusion, it must be stated that the concept of a Carolingian Renaissance as it is currently used by many archaeologists, historians, and art historians is misleading, because it is based on the idea of objects and

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48 Untermann 1999, 167.

architecture that are perceived as early medieval "copies" of Roman "originals". While the term certainly retains its usefulness when applied to Carolingian literature, archaeologists for example should refrain from using it, because such copies are entirely missing within the material culture of the ninth century. Also, this case demonstrates that "copying" terms and definitions coined by authors of neighbouring disciplines introduces a variety of dangers: many concepts are not transferable, since the nature of the studied sources simply differs too much. This seems especially true for the subjects of archaeology and history. In short, copying Renaissances can be seriously misleading!

Figures

Fig. 1: Photo: Author.
Fig. 2: Photo: Author.
Fig. 3: Photo: Author.
Fig. 4: Photo: Author.
Fig. 5: Photo: Author.

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Julia Weber

Copying and Competition: Meissen Porcelain and the Saxon Triumph over the Emperor of China

Abstract It was faithful copies of Japanese porcelain in the Kakiemon style that brought about a crucial change in the appreciation of Meissen porcelain around 1730, two decades after the foundation of the first porcelain manufactory in Europe. The fact that distinguished collectors initially believed them to be East Asian commanded widespread attention and admiration for the Saxon copies in France. It was even stated that some connoisseurs preferred them to the Japanese prototypes. Their unexpected success in Paris, the foremost market for art of the time, also altered the understanding of this native product in Dresden. Convinced that his porcelain had finally trumped the highly-rated imports from the Far East, Augustus the Strong abandoned the plans for his "porcelain palace," the so-called "Japanese Palace:" Henceforth, the central throne gallery of the palace was to be reserved for Meissen copies in the Kakiemon style to testify the superiority of Saxon porcelain. By staging an imaginary public audience of a Far-Eastern delegation whose porcelain gifts he rejected as inferior, Augustus the Strong went so far as to present the success of his unique and much-envied manufactory as a triumph of the Saxon Elector and King in Poland over the almighty Emperor of China. To this end, he eclectically copied and adapted the most successful patterns of absolutist representation in order to emulate previously existing examples of absolutist representation. Being his last, most ambitious, though ultimately unfinished project, the designs for the Japanese Palace sum up Augustus the Strong's constant quest to bolster the royal dignity and imperial aspirations of his dynasty.

Keywords Dresden, Augustus the Strong, Japanese Palace (Dresden), Versailles, Imperial Palace (Beijing)

Copying and competition

When the first Chinese porcelain arrived in Europe in the early sixteenth century, it soon fired in European hearts a desire to find out how to copy this highly-treasured exotic material. Europeans were fascinated by the mysterious processes that turned simple clay into gleaming white translucent wares adorned with enduring and brilliant colors, very delicate and at the same time resistant to heat. Nothing comparable had ever been produced in Europe. When, in 1710—after two hundred years of vain experimentation—Augustus the Strong proudly announced the establishment of Europe's first porcelain manufactory at Meissen, it was a major triumph for the Elector of Saxony and King in Poland. The royal manufactory was a unique trump card that distinguished him from all other European princes. For two decades after the manufactory at Meissen was founded (during which time the method and techniques for making porcelain were mastered), East Asian porcelain remained the model against which the new Saxon products had to compete. Within a very short time, Augustus the Strong assembled the largest collection of Chinese and Japanese porcelain in Europe, which served his manufactory as a permanent source of inspiration, stimulus, and incentive. The Saxons honed their skills and recipes by making copies, which made it easy for all concerned to compare the quality of the new Saxon porcelain with the much-admired East Asian wares. The contest between the copies and their prototypes is reflected in the design of the Japanese Palace, which is situated on the northern bank of the Elbe in Dresden's New Town ("Neustadt"), in which Augustus the Strong planned to house and display his enormous collection (fig. 1).

Figure 1: Japanese Palace in Dresden's New Town, 1727–1733.

Once his royal manufactory was finally capable of imitating not only the smallest and simplest, but also the biggest and most technically-demanding Far Eastern pieces, the former *maison de plaisance* was extended to residence-like proportions with four wings surrounding an inner courtyard. Surviving floor plans and elevations dating from 1730 reveal that the walls of each room were supposed to be decked out with porcelain of a certain type and color (fig. 2).[1] Augustus the Strong was the only European ruler capable of designing and carrying out such an ambitious project, because only he was able to add to his immense yet still insufficient stock of East Asian porcelain by ordering the necessary complementary pieces from his own royal manufactory.


Figure 2: Japanese Palace, floor plan of the upper floor, 1730.

In March 1730, the king submitted an initial commission to Meissen for nearly fifteen hundred vases and dishes after East Asian examples.[2] As can be gathered from surviving drawings and contemporary documents, the initial plan was to show the copies side by side with their prototypes.

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1   For a valuable outline of the Japanese Palace's history, see Wittwer 2004, 32–58.
2   The order list is published in Wittwer 2004, 257. For additional documents concerning this royal commission, see Boltz 1980, 20.

For the two corner rooms on the upper floor, for instance, where vases in blue and gold were to be displayed, at least twenty-six so-called birdcage vases—easily recognizable on the elevations for their characteristic outlines—were needed to complete the symmetrical wall compositions (figs. 3–4). Yet the inventory of the royal collection lists only twenty of these extremely rare Japanese pieces.[3]

Figure 3: Birdcage vase, Japan, ca. 1700.

In his commission, the king therefore asked for additional "birdcages" painted in blue and gold to compensate for the lack of originals. The palace's castellan responsible for coordinating deliveries from Meissen would also have shown visitors around the Japanese Palace. When he pointed out to guests that these exact copies were actually produced in Meissen, they would have been compelled to acknowledge that the astoundingly deceptive Saxon porcelain was indeed the equal of the much-admired and hitherto unique imports from China and Japan.

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3   Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, archive of the Porzellansammlung, inventory no. 234, 348–349.

Figure 4: Japanese Palace, elevation of one wall of the corner room in the upper floor for vases in gold and blue, 1729.

Fakes for the Parisian art market: A turning point

Even before the year 1730 was out, however, the plans for the Japanese Palace, then still under construction, were completely revised to mirror a new understanding and appreciation of Saxon porcelain that had its roots in a scandal derived from the practice of marketing Meissen copies as East Asian originals.[4] Since 1729, a Parisian dealer by the name of Rodolphe Lemaire had been ordering exact copies of (mainly) old Japanese porcelain in the Kakiemon style (fig. 5).

This was then very popular in France, but since it was no longer being produced in Japan, it could only be bought second-hand and at high prices. That Lemaire's aim was to reap large profits by selling the Meissen copies in Paris as Japanese originals was obvious from the beginning, because

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4   For an extensive discussion of this aspect citing all relevant archival documents as well as prior literature on this topic, see Weber 2013, vol. 1, 33–59.

Figure 5: Meissen six-sided vase copying a Japanese example in the Kakiemon style, Meissen porcelain manufactory, ca. 1729/1731.

he expressly asked for his pieces not to be marked on the underside with crossed swords.[5] At first, Lemaire received Meissen porcelain with no marks at all or with pseudo-Chinese letters as he had requested. Not long afterward, however, Augustus the Strong ordered that every single piece had to be marked with the crossed swords, explicitly stating that the pieces for Lemaire were also to bear this mark, in order to prevent the French merchant from continuing to sell them as anything other than Saxon porcelain. Understandably, the king was interested in promoting the products of his unique manufactory all over Europe. Nevertheless, Lemaire managed to obtain copies with the crossed swords in blue enamel on the glaze and not under the glaze, as was customary (figs. 6–7).

The suspicion that immediately springs to mind is confirmed by a hitherto overlooked document in the Dresden archive, the duplicate of a

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5   This mark, derived from the Saxon coat of arms, would have clearly indicated Saxon provenance.

Figure 6: Meissen cups and saucers copying Japanese examples in the Kakiemon style, Meissen porcelain manufactory, ca. 1729/1731.

Figure 7: Meissen crossed swords mark in blue enamel overglaze on one of the saucers in fig. 6.

letter by an anonymous Frenchman and self-appointed specialist for the Saxon court who makes reference to the Parisian trade in Meissen copies of East Asian prototypes. The writer begins by praising Saxon porcelain, the standard of which had by then equalled—and in some respects

even outstripped—that of the Far-Eastern imports. He assures his reader that the Japanese originals are by no means better than the Saxon copies, as is shown by the fact that even the most distinguished of connoisseurs is wont to err when confronted with the latter. This, he continues, was proven by the example of a certain porcelain dealer called Plâtrier who had rubbed off the Saxon marks (in blue enamel on the glaze) with the help of a diamond and had succeeded in passing them off as originals to the Marquis de la Faye, the Countess de Verrue, the marshal d'Estrée, and the Duc de Gramont—amongst a number of other Parisian *amateurs* and merchants.[6] The fact that highly-respected collectors had initially believed them to be East Asian attracted widespread attention and provoked even greater admiration for the Saxon copies in Paris. An article in the *Mercure de France* of February 1731 also states that the quality of the Meissen copies was such that the most skilful connoisseurs were often duped by them, even preferring them to Far Eastern originals—to the outrage of a number of stubborn *amateurs* still devoted to the East Asian wares.[7]

Reconception of the Japanese Palace in Dresden

The unexpected success of the Meissen copies in Paris, the foremost art market of the time, did not go unnoticed in Saxony, where it led to a new evaluation and understanding of the local product. Augustus the

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6   "Les porcelaines de Saxe sont parvenües à un dégré de perfection, qui égalle celle des anciennes de la Chine et du Japon et même quelquefois les èffacent tant pour la blancheur de la paste que par leur poid. [...] L'ancienne porcelaine de Indes á cause de sa rareté est cent fois plus chere que celle de Saxe, et cependant elle n'est guere plus belle, puisque les plus fins connoisseurs sy trompent souvent, témoin l'exemple du nommé Plátrier marchand de porcelaine à Paris qui en a vendu plusieurs fois à M. Delafayë, à Madame de Verruë, à M. Le Maréchal d'Estré, à M Le Duc de Granmond, et à un nombre d'amateurs et de marchands de Paris. Il est vray que l'on assure qu'il en ostoit la marque de Saxe avec un Diamant, et que cela luy à attiré de facheuses affaires, et alterré sa réputation." Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10026 Geheimes Kabinett, Loc. 1341/4, fols. 45a–45b.
7   "Nous ne connoissons pas cette nouvelle Manufacture de Porcelaines à Vienne, mais pour celle qui est établie à Dresde, Capitale de l'Electorat de Saxe, nous osons assurer sans craindre qu'on puisse nous accuser d'exagerer, qu'elle a fait un tel progrés depuis deux ou trois ans, qu'on a envoyé de Paris des Modeles, des Desseins et des personnes intelligentes, qu'il en vient aujourd'hui quantité de Pieces comparables à ce qui vient de plus beau de la Chine et du Japon, et communément de plus belles formes, les Figures, les Animaux, les Arbres, les Plantes et les Fleurs, &c. mieux dessinez et plus de varieté et d'union dans les couleurs; les Reliefs, Broderies et Ornemens, sont traitez avec beaucoup de cimétrie, de précision et de goût; de telle sorte que les plus habiles Connoisseurs sont souvent en deffaut, prenant cette nouvelle Porcelaine pour l'ancienne, et souvent même lui donnent la préference, au grand scandale de divers Curieux d'un gout trop rafiné, ou peut-être mal sûr, et en qui abonde quelquefois plus d'entêtement ou d'ostentation que de justesse, et qui esclaves du préjugé, lui laissent exercer sans la moindre résistance, toute sa tyrannie [...]." *Mercure de France* (February 1731), 329.

Strong quickly became convinced that his porcelain not only equalled but also surpassed the East Asian wares. Henceforth the Saxon porcelain was to be displayed separately in the *piano nobile* of the Japanese Palace, as is first documented in a well-informed travel report by Johann Georg Keyssler dating from 23 October, 1730.[8] Keyssler reports that the porcelain intended for the central hall of the upper floor, the throne gallery (fig. 8), was none other than the Meissen porcelain in the old Indian style, that is, the very same Meissen copies in the Kakiemon style that were so sought after in Paris.


Figure 8: Japanese Palace, floor plan of the upper floor, 1730.

Although the plans were never realised, a written concept for the intended iconographic programme of the throne gallery has survived.[9] The concept was based on the imaginary idea of Augustus the Strong receiving a delegation from the Far East bringing with them examples of their renowned porcelain as diplomatic gifts. These highly-treasured exotica were to be judged by Minerva, the goddess of wisdom and the patron of the arts, and compared with the Meissen porcelain presented by Saxonia. Minerva was

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8   The relevant passage is published in Wittwer 2004, 255–256.
9   Published in Wittwer 2004, 256–257.

to give the crown to the latter, rejecting the gifts offered by the visiting delegation as inferior. Allegorical figures representing Jealousy and Chagrin were to give a sign to the Japanese to take their porcelain back home, as there was no longer any need for it, now that the Meissen manufactory could satisfy European demand. Augustus the Strong was convinced that Saxony was about to be enthroned as king of Europe's lucrative porcelain market. The Meissen copies in the Kakiemon style that had conquered Paris and were to be displayed on the walls of the throne gallery were supposed to serve as actual proof of the Saxon victory.

Even before entering the Japanese Palace, the visitor was to be introduced to the crucial message of Saxony's triumph. In accordance with the redesign of the interior, the leading court architect Jean de Bodt drew up a new scheme for the facade, featuring an allegorical relief in the entrance pediment (figs. 9–10), at the centre of which Saxonia sits enthroned, the palm trees casting their shadows upon her, already promising her victory.


Figure 9: Japanese Palace, elevation of the front side by Jean de Bodt, 1730.

Saxonia looks down from her throne to the Asians on her right, humbly presenting their shipment of porcelain. The Saxons approach with their vases and vessels from the left. In contrast to the Asian kneeling opposite her, the personification of Dresden—bearing a mural crown—confidently places one foot on the first step to the throne. The facade thus anticipates the outcome of the competition that was supposedly carried out inside. The acroteria just over the depictions of the rivers Yangtze and Elbe in the two corners of the pediment represent Asia and Europe, thus turning the encounter into a contest between what were considered the two most developed continents of the time, with Saxony defending Europe's preeminence. In their turn, the coat of arms and the royal crown just underneath the personification of Saxony were to ensure the identification of the land with the Saxon elector and "king in Poland." The two small flanking reliefs displaying allegories of the arts of modelling porcelain and

decorating the fired wares, which were likewise not executed, were to show that the celebrated Saxon triumph was ultimately based on the success of the Meissen manufactory.

Figure 10: Detail of fig. 9.

A tour of the projected new interiors

Having entered the Japanese Palace, the visitor was first to marvel at the quality and diversity of Augustus the Strong's Chinese and Japanese porcelain, "which for beauty, & quantity exceed[ed] any other collection of Europe."[10] The East Asian works, grouped according to types and colors in the rooms of the ground floor, set widely-admired standards which were to be outrivalled by the Meissen porcelain on the *piano nobile*. Stepping out of the stairwell into the gallery of the upper floor facing Dresden's New Town, the guest would have first been confronted with monumental Meissen figures and vases fit for demonstrating what the Saxon genius could—on the basis of European artistic principles—make of this exotic material: first and foremost, namely, the gallery was to house a complete menagerie of life-size porcelain animals which were without precedent even in China (fig. 11).[11]

The culmination of the circuit, however, was the grand throne gallery overlooking the garden and the Elbe, which was so designed as

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10 Quotation from a travel report by the English clergyman Jeremiah Milles of 1736; the relevant passage is published in Weber 2013, vol. 1, 127–128.
11 For a profound discussion of this menagerie of porcelain in the context of the Japanese Palace, see Wittwer 2004, 212–216.

