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Abstract In the early 1930s, both coastal and offshore Japanese fisheries in Kamchatka caused strong tensions between Japan and Soviet authorities. Japanese salmon fishery companies then turned their attention to the East Bering Sea near Alaska. The Japanese government operated its experimental salmon fishery in the international waters of Bristol Bay in Alaska in 1936–1937. The operation immediately triggered massive protests from the US side. Even though the Japanese government was seriously concerned about the situation, Japan could not step back easily, as a compromise with the USA would weaken Japan’s position in its negotiations on a new fishery treaty with the USSR. By examining several conflicts concerning the Bering Sea between Japan, the USSR, and the USA, we come to a fuller understanding of the rivalry between Japan and Russia regarding fisheries in Russian Far East waters in the 1930s.

4.1 Introduction

In the first half of the twentieth century, Japanese fisheries began exploring to the north for fishery resources, which caused fierce diplomatic conflicts with Russia and its successor, the USSR, with regard to fisheries, especially in Kamchatka. At the same time, increasing numbers of Japanese salmon fisheries in the Bering Sea caused serious diplomatic problems with the USA in 1936–1937, when the Japanese government operated an experimental salmon fishery in the international waters of Bristol Bay in Alaska.

Earlier studies in Japan discussed the escalation of the conflict in 1937 and its background mainly from the viewpoint of the history of the Japanese fishery industry. However, few studies made use of Japanese diplomatic documents, so how the Japanese government coordinated fishery policies over the issue and how the problem was related to long-lasting conflicts between Russia and Japan remains poorly understood.

The first goal of this study was to clarify how the conflict in Bristol Bay was related to Japanese fisheries in Kamchatka, checking historical facts and showing an outline of the history of Japanese fisheries in Soviet waters. Interestingly, we found that Japanese policymakers justified their salmon fishery in Alaska in 1936 using the same rhetoric that they had applied to Japanese fisheries in Soviet waters. We will also focus on these rhetorical expressions.

The second goal of this study was to determine why the Japanese government started the project in Alaska in 1936 despite expecting strong opposition from the USA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan anticipated that the US would object strongly to Japanese salmon fishery in Bristol Bay before commencement of the project in 1936. In fact, their concerns soon became a reality when some US fishery journals and newspapers on the West Coast published reports on Japanese experimental salmon operations in Alaska and expressed serious concerns in the autumn of 1936. However, the Japanese government continued the project even in 1937, when it confronted the spreading backlash from the US. The project was finally cancelled at the request of the US government at the end of 1937. We will also clarify the historical facts regarding this process.

This conflict in Bristol Bay was not only an issue between the USA and Japan but was also an issue between the USSR and Japan. The government of Japan faced difficulties in diplomatic negotiations with the USSR with regard to their new bilateral fisheries convention. Escalation of the conflict in Bristol Bay between Japan and the USA resulted from Japan’s difficulties in negotiations with the USSR. To have a solid understanding of long-lasting fishery problems between Japan and the USSR, we will focus on the escalating conflict in the East Bering Sea (Fig. 1).

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4.2 Japanese Fisheries in Kamchatka in the First Half of the Twentieth Century

Japan acquired lasting fishery rights on the Russian Far East coast in the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Japanese salmon fisheries began to occupy fishing areas on the coast of Kamchatka, competing with their Russian counterparts after the Russo-Japanese Fisheries Convention of 1907 established fishery procedures based on the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japanese salmon fisheries adopted the latest cannery technology from the USA in the early 1910s and outcompeted their Russian rivals during the height of the Russian Revolution, Civil War, and Allied Intervention in Soviet Russia.\(^2\)

The Soviet local authorities organised annual competitive bidding for on-shore fishing areas in the Soviet Far East every year. Only Soviet and Japanese fishery operators took part in the bidding and could acquire or renew their rights to operate in fishing areas. The Russian authorities originally began this bidding system based on the Russo-Japanese Fisheries Convention of

\(^2\) With regard to how Japanese fisheries developed in Kamchatka, see Kaminaga, *Hokuyō no Tanjō*. See also Robert Kindler’s chapter in the present book.
1907, and their successors, the Soviet authorities, continued this system in the 1920s.\(^3\)

The Russo-Japanese Fishery Convention of 1907 was a de facto concession for Japan. Although the convention only ensured equality of treatment for Japanese and Russian fishery operators, the terms were advantageous for Japanese fishery operators, especially with regard to securing a workforce. The fishery convention allowed subjects of the Japanese Empire to operate fisheries in Russian Far East seas under the same conditions as subjects of the Russian Empire. It was more advantageous for Japanese fishery operators to do their business in Russian Far East seas than their Russian counterparts because Japanese operators could bring their workers from Japan and export their products to Japan at lower cost. Japanese operators could recruit low-wage, skilled, and experienced fishery workers with relatively little effort, and there was constantly strong demand for various fishery products in Japan.\(^4\) It was more difficult for Russian operators to ensure a Russian workforce and materials for fisheries in Kamchatka, which was barely populated and is very far not only from European Russia but also Primorie, the central region of the Russian Far East.

Japanese salmon fisheries in Kamchatka flourished in the early 1920s. They bid successfully for many excellent fishing areas every year and even rejected the bid by Russian authorities under the auspices of Japanese military forces remaining in the Russian Far East in the early 1920s.\(^5\) Although there were no unclaimed fishing areas for newcomers on the coast of Kamchatka, they could not expand their fields further to the north at that time. Operations in far northern areas were not economically viable because it would cost too much to transport workers to the sites and return their products to Japan.

Fishing areas on west and southeast Kamchatka were initially more popular among Japanese fisheries than other areas in Kamchatka. Bidding prices for fishing areas in west Kamchatka were usually higher due to the relatively greater production per fishing area.\(^6\) Later, however, operations in northeast Kamchatka on the Bering Sea rose in importance. The Japanese operated 102

\(^3\) Kaminaga, *Hokuyō no Tanjō*, 83–85. Regarding the operation of the concession system in the 1920s, see also Robert Kindler’s chapter in the present book.

\(^4\) With the decline of fishing in Hokkaido in the 1920s, more and more poor and unskilled peasants in North Japan had worked aboard on Japanese factory ships in Soviet waters and onshore in Kamchatka. See Howell, *Capitalism from Within*, 143–145.

\(^5\) Ogino, *Hokuyō Gyogyō*, again, see also Robert Kindler’s chapter in the present volume.

\(^6\) Nōrinshō, *Hokuyō Gyogyō*, 14–15. Because of the high cost and technical sophistication of refrigeration, diesel engines, and larger ships, overseas fisheries did not develop
fishing areas in Karaginsky district and thirty-two in Olyutorsky district, with a total catch of salmon and other fish amounting to 13,476 tons in 1934.7

Naturally, the freshly created Soviet Union showed reluctance to take over the convention that the Russian Empire had agreed with Japan in 1907. After the Soviet–Japanese Basic Convention of 1925, which established diplomatic ties between the two countries, talks on their new fishery convention proceeded with some difficulty.8 Finally, the Soviet Union and Japan concluded the new Soviet–Japanese Fishery Convention in 1928. They agreed to keep several conditions of the old conventions on the principles of the fishing areas and fishing rights (Article 1 and Article 2, etc.). At the same time, they agreed to make an exception for Soviet state-owned corporations’ and several Japanese companies’ fishing areas in the annual bidding (Final Protocol, Part I), which had become a main point of issue in their negotiations.9

The Soviet leadership worked to gradually eliminate Japan’s influence on Soviet Far East fisheries from early on in the process. For example, as early as 1921, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) planned to conduct the competitive bidding for fishing areas in its Far East Region by the RSFSR and the Far Eastern Republic. Although they did not carry out separate bidding, it was clear that the Soviet leadership intended to decrease the number of Japanese fishery operators, allowing American fishery operators to take part in the bidding.10

In 1927, a year before both countries concluded the new Soviet-Japanese Fishery Convention, the USSR established the large state-owned corporation, Kamchatka Joint-Stock Corporation (AKO: Aktsionernoe Kamchatskoe Obshchestvo). The Soviet leadership organised AKO to develop the Kamchatka region.11 AKO was not merely a fishery company: the Soviet authorities empowered it not only to exploit natural resources, such as fish, fur, and minerals, but to supply food to the local population, provide transportation in its administrative areas, accept domestic immigrants, and improve the

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7 Nōrinshō, Hokuyō Gyogyō, 6, 14.
9 Kaminagā, Hokuyō no Tanjō, 86–87; Chōsho, JACAR, B10070043700 (eleventh–fifty-first pictures).
10 Frolova, “Sovetskaia kontsessionnaia diplomatiia,” 125.
11 Gosudarstvennyi Komitet, Voprosy istorii rybnoi promyshlennosti Kamchatki, 8–10, 12.
livelihood of indigenous people. A Russian historian in Kamchatka, V. Il’ina, wrote that AKO was “Soviet’s answer” to Japan. AKO acquired many fertile fishing areas at good prices in annual bids from 1929 and soon become a threat to Japanese fishery operators.

That year, 1929, was the first year of the first five-year plan and also “the year of the Great Turn” for fisheries in the Soviet Far East. First, Soviet companies bought thirty-six percent of all fishing areas in the annual bidding, compared to fourteen percent in the previous year. Second, the 1929 Soviet investment in fisheries had grown to 18.8 million rubles, compared to 5 million rubles in 1928. Third, the production of fishery products amounted to 40 million rubles (153,000 tons) in 1928, 49.5 million rubles (171,000 tons) in 1929, and 87 million rubles (317,000 tons) in 1930. Of course, AKO contributed a great deal to the rapid growth of this industry. AKO’s annual catch increased by twenty percent in 1929, 182 percent in 1930, 161 percent in 1931, and 298 percent in 1932 compared to 1928. These figures may be exaggerated, but statistics by the Japanese government also confirmed the rapid growth of the production and catch by Soviet companies to some extent.