Figure 11: Saber-toothed tiger, Meissen porcelain manufactory,
model by Gottlieb Kirchner, ca. 1733.

to stand at the centre of a sequence of rooms with the layout of a state apartment in a princely residence.[12] Before arriving there, the visitor had to traverse an exceptionally long enfilade of four antechambers.[13] In the floor plan of 1730, these are inscribed with different colors in accordance with the Meissen porcelain to be displayed on consoles on the walls (fig. 8). While the vases and dishes in these rooms were painted with the ground color allocated to the room, the reserves on all the pieces bore decoration in the Kakiemon style, thus anticipating the dominant motif of the throne gallery (fig. 12).

In addition to the abovementioned travel report from 1730, the present essay will draw on two principal sources in order to reconstruct the projected interior of the throne gallery: firstly, the designs for the end walls from the same year by the Dresden court architect Zacharias Longuelune, which the king approved with a "fi[at] AR" (figs. 13–14) and secondly,

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12 See Wittwer 2004, 156–157.
13 See Pozsgai 2008. In German-speaking countries, two antechambers that could be preceded by a dining room were customary.

Figure 12: Bottles and dishes with celadon green ground color for the Japanese Palace, Meissen porcelain manufactory, ca. 1730/1735.

Longuelune's written "Explication de la Galerie du Palais du Japon à la Ville neuve,"[14] which he composed a few years later, at around 1734/35, by which time Augustus the Strong had died without carrying out his ambitious plans. Upon his death on 1 February, 1733, all that was more or less completed was the building structure.

For the time being, his scheme was adhered to by his son and successor Augustus III. As Longuelune, who was commissioned with a final series of designs, changed his 1730 plans only in certain details, it can be assumed that the "explanation" of the throne gallery of 1734/35 does in fact still reflect Augustus the Strong's original intentions.[15]

In October 1730, Keyssler noted that the visitor coming from the enfilade of antechambers then entered the grand gallery, which measured around 74 metres in length. On entering, he was supposed to see first a domed canopy with a carillon of porcelain bells suspended underneath it. To Keyssler's astonishment, the place underneath the canopy usually reserved for a chair was intended to be taken by a clock that was big

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14 See footnote 9.
15 See Wittwer 2004, 44 and 53; Baur 2014, 212–214, 243. For Longuelune's final series of designs, see Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10006 (OHMA), P, Cap. II, Nr. 15, fols. 22a, 22e, 23l, 23i, 24a, 24b, 24d, 24e, 25b. Individual drawings are reproduced in Franz 1953, figs. 94–96, 98, 99, 101, 104 and Wittwer 2004, figs. 37, 39.

Figure 13: Japanese Palace, elevation of the wall with the clock in one of
the corner rooms of the upper floor, by Zacharias Longuelune, 1730.

enough to hide an organist playing the carillon.[16] According to Longuelune,
the corner room with the clock which opened onto the slightly smaller mid-
dle section of the gallery was to be dedicated to the sun as the regulator
of day and night, so that all ornaments had to relate to Apollo. The iden-
tification of the Roman sun god with the Saxon-Polish king would have
been ensured by the cypher "AR" on the front of the canopy, in line with
the head of Apollo on top of it (fig. 13). For the ceiling painting, Longuelune

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16 "Hierauf folget die große Galerie von obiger Höhe und zwey hundert und
 sechszig Fuß in der Länge. Gleich beim Eintritte derselben wird sich ein großer
 Baldachin zeigen, worunter ein Glockenspiel von Porzellan hängt. Wo sonst der
 Stuhl seyn sollte, wird eine Uhr, die sechs Fuß in ihrer Höhe hat, stehen, und
 hinter derselben wird ein verborgener Platz für einen Organisten, der das Glock-
 enspiel regieren kann, angeleget seyn." Quoted in Wittwer 2004, 255.

Figure 14: Japanese Palace, elevation of the wall with the throne in one of the corner rooms of the upper floor, by Zacharias Longuelune, 1730.

recommends representing the sun at its zenith, pouring out its rays and benefits on representatives of all the nations.[17]

At the far end of the gallery, exactly opposite the clock, an eight-metre-tall throne made of porcelain was to stand under a domed canopy with a palm tree at its back, exactly as shown in the front pediment of the Japanese Palace (fig. 14). As Longuelune states, this emblem signified that the benefits of wars, victories, and fortunate negotiations regarding the interests of states and kingdoms were due to and resulted from the just

17 "Comme le Salon du Klocken-Spiel, ou doit être l'Orloge est /: pour ainsi dire:/ consacré au Soleil, qui régle les jours et les heures, tous les ornements doivent avoir du raport à Apollon. [...] Dans le Plafond du même salon, on pourra y repre-senter le Soleil au plus haut de sa course, répondant sa lumiere et ses benignes influences sur toutes les Nations; les diferents caracteres des têtes de chaque nation, et leurs habillements diferents, contribueront beaucoup à donner de la varieté au sujet, joint aux alégories qu'un habile Peintre y saura ajoûter." Säch-sisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10026 Geheimes Kabinett, Loc. 895/11, fols. 1a/b, 1b/a. The quotation in Wittwer 2004, 256 is incomplete.

resolutions and orders emanating from the throne and the royal counsel. The heads on the lambrequin of the dais in turn represented the different human affects that were subordinated to the throne as mere ornaments.[18] The king could hush them by listening to Sapientia and Prudentia, who would be seen sitting on either side of the throne. If one looks closely at Longuelune's drawing of 1730, one can see that the throne was originally to be flanked by Justice and Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom. This placed emphasis on the latter, who was also to be the protagonist of the ceiling painting in the scheme proposed by Longuelune, who suggested that the dispute between Minerva and Neptune concerning the naming of the city Athens should be the subject of the ceiling; this would have allowed for the depiction of all the gods of Olympus.[19]

Before the eyes of all nations at one end of the gallery, and of all the gods at the other end, the rivalry between the Saxon and East Asian porcelain was to be settled once and for all:

> The ceiling of the gallery between the two cabinets will be divided into three sections. The middle one will represent Saxony and Japan in the presence of Minerva, competing for the preference and the perfection of their porcelain manufactories. They will be accompanied by Emulation, Taste, Invention, Imitation, Painting, Sculpture and all that contributes to the beauty of works of this kind. The goddess will put the crown, or the prize of the dispute, into the hands of Saxony. And Jealousy and Chagrin will make a sign to suggest to Japan that they should put back their porcelain vases onto the ships that had brought them. [...] The two other sections of the ceiling will represent the arts and manufactories set up in Saxony on the one side and the advantageous products of Nature born or created in the country on the other.[20]

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18 "Dans le fond du Trône, on y a representé en bas relief un grand Palmier, duquel la Victoire vient de cueillir une branche, pour marquer les avantages qui se remporte dans les Batailles, par les victoires: [...]. Le sens de cette Embléme signifie, que les avantages des Guerres, des Victoires, et des Negociations heureuses, qui regardent les interrets des Etats, et des Roïaumes, sont duës, et viennent ordinairement des justes resolutions, et des ordres qui émanent du Trône et du Conseil des Rois. On a mis dans le Cartouche au dessus du Dais les Armes de Pologne et de Saxe, ornez de Palmes et d'Oliviers, les Têtes, qui l'enrichit, representent les diferentes passions des hommes, pour montrer qu'elles sont assujetties au Trône, qu'elles n'y servent que d'ornements, et que les Souverains en y montant, savent les faire taire, en n'écoutant plus que la sagesse et la prudence; qui sont representées par les deux statuës qui sont aux deux côtez du Trône. [...] On pourra peindre dans le Plafond la dispute entre Minerva et Neptune, touchant la nomination de la Ville d'Athéne: C'est un grand sujet puisqu'on y peut representer tous les Dieux du Paganisme, et un Peintre savant, y pourra joindre des ornements et des alégories ingenieuses." Quoted in Wittwer 2004, 256.

19 See footnote 18.

20 "Le Plafond de la Galerie entre les deux Salons, sera partagé en trois parties, celle du milieu representera la Saxe et le Japon, qui disputent ensemble, en presence de Minerve, sur la preference, et la perfection des ouvrages de leurs manifactures de Porcelaines; Elles seront accompagnées de l'Émulation, du Goût, de

The central ceiling of the throne gallery was to maintain the theme of the pediment relief over the entrance. The assumed victory of the Saxon porcelain over the imports from the Far East which, in the eyes of Augustus the Strong, had been achieved through the unexpected success of deceptively perfect Meissen copies was the core idea of the newly-conceived Japanese Palace that would convince all its visitors. In the following, an attempt shall be made to decode the complex message built around this crucial if imaginary triumph. The analysis will thereby exemplify that the visual reasoning made use of another type of copying: the eclectic quotation of different successful patterns of representation which were fused in order to surpass previously existing examples of absolutist representation.

The example of the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles

In architectural terms, the setting of the throne at the end of a long gallery extending over an entire wing of the building was exceptional. This feature of the Japanese Palace cites a prominent example which would have been familiar not only to the French-trained architects at the Dresden court, but also to Augustus the Strong, who had been introduced to Louis XIV in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles during his grand tour.[21] Usually the French king received envoys from European rulers standing up in the state bedroom (fig. 15: H5) or, less frequently, in the adjacent cabinet (fig. 15: H6) of the *Appartement du Roi* surrounding the inner courtyard.[22]

Non-European ambassadors, who first arrived in France during the reign of Louis XIV, were granted an audience in the *Salon d'Apollon* (fig. 15: K3) of the *Grand Appartement* in the northern wing, where the King awaited them enthroned "*en majesté*."[23] On a few occasions, however, the Hall of Mirrors (fig. 15: K1) served as the venue for extraordinary audiences which attracted great public attention.[24] This is why—as Hendrik Ziegler asserts—this *Galerie des Glaces* became, in the collective memory, a place where the highest ranking acts of state and ceremonial performances of the king had taken place.[25]

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l'Invention, de l'Imitation, de la Peinture, de la Sculpture, et de tout ce qui contribuë à la beauté de ces sortes d'ouvrages: La Déesse remettra entre les mains de la Saxe, la Couronne, ou le prix de la dispute; et la jalousie, et le depit feront signe, et sugéreront au Japon de faire rembarquer ses Vases de Porcelaines, sur les Vaisseaux qui les ont aportez. [...] Les deux autres parties du Plafond, representeront d'un côté, les Arts, et les Manifactures établies en Saxe, et de l'autre les productions avantageuses de la Nature, qui naissent, et qui sont produite dans le Païs." Quoted in Wittwer 2004, 257.

21 See Ziegler 2010, 174–175.
22 See Castelluccio 2006, 24–25.
23 See Sabatier 2009, 192, 196–200.
24 See Love 1996, 173; Castelluccio 2006, 28–33; Castelluccio 2007, 114–125.
25 Ziegler 2010, 154.

Figure 15: Versailles, floor plan of the upper floor (detail), published in the fourth volume of Jacques-François Blondel's *Architecture Françoise* of 1756.

On 1 September, 1686, Louis XIV was honored with an embassy from the remote land of Siam.[26] The delegation was escorted up the *Escalier des Ambassadeurs* to the upper floor, where it had to traverse the enfilade of the state apartment in its entirety, as far as the *Salon de la Guerre* (fig. 15: K2) and then turn left before catching its first glimpse of the French king enthroned at the far end of the long gallery. A crowd of distinguished courtiers formed a guard of honor for the envoys as they approached the king while performing the Siamese "*wai*", a repeated deep bow (fig. 16).

According to a detailed analysis by Ronald S. Love, on this occasion Louis XIV was in many respects imitating the very sophisticated Siamese ceremonial—from the sounds of trumpets and drums announcing the delegation and the spatial *mise en scène* of the ritual acts, through the courteous nods with which the king saluted his guests, not to mention his golden robe adorned with prodigiously large diamonds, which obviously resembled the one worn by Phra Narai, the Siamese king, during his audiences. In this way, Louis XIV presented himself "not as a European prince constrained by fundamental laws and the privileges of corporate bodies, but as an omnipotent Asian despot, equal to Phra Narai in power, wealth, remoteness from his subjects and even personal divinity."[27] The *Mercure galant* published an extensive, twenty-six page description of the events that were

Figure 16: Versailles, reception of the Siamese delegation,
drawing attributed to Charles le Brun, ca. 1686.

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26 The following paragraph draws on the most extensive account and discussion of this embassy, as given in Love 1996.
27 Love 1996, 173.

then illustrated in several almanacs the following year. There can be no doubt that Augustus the Strong heard about this exceptional spectacle when visiting Versailles only a few months later, in June 1686. The staging of the Siamese audience was more or less copied in February 1715, when a delegation from Persia arrived at Versailles. This time, the magnificent ceremony was attended by Augustus the Strong's son (likewise on his grand tour), who would certainly have reported the details about it to his father.[28]

Augustus the Strong actually copied this set up by adopting the same arrangement of rooms for the upper floor of the Japanese Palace, thus making his throne gallery analogous to the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, with its two flanking corner rooms (figs. 8 and 15). A visiting delegation would likewise have had to walk the long enfilade in one wing of the palace and turn right (rather than left) before beholding the elevated throne at the far end of an elongated gallery. Just like Louis XIV, Augustus the Strong wished to present himself as equal to an Asian absolute ruler, which is why he transferred the highly symbolic *mise en scène* from Versailles to Dresden, in a core idea that was actually of constitutive importance for the design of the Japanese Palace because the building that had formerly been no more than a *maison de plaisance* would not only feature a residence-like state apartment suitable for ceremonies of the highest rank, but also boasted a general layout with four wings surrounding an inner courtyard that gave it the character of a small princely residence where public audiences usually took place, as did its prominent position in the ideal Baroque complex of Dresden's New Town, on the northern bank of the Elbe.[29]

Unlike Louis XIV, however, Augustus the Strong certainly could not hope for the arrival of a real delegation from the Far East. The ideal setting for the reception of such a delegation in the Japanese Palace therefore had to be utopian. In fact, because an imaginary audience was unaffected by any possible ceremonial conflicts, this made the venue a perfect platform on which to enact the competition between the Saxon and the Far-Eastern porcelain as a shorthand for the more significant contest between the Saxon-Polish ruler and the Emperor of China. In spite of this, it was in fact copies of Japanese, and not Chinese, porcelain that were to prove Saxony's superiority, reminding us that no great distinction was then made between porcelain from China and porcelain from Japan, both of which were often called "Indian."[30] It was, in fact, the Chinese Emperor who was considered the only ruler so far to have mastered the prestigious art of porcelain production virtually at will.

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28 See Castelluccio 2006, 37–44.
29 For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see Weber 2013, vol. 1, 76–78.
30 See Weber 2013, vol. 2, 44.

Daring the Emperor of China

In order to unmistakably challenge the ruler of the "Middle Kingdom," however, it was planned to also embed significant copies of exceptional Chinese porcelain ordered by the imperial court into the "Siamese-French" spatial setting. Augustus the Strong's attempts to compete directly with the Chinese Emperor in the art of porcelain making had thereby started well before this re-conception of the Japanese Palace: in two widely-read letters from the province of Jao-Tcheou published in 1717, the French Jesuit missionary François Xavier d'Entrecolles reported in detail on the production of porcelain in China. Amongst other things, he wrote with great admiration about pieces that astounded foreigners because they could not believe that such difficult objects could actually be made. In one example, Entrecolles refers to a lantern made for the crown prince which was of such delicacy that a whole room could be lit by a single flame within it.[31] It must have been this passage that incited Augustus the Strong to order copies of Chinese lanterns of this kind from Meissen, which he insisted on doing repeatedly, even though more than forty attempts made between 1724 and 1727 failed, the thin sides cracking again and again upon firing.[32] When, finally, a single lantern was delivered to the King, its sides were too thick to be translucent (fig. 17).