Soviet fishery companies, including AKO, employed thousands of Japanese workers in Kamchatka until 1930 because of the shortage in labour, but the demand for Japanese workers decreased rapidly, and Soviet seasonal workers were substituted for Japanese ones in the early 1930s. In October 1932, the local party organisation in Kamchatka concluded that there was no need to ensure Japanese blue-collar workers for AKO in the period of the second five-year plan and that, instead, they had shortages of management-level employees and technical workers, that is, Soviet domestic white-collar workers.

On the other hand, Japanese fishery companies faced several difficulties. First, the cost of purchasing fishing areas in annual competitive bidding increased compared to before AKO came into being. AKO had become a

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14 Voronchanin, Iaponiia i SSSR, 62.
15 Ibid. 60.
16 Ibid. 60; Mandrik, Istoriiia rybnoi, 44.
17 Bol’shakov, Rubinskii and Zhurid, Kamchatskaia oblast’, 62.
18 Nōrinshō, Hokuyō Gyogyō, 9.
19 Mandrik, Istoriiia Rybnoi, 50–51.
20 Gosudarstvennyi Komitet, Voprosy istorii rybnoi promyshlennosti Kamchatki, 44; see also Kurmazov, “V kakom napravlenii,” 410.
21 Kamchatskii Okruchnyi Ispolnitel’nyi Komitet, Postanovlenii v plenuma Kamchatskogo, 10.
powerful competitor to Japanese companies in biddings in the early 1930s. It sometimes bought fishing areas operated by Japanese operators for years, benefiting from its deep pockets and the more favourable exchange rate fixed by the Soviet authorities. Second, the Great Depression from 1929 on adversely affected sales of their products, most of which were destined for North America and Europe. Third, they were concerned about the possibility of a decline of pink salmon resources. They found that they had good catches in odd years and poor catches in even years in Kamchatka from 1925 on. Consequently, they were concerned that their long years of overfishing had caused a decline in the population. It is true that Kamchatka pink salmon resources experienced this biennial cycle, but according to recent studies, the beginning of that cycle had nothing to do with the depletion of biomass of pink salmon. Japanese fishery operators at that time, however, took the situation seriously.

To address these difficulties, Japanese fishery companies decided to merge to survive. First, unincorporated enterprises merged with each other into a single incorporated company, and then in 1932, the largest leader, Nichiro Gyogyō, absorbed smaller competitors to strengthen its management bases, avoiding rivalry among Japanese companies and allowing competition with its real rival, AKO. This consolidation of industries was done under the leadership of the Japanese government, which promoted corporate mergers in all areas of industry in Japan to come out of the depression.

The Soviet leadership did not necessarily aim to exclude Japanese operators from Kamchatka thoroughly even in the mid-1930s. Although Stalin and his allies adhered strongly to the Fisheries Convention of 1928 and insisted on the principles of the traditional competitive bidding system which had already favoured AKO then, they were usually willing to make temporary compromises to maintain a stable relationship with Japan. For example, even in November 1936, at the conclusion of the German–Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviet leadership agreed with Maxim Litvinov, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who insisted that they should not suspend negotiations and the conclusion of a new Soviet–Japanese Fishery Convention. According to the protocol of the Politburo of the Communist

22 Nōrinshō, Hokuyō Gyogyō, 6, 14.
24 Kaminaga, Hokuyō no Tanjō, 166–167.
25 Ibid.
26 Adibekov, Wada, and Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv, VKP(b), 73.
Party, they aimed to reinforce the position of soft-liners towards the USSR in the government of Japan, such as the prime minister and foreign minister of Japan at the time, Hirota Kōki.\textsuperscript{27}

In the early 1930s, Japanese fishery companies also approached the problem from another direction: they developed offshore salmon fisheries in the open sea off Kamchatka. Using newly developed effective drift nets, many groups of ships began to catch various kinds of salmon approaching Kamchatka from the outer seas. Some groups of ships came from Japan proper, while others came from the northern Kurils, which at that time belonged to Japan.\textsuperscript{28} Not only Japanese companies but also AKO advanced the development of offshore and open sea fisheries in the period of the second five-year plan.\textsuperscript{29} Even in this respect, AKO and Japanese competitors were in rivalry with each other.

In the mid-1930s, Nichiro even succeeded in absorbing these offshore fisheries with its financial power under the guidance of the Japanese government. Nichiro completed a monopoly on fisheries on and off Kamchatka in Japan and became the only rival of AKO.\textsuperscript{30} In short, bitter rivalry between AKO and Nichiro pushed other Japanese companies out of Kamchatka fisheries. Under these circumstances, the government of Japan had no alternative but to support AKO's only rival, Nichiro. In spite of an increasingly autarchic tendency in the Japanese economy in the mid-1930s, Japanese fisheries at that time were still orientated considerably toward exports to Europe and North America because fishery products were seen as an important source of foreign currency for Japan.\textsuperscript{31}

Of course, some companies did not obey Nichiro and the government's line readily. Some subsidiary companies of other major Japanese fishery companies, e.g., Nippon Suisan and Hayashikane, endeavoured to develop new fisheries in the open Bering Sea: trawl fishery and salmon fishery near Alaska, a new frontier for Japanese fisheries in the mid-1930s.\textsuperscript{32} Several rapid technological innovations also enabled Japanese fishery companies to operate fisheries even in the international waters near Alaska in the Bering Sea at a lower cost than in the late 1920s.