As Entrecolles continued, "This same [crown] prince also commissioned different musical instruments, amongst others a type of small organ called *tsem* that measured nearly one foot in height and was composed of fourteen pipes [...] but it was worked upon in vain."[33] Again, Augustus the Strong felt defiant and wanted his manufactory to succeed where the imperial Chinese manufactory had failed. From January 1732, the Meissen modellers worked on organ pipes intended for the chapel of the Japanese Palace, but failed once again, as it proved impossible to fire pipes that would produce just the right pitches.[34] According to Entrecolles, the Chinese were more successful with flutes, flageolets, and a carillon made of porcelain to order for the same Chinese crown prince. The Jesuit also alludes to the difficulties involved in producing bells which would strike precisely the right

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31 "car il ne faut pas croire que les ouvriers puissent travailler sur tous les modeles qui leur viennent des payis étrangers. Il y en a d'impraticables à la Chine, de mesme qu'il s'y fait des ouvrages qui surprennent les étrangers, & qu'ils ne croyent pas possibles. En voicy quelques exemples. J'ay vû icy un fanal ou une grosse lanterne de porcelaine qui estoit d'une seule piece, au travers de laquelle un flambeau éclairoit toute une chambre: cet ouvrage fut commandé il y a sept ou huit ans par le Prince heritier." d'Entrecolles 1717, 338–339.

32 See Boltz 1995, 22–23, 32–33; Weber 2013, vol. 1, 27.

33 "Ce mesme Prince commanda aussi divers instrumens de Musique, entre autres une espece de petite orgue appellée tsem, qui a prés d'un pied de hauteur, & qui est composée de quatorze tuyaux, dont l'harmonie est assez agréable: mais ce fut inutilement qu'on y travailla." d'Entrecolles 1717, 339.

34 See Weber 2013, vol. 1, 64 and 71.

Figure 17: Meissen lantern copying a Chinese example,
Meissen porcelain manufactory, 1727.

notes.[35] Not surprisingly, Augustus the Strong also ordered a carillon made of porcelain for the Japanese Palace. As mentioned above, this was to be suspended from a domed canopy at the far end of the gallery from the throne. This arrangement also imitated a significant element known to be part of Chinese court ceremonials: as travel reports recorded, it was the sound of a bell that marked the start of an audience with the Emperor of

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35 "On réüssit mieux aux flustes douces, aux flageollets, & à un autre instrument qu'on nomme yun lo, qui est composé de diverses petites plaques rondes un peu concaves, dont chacune rend un son particulier: On en suspend neuf dans un quadre à divers étages qu'on touche avec des baguettes comme le tympanon; il se fait un petit carillon qui s'accorde avec le son des autres instrumens, & avec la voix des Musiciens. Il a fallu, dit on, faire beaucoup d'épreuves, afin de trouver l'épaisseur & le degré de cuisson convenables, pour avoir tous les tons nécessaires à un accord. Je m'imaginois qu'on avoit le secret d'inserer un peu de métal dans le corps de ces porcelaines, pour varier les sons: mais on m'a détrompé." d'Entrecolles 1717, 339–340.

China.[36] At the Japanese Palace, the intention was that the envoy would hear the sound of chimes secretly played by a hidden musician just as he caught sight of the distant throne for the first time.

Augustus the Strong's intention of daring the Chinese Emperor is demonstrated by other quotations: apart from these copies of exceptional Chinese musical instruments which were to serve as visual references to the court at Beijing, the clock—unusually placed under the canopy with the suspended carillon as a counterpoint to the throne—was a means of emulating the legendary ruler of China. Contemporary travel reports noted that chiming clocks had facilitated the Jesuit missionaries' access to the Beijing residence, when they were invited to explain the clocks' invisible striking mechanisms.[37] So amazed were the Chinese that they called chiming clocks "bell ringing itself;" Emperor Wanli even had a tower built in his pleasure gardens especially for one of them.[38] The Chinese emperors were highly interested in the European science of horology and its partner astronomy, one characteristic of European clocks being that they often indicated the course of the planets in addition to the time. When explaining his "Throne of the Great Moghul" (see the contribution by Corinna Forberg in this volume), Dinglinger emphasized that reliable forecasts of the sun's and moon's orbits were crucial to the Chinese,[39] as they allowed the Emperor to claim and maintain the Celestial

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36 "Whilst we were beholding with admiration all the Pomp and Splendor of this Court, we heard the noise and jingling of a little Bell, sounding sweet and delightful to the Ear. Hardly had this Clock or Bell finish'd the Alarm, but we saw the old *Tutang,* with thirty of the most eminent Persons and chief Councellors of the Empire, in very rich Habits, go and make their Obedience in great State and Humility to the Emperor's Throne."

37 See Maurice 1980, 34–37; Nieuhof 1673, 118.

38 "Ehe die drey tag gar verlauffen / hat der König nach den Uhren gefragt/so man ihme alsbald gebracht. Un haben ime dermassen gefallen / das er den Verschnittnen das Ampt und den Sold gebessert / welches sie den unserigen bald mit frewden angezeit. Unnd kommen noch heutigs tags täglich dero zwen zum König / das kleiner Uhrwerck zu richten / dann ers siehts im gesicht / unnd ein grosse frewd darmit hat. ... Die grösser Uhr hat im Palast/ auß mangl gnugsamer Höhe zu den Gewichten / niendert platz gefunden / derowegen der König bevolhen/ihr/ in einem schönen lustgarten ausserhalb der andern mawren/ darinn sonst auch vilkostliche sachen zusehen/einen Thurm zu bawen/darzu die unserigen die visier gemacht. Und sagt man der König komme offt dahin / wie auch andere fürneme Personen / welche alle ein grosse Frewd daran haben. [...] Es haben auch die Uhrrichter starck angehalten/die Patres dort zubehalten/ dann sie besorgt/wann die Uhr mangelhafft wurd / möchten sie in unglück kommen/so gar lieb war sie dem König. Welches er wol erzeigt/da sein Mutter an ihne geschickt/und das Glöclin so sich selb leitte (also nennt man die Schlaguhrn in China) zu sehen begert. Dann demnach er besorgt sie werds gar behalten wollen/und er ihrs mit fugen nicht abschlagen künden / hat er bevolhen/man soll sie ablauffen lassen / und ihr also bringen. Weil sie sich dann nicht gerührt/hats die alt Königin veracht/ und dem Sohn wider geschickt." Trigault 1617, 331–332 and 344.

39 "Ueber der Pussa ist in der Mitten / der Globus Coelestis / mit allen seinen Signis, der sich zwischen denen drey Ecken der Pyramiden auf allen Seiten drehet, welches von dem Astronomischen Studio der Sineser ein klares Zeugnis giebt, sintemahl die Betrachtung des Himmels und genaue Observirung des

Mandate. As European methods of calculating the times of solar eclipses proved superior to the Chinese ones, Jesuits ascended to the highest offices at the imperial court.[40] When Augustus the Strong dedicated the corner room (with its accompanying clock) to the sun, as the regulator of day and night, it was precisely this European scientific superiority that he was alluding to. While the clock referred to European supremacy with respect to mechanical instruments and astronomy, the porcelain carillon opened the contest with a discipline that had—thus far—been monopolized by the Chinese.

Finally, another element that can likewise be understood as a meaningful sign in the competition between the Saxon-Polish king and the Chinese emperor is the empty throne. As stated above, because Augustus the Strong could not expect a real delegation from China to come to Dresden, he would never actually have used the throne—which was likewise to be made of porcelain—during an audience. Nevertheless, analogue to royal portraits (again, see Forberg), the ruler was believed to be symbolically present in the empty throne which, even in his absence, had to be approached with appropriate respect and obeisance.[41] In China, where the emperor hardly appeared in public at all, the reverence shown to the empty throne was of pivotal importance for court ceremonies. European observers took the fact that the Emperor of China continued to be worshipped even in his absence as further evidence for his absolute and godlike sovereignty: "They prostrate themselves not only in his presence but also before his armchair and his throne. They even kneel down when they see his clothes and his belt. His orders are sacred and his will is observed as if he had descended from the sky."[42] It therefore seems plausible that the empty throne in the Japanese Palace was similarly intended to demonstrate the almighty power of the physically absent but symbolically present Saxon-Polish king, who considered himself in a position to defy even the Emperor of China.

Lauffs der Sonnen, Monds und Sterne diese Völker allerältester Wissenschaft ist, darinnen diejenigen, so durch Erbrecht dazu bestimmet, sich sehr fleissig exerciren, und besteht deren vornehmstes Amt darinnen, dass sie den Lauff der Sonnen und des Mondes wie auch der Finsternüsse sorgfältigst ausrechnen und den Neu-Mond und andere Mond-Aspecten ganz accurat aufzeichnen, nachmals ihre Observationes durchs ganze Reich ausbreiten und anzeigen, was bey jedweder Zeit zu thun oder zu unterlassen." Quoted in Watzdorf 1962, vol. 2, 396.

40 See Klaue 1997, 109, 111 and 122; Schuster-Fox 2009, 123–127.
41 See Winkler 1993, 160–167; Sander 2004.
42 "Ils se prosternent non seulement en sa presence, mais encore devant son fauteüil & devant son trône; ils se mettent même à genoux à la vûë de son habit ou de sa ceinture; ses ordres sont sacrez, & sa volonté est écoutée comme s'il étoit descendu du Ciel." Le Comte 1700, 37–38.

The setting of an imaginary audience

Creating an idealized setting for an imaginary audience was, in fact, a brilliant way of staging the rivalry between two rulers. In the early modern period, public audiences were highly competitive ceremonial acts in the course of which the rank of sovereigns was visually demonstrated for those in attendance. Such audiences, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has noted, consisted of nothing but the exchange of carefully measured symbolic messages. Every reverence accorded or denied to the visiting representative of a sovereign or the receiving prince was significant.[43] Exactly how competitive this spectacle was is indicated in the section on public audiences in the second volume of Friedrich Carl Moser's *Teutsches Hof=Recht* (German Court Law) published in 1755: "This matter belongs to the most common and most delicate ones at court. It is the most frequent cause of irritation and of loss of dignity, or, if it is managed cleverly, of increases in the same."[44]

The imaginary audience was a perfect backdrop for a trial of strength with the ruler of the "Middle Kingdom," whose absolute sovereignty crystalized best during receptions, as the French Jesuit Louis Le Comte described tellingly in his travel report of 1696:

> But the King of China never appears greater, then when he gives Audience to foreign Ambassadors; that prodigious number of Troops who are at that time in Arms, that incredible number of Mandarins in their Formalities, distinguished according to their rank and quality [...] the Ministers of State, the Lord Chief Justices of all the Sovereign Courts, the petty Kings, the Princes of the Blood, the Heirs of the Crown, more humbled before this Prince, then they are exalted above the People: The Emperor himself seated on a Throne, who beholds prostrate at his feet all this Crowd of Adorers; all this, I say, bears an Air of Sovereignty and Grandeur in it, that is to be found nowhere but in China.[45]

In China, too, public audiences were highly choreographed ceremonial acts that played a major role in court ceremonies; indeed, it was the reports of receptions in Beijing that had shaped the European image of the almighty Emperor of China (fig. 18).

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43 See Stollberg-Rilinger 1997, 155–156; Stollberg-Rilinger 2008, 160–161.
44 "Diese Materie ist eine derjenigen, so am häuffigsten bey Hof vorkommen, welche die meiste Pointillen mit sich führet, wo am leichtesten angestossen und der Würde was vergeben, oder selbige durch klügliche Einleitung erhöhet werden kann." Moser 1755, vol. 2, 550 (translation by the author).
45 Le Comte 1697, 177.

Figure 18: The Chinese Emperor Shunzhi, frontispiece of Joan Nieuhof's *Embassy from the East-India Company of the United Provinces, to the Grand Tartar Cham, Emperor of China*, first published in 1665.

The obedient deference shown towards his person during receptions, culminating in the three-fold kowtow, demonstrated his absolute power to best effect. Subjects as well as European envoys were obliged to kneel

and to touch the ground three times with their chest, in a ritual that was humiliating and offensive to Europeans because it reminded them of the prostrations that were part of the Catholic liturgy.[46]

What is more, the Chinese emperor did not receive European envoys as proxies of princes of equal status, but as delegates of his vassals, and he regarded their sumptuous gifts as tribute. Europeans were very acutely conscious of this, as is clear from Le Comte's dedication to Louis XIV in the French edition of his account:

> To date, this proud and arrogant nation has not thought that it was dishonoring the kings by regarding all of them as subjected to their rule. This idea was confirmed in their minds by the fact that the ambassadors of the most prosperous states consistently consented to being received as vassals. And when all Europe flattered itself that it was the universal monarchy, it was in fact somehow under the Asian yoke.[47]

The impressions that European envoys gained during their audiences in Bejing were therefore twofold. While, on the one hand, they were highly impressed by the almighty power of the emperor as shown to best advantage during these ceremonies, they also felt humiliated when they were forced to subject themselves to the Chinese ruler.

The Saxon revenge for the Chinese hubris

This abasing experience was surely the reason why the Chinese were widely presumed to be arrogant. In the 'History of the Court of the King of China,' first published in Paris in 1626, the French historian Michel Baudier spread an anecdote that could not help but hurt Europe's pride:

> the Greatness of his Treasures, the Puissance of his Forces, the Fertility of his Countrey, and the Extent of his State, have carried the Pride of his Spirit to that degree of Insolence, as to contemn all the rest of Men, and to esteem only those of *China*. He sayes often, and the same Vaunting is in the mouth of his Subjects, *That the* Chineses *have two Eyes, the* Europeans *one, and that all the other men of the Earth are blind*.[48]

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46 See Demel 1992, 127–142.
47 "Jusqu'alors cette nation fiere & orgueilleuse, ne croyoit pas deshonorer les Rois, en les regardant tous comme soûmis à son Empire; Les Ambassadeurs des Estats les plus florissans, qui n'y ont jamais estés receus que comme tributaires, avoient par leur propre aveu establi plus fortement cette idée dans les esprits; & l'Europe entiere se trouvoit en quelque sorte sous le joug en Asie, lorsqu'elle se flatoit de la Monarchie universelle." Le Comte 1696, vol. 1, "Epistre".
48 Baudier 1682, 68–69 (emphasis in the original).

This tale was told in Saxony, too, as Johann Ehrenfried Böttger, the inventor of the Meissen porcelain, noted in a memorandum to Augustus the Strong in 1709:

> Although the Indians attribute to themselves great wisdom and outstanding ability in the sciences and arts in comparison with all other nations, and for all that they—because of this arrogance—are not afraid to ascribe to themselves two eyes in this regard and only one eye to the Europeans, this assumption is not borne out by their porcelain manufactories when one considers the bad designs, the mostly clumsy shapes and the absurd painted decoration of the white and red Indian vessels.[49]

Johann Melchior Steinbrück, the first inspector of the manufactory in Meissen, was convinced that the Chinese were robbed of all their illusions of being the only men with two eyes as soon as they received the first examples of Saxon porcelain sent to the East Indies in the manufactory's earliest days.[50] Both Böttger and Steinbrück assured the king that—having wrested the secret of porcelain-making from the Chinese—he now possessed a compelling argument to mock them and punish their hubris. Even as late as 1737, a letter from the Meissen town council states that the late king had proved that, with regard to porcelain, the Saxons were in no way inferior to the highly-clever Chinese people and the inhabitants of the island of Japan.[51]

If Augustus the Strong therefore chose the setting of an imaginary audience to demonstrate the triumph of Meissen porcelain, then he surely did so in order to take his revenge for the degradations suffered during receptions in Beijing. In the iconography in the Japanese Palace, contrary to ceremonial convention, he does not even accept the porcelain presented as tribute in the ceiling fresco, which surely represents a deliberate provocation. As a result, the European visitors to the Japanese Palace would have

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49 "Obwohln die Indianer sich eine große Klugheit und besondere Geschicklichkeit in Wißenschafften und Künsten vor allen andern Nationen beymeßen, und aus solcher Arroganz keinen Scheü tragen, sich selbst in hoc passu zwey, denen Europaern aber nur ein Auge zuzuschreiben: So wil doch solches aus ihren Porcellain-Fabriquen, wenn man die schlechten Erfindungen, die meist plumpen Façons, und die absurden Desseins ihrer Mahlerey an denen Indianischen weißen und rothen Gefäßen betrachtet, nicht erhellen." Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10036 Finanzarchiv, Rep. IXb, Loc. 41910, Nr. 205c, fol. 17a.