\textsuperscript{27} Adibekov, Wada, and Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv, \textit{VKP(b)}, 180–181.
\textsuperscript{28} Regarding the large business combination of these fishery companies, see Nichiro Gyogyō, \textit{Nichiro Gyogyō Keieishi}, 166.
\textsuperscript{29} Shmidt, “Nauchnoe issledovanie,” 249.
\textsuperscript{30} Kaminaga, \textit{Hokuyō no Tanjō}, 167.
\textsuperscript{31} Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 25.
\textsuperscript{32} Kashiwao, “Hokuyō Gyogyō,” 279; Kataoka and Kameda, “Kisen Trōru Gyogyō,” 52.
The important thing is that Japanese fishery operators regarded both the international waters near Kamchatka and those near Alaska as Japanese “Northern Sea (Hokuyō).” The ideological concept of Japanese “Northern Sea” was an imperialistic view that all undeveloped open seas of the North Pacific were destined to be exploited by Japanese people, a self-acknowledged “seafaring race,” but it was also based on their own convenient interpretation of mare liberum, freedom of the high seas. When Japanese fishery companies developed offshore salmon fisheries in the open sea off Kamchatka in the early 1930s, they justified their operation on the ground of mare liberum. Later, in the mid-1930s, they justified their operation in the international waters near Alaska in the same way as they did in the open sea off Kamchatka.

4.3 To the “North” of the Northern Sea: The High Seas of Alaska

The Manchurian Incident of 1931, in which the Japanese Kwantung Army commenced a military operation without permission from the government of Japan, was a challenge to the multilateral regime based on the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922 and its treaty. Japan’s military operation in Manchuria, however, did not cause irreconcilable damage to US–Japanese relations because Japan claimed that the campaign was a defence of its “traditional” concessions in Manchuria, for which the Western powers showed some understanding. On the other hand, the USA was sensitive to military actions by Japan outside of Manchuria. The US government promptly dispatched the US naval fleet to Shanghai in 1932, when the Shanghai Incident (the January 28 Incident) broke out.

Diplomatically, Japan had several alternatives after it withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 and decided to renounce the Washington Naval Treaty in 1934. Among these alternatives, the foreign minister of Japan in 1933–1937, Hirota Kōki, promoted the plan to make an economic bloc for the Japanese Empire not only in Manchuria but also in the rest of northern China, collaborating closely with his vice minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru. Their

33 As to the ideological concept of Japanese “Northern Sea,” see Kaminaga, *Hokuyo no Tanjō*.
diplomacy did not necessarily mean antagonism against the USA, but it obviously tended to exclude influence of the USA and UK from northern China.\textsuperscript{37} After Hirota resigned as prime-minister-doubling-as-foreign-minister due to the domestic situation in February 1937, the new Japanese foreign minister, Satō Naotake, changed the policy toward China, emphasising a cooperative relationship with the USA and the UK. Specifically, Satō announced a policy of seeking cooperation with the USA and the UK for economic development in northern China.\textsuperscript{38} This change achieved recognition from the US ambassador to Japan, Joseph Clark Grew, and the UK foreign secretary, Robert Anthony Eden.\textsuperscript{39}

These improvements in US–Japan relations, however, were only temporary. With the \textit{Marco Polo Bridge Incident} in July 1937, the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War considerably worsened the feelings of the American people toward Japan. The US government had a negative attitude toward economic sanctions against Japan for a while because domestic public opinion in the USA opposed involvement in armed conflicts abroad, but US–Japan relations progressed from bad to worse.\textsuperscript{40}

In the early 1930s, increasing numbers of Japanese fishery companies made applications to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Japan (MAF) for offshore salmon fishery in the international waters of the Bering Sea. Newly equipped fishery vessels enabled the operations there, farther from Japan than in Kamchatka, to be commercially viable. Both the MAF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) maintained a very cautious stance with regard to this ambitious project and did not permit these companies to operate salmon fisheries in this region.