50 "Es ist auch ein Ruhm vor das Land, wenn schöne Manufacturen darinnen aufkommen: und weiln gleich Anfangs von dem Sächßischen braunen porcellain etwas durch den Residenten Bertry aus Amsterdam nacher OstIndien geschicket worden; sowird nunmehro auch dieser Ruhm Sachßens in Indien erschollen seÿn, und die Chineser sich vielleicht desabusiret befinden, da sie geglaubet, sie wären in Wißenschafften die klügsten, und hätten diesfalls alleine 2. Augen, dargegen die Europaeer nur eines hätten, die übrigen Nationes aber blind wären." Steinbrück 1982, vol. 2, 179.

51 See footnote 81.

been compelled to acknowledge that they owed the re-establishment of Europe's honor to the Saxon-Polish king. While Europe had already proven its superiority in the sciences of astronomy and astrology that were so important to the Chinese, it was Augustus the Strong alone who had been capable of defying the Emperor of China in the most sophisticated of all the arts of his land, namely the art of making porcelain.

The Meissen triumph as a prime example of mercantilism

The manufacture of porcelain, however, was not only perceived as an art, but as an industry that bore important yields for the sovereign prince. Just like "the Corn, the Mines of Gold and Silver, the precious Stones, the Pearls, [...] the Wool, the Cottons and the Silks," porcelain was a product gained from the rich Chinese soil that brought the emperor a "great and puissant Revenue."[52] These sources of income were believed to form the basis of his boundless authority: "It is these extraordinary revenues that make this prince so powerful and that enable him to always have such mighty armies at his disposal in order to keep his people under obligation to him."[53] What is more, the Emperor of China could command the revenue and even levy new tributes as he pleased, a matter that Le Comte emphasizes, as it constituted a significant difference between the Chinese and the European forms of absolutism.[54]

As for Augustus the Strong, he did not rule with absolute sovereignty. When he became king in Poland, it was only by election and thanks to military pressure. His power was restricted by the laws of the aristocratic republic, and his finances were controlled by the Sejm. Earnings from royal properties were not sufficient to keep the royal household in Warsaw and considerable additional funds from the Saxon budget had to be granted.[55] Similarly, in Saxony, Augustus the Strong was dependent on the approval of the three estates to cover the state budget. Even though he managed to introduce indirect consumption taxes, he urgently needed more independent sources of income to sustain his claim to absolute power.[56] This is why he set his hopes on Böttger, who had initially promised to make gold before he finally discovered the recipe for porcelain. But even with this "white gold"

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52 Baudier 1682, 64.
53 "Ce sont ces prodigieux revenus qui rendent ce Prince si puissant, & qui luy donnent la facilité d'avoir toûjours sur pied de si nombreuses armées, pour contenir ses peuples dans le devoir." Le Comte 1696, vol. 2, 15.
54 "Premierement toutes les charges de l'Etat sont à sa disposition, il les donne à qui il luy plaist, & il en est d'autant plus le maistre qu'il n'en vend aucune. [...] Secondement, quoique chaque particulier soit maistre de ses biens, & paisible possesseur de ses terres, l'Empereur peut neanmoins imposer de nouveaux tributs, quand il le juge à propos, pour subvenir aux pressans besoins de l'Etat." Le Comte 1696, vol. 2, 13–14.
55 See Lileyko 1997; Vötsch 2001, 58; Neuhaus 2004, 187.
56 See Vötsch 2001, 57–58; Neuhaus 2004, 181–182.

Augustus the Strong still counted on being able to fill up his treasury with sales revenue, as exemplified in the ceiling fresco of the throne gallery. Fueled by the unexpected success of the Meissen porcelain in Paris, he anticipated being able to drive the imported wares out of Europe and to wrest the lucrative porcelain market from the grasp of China and Japan.

In a certain sense, the secret knowledge of porcelain-making was indeed considered a goldmine: contemporaries were fascinated by the fact that it consisted of nothing else but simple clays that a mysterious chemical process transmuted into gleaming white translucent luxury goods.[57] Not only were the necessary clays plentiful in Saxony, but they belonged directly to the king and cost him "almost nothing but the cartage."[58] Owing to Saxony's advancements in the sciences, technology, and the arts, these intrinsically worthless raw materials could be turned into treasured artefacts that not only helped to avoid costly imports from the Far East, but could also be exported for hard cash, thereby improving the trade balance. This approach corresponded perfectly to the mercantilist ideal of enhancing the wealth of a country (and its regent) by fructifying previously unused resources.[59] This is what the intended ceiling painting of the throne gallery was to allude to when it depicted the rich natural resources in Saxony, on the one hand, and its prospering arts and manufactories on the other. In this context, Minerva—the inventive patroness of the sciences and arts who teaches men craftsmanship and technical progress—was the perfect judge in the exemplary contest between Saxon and Far-Eastern porcelain. The royal porcelain manufactory was thus to serve as a model of Augustus the Strong's exemplary mercantilist policies.

The Meissen triumph as a prime example of good government

In his chronicle of the Meissen manufactory of 1717, Steinbrück explicitly stresses that the new enterprise not only generated new income for the country but also raised the public welfare by feeding a goodly number of artists and workers.[60] He compared its establishment directly with the mercantilist measures of Louis XIV and his ministers Fouquet and Colbert, who had promoted the sciences and commerce in every way.[61] Following the example of Louis XIV, it belonged to the glorious duties of a regent to initiate new industry and to act as an entrepreneur in the best interest

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57 See Weber 2013, vol. 1, 17–18.
58 "Solche kostbaren Waaren werden aus LandesMaterialien gemachet, die beynahe nichts als den Fuhrlohn erfodern [sic]; und bishero sonst zu nichts gebrauchet worden. Dadurch wird frembdes Geld ins Land gezogen, und in dem Lande mancher Künstler und Arbeither ernehret." Steinbrück 1982, vol. 2, 178. See also Mücke 1990, 33.
59 See Weber 2010, 157–158.
60 See footnote 58.
61 Steinbrück 1982, vol. 2, 177.

of the country and its inhabitants. Colbert's most significant economic measures were actually incorporated in the form of allegories into the iconographic programme of the *Grand Appartement* at Versailles and thus praised as meritorious aspects of Louis XIV's wise government.[62] In contrast with the state apartment, the Hall of Mirrors laid emphasis on the conquering warlord, whose victories are allegorized in the ceiling paintings of the gallery. As exemplified in the adjacent *Salon de la Paix*, the ultimate aim of these military campaigns was to pacify Europe under French hegemony.[63] As Hendrik Ziegler has shown, the aggressive and triumphalist undercurrent of the picture cycle did not go unnoticed by contemporaries, leading to criticism of Louis XIV's autocratic conduct and expansive foreign policy.[64] Steinbrück also makes reference to his minister of war as the martial Louvois. According to Steinbrück, the expensive wars imposed on France by Louis XIV thwarted the positive effects of his mercantilist policies.[65]

When Augustus the Strong presented himself in the Japanese Palace as a pieceful ruler who mainly excelled on the diplomatic parquet, he was possibly consciously distinguishing himself from the belligerent Louis XIV. His government program was to be presented in the throne cabinet, where the ceiling painting was to depict the dispute between Athena/Minerva and Poseidon/Neptune in naming the city of Athens. The two deities were vying for predominance in Attica and tried to win the mortals over with gifts. According to popular tradition, Neptune made a spring burst forth, but its water was salty. A preliminary sketch by the Dresden court painter Louis de Silvestre (fig. 19) reveals that the artist actually drew on a less common version of the myth: In the sketch, Neptune is seen offering the citizens of the unnamed Attic town a horse, a useful gift in times of war, while Minerva presents them with a fertile olive tree, a symbol of peace. The gods of Olympus, who had to pass judgement, decided in favor of the latter.

The mythological contest was ultimately a parable of the basic struggle between uncontrolled passion (symbolized by the god of the sea) and rationality (represented by the goddess, who was born from the head of Jupiter).[66] At the same time, the decision between Neptune and Minerva was also understood as a choice between two opposing concepts of government. As a 1632 commentary on an English edition of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* says: "Moreover, this fable decides, and by the sentence of the Gods, that a Citty is not so much renowned for riches and empire, purchased by

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62 See Milovanic 2005, 36–44.
63 See Ziegler 2010, 148.
64 Ziegler 2010, 179–180.
65 "Wenn in Franckreich ein Fouquet und ein Colbert, deren einer die Gelehrsamkeit und guthe Künste, andere die Kaufmannschafft liebet, Directores dererCommercien sind, so siehet man, daß Academien derer Wißenschafften aufgerichtet, pensiones vor gelehrte Leüthe geordnet, und die Commercia auf alle weise befördert werden. So bald es aber an einen Martialischen Louvois kombt, so fallen die Wißenschafften wieder; dargegen erhebet sich der Kriegs-Etat destomehr." Steinbrück 1982, 176–177.
66 See Brumble 1998, 42.

Figure 19: Japanese Palace, preliminary sketch for the ceiling painting in
the corner room with the throne in the upper floor by Louis de Silvestre, ca. 1735.

naval victories; as by civill arts and a peaceable government."[67] The icono-
graphic program of the throne cabinet emphasizes the benefits of just and
wise government led by discernment and rationality rather than passion
and allows the sciences, arts, commerce, and trade to flourish for the ben-
efit of the common good.

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67 Quoted after Brumble 1998, 33.

The Meissen triumph as a means of legitimizing the claim to absolute sovereignty

Augustus the Strong thus presented the alleged Meissen triumph as a result of his exemplary government, which at the same time provided him with the necessary means for his claim to absolute power. However, economic strength was a prerequisite, but no guarantee for the actual enforcement of sovereignty. Aside from the German Emperor and King of Bohemia, Augustus the Strong was, in 1697, the first elector to have been crowned king. Although the law of nations theoretically granted him equal rank with the other crowned heads of Europe,[68] this did not necessarily mean that they would pay him the respect his title was due. As mentioned above, he had only become king in Poland by election. His sovereignty was constrained by the laws of the aristocratic republic, and the royal crown was not linked by succession to the Saxon electorate. The established kings had no interest in broadening their circle "to remain even more distinguished,"[69] and the Emperor insisted emphatically on the traditional hierarchy within the Holy Roman Empire, which was in opposition to the principle of the equality of all sovereigns in the law of nations. Augustus the Strong therefore had to assert his new position vigorously. As Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz stated prior to the coronation of the Prussian king in 1701, it was not until the most distinguished Christian potentates—according to Leibniz, most notably the German Emperor and the kings of France and England—accorded him the appropriate ceremonial honors that a pretender effectively gained royal dignity.[70] For "he is a king who is called a king, and who is [actually] accorded the honors traditionally associated with the name [of king]."[71] Or, as André Krischer summed up the matter,

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68 "& quoique cette dignité & souveraineté Roïale soit plus ancienne ou plus moderne l'une que l'autre, elle leur donne un même caractère, un même honneur & une même prérogative." Rousset de Missy 1746, 59.

69 "je höher diese Würde, je schwerer ist es, sie zu erlangen. Die Könige, die es am meisten angehet eyfern auch am meisten darüber; und wollen nicht gern, um desto mehr unterschieden zu bleiben, die Zahl ihrer Mitgenossen vermehren, noch andere, die es nicht sind, zur Gemeinschafft dieses ihres Vorzuges lassen." Lünig 1720, 120.

70 "Ist ein Herr frey, so kann ihm niemand wehren, wenn er sich in seinem Lande als ein könig oder gar als Kayser tituliren lässet, ist er aber nicht mächtig gnug, umb sich bey denen Auswärtigen erkennen zu machen so, wird er damit nichts als Spott erhalten! Dieweil es demnach mit der Königlichen Würde kein Domesticum, sondern res juris Gentium, so ist nöthig, sich Anderer zu versichern. Ein mächtiger freyer Herr hat Potentiam proximam; aber weilen andere in Possession, gewisse Ehren von ihm zu empfangen, und gewisse Ehre ihm zu geben, so erscheinet, daß die Annehmung königlicher Würde nicht pure und allerdings merae facultatis sey, sondern eine gewisse Autorität zu deren Erlangung erfordert werden." Leibniz 1966, 308.

71 "Ein König ist, der also heißet, und dem die dem Namen, der Gewohnheit nach, anhängende Ehrenrechte zukommen." Leibniz 1966, 306.

"the essence of royalty in the eighteenth century was primarily founded on social esteem and only secondarily on power."[72]

As there was "not a more illustrious Mark of Sovereignty than the Right of sending and receiving Embassadors,"[73] the mutual acceptance of sovereignty became most clearly evident during audiences. These state events were the public acknowledgement of royal status. While Augustus the Strong could not force other European princes to honor him with an official embassy, by staging the imaginary reception of a Chinese delegation he essentially claimed that the almighty Emperor of the "Middle Kingdom" acknowledged him as his equivalent. His purpose was surely to compel all European crowned heads to follow suit. The triumphal message of the Japanese Palace was not principally directed at the Emperor of China, who would hardly have taken notice of the one-sided challenge. Meissen porcelain had in fact been sent to China to proclaim Saxony's victory, but to no great effect. The real addressees were the high-ranking envoys from European courts who would have been guided through the palace on the occasion of their visits to Dresden.

Instead of maintaining his equal (if not superior) status in direct comparison with his potential opponents, Augustus the Strong played the game indirectly by defying the Emperor of China, a ruler who was considered to possess status on par with the German Emperor, as Susan Richter has established with reference to contemporary travel reports and legal treatises on princely ranks:

> China was described as a centralized absolutist state with a complex and vigorously hierarchical administration and also with a form of rule legitimized by religion, at the head of which stood the ruler. [...] European treatises on the law of nations used these descriptions as evidence for their arguments and thus determined China's coequal status and equality as well as the highest status of the Emperor of China. [...] From a European perspective, the Chinese Emperor was thus granted a legal position alongside the head of the Holy Roman Empire, the French and Spanish kings and also the Russian tsars.[74]

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72 "Das Wesen des Königtums im 18. Jahrhundert gründete zuerst in sozialer Schätzung und dann erst in Macht." Krischer 2009, 17.

73 Wicquefort 1716, 6.

74 "China wurde als ein absolutistisch regierter Zentralstaat mit einer komplexen und stark hierarchisierten Administration sowie religiös legitimierten Herrschaft dargestellt, an dessen Spitze der Herrscher stand. [...] Diese Beschreibungen griffen europäische Völkerrechtstraktate als Argumente auf und fixierten somit die Gleichrangigkeit und Gleichwertigkeit Chinas als Staat sowie den höchsten Rang des chinesischen Kaisers. [...] Aus europäischer Perspektive wurde damit dem chinesischen Kaiser eine rangrechtliche Position neben dem Kaiser des Heiligen Römischen Reiches, den französischen und spanischen Königen sowie dem russischen Zaren zuerkannt." Richter 2010, 29.