Japanese entrepreneurs had given attention to the potential of salmon fishery in Alaska even before the Russo-Japanese war and made applications to the Japanese government to open such fisheries.\textsuperscript{41} The government at the time also expected opposition from the US and rejected these petitions, and in 1906, the US Congress passed a bill prohibiting foreign citizens from operating fisheries near the US territorial coast of Alaska.\textsuperscript{42}

In the 1930s, fishery was one of the main industries in Alaska, with salmon fishery being the most important. The total catch of salmon in 1935

\textsuperscript{38} Hosoya, “Shinjuwan,” 132.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B11091798900 (second–fifth pictures).
\textsuperscript{42} Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B11091896000 (seventeenth–twenty-sixth pictures).
was more than 73 million fish, most of which consisted of pink salmon and red salmon.\textsuperscript{43} Most of the salmon were processed by canning. Ninety-nine canneries, including seven floating canneries, were operated in Alaska in 1935. The total pack of canned salmon exceeded 5 million cases, valued at more than 25 million dollars,\textsuperscript{44} and this industry employed 17,529 people.\textsuperscript{45}

Some Japanese fishery companies already had experience with operations in the international waters off Alaska in the early 1930s, with backing from the prevailing regime of freedom of the seas in international waters.\textsuperscript{46} Their fishing vessels, however, did not cause any disputes with the US because they were cod and crab fishing boats, floating crab canneries, and trawlers for fishmeal, with a small total catch. Furthermore, they only caught fish and crabs on the sea floor and did not compete with salmon fisheries, which operated in coastal areas. Most Japanese crab fisheries with floating canneries operated in the international waters near Kamchatka, so only a few vessels ventured close to Alaska.\textsuperscript{47} At this time, the major concern for the Japanese government was to develop effective regulations toward increasing crab fishing vessels in Kamchatka, to conserve crab resources, and to avoid conflicts with Soviet authorities.\textsuperscript{48}

The Japanese government promoted trawling with floating fishmeal factories in the international waters of the Bering Sea.\textsuperscript{49} The first Japanese experimental trawler operated there in 1929.\textsuperscript{50} The Japanese government submitted a bill for promotion of the fishery to the Diet, which passed in August 1932. According to the law, the government granted subsidies of 200,000 yen\textsuperscript{51} to two fishery companies to build trawlers and floating factories in 1932 and granted a 150,000-yen subsidy for operating in Bristol Bay of Alaska in 1933.\textsuperscript{52} One of these companies, Shinko Suisan Co. Inc., began operating in 1933. It achieved solid results in 1934–1937, operating a floating factory with between five and thirteen trawlers. They produced not only fishmeal but also canned crab, canned cod, salted cod, and frozen cod. In 1936, the company partnered

\begin{footnotes}
\item[43] Bureau of Fisheries, \textit{Alaska Fishery}, 24.
\item[44] Ibid., 30.
\item[45] Ibid., 30–31.
\item[46] Smith, “Fisheries,” 71.
\item[49] Ibid., 150–151.
\item[50] Ibid., 150.
\item[51] 200,000 yen was worth about 49,500 dollars in August 1932. See Ōkurashō Rizaikyoku, ed., \textit{Kinyū Jikō Sankōsho}, 44.
\end{footnotes}
with a US fishery company from San Francisco, Union Fish Inc., for help through a Japanese giant general trading company, Mitsubishi Corporation, and began to sell raw fillet cod on site to Union Fish vessels in Bristol Bay.\textsuperscript{53}

Increasing numbers of Japanese fishery companies made applications to the Japanese government for salmon fishery in the international waters of Bristol Bay in Alaska from 1933.\textsuperscript{54} We have no concrete data regarding why such applications increased from 1933, but it was presumably somehow related to the commencement of Japanese floating crab cannery operations there in 1930 and of trawler operations in 1932. We assume that they gradually discovered the tremendous potential for Japanese salmon fisheries in this area.

As mentioned above, the MAF did not allow Japanese fishery companies to operate salmon fisheries on the high seas of Bristol Bay. However, it presented the project to operate an experimental salmon fishery there in 1936. The Diet approved the budget bill in May 1936,\textsuperscript{55} which amounted to 240,000 yen for this three-year project in Bristol Bay. At the same time, on May 24, 1936, the lower house of the Diet adopted a recommendation that the Japanese government should develop a solid policy on “salmon fishery in the Eastern North Pacific.”\textsuperscript{56}

The recommendation was worded vaguely, but it is possible to read between the lines by examining the discussion on it in the Diet: coastal salmon fishery and offshore salmon fishery in Kamchatka have less potential because of excessive competition not only with Soviet companies but also with other Japanese companies. Therefore, the Japanese must exploit “the Eastern North Pacific,” where Japanese trawlers and floating crab canneries have already begun to operate. The international waters are open to everyone. However, the Japanese must choose a careful path because new salmon operations by Japan could generate protests from the US; and so on. “Eastern North Pacific” is an intentionally vague expression representing a paraphrasing of “Bristol Bay of Alaska,” as had been done previously by referring to Soviet Kamchatka waters as Japanese “Northern Sea (Hokuyō).” Thus, Soviet–Japanese fishery issues became involved in US–Japanese fishery issues in Alaska.