The fact that Augustus the Strong even dared to raise himself above this potent monarch might also be understood as a provocative gesture towards the German Emperor. Nor would it have been the only instance of Augustus the Strong insolently laying claim not only to absolute sovereignty, but also to a leading role in the Holy Roman Empire.[75]

Since the end of the Thirty Years War, German princes had gained more and more independence from the imperial court. Given, as mentioned above, that Augustus the Strong was the first to achieve royal dignity, he would have felt himself to be in a privileged enough position to step out of the Emperor's shadow and to make a bid for a leading role in Europe. Accordingly, his main aim was to cement the Polish-Saxon union prior to his death and thus secure the royal crown for the house of Wettin. An attempt to dispense with free elections in Poland and impose a hereditary succession to the throne had failed.[76] Augustus the Strong could only invoke the general acceptance of his royal rank and attempt to link it to his dynasty. On the diplomatic parquet, he actually came closer to this objective than in any other field, succeeding in accrediting ambassadors in Dresden who honored him as elector of Saxony and "King in Poland."[77] This main political achievement would have been corroborated and glorified in the Japanese Palace, at the same time raising claims that by far exceeded what Augustus the Strong actually achieved. Because the iconographic program was concentrated not so much on his own person as on his position as Saxon elector and Polish king, it was also—and even principally—also applicable to his son and successor Frederick Augustus II, for whom he tried to procure the Polish crown against the resistance of the neighboring states. This is borne out by the fact that, shortly after his election by a minority of the Sejm in October 1733 and his coronation in January 1734, King Augustus III resumed the work on the Japanese Palace in close accordance with his father's original design from 1730, though he did in fact gradually abandon it a few years later.

The public reception of the Japanese Palace

As the interiors hardly progressed beyond the planning phase, it is impossible to establish whether the intended message of the Japanese Palace was actually understood. However, various panegyric writings published after Augustus the Strong's death in February 1733 make it clear that his reading of the Meissen triumph soon became a topos, at least in Saxony. The Meissen victory over Chinese and Japanese porcelain is repeatedly emphasized, though not without a certain vein of mockery: it not only

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75 See Lorenz 1995, 376; Schlechte 1990, 103–104, 113–116; regarding Augustus the Strong's hope of securing the imperial throne for his son and successor, see Schnitzer 2014, 8–10.
76 See Schnitzer 2011, 47 for more references.
77 See Staszewski 1997, 16.

proved that the Saxons were indeed endowed with two eyes,[78] but it also made the Chinese blush with shame.[79] These eulogies also reflected the fact that it was the great success of Meissen porcelain on the Parisian art market that had finally led to the Saxons' conviction that they had outdone the Asians. For example, the boastful article in the *Mercure de France* of February 1731 mentioned above is summarized and in part quoted verbatim in a biography of Augustus the Strong from 1733. The passage also explicitly points to the fact that renowned connoisseurs had been duped by the Meissen copies of Japanese prototypes, even finding the former finer than the latter.[80]

The importance of the French market is also acknowledged in an enlightening letter from the Meissen city council of August 1737, which reads as follows:

> It is thus not to be held against the late king that at first he kept a thing to himself, the discovery and establishment of which had cost him so much, filling up his rooms and curiosity cabinets with it, and that by means of the porcelain gifts that he made to other high courts he had proved that his beloved Saxony conceded nothing to the highly clever Chinese and the inhabitants of the island of Japan, either in the wealth of materials for the porcelain or in the artistry and skill in the preparation of the same, but, rather, outshone them by far. The latter claim does not need any proof, as the Turks and French, who are good connoisseurs of this kind of wares, would otherwise not deign to become involved in its commerce.[81]

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78 "Denn es können die Fremden die schöne Mahlerey nicht sattsam bewundern, welche diejenige, so an dem Chinesischen Porcellin zu befinden, weit übersteiget. Dahero, wenn die Europäer ein Auge haben, die Chineser aber mit zweyen Augen begabt seyn, so wird das doppelte Augen=Licht gewiß auch denen Sachsen nicht fehlen, welche die Chineser in der Mahlerey des Porcellins noch übertreffen." "Von denen zehn Merckwürdigkeiten" 1732, 73.

79 "Dich wird noch Dein Meißen nennen, / Weil es läst die Erde brennen, / Die nun China schaamroth macht." Henrici 1733, not paginated.

80 "Ja was noch mehr? Hat nicht Sachsen unter der weisen Regierung Augusti den Chinesischen Reiche den Rang abgelauffen, und es mit Verfertigung des Porcellains so hoch gebracht, daß andere Nationen darüber erstaunen müssen? Die Porcellain-Fabrique [...] blühet noch jetzo in der Stadt Meissen, und werden daselbst die schönsten Gefässe von allerhand Gattungen verfertiget, zugleich aber so künstlich gemahlet und vergoldet, daß das Japanische und Chinesische Porcellain gar schlecht gegen dasselbe aussiehet, ja auch die Mahlereyen auf demselben an Thieren, Bäumen, Pflantzen und Blumen viel schöner und die Farben besser gewechselt werden können, so daß auch die geschicktesten Kenner sich offtmals betrogen, indem sie das Sächsische Porcellain vor dem Japanischen nicht erkennen, sondern dem Meißnischen den Vorzug vor jenem gegeben." *Merckwürdiges Leben Ihro Königl. Maj. von Pohlen* 1733, 26. Compare to footnote 7.

81 "so war es ja dem höchstseel. Könige gar nicht zu verargen, daß er eine Sache, deren Erfind- und Einrichtung ihm so kostbar gefallen war, noch zur Zeit vor sich behielte, seine Zimmer und Raritaeten-Kammern damit anfüllete, und durch seine an andere Hohe Höfe übermachte Pourcelaine-Praesente erwiesen, daß sein geliebtes Sachsen denen super-klugen Chinesen und Einwohnern der Insul

These lines not only provide further testimony of the great satisfaction felt in Saxony about having defeated the arrogant Asians, they specify the same favorable preconditions for this unique success as the intended ceiling painting of the throne gallery, namely, the rich natural resources of Saxony and the scientific and artistic expertise of its inhabitants. In so doing, it gives the sovereign sole credit for the establishment and glorious achievements of the Meissen manufactory.

Summary

The example of Augustus the Strong's feigned triumph over the Emperor of China staged as an imaginary audience in the Japanese Palace deals with two different types of copying: the actual physical copying of East-Asian porcelain on the one hand, and the eclectic quotation and fusion of existing successful patterns of representation in the Japanese Palace via the emulation of the cited role models on the other. The success of the first served to legitimate the claim raised by the latter.

The precondition for actually copying Chinese and Japanese porcelain was the ground-breaking reinvention of this hitherto exclusively East Asian luxury material. The throne gallery's ceiling decoration was intended to highlight why it was that this complex technology could finally be recreated in Saxony and not elsewhere: credit is given to Saxony's ruler and his wisdom in showing encouragement and support for the sciences and arts, as well as his exploitation of the natural riches in his domain. The making of exact copies of the most prestigious and elaborate East Asian originals in the royal collection was meant to visually demonstrate this much-envied success. The primary idea was therefore to present the pieces side by side with their prototypes, in order to prove their parity.

The so-called Hoym-Lemaire-Affaire, however, gave even greater meaning to the Meissen copies: the equality claimed for them was confirmed beyond doubt when highly-esteemed French connoisseurs were duped by them. The deliberate omission of the blue crossed swords mark taken from the Saxon coat of arms had turned the copies for the Parisian dealer Lemaire into deceptive fakes. The rapid uncovering of this fraud triggered a wide-reaching debate in France about the true rank of Meissen copies vis a vis East Asian originals.[82] Arguments advanced by dealers and collectors as well as scientists and economists prove that contemporaries did not disdain the widespread practice of copying itself. On the contrary, copying

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Japan weder an Reichthum der Materialien zum Pourcelain noch an Kunst und Geschicklichkeit, in Bereitung deßelben etwas nachgäbe, wollen sagen, weit überträffe. Das leztere braucht keines Beweises, denn sonst würden Türcken und Franzosen, als gute Kenner derg. Waare sich in deßen Commerce nicht so weit einlaßen." Staatliche Porzellan-Manufaktur Meissen, archive, AA I Aa 24c, fols. 194b, 195a.

82 See Weber 2014.

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was a respectable means by which to improve one's reputation, particularly if recognized connoisseurs were taken in. It was, however, of primary importance that copies be identified as such in order to understand them in relation to their prototypes. Only in the undisturbed economic framework of a hierarchical order of goods was it convenient to value them as originals in their own right.[83]

The Meissen copies were essentially viewed as incontrovertible proof of technological pioneering and achievement. They were therefore judged for their extrinsic as well as intrinsic material qualities when pitted against East Asian porcelain. As suggested in the *Mercure de France* of February 1731, the most refined Parisian connoisseurs preferred the Saxon copies to the East Asian originals. The transformative power of these copies fundamentally altered the perception and appreciation of Meissen porcelain not only in France, but also in Saxony itself: their great success on Europe's foremost art market gave birth to a wholly new understanding of the native product that culminated in the reconceiving of the then-principle royal project—the extension and rearrangement of the Japanese Palace. Copies made at Meissen were no longer intended as proof of parity with the much admired East Asian originals. The copies of Japanese porcelain in the Kakiemon style apparently preferred by Parisian opinion makers served rather as physical evidence of the superiority of Saxon porcelain.

In order to turn simple success into triumph over the Emperor of China and thus into a claim of absolute sovereignty, Augustus the Strong had his Meissen copies incorporated into an architectural setting that deliberately quoted established patterns of representation, for instance, by copying a meaningful spatial setting or quoting significant elements of foreign court ceremonials as visual references. In cleverly merging quoted examples of excellence, they were appropriated to assert Augustus the Strong's superiority as an absolute monarch. As demonstrated with regard to Dinglinger's Great Moghul (see the contribution by Corinna Forberg in this volume), Augustus the Strong did not shy away from offending and humiliating the exemplary monarchs in a process of what could be called emulatory elimination.

Meinrad von Engelberg has convincingly argued that this emulative eclecticism is characteristic of baroque architecture in the Roman Holy Empire. The innovative power of eclecticism consisted of potentizing quotations, the sources of which always shone through and stood out as recognizable benchmarks. This it did by superimposing a novel and more ideal solution upon them. This widespread design principle relies on viewers who actually understand visual references and who will admit that the refinement with which they find themselves confronted unquestionably outstrips the referenced examples. Here again this practice of quoting was

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83 See Weber 2014, 136–137.

not considered a paucity of originality, but rather—if cleverly applied—a demonstration of intellect, education, ambition, and aesthetic sensitivity.[84]

Figures

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84 See Engelberg 2012, esp. 32 and 35.

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Corinna Forberg

Copying the World's Emperor: Dinglinger's Great Moghul and the French Model of Absolute Power

Abstract   The kings and princes of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Europe were steeped in the desire for absolute power. The most ambitious and successful ruler among them was Louis XIV. In Asia, Aurangzeb, the acting Great Moghul, was known as his equivalent. Both used the potential of courtly representations not only to illustrate, but to legitimize their claim to power. In order to document their grandeur and immortality, they let pictures of themselves be distributed; some images of the Great Moghul even reached Europe, where they were copied for travel literature. Johann Melchior Dinglinger, goldsmith at the court of the Elector of Saxony and King of Poland Augustus the Strong, used those images spread via print media to create his masterpiece *The Throne of the Great Moghul*. Dinglinger's aim was not to exhibit an exact effigy of the historical Great Moghul Aurangzeb and his splendid court, but to depict absolute power. However, the absolute monarch is inimitable. This article pursues Dinglinger's strategy to meet the problem of how to imitate the inimitable. For this, he used both formal and stylistic devices and imperial concepts of representation. The latter included Dinglinger's presentation of his cabinet piece to the king, which became a key moment in the understanding of the art work. It was that moment when Augustus the Strong's desire for absolute power was satisfied, comparable to the situation when the transubstantiation of Louis XIV in juxtaposition with his portrait took place, as described by Louis Marin in his thesis on the portrait of the king. Ultimately, Dinglinger applied the practice of copying in order to erase the original.

Keywords   Copy, inimitability, Johann Melchior Dinglinger, Louis XIV, Louis Marin

Introduction

In 1701, the court jeweller Johann Melchior Dinglinger began to work on his masterpiece *The Throne of the Great Moghul* (fig. 1), which he devoted to Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland. In the same year, Hyacinthe Rigaud created what is probably the most famous portrait of Louis XIV, depicting him as an absolute ruler (fig. 2), and which henceforth substituted for the king in his absence.

At this time, Roger de Piles had seen in his writings on art theory that color was brought into the strict rules of the French royal academy by occasionally paying tribute to the coloring of the Venetians and the qualities of the Dutch, in addition to the classical ideal. Before it was unanimously agreed upon—under the leadership of the first court painter and director of the *Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture*, Charles Le Brun, and the court historian and art critic, André Félibien—that Greek and Roman antiquities represented the only worthy model from which nature could be reproduced. In terms of the basic principles inherent to art—composition, expression, design, and color—such antiquities combined these in a harmonious way, and always with an emphasis on *dessin* over *couleur*. The most important tool of the budding artist therefore was copying, for nothing held so much weight as the right choice of model. Seldom were theory and practice so closely aligned as at the Royal Academy under the rule of Louis XIV.

As they were political enemies and never related by blood or marriage, the relationship between Louis XIV and Augustus the Strong remained always distant. Nevertheless, there was no greater model for the Saxon Elector-King than Louis XIV, who succeeded—by the means of his centralist government and his clever machinery of representation—to come closer to the ideal of the absolute ruler than any of the other ambitious princes in Europe. To realize his plans for the establishment of an absolute, controlled state, Augustus the Strong risked a lot. He converted to Catholicism to obtain the Polish crown, became entangled in daring warfare to defend his territory, and spent vast sums of the national budget to win the loyalty of the nobility. Altogether, his political and military efforts remained—more or less—unsuccessful in the course of this reign. In fact, he attained more success in a different field—art. Shortly before the end of his life, Augustus the Strong was able to boast to being the owner of the richest treasury in Europe. Dinglinger's *Throne of the Great Moghul* is a mirror of this wealth, which is expressed not only in material categories, but also in its uniqueness and artistic perfection.

The treasury contained more than what we might call art in the traditional sense; Dinglinger's cabinet piece has not really been considered to fall within the category of art, but as "a special genre of the virtuoso, courtly Kunstkammer object."[1] Dinglinger himself referred to Augustus the Strong

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1   Warncke 1988, 159: "die Sondergattung des virtuosen, höfischen Kunstkammerstückes."

Figure 1: Johann Melchior Dinglinger, *The Throne of the Great Moghul,* Dresden, Green Vault.

as a Maecenas who admired and supported "all liberal arts and especially the art of enamellists and goldsmiths."[2] Dinglinger therefore associated

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2   J. M. Dinglinger, letter to Augustus the Strong from 11 October 1707, published in: Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 388: "alle freyen Künste und sonderlich gegen die emaillir- und Goldarbeiter Kunst."

Figure 2: Hyacinthe Rigaud, *Louis XIV,* 1701/1702, Oil on Canvas, 179 × 190 cm, Paris, Musée du Louvre.

his handicraft with the liberal arts, as well as with painting, graphics, sculpture, and architecture, which have helped artists to gain prestige by being part of the liberal arts and the academy since the Renaissance.[3] Although goldsmiths were not trained at the academy, their discipline was closely related to that of graphic artists. Cutlers and goldsmiths frequently became professional printmakers and engravers.[4] The goldsmith's art at the European courts served primarily the representational purposes of the king or prince. Such costly and complex imperial representations were not simply meant to decorate his power, but functioned as an important tool to enforce power interests and legitimize claims of sovereignty. Preparations for lavish festivals and court ceremonies were among Dinglinger's tasks at the Saxon court. Consequently, his work must always be understood in the context of a comprehensive ceremonial choreography.

If we approach the theme of the copy in the case of *The Throne of the Great Moghul*, we must critically examine the tools available to us as art historians. My study will not provide novel or detailed insights into Dinglinger's cabinet piece, but will instead demonstrate that the form-analytical comparison—the most common method of art history analysis—is dependent on today's inadequate concept of art and needs further resources in order to fully appreciate how Dinglinger's work utilized the concept of copying.

Investigating Dinglinger's piece as an object means to consider its historical, social, political, and economic context in dependence on the categories of time and space. The object obtains a history and this history enables comparison. We compare past and present, here and there or, sometimes, original and copy. This is a proven method and provides the scholar with an important tool. However, what happens when the presentation of an object like Dinglinger's cabinet piece becomes part of art itself? What happens to the categories of time and space, to historical comparisons in regard to performing a ceremonial act that is linked to its present time alone? This temporal component has also become apparent in analyzes of language and movement of the present volume (Sanchez-Stockhammer, Schwan). An original cannot be traced due to an indeterminate time span, so that there seem to exist only copies of copies. This immeasurability of time that passes between original and copy, or copy and copy, and the resulting assumed simultaneity result in the deletion of the original. Dinglinger's declared intention was to display absolute power which, a priori, excludes comparability, in the form of a unique art work. His goal was inimitability, what can basically be compared to the

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3   About 50 years later, the fine arts would be permanently disconnected from the liberal arts at the instigation of leading French intellectuals and aesthetics (Batteux, d'Alembert). See Pochat 1986, 351–354.

4   Dinglinger came from a family of knife makers in Biberach, but was trained to be a goldsmith by his maternal uncle in Ulm. Some engravings by him also survive. See Watzdorf 1962, 15: "Oft gingen aus dem Messerschmiedehandwerk kunsthandwerkliche Spezialisten, Eisenschneider, Kupferstecher, Medailleure hervor – man denke an die Sadeler! –, die engste Zusammenarbeit mit dem Messerschmied verband. Häufig war der Goldschmied der Dritte im Bunde."

non-reproducibility of ID cards, banknotes, or credit cards as described by Schröter in this volume. Here, non-reproducibility served purposes of identity protection and preserved the social and political order. With these aspects of time, simultaneity, and comparability (in the context of the copy) in mind, the present essay will analyze Dinglinger's cabinet piece on the basis of representation strategies, including court ceremonies, as part of the art work and demonstrate the limits of object-related analyzes in art history. After a brief description of Dinglinger's *Throne of the Great Moghul*, we will select some formal aspects and trace the transformation of a ruler figure with the help of a chain of copies and variations. This will be followed by an in-depth study of the representative aspect of that work in dependence of an exemplary paper by André Félibien, royal chronicler to Louis XIV. Finally, we will revert to Dinglinger's cabinet piece and try to reveal his approach to copy and inimitability.

Description of Dinglinger's *Throne of the Great Moghul*

It took Dinglinger seven years to complete *The Throne of the Great Moghul* and to finally give it to his royal addressee in 1708. This was only two years before Johann Friedrich Böttger discovered the recipe for making hard paste porcelain (see Weber). The elaborate masterpiece was housed in the electoral treasury—the *Geheime Verwahrung* (secret depot)—which was expanded into a publicly accessible museum known as the *Green Vault* in 1724. Within the latter, Dinglinger's showpiece initially held a prominent place in the *Pretiosensaal* (precious jewellery hall), and later on in the even more splendid *Juwelenzimmer* (jewel room).[5] Augustus the Strong had also opened his *Kunst- und Wunderkammer* to a select audience in the years before.

The cabinet piece by Dinglinger shows the birthday party of the Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707), a contemporary of Augustus the Strong, which was celebrated with the ceremonial weighing of the ruler. The emperor wanted his subjects to weigh him in gold, silver, and rice, which were distributed among the poor afterwards. On the same occasion, the emperor's grandees paid homage to him with valuable presents. The representation of this event, which is composed of 165 tiny gold enamel figures (including animals, vessels, and splendor gifts) and was originally decorated with 5,223 diamonds, 189 rubies, 175 emeralds, 53 pearls, two cameos, and one sapphire,[6] contains a multitude of information. Dinglinger fell back to various sources in order to obtain this, including reading of "curious travel accounts of foreign and distant countries and nations,"[7]

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5   Cf. Syndram 1996, 15–16.
6   See e.g. Warncke 1988, 160.
7   "curiosen Reissen-Beschreibungen frembder und weit entlägner Länder und Nationen."

as he noted in his letter to the elector-king from 11 October 1707, and of ancient writers,[8] as he stated in his paper with a description of his cabinet piece.[9] In the older art historical investigations on the subject, especially by Erna von Watzdorf and Walter Holzhausen,[10] the various sources, such as the accounts and compendia by Athanasius Kircher, Joan Nieuhof, Olfert Dapper, Wouter Schouten, Arnoldus Montanus, Simon de Vries, Francois Bernier, and Jean-Babtiste Tavernier, were exactingly researched and categorized as travel literature.[11] Olfert Dapper's work *Asia,* translated into German in 1681, proved to be Dinglinger's main source, with which we will deal later. Dinglinger was able to use the well-stocked library of Augustus the Strong, as well as the books owned by his brother and collaborator Georg Christoph Dinglinger, for instance *Ost- und westindische Dinge* by Simon de Vries.[12] Dinglinger obviously preferred the rich image material of the travel literature, since the additional information that he received in the accompanying text passages helped him to create the total composition, the architectural arrangement, the individual figures, the costumes, the jewellery, and the vessels. It would, at least, explain why he did not use the album of Indian miniatures that was in Augustus' possession since the 1690s.[13]

The most recent and convincing study on *The Throne of the Great Moghul*, by Carsten-Peter Warncke and published in 1988, perfectly reconstructs the original composition of the mostly mobile objects on the basis of Dinglinger's paper describing his work.[14] It differs from previous approaches, particularly that of von Watzdorf, for which an engraving of the cabinet piece from 1739 by Christian Philipp Lindemann was decisive for the reconstruction.[15] The ascending architectural ensemble—opened to the viewer in front of a multi-unit reflecting back panel—is arranged on three floors, the quality of which increase simultaneously with their closeness to the Moghul emperor—the main focus of the depiction. The lower and middle levels are of silver and the upper one is made of gold. At the end of the tapered stairs, one can see the magnificent Peacock Throne (described in detail by Bernier and Tavernier) on which the Great Moghul sits cross-legged in an oriental manner, holding his sceptre in his right hand and distantly overlooking the event. His fanciful crowned head is

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8   Watzdorf 1962, vol. I, 131 and 134.
9   Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392–400.
10 Watzdorf 1962; Holzhausen 1939.
11 See *References*.
12 See Watzdorf 1962, vol. I, 134; Comp. Holzhausen 1939, 93 and esp. fn. 2: He maintained that all relevant books were in Georg Christoph's library and assumed a comparable one was available in Johann Melchior's house; J. M. Dinglinger was friends with the royal librarian Rüger.
13 Dating from 1689, it was first mentioned in the inventory of the cabinet of prints and drawings, Dresden, from 1738.
14 Warncke 1988; Dinglinger's tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392–400. Syndram (2014, 102–113) published a transcription of the earliest copy of Dinglinger's description.
15 Watzdorf 1962, vol. I, 135, fig. 153.

framed by a big, golden sun with a halo and a majestic lion at its centre.[16] It is not the task of this paper to reconstruct the structure of the entire work again, so that, at this point, only the most important references to the involved characters and objects are provided in order to convey an overall impression and a basic understanding of the work, which will be necessary for further understanding of my investigation. By following Warncke's construction, the show of the dignitaries is performed hierarchically: the most prominent dignitary moves into the parade on the lowest level, while the lower ranking one has already reached the final section of the stairs in front of the throne: the *Chan Chanon* (Prince of Princes) and the *Mir Miron* (Lord of Lords), with palanquin carriers and entourage on the lower level, the *Chani Alem* (Prince of the People) and the *Primo Vezier* (Imperial Chancellor), with canopy carriers on the middle level, and the *Wasan bassi* (Treasurer), on the lower stairs and the *Omrahm Nabab* (Governor) on the upper stairs of the upper, golden floor.[17] Servants, followers, and other visitors of lesser rank move between these figures, carrying gifts or admiring them.

Dinglinger divided his work, and correspondingly his paper, into three chapters, beginning with the "magnificence of the Great Moghul and his gorgeous throne,"[18] followed by the "splendour of the solemn parade of the grandees and their presents,"[19] and concluded by the elucidation of the hidden meanings of some of the presents which could only be deciphered after reading the ancient books. He did not fail to point out that such a court did not only exist in the past, but even today, particularly in the empire of the Great Moghul on the occasion of his birthday. The seemingly mythical richness of the oriental rulers had been brought closer to Augustus the Strong not only in terms of time, but of space, too, with the aid of Dinglinger's cabinet piece whose cost and effort were worthy of its model.[20] According to Warncke, baroque texts required a thorough knowledge of their contemporaries, such that they only reported on what was deemed necessary.[21] For this reason, Dinglinger mentioned those events, characters, gifts, and their meanings that were not based on common iconography, but on Oriental and antique sources.

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16 See Dinglinger's tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392, in which he describes it as a symbol of the Great Moghul.
17 The proper names and their meaning are taken from Dinglinger's tract and can be found—with the same spelling—in Dapper, 1681, 149–150.
18 "Magnificenz des grossen Moguls und dessen prächtige[n] Thron"
19 "Splendeur des solennen Aufzugs derer Grandium nebst ihren Praesenten"
20 See the introduction of his tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392. See also his letter of 11 October 1707 (Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 388).
21 Warncke, 1988, 165.

The object-related copy

Within Dinglinger's total conception, we will focus on a single figure among the countless others (fig. 3).

It is located on the left margin of the balustrade on the middle level, seen under a canopy carried by a servant. The figure is clear enough to be recognized in the foreground performance, but it is apparently too mean to be considered closely. It is among those figures that were marginally mentioned by Dinglinger at the end of the second chapter of his tract: "And, finally, there are eleven figures or dignitaries who observe the court and the presents as spectators."[22] Holzhausen, who discovered the graphic models for Dinglinger's *The Throne of the Great Moghul*, recognized the model for the entire spatial construction of the court in an engraving in Olfert Dapper's *Asia*, engraved by J. A. Bauer.[23] Beyond this, he learned that Dapper's portraits of the Moghul emperors *Shah Salim* (Jahangir) and

Figure 3 (left): Johann Melchior Dinglinger, *Audience Visitor* (Detail of Fig. 1).
Figure 4 (right): Anonymous, *Aurangzeb,* engraving, in Dapper, Olfert, 1672.

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22 "Und letztlich sind noch Eilff andere Figuren oder Persohnen von Condition, als Spectatores, die den Etât und die Geschenke betrachten." Dinglinger, tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 393.
23 Dapper, 1681, fig. 15.

Shah Orangzeb (Aurangzeb) (fig. 4) emerged again in Dinglinger's work as audience members, with the latter being identical to our selected figure. Holzhausen sums his observation up as follows: "In this manner, the Great Moghul emerges twice at his birthday party, since he also sits on his throne!"[24]

However, this was not the case. In Dinglinger's work, which was created with several layers of meaning and was meticulously thought through, not only was each figure (including the presents) iconographically scrutinized, but so was every detail.[25] Consequently, if Dinglinger used the portrait of Aurangzeb as described by his main source, Olfert Dapper, but did not integrate it into its designated place, namely the throne of the Great Moghul, it would have been for a special reason.

Figure 5: Johann Melchior Dinglinger, *Aurangzeb* (Detail of Fig. 1).

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24 "Auf diese Weise kommt der Großmogul, da er ja auch auf seinem Thron sitzt, an seinem Geburtstagsfest zweimal vor!" Holzhausen 1939, 100.
25 We can conclude this from Dinglinger's total concept and his paper. Cf. Warncke's interpretation (Warncke 1988, 168–180).

Let us first look at Dinglinger's Aurangzeb on the throne (fig. 5) in comparison with the figure designed after Dapper's model (fig. 3). Apart from the crown, sceptre, and coat, it is especially the attitude that distinguishes both figures considerably. Dinglinger's Aurangzeb followed an illustration in Wouter Schouten's *Ost-Indische Reyse* from 1676.[26] In it, the emperor sits cross-legged on a cushion and is supported by another from behind. His arms are bent, his left hand resting on his thigh and his right holding the sceptre. His robe and turban—provided that it is freed of its fancy crown—are definitely related to contemporary Indian pictures of the Moghul fashion. The manner of the sitting position—as seen here in the example of Aurangzeb—is only known from Indian models of rulers or gods, although Schouten did not revert to an Indian miniature or sculpture, but to Dutch copies of them in travel literature. Dapper's Aurangzeb, in contrast, poses in a swinging contrapposto, his left arm on his hip and his right one holding the sceptre. The side-closures of his robe (*jama*) and trousers (*payjama*), the rich sash, and the tightly bound turban show that the engraver knew Moghul fashion from having viewed Indian miniatures. His attitude, however, is far from the typical posture of a Moghul potentate in Indian paintings in which his head and legs are in profile and his body in a three-quarter view. In fact, the pose of Dapper's figure resembles the posture which was attributed to nobles (and particularly rulers) in European paintings and which eventually became the epitome of an absolute ruler, with Hyacinthe Rigaud's portrait of Louis XIV of 1701/02 (fig. 2).[27] Therefore, it is obvious that Dinglinger chose a model that could be easily distinguished from the European and especially the French repertoire of courtly gestures and attitudes. It has not yet become clear why Dinglinger copied Dapper's figure of Aurangzeb and integrated it as a dignitary of inferior rank within the ceremonial act.

The history of the copy and its original

To answer the question of why Dinglinger used Dapper's Aurangzeb in this fashion, it is necessary to examine earlier representations of Moghul emperors. As the few portraits of the Great Moghul in travel literature from the first half of the seventeenth century that actually followed Indian miniatures had never been copied by later authors,[28] the circle of relevant publications can be limited to only one book, *China illustrata*, by Athanasius Kircher, from 1667, in which the portrait of the Moghul Emperor Akbar can be found (fig. 6).

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26 Schouten 1676, book III, 165. See Holzhausen 1939, 100.
27 Rigaud's portrait was often copied throughout Europe and had become famous.
28 In Laet 1631, title page; Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas 1625 (two engravings in the travel account by Edward Terry); Boulaye-le-Gouz 1653; Comp. with Mitter 1977, 68–72.

Figure 6: Anonymous, *Akbar* [Jahangir], engraving, in Athanasius Kircher's
China monumentis,[...] illustrata, 1667.

Figure 7: Abul Hasan (?), *Jahangir,* 1617, Gouache on Cotton, 210 × 141 cm, private collection.

Major parts of Dinglinger's description of the sun pyramid were based on Kircher's work. Olfert Dapper also used Kircher's book several times, both in his literary descriptions and for the illustrations. Consequently, we have to assume that Dapper as well as Dinglinger knew Kircher's portrait of the Moghul emperor.

In the portrait, Akbar sits in profile on a throne of European provenance, his bare feet resting on a low footstool. His head is framed by a radiant nimbus; his raised hand holds a large globe. At his feet are a long-necked bottle and three drinking vessels. The figure of the Great Moghul is covered by a canopy. The whole throne area is on a platform, providing the king's body with adequate space. The platform is surrounded by richly decorated room elements, carpets and an opened curtain. A dog crouches in front of the podium next to the sovereign. Four visitors are present in the audience, of which only the front man attends to the emperor with a deep bow. Two of the remaining three visitors look at the viewer; the last one turns to his neighbor.