\textsuperscript{53} Kaiyō Gyogyō Kyōkai, Hōmpō Kaiyō Gyogyō, 152.
\textsuperscript{54} Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (twentieth–twenty-fifth pictures).
\textsuperscript{55} Teikoku Gikai, Dai 69-kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Honkaigi, no. 10, May 16, 1936, 265. See also Teikoku Gikai, Dai 69-kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Yosan În Dai 5 Bunka, no. 3, May 16, 1936, 1.
\textsuperscript{56} Teikoku Gikai, Dai 69-kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Kengi În Dai 2 Bunka, no. 2, May 19, 1936, 1–4; See also Teikoku Gikai, Dai 69 kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Honkaigi, no. 16, May 24, 1936, 477.
In addition, rhetorical expressions similar to those used by contemporary Japanese people when justifying exploitation of colonial Manchuria were used. The policymakers who submitted the recommendation explained that the fishery was a project of national importance and its purpose was to save poor Japanese fishery workers. This was reminiscent of similar arguments that Manchuria was a national lifeline and that Japan had to exploit Manchurian land with the labour of poor Japanese farmers.

Japanese fishery companies had already justified their operations in Soviet waters, claiming that the “Northern Sea” was a national lifeline for Japan and the Japanese had to exploit its national resources with the labour of poor Japanese fishery workers to save them from poverty.\(^ \text{57} \) The “Northern Sea” was enlarged to encompass Alaska in 1936.

### 4.4 Conflict in Bristol Bay, 1936–1937

The MAF officially launched its research project in Bristol Bay in June 1936 after receiving funding from the national budget. However, the MAF had already begun preparations for the project before the official launch and submitted a detailed plan to the MOFA in April 1936.\(^ \text{58} \) Although the MOFA expressed some concerns,\(^ \text{59} \) it did not stop the project from being carried out.

Two fishing vessels conducted this research voyage. The mother ship belonged to a major Japanese fishery company, Hayashikane, which was one of the predecessors of the current major Japanese food company, Maruha Nichiro Corporation. The fishing ship belonged to a Japanese offshore salmon fishery company, Taiheiyō Gyogyō Corporation, which was a subsidiary company of Nichiro and was also one of the ancestors of Maruha Nichiro.\(^ \text{60} \) These ships left Japan proper in early June 1936. They joined each other near the northern Kuril Islands in the middle of June and left for Alaska.\(^ \text{61} \)

They began their research activities in Bristol Bay at the end of June 1936, investigating the climate and sea currents, operating experimental salmon

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57 The term “lifeline” was on everyone’s lips then in Japan, and the images of the lifeline successfully bound Manchuria to Japan within an organic definition of empire. See Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 95.
58 Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (first picture).
60 Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (fortieth picture).
61 Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (thirty-ninth picture).
fishery with drift nets, and trawling for cod, halibut, and red king crab in the international waters of Bristol Bay from 160° west longitude to the west for more than a month.

The US government obtained information on this research voyage from a Japanese newspaper in late May 1936 and immediately made inquiries to the MOFA through the US embassy in Tokyo on June 3, 1936. On the same day, the MOFA answered that the purpose of the voyage was only to make an investigation. A week later, the MOFA gave the US embassy additional information on this research voyage. The US government accepted these replies and did not raise objections in this instance.\(^{62}\)

As will be described below, the MOFA and the MAF had talks about this matter in April and May 1936. At that time, the MAF explained that this research voyage was nothing more than a conciliatory gesture to Japanese fishery companies, and the MAF would never permit them to operate salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. In response, the MOFA expressed understanding of the MAF’s explanation, stating that this voyage was inappropriate for current US–Japanese relations.\(^{63}\) Thus, the research voyage was put into action.

In spite of the MOFA’s warning, the MAF was convinced that their research vessels would not receive any objections from the US because some Japanese trawlers and floating crab canneries had already operated in Bristol Bay for several years without any major protests.\(^{64}\) According to a report of the Japanese consul in Seattle on September 22, 1936, however, the US fishery journal *Pacific Fisherman* reported that salmon fishery by Japanese vessels in Bristol Bay threatened not only US coastal salmon fishery in Alaska but US national security. In addition, it insisted that the US government should immediately start diplomatic negotiations to force Japan to enforce a continued ban of their salmon operations in Bristol Bay. A similar report arrived in Tokyo from the Japanese consul general in San Francisco on September 1936.\(^{65}\) These Japanese diplomats pointed out that these articles included some exaggerations and may have misled their readers.\(^{66}\) Seemingly, the Japanese research voyage in Bristol Bay had not become such a big issue yet. In fact, a Japanese

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64 Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (second–third pictures).
65 Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (fifty-eighth–fifty-ninth pictures).
66 Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (sixty-first picture).
acting consul in Chicago addressed a telegram to Tokyo stating that “Alaska fishery” had not been recognised as a problem there in late November 1936.\(^{67}\)

However, opposition mounted in the early 1937.\(^{68}\) On March 15, 1937, a Japanese consul general in San Francisco also sent Tokyo a telegram stating that legislators and others in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington had begun talking about countermeasures from late January to early March of 1937.\(^{69}\)