Athanasius Kircher was not only a well-known author and polymath, but also an enthusiastic collector.[29] His so-called *Museum Kircherianum* in Rome, where he spent most of his life at the Jesuit College, was one of the largest and most famous cabinets of curiosities of his time. In a collection catalogue,[30] a portrait of *Regum Tartariae* that is mentioned within the chapter *De variis Picturis & Effigiebus* could have served as a model for Kircher's engraving. He himself wrote in his book, "The fathers sent to Rome a picture or likeness of him [Akbar] in the dress which he used for public audiences."[31] A few decades ago, an unusual miniature (life-sized and applied to cotton) with the portrait of Jahangir, son of Akbar, was sold at an auction.[32] This picture (fig. 7) was undoubtedly copied by Kircher's engraver.[33]

It helps to distinguish the different models of the engraving from each other. Since a detailed comparison between original and copy is not relevant to our present study, it should suffice to refer to two key aspects: First, the Indian model is limited solely to the figure of the Great Moghul, including the throne, nimbus, globe, footstool (in the original a folded carpet), and the drinking vessels. Everything else—canopy, platform, decoration, and other figures—sprang from the imagination of the European engraver, or at least from European models. Second, a certain communication is evident between the ruler, the audience member standing at the left margin and focusing on the viewer, and the viewer him or herself by the view coordinates. The emperor looks in the direction of the

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The list of recent publications on Athanasius Kircher is very long. I select only a few of them: Fletcher 1988; Lo Sardo 1999; Lo Sardo 2001; Findlen 2004.
30 Sepibus 1678.
31 Kircher 1987, 71.
32 Oriental Manuscripts and Miniatures 1995, 74–83. Last sold: Bonhams, *Islamic and Indian Art London*, New Bond Street, 5 April 2011, auction 18801, lot 322.
33 See Crill and Jariwala 2010, 76–77. For a detailed investigation of the portrait, see in Forberg 2015, 144–148 and Forberg 2016, 227–230.

visitor, who, on the other hand, passes his gaze in an optical extension to the viewer. Eye contact with the viewer was a well-established iconographic instrument in European art meant to highlight the authenticity of contemporary events, in this case the encounter with the Great Moghul. What is even more important for our study is the juxtaposition of the two figures in a clearly distinguished body language that, seemingly for demonstration purposes, separates two cultures from each other. Akbar, whom we know (thanks to the original) to be Jahangir, has his head and feet, following the norm, in profile and his upper body in a three-quarter view. These aspects of the pose belonged to the rigid rules of portraiture at the courts of the Moghul empire and its surrounding principalities. The visitor, however, displaying his whole body in a three-quarter view, has his right arm on his hip, while the other rests on a stick. We remember observing the same pose in Dinglinger's audience visitors and Dapper's portrait of Aurangzeb. The pose is repeated in courtly representations in European art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as persistently as the Moghul pose is repeated in portraits of Indian princes. It had initially been developed from discussions and descriptions of the nobleman, particularly after the example of *Il Cortegiano*, by Baldassare Castiglione.[34] It was essential to translate the—taken literally—indescribable elegance of the nobleman, which so obviously distinguished him from the rest of the society, into a picture. Seventeenth-century authors agreed on the subject, stating that it was "hard to describe" and "cannot be imitated."[35] Castiglione himself based his work on the assumption that grace "is often a gift of nature and the heavens."[36] Formulations of grace were soon followed by those of "civility," which were translated by contemporary painters into natural movement and an elegant *contrapposto*.[37] Anthonis van Dyck seems to have found the most convincing depiction at his time, when he made the *Portrait of Charles I, King of England at the Hunt* (about 1635),[38] although he did not invent this posture, but was rather inspired by diverse portraits of noblemen and rulers by Titian, on which some portraits by Bronzino and Parmigianino might also have depended.[39] Although this posture was generally used in place of the grandeur of the nobleman, it was especially established at the court of Louis XIV and became a symbol of absolute power as mentioned

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34 Baldassare Castiglione, *Il Libro del Cortegiano*, first published in 1528 (Castiglione 1528), later translated into numerous European languages and frequently edited throughout the centuries since then.
35 Roodenburg 2004, 10.
36 Roodenburg 2004, 10.
37 Roodenburg 2004, 120.
38 Schneider 1994, 128–131.
39 This posture can be traced to fifteenth-century portraits of aristocrats, particularly in pictures by Piero della Francesca, Antoniazzo Romano, Andrea Mantegna, and Sandro Botticelli, though not in individual portraits. An exception is the famous sculpture of David by Donatello, which is, however, not from a contemporary aristocratic context.

above.[40] It was copied many times by the rulers of neighboring states, just as by Augustus the Strong.[41]

The pose of the nobleman was also popular and distributed in the Netherlands, so that Dapper's choice for the design of his portrait of Aurangzeb is comprehensible. Kircher describes his portrayal of the Great Moghul as follows:

> In a public assembly he gleamed in his majesty. [...] Few monarchs had dressed of similar beauty, for he exhibited himself to view adorned with a diadem made of gold, pearls, and precious stones of great price, and shining like that of a divinity. [...] In his hand he held a sphere, through which he showed himself to be the lord of the world and the greatest power.[42]

What he is describing is the image of an absolute monarch. Dapper had no doubt of the Moghul emperor's absolute power, but probably of the choice of the devices that Kircher used for his representation. Therefore, he dispensed with the Indian model (or its copy in Kircher's book) and replaced it with the ruler type in European portraiture. What we observe in this chain of copies can therefore be called a negotiation with the foreign formulation and style of absolute power, rather than a translation of it.[43] When Dinglinger designed his figure of the visitor at the court of the Great Moghul, he was aware of the fact that a European figure in oriental costume placed within an exotic surrounding did not make an Indian potentate. Moreover, the awareness of a difference between the European and Indian type of an absolute ruler provided him with additional tools for the creation of his multi-layered cabinet piece. Consequently, Dinglinger marginalized the posture of a European potentate—at this time already personified by Louis XIV—in the figure of the audience visitor of inferior rank comparable with Kircher's audience member. This statement is not meant to be a contradiction to the abovementioned portraits of Augustus the Strong, where the "absolutistic contrapposto" was copied following the French model. With his model of the regally seated Great Moghul, Dinglinger created a figure which could clearly be distinguished from European—and particularly from French—models, and which offered an alternative to the inflationary formulation of absolute power. For this reason, the well-informed viewer, like Augustus the Strong (who knew the contemporary travel literature), was able to relate to the transformation of Dapper's original figure of the emperor Aurangzeb that lost the status of the absolute in favor of the rank of a minor court officer. The probable intention behind this transcultural displacement was not the conveyance of an

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40 See Schneider 1994, 132–133.
41 See the portraits by Louis de Silvestre, Augustus's favourite painter.
42 Kircher 1987, 71.
43 Cf. the translation concept demonstrated in Michael Falser's essay in this volume. In addition see Forberg 2015, 10–12, and ibid. 2016, 215–216.

alternative model of the absolute monarch (this is why the term translation would be insufficient), but rather the substitution of a symbolic figurehead (including its posture) with the aid of a non-European "authentic" figure (including its posture). In this formal act, which is based on the comparability of the Indian and the European model, or of the Indian original with its European copy, a political *calculatio* dominates.

The degradation of the European absolutist posture in Dinglinger's work had, therefore, a political dimension within this complex system of representation. Therein, the political position of Saxony-Poland is unmistakably determined by symbolic references to its friends—Russia and Denmark—and its enemy, France. The complex structure of overlapping levels of meaning can only be understood with the aid of concrete knowledge about coronation and welcome ceremonies at the courts of Louis XIV and Augustus the Strong, as would have been known to a courtier of that time, and which Dinglinger could quote from contemporary publications.[44] Dinglinger thus emancipated himself from the French model by developing new creative means, again and again, and confronted the French king with outright hostility, as revealed to the insider by the piece's unambiguous symbolism.[45]

Consequently, Dinglinger's masterpiece not only caused astonishment and admiration among its viewers regarding the immeasurable richness of an Oriental sovereign, but, above this, it demonstrated the superiority of Augustus the Strong as absolute monarch. In the first case, it was enough to check the material quality; the second case required a smart composition of representation strategies. Dinglinger's tract points out that the multi-level courtly representation was part of the artistic achievement of its creator.[46] Due to this fact, the figure of the Moghul emperor, until now analytically considered in terms of form and its copying history only, must be included within an investigation that especially considers courtly representation as a means of establishing and legitimizing absolute power.

Courtly representation as part of an art work, or, the idea-related copy

The most important tool of courtly representation was imitation. Based on the fact that France served as a (positive or negative) role model, it is worth learning from studies which deal with the royal representations of Louis XIV in order to grasp Dinglinger's idea of copying the imperial court of the

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44 See Museum of Prints and Drawings, Bureau IX, and countless documents of Saxon festivals from the former *Oberhofmarschallamt* in Dresden, which are now conserved in *Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Archiv des Landesamtes für Denkmalpflege, Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden*, and in the Museum of Prints and Drawings. See Schnitzer 2000, 12–29, and Miksch 2000.
45 See Warncke 1988, 173–176.
46 Cf. Warncke 1988, 180.

Great Moghul. Augustus stored publications on and descriptions of royal ceremonies at Louis' court separately in a cabinet called *Bureau IX*, at the Museum of prints and drawings.[47] He used these as a source of inspiration or imitation for the preparation of his own festivals.[48]

Historians often point to the fact that the absolute monarch in itself does not and cannot exist, but only the ideal of the absolute monarch is possible. We will first ask what the royal portrait, in this case that of Louis XIV, displays against the background of representations of absolute power. For this purpose, we will look to the famous thesis on the portrait of the king by Louis Marin,[49] which he wrote in continuation of the even more famous thesis on the king's two bodies by Ernst Kantorowicz.[50] Kantorowicz had already observed that royal representation as a political means had become highly important at European courts of the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period. His most remarkable achievement was the discovery of the principle of the king's two bodies, which could be illustrated best with funeral rites. Amy Schmitter summarized his thesis in a few words:

> The dead body in the coffin was no longer the King, for death did not dissolve the King into his two bodies, but merely created a corpse, while the substance of the King's body transferred to that of the effigy in an act of political transubstantiation. [...] As long as no living body bears the Dignity, the effigy seemed to display the real presence of the king qua King. Indeed what one saw when one looked even at the living King was not a natural body at all [...], but the Majesty ordained by God appearing externally.[51]

The two bodies of the king consisted consequently of a human (historical) body and a political body. Instead of the king's two bodies in medieval representational systems, the portrait of the absolute monarch, according to Marin, combines three bodies: a physical historical body, a juridico-political body, and a semiotic sacramental body.[52]

This is preceded by establishing that two different levels of meanings are hidden in the phenomenon of representation: first, representation in the sense of medieval effigies, as a substitute of the living; and second, representation in the sense of absolute power that becomes real only in its representation. Consequently, representation is not only an instrument of power, it *is* power.[53]

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47 Heucher 1738, 96 and following pages. See Schnitzer 2000, 26–27.
48 More details in Schnitzer and Hölscher 2000, esp. 146–177.
49 Marin 2005.
50 Kantorowicz 1957.
51 Schmitter 2002, 413.
52 Marin 1988, 14.
53 Marin 1988, 5–6.

This statement needs further explanation. Power, following Marin, is nothing more than the ability to exert an action on something or someone. It is not an action per se, though. The execution of force (power in the most vulgar and general sense), however, is power through elimination, recognizable in the confrontation with another power. The essence of force is absolute. By means of representation, power will be transferred into signs and legitimized by law. Provided that power is the desire for the absolute of all powers, representation is consequently the imaginary satisfaction of this desire and, at the same time, its real deferred satisfaction. On the basis of different examples, Marin traces the transformation of the desire for absolute power into the imaginary absolute of the monarch. In so doing, he meets inevitably with the theme of the Eucharist, simplified in the declaration "This is my body," which was already essential to Kantorowicz's thesis, where he proved the juridical and political model function of the catholic theology of the *Corpus Mysticum* for the theory of kingship. Marin's main source is the logic by Port-Royal that introduces the contiguity between the Eucharist symbols of Christ and the political signs of the monarch (as in "the portrait of Caesar is Caesar" or "the portrait of Louis XIV is Louis XIV"), but only with the intention to trace an insuperable boundary between them. It is this boundary that the desire for absolute power crosses, with the fantastic representation of the absolute monarch. By crossing this boundary, the body of the king would become visible in three senses, as mentioned above: "as sacramental body it is really present in the visual and written currencies, as historical body it is visible as represented, absence becomes presence again in 'image;' as political body it is visible as symbolic fiction signified in its name, right, and law."[54] The sacramental body, which is the portrait of the king as absolute monarch, resolves the tension between the historical and the political body of the king by arranging the complete exchange between the two of them. How can representation be the satisfaction of this highly-desired absolute power? As Marin stated, "The portrait of the king that the king contemplates offers him the icon of the absolute monarch he desires to be, to the point of recognizing and identifying himself through and in it at the very moment when the referent of the portrait absents himself from it. The king is only truly king, that is, monarch, in images."[55]

Marin's thesis becomes clearer in the example of the portrait of Louis XIV by Charles Le Brun, for whose investigation Marin draws on the writings by André Félibien. The selected portrait of Louis XIV does not exist anymore, but only Félibien's description remains.[56] It is actually, according to Marin, not a description of the portrait, but of the "real" king.[57] He uses the same tools as the painter. He codifies the sublime characteristics of the

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54 Marin 1988, 13.
55 Marin 1988, 7–8.
56 Félibien 1671, 85–112.
57 Marin 1988, 208.

king in signs and symbols wherein he locates the mystery of the king. Le Brun added the allegories of abundance, renown, and victory, which Félibien transferred into the sublime features of the king: goodness, majesty, and power. Félibien repeatedly encountered the theme of the copy in his description, which was a depiction of the absolute monarch at the same time. The aim of his depiction was to highlight the inimitability of the king as a logical consequence of his quality as an absolute potentate. The formulation of inimitability can be found in the countless eulogies of different kings and electors in baroque times, which, however, seldom amounted to more than an assertion. In contrast to most contemporary writers, Félibien succeeded in synchronizing the portrait of the king, the representation of the absolute, with the sacramental body of the king and, in consequence, to take it to the same level as the theological discourse on the Eucharist; he praises the real presence of the king's body not in an allegorical, but in a direct sense. Its presence is believed, for it is seen the same way as in the case of Christ. "This is my body" is an absolute statement that has no adequate translation.[58] Nevertheless, Félibien dealt repeatedly with the term "copy" in his description of Le Brun's portrait, obviously without recognizing any contradiction to the postulated inimitability of the king.

Louis XIV, as well as Augustus the Strong and probably the rest of the ambitious kings in Europe, compared themselves preferably with Alexander the Great. In his description of the king, Félibien repeated the well-known anecdote that only Lysipp and Apelles were allowed to portray Alexander the Great, and added afterwards that, however, others were allowed to copy the original portraits that were also just copies of the original or the real king. Marin quotes Félibien as follows: "In this hierarchy of representations the first model, Alexander (in flesh and blood, if I may say so), is effaced as at the other end of the [mimetic] chain the last copies come dense and monumental. Alexander's portrait is only a representation, a reminder in images and tombs of the historic body of the deceased prince; it is only a memory."[59] In order to surpass the boundaries of representation as a memorandum, Félibien recognizes the king as the model of the great heavenly king—as the masterpiece of heavenly power. This comparison is beyond the purpose of legitimating power. He thus marks the picture of the king as the portrait of the absolute and not as the portrait of the royal person as in Alexander's case. "Consequently […], to make the king's portrait, that is, to make a copy of the king's portrait, is not only to reproduce and multiply the links of the mimetic chain but also to celebrate, as officiating priest chosen by Heaven, the ritual of the royal mystery of the transubstantiation of the prince's body."[60]

Hence, the perfect imitation that diminishes the portrait as a replica of the king (as in Alexander's case) was not the ideal of both the court

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58 Cf. Marin 1988, 11 and 209.
59 Marin 1988, 210.
60 Marin 1988, 211.

painter and the chronicler. If resemblance played only a marginal role, how could the king Louis XIV be distinguished? The king could be identified by characteristics and virtues that recur in traditional depictions of antique demigods or, as Félibien described it, by the aid of "that bearing and that size, so great, noble, and at ease, with which the Ancients formed their demigods ..."[61]

Marin asks the most important question at the end: Why was Félibien's description of this portrait necessary, since the king was, more or less, the only recipient of the picture that hung in his cabinet?[62] Marin's crucial conclusion is that the absolute monarch who does not exist in reality exists only by means of his representation. Not until the king and his portrait were juxtaposed did the king reveal himself as absolute monarch. This is what Marin calls the mystery of the transubstantiation of the king's body, or, in his own words: "The king's portrait in its mystery would be this sacramental body that would at once operate the political body of the kingdom in the historical body of the prince and lift the historical body up into the political body."[63] Or, as we read in his introduction, "The portrait of the king [...] offers him the icon of the absolute monarch he desires to be, to the point of recognizing and identifying himself through and in it at the very moment when the referent of the portrait absents himself from it." With the idea of a representation of the ahistorical absolute monarch, the question regarding the original and the copy has become irrelevant and the aim of inimitability has been reached.

The timelessness of the inimitable

This inimitability is exactly what Dinglinger intended to portray with *The Throne of the Great Moghul*. In his letter to Augustus the Strong on the occasion of the presentation of his cabinet piece on 11 October 1707, accompanied with a request for paying the bill, he excuses the costs of the production with the following words:

> The size of the work as mentioned above is all of silver, but the throne with its figures and presents is all of pure gold, adorned with diamonds, emeralds, rubies, and pearls, and made in an artful and delicate manner, enamelled and molten with the most pleasant colours, that, without praising myself, a work of this kind has never been made by an artist and will never be made in the future, since most [of the artists] do not have the capacity to achieve this, but even if there is one, he would have been prevented from taking

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61 Félibien 1671, 102–103 (in Marin 1988, 212).
62 Marin 1988, 212.
63 Marin 1988, 209.

> such a hazard by the great expense and the length of time, so that nothing similar can be found in a gentleman's collection.[64]

Dinglinger's statement is clearly more pragmatic than Félibien's intellectual subtleness, but is also rich in information. Dinglinger highlights the singularity of the work, which encompasses not only the artistic skills of the goldsmith, but also his entrepreneurial ability and his readiness to take a risk. At the same time, he places his work within the representational system at the royal court, when he says that the cabinet piece will not be found in any other royal collection. The so-called *Green Vault* corresponded to former encyclopaedic collections, and it was built up and continually enlarged by Saxon electors from the sixteenth century on.[65] It consisted of *artificialia* as well as of *naturalia*, *scientifica*, and *exotica*, in order to reflect the macrocosm in a micro form. Besides other functions, royal collections of that time had a strong representational character. Diverse objects of Dinglinger's *The Throne of the Great Moghul*, especially the presents, were part of these encyclopaedic collections. The votive hands, for instance, could be found in Athanasius Kircher's museum, whereas the miniature coffee set was a copy of the *Golden Coffee Set* made by none other than Dinglinger himself, which became a fresh member of the Saxon treasury shortly before Dinglinger began working on his new masterpiece. It was also the destiny of *The Throne of the Great Moghul* to become a part of the Saxon treasury. The encyclopaedic collection, as a miniaturist mirror of a macrocosm, underlined the king's goal of universal learning that was a part of the ideal of the absolute ruler.[66] The Kunstkammer had, consequently, a manifest function within the ceremonial court life and was used as a means to demonstrate his absolutist ambition for availability of and control over the country, the people, and their products. The main focus of Dinglinger's cabinet piece was on the courtly feasts and ceremonies in general that existed at the Moghul court, as well as in Saxony.[67] Visiting the Kunstkammer or the treasury was sometimes a part of the welcome ceremony of local and foreign visitors. A lot of details in this work, as seen above, consciously address certain recipients—particularly, Saxon courti-

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64 "Obbeschriebene größe des Wercks ist alles von Silber, der Thron aber mit den Figuren und praesenten alles von klaren Golde, mit Diamant, Schmaragd, Rubin, und Perlen garnisiret, auf das allerartigste und zierlichste verfertiget, mit den angenehmsten coloriten emaillirt und geschmeltzt, daß, ohne unzeitigen und eigen Ruhm zumelden, dergleichen Arbeit noch niehmaln von einen Künstler ist vorgestellet worden, auch nach der Zeit nicht geschehen wird, inmassen viel(e) die capacité nicht haben, solches zu praestiren, wo auch dieses wäre, hindert doch dasselbe der große Verlag und noch mehr die länge der Zeit, sothanen Hazard zu thun, dahero dergleichen Stück in keines großen Herrn Cabinet sich nirgend finden wird."

65 See Kolb, Lupfer, and Roth 2010.

66 Cf. Warncke 1988, 170.

67 Warncke (1988, 170–171) also mentions further important aspects of Dinglinger's cabinet piece as indicative of the dining ceremony or the royal hunt mirroring Augustus the Strong's absolutistic ambitions.

ers, ambassadors, friends, and enemies. The theatrical character of *The Throne of the Great Moghul* corresponds with the court ceremonial.[68] Part of Dinglinger's concept of the representation was the presentation of the cabinet piece to the king by the artist.

Dinglinger's letter to the king would have been inappropriate if he had praised only his own artistic gifts. The fame that touches the artist also belonged to the king, who engaged singular artists and subjects like Dinglinger who created singular works that could not be found in other treasuries. It is the high quality and the unconditional devotion of his subjects which made the monarch unique and powerful—and therefore inimatable. This is what Dinglinger expressed in *The Throne of the Great Moghul*, where the grandees of the empire paid homage to the king with luxurious presents. Dinglinger knew this fact from Olfert Dapper's description of the Moghul court, which repeatedly pointed out that there was no nobility by inheritance in the Moghul empire:

> The *Omrahen* or gentlemen at the court of the Moghul are not children or sons (as one could think) of his house or lineage comparable to France or elsewhere, since every country of the kingdom belongs to the property of the king, consequently, neither dukes nor margraves nor any other house that has its own estate or patrimony can be found [...] All property of the entire kingdom belongs exclusively to the king, so that nobody possesses a foot of estate, unless he wins the king's favour, for this reason they all are focused on him and humbly request his favour and grace. [...] When a gentleman dies, he loses the whole estate to the king again—that what was presented to him by the king as well as what he himself acquired.[69]

This extent of absolute control of his subjects was not possible in Europe, although the French king Louis XIV succeeded in controlling the aristocratic layer by means of its (forced) presence at the court—a level of power that Augustus the Strong, despite endless and expensive efforts, never managed to achieve. Nevertheless, Dinglinger's cabinet piece has to be regarded in this context. The artist's "present" of *The Throne of the Great*

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68 An in-depth study of the theatrical aspects of the cabinet piece can be found in Warncke 2004 and Baader 2013.
69 Dapper 1681, 138 and 146: "Die Omrahen oder Herren am Hofe des Mogols/ sind keine Kinder oder Söhne (wie man etwan denken mögte) von seinem Hause oder Geschlecht / wie in Frankreich oder anderswo/ dann indem alle Länder des Königreichs dem König eigenthümlich zustehen/ so folget daraus/ daß allda keine Herzogen noch Markgrafen/ noch einig ander Geschlecht/ so mit Ländereyen begabet/ oder Vätterliche Erbgüter hat/ gefunden werden. [...] Aller Grund und Boden des ganzen Königreichs gehört dem König eigenthümlich zu/ also daß niemand einen Fußbreit Landes besitzet/ als durch des Königs Gunst und Geschenk/ dannenhero sie alle auf ihn ihr Absehen haben/ und seine Wohlgewogenheit und Gnade demüthigst verlangen. [...] Wann ein Edelmann stirbt/ so verfallen alle seine Güter/ sowohl diejenigen/ die er vom König überkommen/ als die er selbst erworben/ wieder an den König."

Moghul exactly corresponds with the Moghul court ritual as Dinglinger depicted it. That is, nobody was allowed to approach the emperor without a present, as Dapper explained: "This king notices a considerable increase of his wealth and a multiplication of his treasuries through the presents he receives. Because nobody—neither foreigner nor subject—is allowed to appear before the king without any present."[70] Based on this fact, the Moghul emperor had the most splendid court in the entire orient and possessed the biggest treasury.[71] "He has, as it is said, seventeen *Karoras* of pure gold in his treasury, one *Karoras* is equivalent to 1,000 tons of gold, besides his jewels and other treasuries."[72] Therefore, the presentation of the gifts becomes a symbol for the absolute loyalty of the king's subjects and, at the same time, for his wealth. In this game of giving and receiving, the emperor alone decided who had to give and receive what, when, and how much. It was an excellent metaphor of absolute control and power—to such an extent unknown in Europe.

Dinglinger followed his own model of *The Throne of the Great Moghul* and demonstrated his loyalty to the elector-king. Dinglinger, too, was a favorite of Augustus; he acquired wealth and prestige during his services for the king, and possessed a splendid house in Dresden, where even the Tsar preferred to live in during his stay in Dresden, in 1711.[73] Dinglinger's *Golden Coffee Set*, valued at 50,000 thaler, and *The Throne of the Great Moghul*, valued at 60,000 were, as we saw above, not commissioned works, but produced at his own risk and expense, and only offered to the king upon their completion (though for sale). It was not until the artwork was sold that it was—both allegorically and financially—finished, so that the cabinet piece could live up to its promise.

Comparable to the portrait of Louis XIV, Dinglinger did not aim to copy the outward appearance or the historical person of the monarch, but to represent absolute power. While the transubstantiation of King Louis XIV took place at the moment of the juxtaposition of the king and his portrait, it occurred, in the case of Augustus the Strong, in the act of receiving and accepting the cabinet piece by the king following the model of the Moghul court ceremonial. In the moment Augustus accepted Dinglinger's piece, he had become the absolute ruler who enjoyed the absolute loyalty of his subjects, made them rich at will, and received invaluable presents that made him the owner of the richest treasury (at least in Europe). Dinglinger consciously avoided references to the French model and chose the Moghul one.

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70 Dapper 1681, 146: "Dieser König empfindet einen merklichen Wachsthum seines Reichthums/ und Vermehrung seiner Schätze/ durch die ihme gethane Geschenke und Präsenten. Dann niemand/ er sey ein Frembdling oder Unterthan/ darf vor ihm erscheinen/ er bringe dann einig Geschenk mit."
71 Dapper 1681, 142.
72 Dapper 1681, 145: "er hat/ wie man vorgiebt/ in seiner Schatz-kammer am paarem Gelde liegen/ siebenzehen […] Karoras/ einen jeden Karoras auf 1000. Tonnen Goldes gerechnet/auser seinen Juwelen und andern Kostbarkeiten."
73 Eberle 2014, 11.

Conclusion

In consideration of space and time, of the exposition of the art work, and of its ceremonial framework, the figure of the Great Moghul is formally not comprehensible. Dinglinger's idea of the transubstantiation of the king into an absolute monarch, probably inspired by Félibien, would have been meaningless if only the figure of the historical Great Moghul Aurangzeb had served as a model for Augustus the Strong. Instead, his model was not the figure of the Great Moghul, but of the absolute monarch. However, the absolute is inimitable. How did Dinglinger solve the dilemma that is inherent in the imitation of something inimitable? He solved it by means of emulation and elimination.

Dapper's figure of Aurangzeb, with its French absolutistic posture, was simply marginalised and, with it, the possibility of French superiority denied. In the transubstantiation of Augustus the Strong, in the moment he accepted the "present", the satisfaction of his desire for absolute power not only became true, but, in addition, provided a model he could keep in his hands and play with. It was no longer Aurangzeb who dominated the game, but Augustus the Strong. Here we find some similarities to the concept of the Japanese Palace in Dresden, which was introduced by Julia Weber in this volume, where Augustus the Strong eventually sought an open contest with the emperor of China. In both cases, neither the Great Moghul nor the Chinese emperor had been the actual addressee, but it was the subjects in Dinglinger's case and the foreign visitors—ambassadors and potentates of neighboring states—in the case of the Japanese Palace. The difference between both the works is especially apparent in their use of the concept of the copy. Dinglinger's intention was, from the beginning, to emulate the French model with the aid of an Asiatic alternative. In the case of the Meissen Porcelain, it was a chain of prior possibilities for copying that nursed the idea of emulation. Although the object itself did not change, it was its perception and meaning that changed, in the end, due to different assessments regarding the categories of the copy and the fake. Finally, the porcelain gained the status of an original that allowed Augustus the Strong to compete with the Chinese emperor. This is exactly the point where Dinglinger's work differs from the porcelain: Dinglinger never sought an open contest with the Great Moghul, even if Augustus the Strong eventually played with the figure of Aurangzeb. Dinglinger's achievement was his innovative idea to exhibit absolute power and realize it with the help of a ceremonial act. The latter was a single and unrepeatable performance that prevented imitation and thus comparability. We compared this phenomenon, at the beginning of this essay, with the performance of choreography (Schwan).

We have dealt with a formal copy, that is, the copy of Dapper's figure of Aurangzeb, and a copy of an idea. This is the idea of absolute power, which became manifest at the court and in the ceremony of the Great Moghul. Dinglinger used the power of the copy to manipulate the original until it

had been annihilated. Finally, there can only be one original: the absolute monarch, that is Augustus the Strong as absolute monarch, is unique and inimitable. The question of the original and the copy has become irrelevant. As the original can only be an original in the reflection of its copy, the absolute exists beyond the categories of original and copy. This meant, in terms of its main addressees—Augustus the Strong's subjects—that the absolute was the only and legitimized instrument of power that guaranteed social order and wealth (in a way comparable to the necessity of the non-reproducibility of ID-cards and banknotes as analyzed by Schröter in the present volume). The transformation of Augustus the Strong into an absolute monarch is part of the art work, causing it to differ from art objects, due to it being a momentary and unrepeatable act. It extinguishes the historical dimension of the art work, and, as a result, its comparability and the existence of an original and a copy.

Figures

Fig. 1: © bpk | Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden | Jürgen Karpinski.
Fig. 2: © bpk | RMN – Grand Palais | Gérard Blot.
Fig. 3: © bpk | Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden | Jürgen Karpinski.
Fig. 4: Photo: Author.
Fig. 5: © bpk | Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden | Jürgen Karpinski.
Fig. 6: Amsterdam: Jacobum à Meurs, 1667, after p. 78. Photo: Author.
Fig. 7: After Forberg 2015, fig. 106.

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2

HEIDELBERG STUDIES ON TRANSCULTURALITY

This volume offers a fresh perspective on the copy and the practice of copying, two topics that, while the focus of much academic discussion in recent decades, have been underrepresented in the discourse on transculturality. Here, experts from a wide range of academic disciplines present their views on the copy from a transcultural perspective, seeking not to define the copy uniformly, but to reveal its dynamic and transformative power. The copy and the practice of copying are thus presented as constituents of transculturality via thought-provoking contributions on topics spanning time periods from antiquity to the present, and regions from Asia to Europe. In so doing, these contributions aim to create the basis for a novel, interdisciplinary discourse on the copy and its transcultural impact throughout history.