It is likely that a conference triggered the spreading backlash in 1937. In early February, several representatives of the Japanese can-manufacturing industry approached the salmon-canning industry in Seattle with a proposal of a joint American–Japanese exploitation of the Alaska salmon by off-shore fishing and floating canneries. On February 23, 1937, these Japanese representatives had a conference in Seattle to invite opinion from persons concerned in Alaska: several executives of salmon-canning companies in Alaska, agents of the Alaska Fishermen’s Union, and the owner (and publisher) of the fishery journals *Pacific Fisherman* and *Western Canner and Packer* in San Francisco. Naturally, the Japanese businesspersons faced fierce opposition from their guests, and soon after, the conference withdrew their plan.\(^{70}\)

The April issue of *Pacific Fisherman* reported this conference and further details about opposition movements, with the headline “Japanese intention to invade Alaska salmon fisheries is openly declared.”\(^{71}\) According to the journal’s report, a senator from the state of Washington, Homer T. Bone, proposed a resolution to the Senate on March 24, 1937 and asserted that the State Department should immediately begin talks with Japan to stop Japanese fisheries’ “invasion” of Alaska.\(^ {72}\) On the same day, the resolution was resolved that “the Secretary of State is requested to take all necessary steps as quickly as possible to safeguard from aggression by Japanese fishermen, and to secure recognition of the special rights of the United States in the salmon fisheries in Alaskan extraterritorial waters.”\(^ {73}\) In June 1937, a resolution calling for the US jurisdiction over Alaskan salmon in the entire eastern half of the Bering Sea

\(^{67}\) Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208500 (eighteenth picture).


\(^{69}\) Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208900 (fifty-third–fifty-sixth pictures).

\(^{70}\) Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208900 (thirty-eighth–forty-fifth pictures).


\(^{72}\) Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208500 (fourth–fifth pictures).

\(^{73}\) “Congressional Record. 75th Congress, 1st Session,” 2670.
was submitted both to the House and the Senate at the same time. It pressured the US government to take necessary actions, but it was not resolved.\textsuperscript{74}

Nevertheless, the MAF went ahead with this research in Bristol Bay in June 1937. Of course, research in this year also triggered fierce opposition, including a call for a boycott of Japanese goods.\textsuperscript{75} In fact, the Alaska Fishermen’s Association adopted a resolution to boycott Japanese goods on and after November 15 unless all Japanese fishing vessels illegally operating in Bristol Bay were immediately withdrawn.\textsuperscript{76} However, the outbreak of war between Japan and China in July 1937 had already caused the widespread boycotting of Japanese goods by American consumers.\textsuperscript{77} Finally, on November 22, 1937, the US government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government to ask for the implementation of necessary measures. The US government announced that salmon fishery in international waters could block various efforts for protection of salmon resources in Alaska.\textsuperscript{78} In response to the memorandum, the Japanese government decided to cancel the three-year project in December 1937.\textsuperscript{79}

Why did the Japanese government continue the project in the spring of 1937? One reason is that the research was an excuse to continue rejecting fishery companies’ requests. On April 28, 1936, before the project was officially launched, the director of the Fisheries Supervisory Division of the MAF came to the MOFA and stated that the research was merely an excuse to Japanese fishery companies.\textsuperscript{80}

The MAF conducted their project to buy time. This intention on the part of the MAF can be confirmed by another document from the administrative vice minister of foreign affairs to the administrative vice agricultural minister on May 21, 1936, showing that the MOFA understood that the MAF was confronted with a difficult domestic situation.\textsuperscript{81} Of course, the MOFA did not convey these explanations to the US government. The Japanese government officially stated

\textsuperscript{74} Ito, “Contesting Alaskan Salmon,” 189.
\textsuperscript{75} Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests,” 52; Gaimushō, \textit{Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Showa-ki III, Dai 3-kan}, 1780, 1782.
\textsuperscript{80} Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (second–third pictures).
\textsuperscript{81} Senzen-ki Gaimushō Kiroku, JACAR, B09042208400 (thirty-fifth–thirty-eighth pictures).
that it would continue research in Alaska but that it would continue to reject applications from Japanese fishery companies for salmon fisheries in Alaska. Presumably, these statements raised doubts in the US government.

The other and more important reason is that Japan was negotiating with the USSR on their new fishery treaty. Briefly, Japan could not show weakness on fishery issues in international waters to the USSR. As the treaty expired at the end of 1936, Japan and the USSR were negotiating for extension of its validity. Japan operated its fisheries on the shore of Kamchatka under the expired convention of 1928 in 1937.

On December 7, 1937, the minister of foreign affairs, Hirota Kōki, informed the Japanese ambassador in the USSR, Shigemitsu Mamoru, that he was considering when to provide a response to the US government regarding its memorandum for salmon fishery issues in Bristol Bay in November 1937 because “this was a very sensitive period then” over the new Soviet–Japanese Fisheries Convention.82

Hirota also notified Shigemitsu that he would not accept a proposal from the US government to make a multilateral framework treaty on fisheries in the Bering Sea for the time being. Hirota was concerned that the USSR, which did not have a stake in the issue, would take part in the negotiations. Hirota requested that the USA should not make any proposals for fisheries in the Bering Sea to the USSR without prior consultation with Japan.83

Prior to Hirota’s notice, on October 9, 1937, Shigemitsu sent Hirota his opinion that they had no alternative but to maintain their tough stance when negotiating their concessions with the USSR. In this telegram, Shigemitsu wrote that a tough stance toward the USSR meant preparing to operate massive offshore fisheries in Kamchatka.84 Based on relevant diplomatic documents regarding this issue, it seems that the minister shared his thoughts with the ambassador in 1937. It is likely that Japan continued the research in Bristol Bay in 1937 to maintain an unyielding stance on offshore fisheries in international waters at the USSR.

82 Gaimushō, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Showa-ki III, Dai 3-kan, 1790–1791.
83 Ibid., 1791.
84 Ibid., 271–272.
4.5 Conclusion

Both coastal and offshore Japanese fisheries in Kamchatka caused strong conflict with Soviet authorities in the early 1930s. Japanese salmon fishery companies then turned their attention to the East Bering Sea near Alaska, where Japanese trawlers and floating fishmeal factories had already operated. However, the Japanese government did not permit Japanese companies to operate salmon fisheries there because it expected opposition from the US.

The Japanese government announced that it would operate its experimental salmon fishery in international waters of Bristol Bay in Alaska in 1936. However, the project was a conciliatory gesture to the Japanese fishery industry. The project triggered massive protests from the US. The Japanese government was seriously concerned about the situation but could not concede easily and needed to maintain an unyielding stance on offshore fisheries in international waters because it was negotiating a new fishery treaty with the USSR. It continued the project in 1937 and provoked stronger backlash from the US. Finally, the Japanese government decided not to continue the project in the winter of 1937 in response to the US government’s memorandum. The Japanese experimental salmon fishery in Bristol Bay resulted only in bad feelings toward Japan from many people on the West Coast and in Alaska.

The Japanese government had no choice but to maintain a tough stance on fisheries in the international waters of Alaska in 1937 because of its negotiations with the USSR at that time. As is usual with diplomacy, its hardline stance was merely a bluff, and the Japanese government was under increasing pressure not only from the US but also from the USSR as well as Japanese public opinion.

In the mid-1930s, rhetorical expressions justifying Japanese fishery concessions in Soviet Far East waters became prevalent in Japan. Using this rhetoric, Japanese fishery companies and several policymakers repeatedly demanded that their government should hold a firm stance toward the USSR in diplomatic negotiations regarding their fisheries. Their claims seldom faced opposition because the rhetoric evoked public memories of the Russo-Japanese War effectively. Therefore, the government of Japan had reduced options for the negotiations in 1936–1937. Under these conditions, Japan faced strong opposition from the USA regarding the project in Bristol Bay in 1936–1937. However, Japan could not step back easily, as a compromise with the USA would weaken Japan’s position in its negotiations with the USSR.

For the government of Japan in 1936–1937, the fishery conflict with the USA in the East Bering Sea was deeply involved in the long-lasting conflict with the USSR. We can see the whole picture of rivalry between Japan and
Russia regarding fisheries in the Japanese “Northern Sea,” i.e. Russian Far East waters, in the 1930s by examining several problems around the Bering Sea between Japan, the USSR, and the USA.

To see the whole picture of long-term international relations over natural resource development in the North Pacific, it is necessary to understand fishery issues in the Bering Sea of the mid-1930s as a Soviet–Japan–US triangle relationship. Boats went over the waters easily to explore resources, and later governments sought solutions acceptable to all sides. There were already conflicts between the USA, Russia, and Japan regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the North Pacific in the late nineteenth century. Then, American sealers who operated near the Kuril Islands, Kamchatka, and the Aleutian Islands were common threats to Russia and Japan. These conflicts led them to the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911 as a political solution.

After World War II, the USA and Canada contained postwar Japanese pelagic fisheries in the northeast Pacific by means of the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean when Japan recovered its independence in 1952. Similarly, the USSR also restricted Japanese pelagic fisheries in the northwest Pacific with the bilateral fishery convention when they normalised their relations in 1956. These solutions can be traced to their experiences in Kamchatka and Alaska in the 1930s.

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Terms and Abbreviations

AKO: Aktsionernoe Kamchatskoe Obshchestvo (Kamchatka Joint-Stock Corporation).
Diet: Japan’s bicameral legislature (1890–present). It was officially called the Imperial Diet until 1947.
MAF: The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Japan (1925–1943). It held jurisdiction over fisheries at that time.
Marco Polo Bridge Incident: A battle between China’s National Army and the Imperial Japanese Army in July 1936. The full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War is widely considered to begin with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
MOFA: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1869–present).
Nichiro: Nichiro Gyogyo Corporation. It was one of the largest fishery companies in twentieth-century Japan. Its predecessor company was established in 1906 and enjoyed huge success in Kamchatka inshore fisheries in the 1910s.
Shanghai Incident (the January 28 Incident): A battle between China’s National Army and the Imperial Japanese Army in January–March 1932. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, China and Japan signed the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement in May 1932.
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